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Abstract 
The Australian Real Estate Investment Trust (A-REIT) sector is the second 
largest REIT market, by market capitalisation, in the world and an important 
component in the Australian equities market. This importance is expected to 
continue to grow as the superannuation industry (which currently manages over 
$1.6 trillion) responds to the higher dividend distribution demands of an aging 
population (Ratcliffe and Dimovski 2014). Jones Lang LaSalle (2012a) has 
forecasted real estate allocation by superannuation funds to increase to 25% over 
the next decade. For this reason, a better understanding of the features within the 
sector is important. This thesis makes a contribution to the body of knowledge in 
this area with an examination of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) from 1995 to 
2013.  
The market capitalisation of the A-REIT sector increased from over $10 billion 
in 1996 to almost $150 billion in late 2007, prior to the onset of the global 
financial crisis (GFC). Between 1996 and 2007 there was a move by A-REITs to 
engage in merger activity, with approximately 15% of the A-REIT sector 
involved in a M&A, this compares to 2.5% for the overall equities market. 
Despite the high level of M&A activity, there has been limited research into the 
benefits and costs of M&As within the Australian listed real estate sector.  
The overall aim of this dissertation is to identify the underlying motivation(s) 
of M&As within the sector. Anderson et al. (2012) argue that the conclusions 
from prior REIT M&A research have been largely based on the short-term 
announcement period returns in the US market. Therefore, examination of M&As 
across three different phases, within the Australian sector, will add to the existing 
research. First, announcement period abnormal returns for both acquirers and 
 xiv
targets are assessed. Second, the study investigates the firm characteristics that 
have an impact on the probability of a firm being a bidder or target. Finally, the 
long-term post-announcement performance of acquirers is examined. This is the 
first study to examine A-REIT M&As across the three periods to provide an 
improved understanding of the motives for M&As in the Australian real estate 
environment.  
An event study methodology is used to test established hypotheses that have 
been used to explain the outcomes of merger activities. The results of the short-
term event study around the M&A announcement provide support for the synergy 
motive in the Australian market. Both targets and acquirers earn positive and 
significant abnormal returns. Two additional findings in this respect are; scrip as a 
method of payment is a more attractive option when compared with cash and 
M&As may not be driven by the diversification argument.  
The pre-announcement study also finds support for the synergy motive, 
however, there is some evidence suggesting that the inefficient management 
hypothesis is the driver in the pre-M&A phase. Results show that share price 
underperformance increases target likelihood, while A-REIT bidder probability is 
significant and positively influenced by greater share price performance. In 
addition, internally managed A-REITs are more likely to be bidders while target 
probability increases with A-REIT liquidity.  
Outcomes from the long-term post-announcement study show bidders earn 
negative and significant excess returns in the long-term. However, the study 
identifies that the negative excess returns are influenced by the financial crisis. 
Long-term post-M&A abnormal returns that extend into the GFC are negative and 
highly significant. The results suggest that the GFC has caused a structural break 
 xv
in the market for corporate control within the A-REIT sector. The findings of this 
research contribute to improving the understanding of the factors that influence 
A-REIT shareholders wealth, both in the short and long-term.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1Introduction
The market for corporate control should result in more efficient management 
of corporations, an increased mobility of capital, provide protection to non-
controlling corporate investors and a more efficient allocation of resources 
(Manne 1965). Sugiarto (2000) suggests mergers and acquisitions (M&As) play a 
significant role in the business environment and represent an important 
investment strategy for firms.   
M&As are a principal method for firms to gain access to external resources 
and provide growth opportunities for the acquiring firm (Cheng-Wei et al. 2013). 
Whether the goal of the acquisition is increasing market share, improving 
margins, or raising shareholder wealth, growth is critical (Lynch and Lind 2002). 
Caves (1989) argues that M&As are profitable activities because they create 
value. 
Acquisition decisions expend substantial corporate resources and expose 
shareholders to high uncertainty (Ooi et al. 2011). The market for corporate 
control has long been a subject of academic debate, given the level of resources 
and the uncertainty surrounding a M&A. There exists an extensive body of both 
empirical and theoretical research on M&As, with the major focus on whether 
they create or destroy shareholder wealth (Ling and Petrova 2011; Ooi et al. 
2011).  
This thesis examines M&A announcements within the Australian real estate 
sector and more specifically, Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs) 
from 1995 to 2013. The A-REIT sector experienced considerable consolidation 
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during this period, with the recognition that firm size is an important aspect for  
A-REITs (Ratcliffe et al. 2009). The average size of A-REITs increased from 
$307 million in 1995 to $1.88 billion in 2013, a growth rate of over 500%.1 This 
compares to an average size increase of 215% for all companies listed on the 
Australian share market during the same period.2 
The investigation is conducted over three analytical phases. The overall aim of 
this dissertation is to identify the underlying motivation(s) of M&As within the 
sector. Three major motives for M&As have been identified in the literature. 
These are the synergy motive, the hubris hypothesis and the agency motive 
(Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993). The synergy motive suggests M&As result in 
the realisation of some form of economic gain by merging the resources of two 
firms (Sudarsanam et al. 1996). The hubris hypothesis argues management make 
mistakes in evaluating targets and engage in acquisitions even where there is no 
synergy (Roll 1986). The agency motive suggests that M&As occur because 
managers pursue their own self-interest, sometimes at the expense of shareholders 
(Malatesta 1983).  
An examination of M&As across three phases will enable the researcher to 
answer three fundamental questions that will hopefully contribute to a clearer 
understanding of the underlying motive(s). 
 
Question 1. 
What is the impact on shareholder wealth when a M&A is announced in the 
Australian real estate sector and, more specifically A-REITs? 
 
                                                 
1Authors calculation from ASX LMI monthly updates (available at 
http://www.asx.com.au/products/managed-funds/market-update.htm). 
2 Source: http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/australia/market-capitalization-of-listed-companies  
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Question 2. 
Given the impact M&As announcements have on shareholders wealth, what are 
the characteristics of firms that may influence M&A probability? 
   
Question 3. 
Given the answers to questions one and two, what are the long-term impacts for 
shareholders wealth, post the M&A announcement? 
 
To answer the first question, the thesis conducts an event study to measure 
shareholders abnormal returns from twenty days prior to twenty days post the 
announcement. The measurement of shareholder wealth has long been considered 
an appropriate measure of firm performance (Caves 1989). Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008, p. 2152) explains “shareholders are the residual owners of the 
company and a focus on shareholder value yields an efficient evaluation 
criterion”. By examining the short-term wealth effects this research will be able to 
identify if M&As add value to both targets and bidders. The analysis will also 
scrutinize the excess returns for A-REITs. Prior research in this area on 
conventional firms has shown that target shareholders enjoy positive and 
significant gains, while the impact on bidders’ abnormal returns is somewhat 
mixed (Martynova and Renneboog 2008).  
In an attempt to answer Question Two, a logit regression model is employed. 
This model is designed to identify particular firm characteristics that have an 
impact on the likelihood that a firm will be involved in a M&A (Palepu 1986; 
Powell 1997). An investigation of these characteristics will provide an improved 
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understanding of the motivation(s) to enter into a M&A within the Australian 
listed property sector.  
To address Question Three, the thesis measures the long-term post-
announcement performance of bidding firms. The study employs two 
methodologies to examine the long-term wealth effects for shareholders. The first 
is buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) method, described by Barber and 
Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999). The second is based on the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model.  
Figure 1 displays a timeline of how the thesis will approach the examination of 
the M&A process across the three analytical investigations. It is considered that 
investigating the three phases in one study and utilising the same data set, will 
provide a better understanding of the motives.  
 
Figure 1.1: Thesis Study Timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 provides a time-line of the M&A study periods across the three analytical studies of 
this thesis.  
 
1.2MotivationoftheThesis
Prior literature shows that REITs provide liquidity and transparency to 
property investment (Dolvin and Pyles 2009; Newell 2005). The inclusion of 
REITs in an investment portfolio can act as a defensive stock (Glascock et al. 
2000; Newell 2005; Newell and Tan 2003) due to their lower volatility and 
t = -3 yrs 
Pre-announcement 
logistic regression 
study. 
Post-announcement 
performance study. 
t = 0 yrs t = +3 yrs 
Announcement 
returns event 
study. 
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diversification benefits (Ratcliffe and Dimovski 2007). The Australian REIT 
sector is recognised as a world leader in securitised property (Higgins and Ng 
2009) and now comprises an important component of the property market (Parker 
2011).  
 Newell (2008) highlights the importance of property investment to 
superannuation funds. The estimated collective worth of Australia’s 
superannuation industry totals $1.62 trillion as at June 2013 (APRA 2014). 
Superannuation funds have 9.5% of their assets allocated to real estate; this 
includes approximately 2% directly invested in A-REITs (APRA 2014).  
The importance of the A-REIT sector is expected to continue to grow as the 
retirement investment industry responds to the demands of an ageing population. 
Reddy (2013) examined the asset allocation of industry superannuation funds and 
found funds would improve their risk-adjusted returns by increasing their 
investment allocation in property assets to 21%. In addition, a market report by 
Jones Lang LaSalle (2012a) forecasted real estate allocation by superannuation 
funds to increase to 25% over the next decade. 
In Australia, approximately 70% of investment grade property is securitised, of 
which 46% is owned by A-REITs (ACFS 2013). For A-REITs to continue to 
grow, increase market share and improve shareholder returns, they can either re-
develop existing properties, expand into international markets or acquire other 
firms with existing property portfolios.  
However, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, property re-development brings 
with it property development risk. Newell and Steglick (2006) identifies a number 
of risks involved in property development, the major factors cited include; 
environmental risk (e.g. heritage factors) political and approval risks (e.g. zoning, 
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community and government support) and completion risk (e.g. time delays, cost 
increases and unanticipated variations). Newell and Steglick (2006) also highlight 
that listed property firms involved in development have higher levels of share 
price volatility. Furthermore, property development was an area that suffered 
greatly as a result of the financial crisis. Property development revenues fell by 
approximately 35% from 2007 to 2009 in Australia (Thangaraj and Chan 2012).  
While the expansion into international property markets bring diversification 
gains, the strategy also introduces additional political, currency and economic 
risks (Thangaraj and Chan 2012). The move into the international property market 
has not provided the additional returns A-REITs were attempting to achieve, 
given the additional risks. A-REITs with international exposure have 
underperformed domestic focused A-REITs over the ten-year period to December 
2013, with an average annual return of 1.81% compared to 8.42%.3     
Consequently it appears that M&As are the major avenue for A-REITs to 
continue to grow, given the relatively high level of securitisation in Australia. 
MIS (2006) and Ratcliffe et al. (2009) identify M&As as a way for A-REITs to 
increase size, achieve asset growth and diversification thus enabling them to 
improve returns and attract capital. Therefore an understanding of the impacts of 
M&As within the Australian listed property sector is important for investors, 
managers and policy makers.  
1.3ContributionoftheThesis
There has been a vast amount of academic research conducted on M&As, with 
the majority of studies focusing on the impact on shareholder wealth around the 
announcement period (Martynova and Renneboog 2008). Despite this, many of 
                                                 
3 See Chapter 2, Table 2.4. 
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these studies exclude observations from regulated industries, such as REITs, for 
example, Graham et al. (2002); Martynova and Renneboog (2011). Ambrose 
(1990) suggests that regulated industries add a non-market variable, of 
unidentified importance, to the model. Furthermore, research across multiple 
industries may be the driver for the mixed results observed in prior M&A studies 
(Ling and Petrova 2011). Therefore, by focusing this study on the real estate 
sector and more predominantly A-REITs, will provide a clearer understanding of 
the motivation(s) of M&As in this sector (Campbell et al. 2005).  
Although there has been extensive research into the impact on shareholders’ 
wealth from M&A announcements, there has been a limited number of studies 
examining listed property. The vast majority of these studies have been focused 
on announcement period results in the US real estate market.4 To date, only three 
papers have exclusively examined the impact of M&As within the Australian 
REIT sector.5 This is despite the fact that approximately 15% of the A-REIT 
sector was involved in a M&A announcement between 1995 and 2007,6 compared 
to an average of 2.5% for the overall Australian equities market .7 
As discussed above, the aim of this research is to examine M&As across the 
three periods to provide an improved understanding of the motives for M&As in 
the Australian real estate environment. This is the first study to examine the 
impact of M&As across three distinct phases conducted on the Australian listed 
property sector. Anderson et al. (2012 p. 41) argue that the conclusions of prior 
                                                 
4 There have only been approximately 25 prior research papers published focusing solely on 
M&As in the global real estate sector across the three phases of investigation by this thesis. Of 
these, 18 focus wholly on the US market. Chapter 3 discusses, in more detail, the prior literature in 
this area.  
5 The three previous studies have been developed from this dissertation as part of the doctoral 
process. See: Ratcliffe et al. (2009); Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2012a) and Ratcliffe and Dimovski 
(2013).
6 Source: Authors calculation from Datanalysis and Connect4 databases. 
7 Source: Karagiannidis (2010). 
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REIT research in regards to the underlying motivations of M&As “based 
exclusively on the returns around the deal announcement does not enable 
consideration of the fact that there may be other theories that predict the same, or 
at least a very similar return pattern”.  
1.4FindingsoftheThesis
1.4.1AnnouncementPeriodResults
The results of the short-term impacts around the announcement for 
shareholders support the synergy motive. Both targets and acquirers earn positive 
and significant abnormal returns. The study finds payment method for A-REIT 
M&As is in contrast to prior research on conventional firms. Bidders utilising 
scrip and/or a combination of scrip and cash earn higher excess returns, rejecting 
the signalling implications hypothesis proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984). 
Regression modelling results suggest that the synergetic benefits from A-REIT 
M&A announcements have been driven by improved capacity for economies of 
scale. 
1.4.2PreǦAnnouncementPeriodResults
The pre-announcement study also finds support for the synergy motive. 
However, evidence suggests that the inefficient management hypothesis is the 
driver in pre-M&A phase in that, share price underperformance increases A-REIT 
target likelihood. In addition, results show that A-REIT target probability 
increases for firms with high liquidity, but low investment opportunities. A-REIT 
bidder probability is also significantly influenced by share price performance. 
However, in this case, it has a positive impact. More specifically, a one 
percentage point increase in average monthly returns increases bidder likelihood 
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by over 50%. This outcome suggests that bidding A-REITs are in a healthy 
financial position, possibly due to enhanced management or asset performance. 
1.4.3PostǦAnnouncementPeriodResults
Results from the long-term post-announcement study show bidders earn 
negative and significant excess returns in the long-term. This result is consistent 
with prior research on conventional firms (Ang et al. 2008; Bessembinder and 
Zhang 2013). However, further investigation shows that the GFC has had a 
significant impact on post-announcement abnormal returns. Results show that    
A-REIT bidders earn negative and significant excess returns during the crisis 
period, while pre-GFC results display positive and significant abnormal returns, 
supporting the synergy motive.  
1.5StructureoftheThesis
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a 
discussion of the listed property environment in which M&As took place from the 
mid-1990’s in Australia. Chapter 3 reviews the existing literature in relation to the 
three analytical studies. Each of the sections begins with a discussion of the 
general corporate finance literature and then focuses on the studies that have 
examined the listed real estate sector and REITs. Chapter 4 describes and defines 
the methodologies employed in the analysis.  
Chapter 5 addresses the data collection and filtering processes used to identify 
the observations for all three studies. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present the results from 
each investigation. Starting with the short-term announcement period event study, 
followed by the logit regression model results for the pre-announcement period. 
Finally, the long-term post-announcement results are presented and discussed. 
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The final chapter provides the concluding discussions and implications of the 
results, along with a discussion on areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Institutional Background 
2.1Introduction
This chapter aims to clarify the listed real estate environment in which mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) took place from the mid-1990’s in Australia. An 
understanding of this environment may shed more light on the motives for M&As 
in the sector.  
Securitised property investment has grown significantly over the past 20 years 
and the Australian Real Estate Investment Trust (A-REIT) sector now comprises 
an important component of the property market (Parker 2011). Following the 
collapse of the unlisted property trust (UPT) sector in the early 1990’s, the market 
capitalisation of the A-REIT sector has grown from around $10 billion in 1995 to 
over $90 billion in 2013. Securitised property trusts perform a vital capital 
formation role in the real estate market (Allen et al. 2000). This function is 
significant in the Australian sector with the percentage of the listed real estate 
market being amongst the highest in the world, along with the contribution the 
sector makes to the total equity market (Ratcliffe and Dimovski 2007). 
This chapter provides a discussion of the institutional features of A-REITs. 
Commencing with a discussion of the development and drivers of the growth in 
the industry, including comparisons with the international REIT market and the 
regulatory framework for the A-REIT sector. Finally, the chapter provides an 
analysis of the A-REIT sector performance, the risk factors, diversification 
benefits and management structure.  
REITs originated in the US in 1960 when they were authorised by the US 
Congress. This authorisation was designed to achieve two objectives. The first 
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objective was to provide improved liquidity to the real estate market by providing 
developers and owners access to public markets. The second objective for REITs 
was to offer smaller investors the opportunity to invest indirectly in real estate 
(Campbell and Sirmans 2002). 
The development of securitised property investment in Australia provides a 
number of benefits to investors that are not available for direct property 
investment. Direct investment in property initially requires a large capital outlay. 
However, investing indirectly allows an investor to purchase units/shares in the 
entity’s property portfolio enabling investment with a much smaller initial outlay. 
Syndicated property investments also provide investors with exposure to high-
grade commercial property along with diversification opportunities across 
property type and geographical location. Finally, the management of the portfolio 
is handled by professional managers (ACFS 2013; IPF 2008).  
Listed property investments, such as A-REITs, have further benefits over 
unlisted property. They provide greater liquidity to investors via real time pricing 
on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) along with low entry and exit costs. 
A-REITs are subject to Australian and Securities Investments Commission 
(ASIC) disclosure requirements.8 Finally, the dividend yields of A-REITs have 
been historically higher than the Australian share market (IPF 2008). The average 
annual dividend yield for A-REITs since 2000 has been 5.44%, compared to 
4.05% for the S&P/ASX200 (AFR 2014; RBA 2014).  
Alternative investment opportunities via listed indirect property can be 
achieved by investing in Real Estate Management and Development (REMD) 
companies (alternatively known as property companies). Both REITs and REMDs 
                                                 
8 The regulatory structure of A-REITs is discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.1. 
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in Australia are heavily involved in the property markets, however, they are 
fundamentally and significantly different from one another (Cheong et al. 2009). 
REITs have a defined investment policy, investing primarily in income generating 
real estate, while REMDs are not restricted to operating in property development 
and investment, allowing them to diversify into unrelated industries or activities 
(NAREIT 2014). Unlike REMDs, A-REITs are not required to pay company tax, 
however, they are required to distribute 100% of their earnings to shareholders to 
avoid any punitive taxes (Cheong et al. 2009). 
Finally, the financing activities of both REITs and REMDs are significantly 
different. Due to the distribution requirement of REITs, they are reliant on 
external funding to finance their investments, whereas REMDs may rely on 
internally generated funds (Cheong et al. 2009). This reliance on capital markets 
decreases the information asymmetries between shareholders and the managers of 
REITs (Ghosh and Sirmans 2005). 
2.2AǦREITProfile
A-REITs, formally known as Listed Property Trusts (LPTs), have a long 
established history in the Australian equities market. The first A-REIT was listed 
on the ASX in 1971. However, it was not until the collapse of the UPT sector in 
the early 1990’s that A-REITs started to experience substantial sector growth (IPF 
2008). The outcome of the UPT collapse highlighted the importance for liquidity 
in the property investment market, an attribute not found in direct property. In the 
majority of cases, UPTs were ultimately listed on the ASX as the only way for 
investors and the trusts themselves to gain liquidity (Keavney 2010). Table 2.1 
provides a summary timeline of the significant events that have impacted on the 
development of the sector.   
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Table 2.1: Australian REIT Sector Timeline 
Year Event 
1970 A-REITs introduced in Australia, originally called Listed Property Trusts. 
1987-91 Major property market downturn. 
1987 share market collapse saw the collapse of the Unlisted Property Trust sector. 
1991-93 Majority of remaining UPTs listed on ASX.  
Property markets recovered. 
1996 Market cap hits $10b.  
First international A-REIT introduced (Westfield America). 
1998 A-REIT debt-to-total assets ratio hits 40%.  
Market cap reaches $20b. 
2000 Managed Investments Act 1998 introduced to allow self-managed A-REITs.  
M&A activity begins to increase, 10 A-REITs receive M&A offer 
2001 M&A activity continues with 9 M&A announcements made in the year. 
2002 A-REIT index outperforms ASX200 and continues until 2007.  
Increase in levels of international property exposure, mainly in US market.  
2004 Major internalisation of management structures by Westfield, Dexus and Macquarie 
Goodman via merger. 
2005 A-REIT exposure to US property market reaches 29%.  
Sector market cap reaches $100b. 
2006 Debt-to-total assets ratio moves above 50%. 
Expansion of international property focus to Europe and Asia. 
Number of listed A-REITs peaks at 71. 
M&A activity increases with 18 A-REIT announcements in 2005-06 
2007 Sector market cap peaks above $145b. 
M&A activity remains high, 14 A-REITs targeted in a M&A.  
Centro Properties announce earnings revision, the announcement has compounding 
impact on entire A-REIT market.  
A-REIT index falls 30% from Sept 2007 to March 2008. 
2008 ASX change name of sector from LPT to A-REIT to bring into line with the global 
regimes. 
A-REIT sector makes up 12.4% of the global REIT market.  
M&A activity decreases substantially, only 2 announcements made 
2009 A-REIT index falls to lowest level since 2000. 
2010 Westfield Retail Trust established through distribution of $7.3b capital to 
shareholders by Westfield Group. 
2011 A-REITs refocus property exposure to domestic markets.  
International exposure falls to 21% (13% in US). 
M&A activity increases again, 5 A-REITs targeted. 
2012 Number A-REITs listed falls to 47, lowest level since 2001. 
2013 Stapled A-REITs make up 85% of the market cap.  
A-REIT component of global REIT market falls to 8%. 
Table 2.1 provides a timeline of the significant events that have had an impact on the A-REIT 
sector. Source: Authors collection from various sources; ACFS (2013), Dimovski (2009), EPRA 
(2012, 2013), IPF (2008), Keavney (2010), PIR (2013), Tan (2004), Thomson Reuters database, 
Datanalysis database, ASX LMI monthly updates (available at: 
http://www.asx.com.au/products/managed-funds/market-update.htm) and BDO A-REIT surveys 
(available at: http://www.bdo.com.au/resources/surveys/corporate-finance). 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the growth in the number of listed entities and their market 
capitalisation since 1995. Since the events of the UPT sector the A-REIT sector 
has “become more mature, sophisticated, highly successful indirect property 
investment vehicle, with an outstanding track-record and significant commercial 
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property assets, being available to both general investors and institutional 
investors” (IPF 2008, p. 18). Figure 2.1 also shows a steep growth in the market 
capitalisation of the A-REIT sector rising from over $10 billion in 1996 to a high 
of $147 billion in October 2007 prior to the onset of the GFC. The number of    
A-REITs listed also went through a growth period, increasing from 17 in 1992 to 
peak at 71 in 2006. A large amount of this growth was a result of large life 
insurance companies restructuring their balance sheet exposures from direct 
property and repackaging them into A-REITs in an attempt to increase liquidity in 
their property investments (Brenchley 2001).  
During this growth period there was a move by A-REITs to engage in merger 
activity. This activity was a way for A-REITs to increase size, achieve asset 
growth and diversification to enable them to improve returns and attract capital 
(MIS 2006). During the period of 1995 to 2007 there was over 95 M&A 
announcements made, where at least one of the parties was a listed A-REIT.9 This 
equates to an average of 15% of the A-REIT sector over the period, compared to 
an average of 2.5% for the overall Australian equities market.10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Source: Authors calculation from Datanalysis and Connect4 databases. 
10 Source: Karagiannidis (2010). 
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Figure 2.1: The Growth of A-REIT Market Capitalisation and Number of 
Entities 
This figure displays both the market capitalisation of the A-REIT sector in $ billions, depicted by 
the line chart and the number of A-REITs listed on the ASX (shown by the bar graph) as at 
December from 1995 to 2013. Source: Authors computations from ASX LMI monthly updates 
(available at http://www.asx.com.au/products/managed-funds/market-update.htm).  

The GFC had a significant impact on the A-REIT sector with the market 
capitalisation falling 68.7% to $46 billion in February 2009. Since then the        
A-REIT sector has rallied to over $92 billion market capitalisation as at 
December 2013. The number of A-REITs also fell from the 2006 high of 71 to 49 
in December 2013. This was a result of significant consolidation and delisting of    
A-REITs post the GFC (PIR 2013). During the period of 2006 to 2013, over 20 
A-REITs were targeted in a M&A announcement. This period was characterised 
by significant discount to net tangible assets (NTA) for many A-REITs, 
presenting opportunities to target A-REITs at relatively low market values 
(Zochling and Phipson 2011). BDO (2012) identify that NTA discounts 
contributed to the M&A activity during this period.  
Table 2.2 displays the 17 A-REITs that make up the S&P/ASX200 A-REIT 
index, along with their management structure and the number of properties 
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owned, as at December 2013. It can be seen that the top five A-REITs, by market 
capitalisation, are internally managed11 and make up over 60% of the overall 
index. The largest A-REIT in Australia is the Westfield Group, with a market 
capitalisation of over $21 billion and making up almost one quarter of the index.  
Table 2.2: Leading A-REITs by Market Capitalisation  
Name Market Cap (A$ billion) 
Management 
structure 
% S&P/ASX200 
A-REIT Index 
No. of 
Properties 
Westfield Group 21.33 Internal 24.97% 105 
Westfield Retail Trust 8.85 Internal 10.36% 47 
Stockland 8.32 Internal 9.74% 138 
Goodman Group 8.13 Internal 9.52% 43 
Mirvac Group 6.16 Internal 7.21% 66 
CFS Retail Property Trust 
Group 5.85 External 6.85% 30 
GPT group 5.76 Internal 6.74% 68 
Dexus Property Group 4.65 Internal 5.44% 104 
Federation Centres 3.34 Internal 3.91% 40 
Commonwealth Property 
Office Fund 2.92 External 3.42% 26 
Australand Properties 2.23 Internal 2.61% 68 
Investa Office Fund 1.92 Internal 2.25% 93 
BWP Trust 1.37 External 1.60% 71 
Charter Hall Retail REIT 1.30 External 1.52% 91 
Abacus Property 1.15 Internal 1.35% 94 
Charter Hall Group 1.13 Internal 1.32% 104 
Shopping Centres 
Australasia 1.00 Internal 1.17% 56 
Table 2.2 displays the 17 A-REITs that constitute the S&P/ASX200 A-REIT Index as at December 
2013. Management structure, market capitalisation and the number of properties are also presented. 
Source: authors calculations from Datanalysis, SNL database and 
http://www.investing.com/indices/s-p-asx200-a-reit-components. 
 
2.2.1RegulatoryFramework
A property trust (either listed or unlisted) is first established under a Trust 
Deed in accordance with the law of Equity. They are subject to the regulations of 
the Managed Investment Act regulated under Corporations Law (EPRA 2012). 
EPRA (2012) identify the broad requirements for a trust to be considered as a 
Managed Investment Trust (MIT) which include: 
                                                 
11 Section 2.3.3 provides further discussion on the characteristics of internally and externally 
managed A-REITs.  
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x they must be Australian managed and controlled, or the trustee must be an 
Australian resident; 
x 75% or more of the entities interest may not be held by 20 or fewer 
persons; 
x a foreign individual cannot hold 10% or more interest/units in the entity. 
In addition, if a trust applies for listing on the ASX, they are subject to ASX 
listing requirements, which include: 
x continuous disclosure, listed entities are required to immediately notify the 
ASX if there is any information likely to affect the share price; 
x ensuring the issue of new equity complies with ASX regulations; 
x maintenance of share ownership registration.12 
Under Australian tax laws A-REITs have tax transparency and the benefit for 
investors in A-REITs is that the distributions retain their tax attributes. For         
A-REITs to achieve tax transparency they are required to distribute all of their 
taxable income (post-depreciation), at least annually. The tax-deferred component 
of the dividend – generally between 15% and 100% of the total dividend – is 
passed through to investors (ASX 2013). Investors do not pay tax on this portion 
of the dividend until their holding in the trust is sold. This reduces the cost base 
and capital gains are based on the new cost base, which can lead to attractive 
results net of tax (Ellis et al. 2007). Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2012a) identify that 
this regulatory requirement on distribution limits the opportunity for A-REITs to 
finance acquisitions with internally generated funds and therefore may lessen the 
negative impacts of using scrip as a method of payment in a M&A.  
                                                 
12 Source: Australian Securities Exchange, asx.com.au.   
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Other regulations include that:  
x A-REITs are permitted to invest in international properties, with no limit 
to the exposure;  
x A-REITs are not regulated on the level of leverage they employ in their 
capital structure; 
x A-REITs are permitted to have an internal management structure, which 
allows for the A-REIT to invest in property development activities.  
Table 2.3 provides a comparison of operational details of A-REITs and other 
major global REIT regimes. It can be seen that the European and North America 
REIT structures are very similar to Australia; all of which are permitted to invest 
overseas, operate in property development, be internally managed and have no 
government limits on leverage (excluding UK). The Asian REITs are more 
restrictive in their structure. Both Singapore and Japan REITs are excluded from 
internal management and have restrictions on property development. Only 
Australia and Canada are required to distribute 100% of their taxable income in 
the form of dividends to qualify for tax transparency.  
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Table 2.3: Comparison of Global REIT Structures 
  Aust. US France UK  Japan Sing. Canada 
Management 
Internal 
& 
external 
Internal 
& 
external 
Internal 
& 
external 
Internal 
& 
external 
External External 
Internal 
& 
external 
Property 
Investment Flexible 75%+ Flexible 75%+ 75%+ 70%+ 90%+ 
Overseas 
investment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property 
development Yes Yes Yes Yes Restricted 
Max 20% 
assets Yes 
Gearing No limit No limit No limit 
1.25x 
interest 
cover 
test 
No limit 
35% total 
assets; 60% 
total assets if 
credit rating 
No 
Limit 
Distribution 
100% 
taxable 
income 
>90% 
taxable 
income 
>85% 
taxable 
income 
>90% of 
rental 
asset 
income 
>90% 
taxable 
income 
>90% taxable 
income 
100% 
taxable 
income 
Tax 
transparency Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 2.3 provides a comparison of the regulatory structures of REITs globally. Source: EPRA 
(2012), IPF (2008).  
 
2.2.2InternationalREITMarket
Since the introduction of the first REITs in the US there has been a 
considerable growth in the number of countries that now have REIT-type 
structures operating on world stock exchanges. Figure 2.2 shows the breakdown 
of the global REIT market. The US is the largest REIT market, representing 
almost 60% of the global market. The Australian market is the second largest with 
8%, followed by France with 6.33% (EPRA 2013).   
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Figure 2.2: Global REIT Market 
This figure provides a breakdown of the size (by market capitalisation) of the international REIT 
market. Source: EPRA Global REIT Survey (2013) 
The A-REIT sector is recognised as a world leader in securitised property, 
operating in an established regulatory environment providing investors with stable 
governance and liquidity (Higgins and Ng 2009). The A-REIT sector sits third 
behind the US and UK in the Jones Lang LaSalle Global Transparency Index 
(JLL 2012b). The sector is a significant component of domestic financial markets 
accounting for approximately 7% of the market capitalisation on the ASX. 
Approximately 70% of the total commercial grade property in Australia is 
securitised, of which 46% is owned by A-REITs and the remaining 56% is owned 
by private property groups (ACFS 2013).13  

                                                 
13 Private property groups include: unlisted property trusts, property funds and syndicates. 
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2.3AǦREITPerformance
Figure 2.3 provides a comparison between the total returns for the 
S&P/ASX200 and the A-REIT index from January 1995 to December 2013. The 
A-REIT sector delivered strong performance up to 2007 and was the best 
performing asset class for 8 of the 12 years over the period of 1996 to 2007 
(Newell and Peng 2009). In addition, A-REIT risk levels over this period were 
significantly below the share market, reflecting the defensive characteristics of the 
sector (IPF 2008). Figure 2.3 shows that the A-REIT index moved above the 
share market index in early 2002 and continued to show strong performance until 
late 2007. Newell and Peng (2009) indicate that the average annual total return for 
A-REITs over 10 years to September 2007 was 14.67%, compared to 13.46% for 
the Australian share market and 12.18% for direct property.  
 
Figure 2.3: A-REIT Total Return Performance  
 
Figure 2.3 compares the S&P/ASX200 Accumulation Index and the S&P/ASX200 A-REIT 
Accumulation Index from January 1995 to December 2013. For comparison, both indices are set 
to a base value of 100 in January 1995. Source: Authors computations from Thomson Reuters 
database.  
 
In December 2007 there was a dramatic fall in the both the S&P/ASX200 and    
A-REIT indexes as a result of the financial crisis. This break point is consistent 
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with Dimovski (2009) who identifies December 2007 as the trigger point for the 
start of the crisis for Australian REITs. It can be seen that the A-REIT index fell 
more sharply and has continued to remain below the overall share market in terms 
of total returns for the remainder of the study period.  The average one year total 
return for A-REITs to December 2008 was -55.3% (Newell and Peng 2009). 
Doble (2009) points to the divergence of A-REITs away from their core activity 
and their ability to service debt commitments as major reasons why A-REITs 
suffered such large losses during the GFC. In addition, high exposure to offshore 
property using high gearing levels, also contributed to the negative performance 
(PFA 2012).  
The impacts of the GFC continued until March 2009. In Australia, the 
S&P/ASX200 index hit a low of 3,145.50 in early March 2009. The reversal of 
the downward trend was a result of many G20 nations injecting funding into their 
economies. In addition to the economic stimulus announced by the Australian 
government, China also announced a stimulus package that pushed commodity 
prices back to pre-GFC levels (Atkinson 2011).  
Consistent with the overall Australian share market, BDO (2010) observed a 
dramatic fall in A-REIT volatility in 2009 compared to 2008. PCA (2010) suggest 
that the recovery of the sector was due to A-REITs focusing on their core 
business of rental returns and lower risk exposures.  
Panel A of Table 2.4 compares the total returns for the S&P/ASX200 
Accumulation index, REMDs and A-REITs over different time periods ending 
December 2013.14 It can be seen that A-REITs have marginally outperformed the 
Australian share market over the three and five-year periods. However, A-REITs 
                                                 
14 Total weighted average returns were calculated for all A-REITs and REMDs with returns data 
as at December 2013.   
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have severely underperformed over the one and ten-year time frames. The ten-
year period, which incorporates the GFC, indicates A-REITs underperformed the 
ASX by over ten percentage points. The one-year period shows underperformance 
by almost 12 percentage points.  
In comparison to REMDs, A-REITs have underperformed across all time 
periods. This outcome suggests that REMDs were not as adversely affected by the 
GFC (10 year return for REMDs 8.12% compared to 5.17% for A-REITs) and 
have also recovered better than A-REITs post the GFC. Thangaraj and Chan 
(2012) suggest that the impact of the GFC for material suppliers and construction 
companies was minimal due to economic stimulus packages provided by the 
Australian government. There were, however, severe impacts on property 
developers, especially those with high levels of leverage.  
Table 2.4: Weighted Average Annual Total Returns – December 2013 
Panel A 1 year 3 year 5 year 10 year 
A-REITs 2.92% 10.71% 19.12% 5.17% 
S&P/ASX200 Accum 
Index 14.53% 9.69% 17.84% 15.32% 
REMD 20.26% 16.24% 49.25% 8.12% 
Panel B     
Sub-sectors 1 year 3 year 5 year 10 year 
Office 13.65% 19.72% 25.06% 13.94% 
Retail -2.36% 9.24% 11.75% 9.83% 
Industrial 7.04% 16.73% 37.95% -7.52% 
Diversified 7.31% 21.85% 20.42% 0.17% 
Panel C     
Property Exposure 1 year 3 year 5 year 10 year 
Domestic 5.35% 14.68% 15.54% 8.42% 
International 1.91% 18.21% 20.54% 1.81% 
Panel A presents the weighted average total returns for A-REITs in comparison to Australian 
REMDs and the S&P/ASX200 Accumulation index to December 2013. Panel B provides a 
breakdown of the A-REIT returns by the major sub-sectors. Panel C compares the returns of any 
A-REIT with international properties in their portfolio with A-REITs with only domestic 
properties. Source: Authors computations from Datanalysis database and Thomson Reuters 
database.  
 
Panel B of Table 2.4 provides a breakdown of the returns by the major sub-
sectors. The office sector has been the best performing sub-sector for A-REITs 
over the one and ten-year time periods. Diversified A-REITs have only 
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outperformed the other major sub-sectors in the three-year period. Industrial 
focused A-REITs have the worst performance over the ten-year period.15 Panel C 
shows that the portfolio of A-REITs with exposure to international properties 
have underperformed A-REITs with no international exposure over the one and 
ten-year periods. The average ten-year return for A-REITs with domestic 
exposure only was 8.42% compared to 1.81% for A-REITs with international 
exposure.  The impact and level of exposure to international properties for         
A-REITs is discussed further in Section 2.3.2.  
Evaluation of the A-REIT sector performance has shown that A-REITs 
outperformed the overall market over the period of 1995 to 2007. During this 
period the A-REIT sector also experienced significant M&A activity, with 15% of 
the sector involved in a M&A. Ratcliffe et al. (2009) discuss that consolidation 
during this period was one of the few avenues of growth available to A-REITs. 
Mehrez et al. (2012) identify that firms experiencing greater performance have a 
higher probability of being an acquirer in a M&A.  
Post-GFC performance is reversed, with A-REITs severely underperforming 
when compared to the overall market. In addition the sector experienced 
significant discounts to NTA and these factors contributed to the M&A activity 
post the financial crisis (BDO 2012). Palepu (1986) observes a significant 
negative relationship between target probability and share price performance. 
2.3.1Leverage
The purchasing of investment grade property generally requires large capital 
outlays, therefore the use of debt financing can increase investment opportunities 
                                                 
15However it is noted that the ten-year return portfolio only contained one A-REIT with ten years 
of return data (Agricultural Land Trust).
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(ACFS 2013). The use of debt can enhance returns as long as the investment 
returns are greater than the debt costs. However, the overall risk of the investment 
is amplified, along with the volatility of the equity returns. Figure 2.4 shows the 
average debt-to-total assets ratios for all listed A-REITs from 1995 to 2013. There 
is a steady increase in the leverage ratio from 1997 through to the onset of the 
GFC, with the average reaching a high of 57.6% in 2007. IPF (2008) argues that 
this steady increase was due to a low interest rate environment and increased 
exposure to international properties. However, in comparison to US REITs and 
the overall share market, the leverage levels for A-REITs are relatively low (IPF 
2008). Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2007) suggest that structural changes, such as 
increased merger activity, a wider range of property asset classes and a rise in the 
number of internally managed entities, have contributed to the increased levels of 
leverage. 
During and post the GFC, the majority of A-REITs decreased their debt levels 
through recapitalisation and balance sheet restructuring (Newell and Peng 2009). 
Dimovski and O’Neill (2012) identify a significant increase in private equity 
raisings by A-REITs post-December 2007. The outcome is evident in Figure 2.4 
with the average leverage ratio of A-REITs falling almost 20% from its high in 
2007 to 46.8% in 2013.  
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Figure 2.4: Average Leverage Ratio for A-REITs 
 
This figure displays the leverage ratio for A-REITs from 1995 to 2013, calculated as total 
liabilities divided by total assets. Source: Authors computations from Datanalysis database. 


Previous research has found higher levered REITs are more sensitive to macro-
economic factors. Chan et al. (1990) found REITs with higher levels of leverage 
are more sensitive to interest rate risk than moderately levered REITs. Likewise, 
Allen et al. (2000), Chaudhry et al. (2004) and Delcoure and Dickens (2004) all 
provide evidence that the degree of financial leverage and market risk are 
significantly positively related.  
Research into A-REITs by Lee et al. (2008) and Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2007) 
has provided similar results. Lee at al. (2008) found higher levels of leverage have 
a significant positive impact on market risk. Furthermore, leverage levels have a 
strong positive relationship with downside risk. Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2007) 
found increased debt levels resulted in higher market risk. The authors concluded 
that the degree of leverage is an important variable for A-REITs. Jensen (1986) 
argues that highly levered firms make better investments decisions due to low 
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levels of financial slack. It then follows that A-REITs with higher gearing will be 
more prudent in accessing a M&A opportunity. 
Table 2.5 shows the impact of leverage on A-REIT performance, A-REITs are 
classified into three levels of leverage; low, medium and high.16 Total returns are 
measured over a one, three and five year period ending December 2012.17 The 
table shows that lower levered A-REITs have lower standard deviations. The five-
year returns, which include the GFC, show that higher levered A-REITs had the 
worst performance. Consistent with Newell and Peng (2009), this analysis 
displays the effectiveness of low leverage during the GFC. These outcomes 
support the claim by Lee at al. (2008) that higher gearing ratios have a strong 
impact on downside risk.  
Table 2.5: Impact of Leverage on A-REIT Performance 
 Average yearly total return  
Leverage level 1 year 3 years 5 years St.Dev (5 yr) 
Low 24.76% 11.31% -5.46% 10.89% 
Medium 33.14% 13.26% -9.81% 16.27% 
High 35.95% 4.36% -22.90% 18.85% 
Table 2.5 shows the average yearly total return for A-REITs ending December 2012 when 
classified into low, medium and high leverage levels. Source: Authors computation from 
Datanalysis database. 
2.3.2DiversificationIssues
Investment in A-REITs exposes investors to investment grade properties 
across the various commercial property markets. Figure 2.5 provides a breakdown 
of the A-REIT sector portfolio by property type. Retail is the largest property type 
(59.88%) invested in by A-REITs, with office second at almost 23%. Industrial 
property and logistic centres are the third largest at 8.45% followed by residential 
and development (7%). The profile of property type allocation has remained 
                                                 
16 A-REITs were ranked from lowest to highest levels of financial leverage. The data set was then 
split into three even groups. The groups were then categorised into low, median and high leverage 
sets. 
17 The decision to use December 2012 as the cut-off date for returns was specifically selected to 
capture the impact of the GFC from December 2007 in the five year returns data.  
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steady across the three major areas (office, retail and industrial/logistic) over the 
last decade. The greatest amount of growth has occurred in the residential and 
development area (ACFS 2013). This result is consistent with the claims that     
A-REITs have increased their exposure to property development risk (IPF 2008). 
ACFS (2013) note that due to the large majority of the investment grade property 
already securitised the growth opportunities for A-REITs are limited.  
Figure 2.5: A-REIT Diversification by Property Type 
Figure 2.5 displays the composition of property type invested in by A-REITs as reported in the A-
REITs latest report up to December 2013. Source: Authors compilation from Datanalysis 
database. 
Figure 2.6 shows the breakdown of property investment by geographical 
region. It can be seen that NSW and Victoria are the two major property markets 
for A-REITs, making up over 55% of the total property investments.18 A-REITs 
have almost 80% of their investment in Australian property. The high level of 
securitisation of Australian property has resulted in A-REITs adding international 
properties to their portfolios to increase growth and improve diversification 
benefits (IPF 2008). According to BDO (2012), A-REITs have focused their 
                                                 
18 NSW and Victoria are also the two most heavily populated states in Australia. 
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international expansion on the US market, with approximately 11% of A-REIT 
property investment now located in the US.  
Figure 2.6: A-REIT Diversification by Geographical Region  
 
Figure 2.6 displays the geographical diversification of property investment by A-REITs as 
reported in the A-REITs latest report up to December 2013. Source: Authors compilation from 
Datanalysis database. 
 
However, this exposure to international markets has fallen since the onset of 
the GFC. Prior to the GFC, A-REITs had over 35% of their assets located 
internationally, 25% located in the US property market (BDO 2008). This decline 
in the proportion of international assets was a reflection of a restructuring by      
A-REITs post-GFC to focus on their core activities and Australian properties to 
improve performance (BDO 2012).  This change in international exposure is 
evident in Figure 2.7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACT/NT (2.68%)
NSW (37.12%)
VIC (18.55%)
TAS (0.31%)
QLD (13.56%)
WA (4.84%)
SA (2.63%)
New Zealand (2.04%)
Japan (1.51%)
Europe (5.59%)
USA (10.81%)
Other Asia (0.33%)
 
 
31
Figure 2.7: A-REIT International Property Exposure (2005-2013) 
 
Figure 2.7 provides the breakdown of global asset exposure by A-REITs from 2005 to 2013. 
Source: Authors computations from various BDO reports (available from: 
http://www.bdo.com.au/resources/surveys/corporate-finance).   
 
 
The motivation of A-REITs to focus their investments locally is supported by 
the findings of Newell and Peng (2009) who showed the one year performance to 
November 2008 of A-REITs with no international property exposure significantly 
outperformed A-REITs with international exposure. This outcome is further 
supported by the findings in Table 2.4. Domestic only A-REITs earning average 
annual total returns of 8.42% over the ten-year period, compared to 1.81% for   
A-REITs with international properties.  
Allen and Sirmans (1987) and Campbell et al. (2001) observe that acquiring 
REITs experience lower shareholder excess returns when a M&A results in 
increased geographical diversification. This outcome suggests that managerial 
focus may become disjointed when the property assets are widely spread apart 
(Campbell et al. 2001).  
 Pike and Neale (2006) argue that firm level diversification is perhaps an 
inadequate strategy to reduce risk because companies are attempting to 
accomplish something that shareholders can do themselves and possibly more 
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efficiently. Ibbotson (2006) highlights the inclusion of REITs in a securities 
portfolio provides individual investors with diversification benefits. Research has 
provided evidence of low correlations between movements in the overall equities 
markets and REITs (Glascock et al. 2000; Gyourko and Keim 1992; Newell 
2005). 
Table 2.6 shows the correlation matrix across the major asset classes from June 
2008 to December 2013. A-REITs are positively correlated with all asset classes; 
the highest correlation is with the equities market (0.64). This reflects some 
degree of portfolio diversification for investors. Direct property and A-REITs 
have a low, positive, correlation of 0.12. This result is comparable to PFA (2012) 
who found direct property and A-REITs have a correlation of 0.16 over five years 
to March 2012. This outcome shows that investors can also achieve 
diversification benefits from a combination of direct and indirect property 
investment.  
Table 2.6: Inter-Asset Correlation Matrix (2008-2013) 
A-REITs S&P/ASX Fixed Interest 
S&P/ASX
200 
Direct 
property 
A-REITs 1 
S&P/ASX Fixed Interest 0.011 1 
S&P/ASX200 0.639 -0.018 1 
Direct property 0.117 0.211 -0.179 1 
Table 2.6 presents the correlation matrix between A-REITs, direct property, Australian share 
market and fixed interest. Source: Authors computation from IPD/PCA composite index and S&P 
Indices. 
 
2.3.3ManagementStructure
Another issue impacting the performance is management structure. The 
management structure of an A-REIT can be classified into two categories: 
internally and externally managed. An internally managed (or stapled) REIT 
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occurs where two or more securities are related and trade through one security.19 
The REIT entity usually holds the passive property assets while non-passive 
activities, such as property management and development are conducted by the 
management company. An externally managed REIT is one that outsources the 
management of their assets to a separate company (Ratcliffe et al. 2009).  
As displayed in Table 2.2, the five largest A-REITs are internally managed. In 
addition, stapled A-REITs account for almost 85% of the A-REIT market 
capitalisation (ASX 2014), compared to 33% in 2003 (Tan 2004). The driver for 
A-REITs to become internally managed was the Managed Investments Act 1998 
which allowed for the introduction of a single Responsible Entity role post-June 
2000 (Dimovski 2010). This Act meant that A-REITs were no longer required to 
engage both a Manager and a Trustee. The “removal of the trustee safeguard was 
an important institutional event” (Dimovski 2010, p. 40). Following this 
legislation the market experienced a number of internalisations by A-REITs via 
M&As. Three of the largest stapling’s occurred in 2004 when Westfield, Dexus 
and Macquarie Goodman were all formed via merging of the trusts and 
management companies.  
 Capozza and Seguin (2000) examined the performance of externally and 
internally managed US REITs. The authors found that “externally managed 
REITs under-perform and are priced at a discount relative to their internally 
managed counterparts” (Capozza and Seguin 2000, p. 92). The authors extended 
their investigation to identify whether externally managed REITs have greater 
risk due to financial or business risk. The results suggested that externally 
                                                 
19 This means that the units in the REIT and shares in the company cannot be sold separately. 
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managed REITs pay interest rates on debt that are approximately 3% higher than 
their stapled counterparts.  
Investigation into the performance of A-REITs via management type by Tan 
(2004) showed that internally managed A-REITs outperformed their externally 
managed counterparts by 2.33% on a risk-adjusted basis over the period of 1997 
to 2003. In addition, industry surveys show that internal A-REIT managers 
consider the opportunity to be involved in property development as an effective 
growth strategy to enhance returns (Norris 2004; Tan 2004). 
However, more recently the trend appears to have reversed. Newell and Peng 
(2009) show that externally managed A-REITs have outperformed the internal 
management structure over the three-year period to November 2008 and at a 
significantly lower risk level. The average annual total return for externally 
managed A-REITs was 6.1% compared to -33.5% for stapled A-REITs. 
Furthermore, the risk level for external A-REITs was 18.2% compared to 44.3%.  
Table 2.7 provides a comparison of the weighted average total returns to 
December 2013 by management structure. Consistent with Newell and Peng 
(2009), it can be seen that externally managed A-REITs outperform stapled       
A-REITs across the one, three and ten-year time periods. The ten-year returns for 
external A-REITs are over five percentage points higher than the internal           
A-REITs (8.78% v 3.38%). Furthermore, the standard deviation of the ten-year 
returns is lower for externally managed A-REITs.  
Table 2.7: Weighted Average Annual Total Returns by Management 
Structure – December 2013 
 1 year 3 year 5 year 10 year St.Dev. (10 year) 
Internal 
management 1.99% 14.04% 19.23% 3.38% 18.41% 
External 
management 8.07% 26.38% 18.58% 8.78% 7.55% 
Table 2.7 presents the weighted average total returns for A-REITs by management structure to 
December 2013. Source: Authors computations from Datanalysis database. 
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PFA (2012) and Thangaraj and Chan (2012) suggest that this 
underperformance is largely due to stapled A-REITs exposure to riskier activities 
such as property development and international property markets during the GFC. 
Packer and Riddiough (2012) argue that externally managed REITs may be 
viewed as more transparent than stapled REITs by the capital markets and the 
benefits of external management may outweigh the agency costs that the internal 
structure was designed to eliminate/reduce. 
2.4Conclusion
The A-REIT sector comprises an important component of the Australian 
property market. A-REITs experienced substantial growth from 1995 to 2007, 
with the market capitalisation increasing from around $10 billion to a high of 
$147 billion in 2007. This growth was largely due to an increase in demand for 
liquidity by both institutional and general investors. However, due to the high 
level of Australia’s commercial property market being securitised, A-REITs could 
redevelop their properties, look to acquirer international assets or enter into a 
M&A to maintain growth and increase market share.  
The onset of the GFC resulted in severe under-performance by the sector.          
A-REITs entered a period of balance sheet restructuring to reduce leverage levels, 
with many A-REITs selling off international properties to focus on their core 
activities domestically. The sector experienced significant consolidation, with 
over 20 A-REITs targeted in a M&A announcement. The large discount to NTA 
for many A-REITs is attributed to the M&A activity over this period.  
This chapter has examined the institutional background of the Australian real 
estate sector and more specifically A-REITs. It appears that for A-REITs to 
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continue to grow, increase market share and possibly improve shareholder returns 
is via M&As, given the relatively high level of securitisation in Australia. 
Property re-development brings property development risk, which was an area 
that was greatly impacted during the GFC. International exposure has shown not 
to provide the additional returns, given the increased risk, which A-REITs were 
looking to achieve.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review  
3.1Introduction
The focus of this study is to investigate the motives for mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) within the Australian real estate sector.20 Andrade et al. 
(2001) cite a number of motivations for why M&As may occur, and these 
include: efficiency-related, market power, market discipline, agency theories and 
diversification.  Efficiency-related mergers can lead to economies of scale or 
other synergistic benefits. The formation of monopolies or oligopolies may 
provide the motivation for mergers to improve market power. Market discipline 
motives can stem from the removal of incompetent management. Agency theories 
suggest the self-serving motivations of acquiring management to over-expand. 
Finally, diversification motives may include the managing of risk for 
undiversified managers. The first part of this chapter examines these motives. 
 Jensen and Ruback (1983 p. 6) identify the M&A market, or market for 
corporate control, “as a market in which alternative managerial teams compete for 
the rights to manage corporate resources”. It is this competition that serves to 
limit managerial departures from the maximisation of the owners (shareholders) 
wealth. Manne’s (1965) seminal paper on the market for corporate control 
identifies that M&As provide some guarantee of effective competition between 
managers and thus protect the interests of non-controlling shareholders. Manne 
(1965) concludes that M&As provide for efficient management of companies, 
protection of non-controlling investors, improved mobility of capital and an 
efficient allocation of scarce resources.  
                                                 
20 The terms ‘merger’, ‘acquisition’ and ‘takeover’ are assumed to be similar in meaning and are 
used interchangeably throughout this thesis (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993; Jarrell et al. 1988). 
 
 
38
This study aims to empirically examine the conclusions of Manne (1965) 
within the Australian real estate sector. The focus of the examination in this 
chapter is to evaluate the prior literature over the three periods of the M&A 
pathway. First, the research around announcement period returns for both targets 
and bidders is examined. Second, the study identifies the possible firm 
characteristics that may have an impact on the likelihood of a firm being a target 
or bidder that has been presented in the literature. Finally, the focus turns to the 
long-term impacts on the acquirers shareholders post the M&A announcement. It 
is recognised that there has been a vast amount of literature in the M&A area 
across conventional firms and a brief description of the main findings is 
discussed. However, this study focuses the majority of the discussion on research 
that is directly relevant to the real estate sector and, more specifically, Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs).  
3.2RationaleforMergersandAcquisitions
In discussing the theoretical framework that provides a rationale for M&As, 
the following section will provide an overview of the motives. Three major 
motives for M&As have been identified in the literature. These are the synergy 
motive, the hubris hypothesis and the agency motive (Berkovitch and Narayanan 
1993).  
3.2.1SynergyMotive(valuemaximisingtheory)
The synergy motive (or value maximising theory) originates in economic 
theory (Manne 1965) and suggests that the managers of a firm have a primary 
goal of maximising shareholders wealth. Given this theory, the synergy motive 
suggests takeovers result in the realisation of economic gains with the merging of 
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the resources of two firms. It assumes that managers of both targets and bidders 
would only engage in a takeover if it results in gains to both sets of shareholders.  
 Sudarsanam et al. (1996) discuss three sources of value creation. Financial 
synergy, operational synergy and managerial synergy. Financial synergies can be 
achieved through increased debt capacity and the tax advantages that come with 
it, improved capital redeployment and stabilised earnings. Sudarsanam et al. 
(1996) argue that if one of the merging firms has unused debt capacity while the 
other is operating at the optimal leverage level, the tax advantage of debt provides 
financial synergy to both firms. In addition, Leland (2007) suggests if the M&A 
improves the optimal capital structure of the bidder, financial synergies can be 
created.  
The operational synergy is achieved via overlapping of business activities. 
These synergies may result from economies of scale, improved production 
techniques, increased market power or combining complementary resources 
(Bradley et al. 1983; Seth 1990; Singh and Montgomery 1987). The management 
synergy, commonly referred to in the literature as the inefficient management 
hypothesis, occurs when competent management teams acquire firms with 
underperforming management (Sudarsanam et al. 1996). Anderson et al. (2012, p. 
40) further argue “firms with superior management acquire other firms that 
possess unexploited opportunities to cut costs and increase earnings”. Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) propose that the market for corporate control is driven by 
alternative management teams competing for the rights to control corporate 
assets.  
If the objective of synergistic gains cannot be achieved, managers should not 
proceed with the merger proposal or reject the merger offer. The ability to 
 
 
40
identify a good M&A target is essential (Powell 1997). It then follows that if the 
takeover is motivated by synergy, total gain and the gains to both targets and 
bidders will be positive. Bradley et al. (1988, p. 13) state that successful M&As 
“generate significant synergistic gains and lead to a more efficient allocation of 
corporate resources”.  
3.2.2HubrisMotive
The hubris hypothesis argues management make mistakes in evaluating targets 
and engage in acquisitions even where there is no synergy. Roll (1986, p. 201) 
contends that the hubris hypothesis suggests “that the average increase in the 
target firm’s market value should then be more than offset by the average 
decrease in the value of the bidding firm”. Thus the total combined M&A gain to 
shareholders is non-positive. If positive total gains are observed, Roll (1986) 
explains that this result is due to true synergies existing in a takeover. However, 
management may still make errors in valuation. A number of studies show a 
decline in bidding firm value following the announcement of a takeover. For 
example, Dodd (1980) provides evidence of statistically significant negative 
excess returns for bidding firms following the announcement of a takeover offer.  
Kiymaz and Baker (2008) provide further support of post announcement negative 
returns of -1.29% over the event window [+1,+30].  
3.2.3AgencyMotive
The agency motive suggests that M&As occur because managers pursue their 
own self-interest, sometimes at the expense of shareholders (e.g. Malatesta 1983; 
Penrose 1959; Williamson 1964). Morck et al. (1990) suggest that the agency 
motive is driven by three different factors: poor performance of acquiring firm 
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managers before the takeover, acquisition of rapidly growing targets and firm 
diversification. Other drivers of the agency motive include the use of free cash 
flow to increase the size of the acquiring firm (Jensen 1986) and acquisition of a 
target firm’s assets that result in an increase in the acquiring firm’s dependence on 
management (Shleifer and Vishny 1989).  
 Lewellen et al. (1985) find excess returns for acquiring firms are positively 
related to the amount of shares held by senior management of the acquiring firm 
prior to the announcement. The authors argue that senior management with high 
levels of equity ownership in their firm are more prudent in accessing a M&A 
opportunity and the resultant impact on the share price. Therefore they “should 
less frequently put their firms through shareholder-wealth-decreasing acquisitions 
than managers whose equity stakes in their companies are small” (Lewellen et al. 
1985, p. 216).  
 Lang et al. (1989) show that bidder excess returns are positively related to the 
quality of acquirer management. Lang et al. (1989) conclude that the market, as 
measured by abnormal returns, rewards well-managed firms when they target 
poorly managed firms. However, the market penalises poorly managed firms 
when they target well-managed firms. Malmendier and Tate (2008) suggest that 
overconfident CEOs over-estimate their ability to generate returns and therefore 
overpay for a target resulting in value-destroying acquisitions. The authors find 
that these effects are more apparent when the firm has access to internal 
financing. Finally, Henry (2005) argues that target firm directors may also be 
motivated by agency issues. The author suggests that target directors are more 
likely to accept a takeover offer when they have large personal shareholdings. 
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To help distinguish between the different motives for M&As, Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993) developed a correlation technique. If the acquisition was driven 
by synergy, the gains would be split between both parties. In this case, there 
would be positive correlation between the values of the target and bidder gains. In 
considering the hubris motive, the authors argue that bidding managers only 
engage in a merger when they overestimate the synergy benefits. Since synergy is 
presumed to be zero, the payment to the target is simply a transfer of wealth 
between the target and the bidder. Therefore, the higher the target gain, the lower 
the bidder gain resulting in a total gain of zero. It follows that target and bidder 
gains are negatively correlated, but target and total gains are uncorrelated.  
Finally, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) posit that the impact on the gains 
following an agency motivated M&A results in bidder gains being negative while 
targets enjoy positive gains. However, the value of the negative bidder gains 
would be greater than the targets gain resulting in a negative total gain. 
Furthermore, the more severe the agency problem, the greater the target gain.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: first, the literature 
surrounding the impact on shareholder value (namely abnormal returns) around a 
M&A announcement is examined; second, the thesis analyses the literature on the 
firm characteristics that may influence the likelihood of a firm being a bidder or a 
target; finally, the long-term post-announcement impact on shareholder value for 
acquiring firms is presented.  
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3.3AnnouncementPeriodReturns
3.3.1Introduction
Manne (1965) suggests that the impact on share prices is dependent on the 
motive for the merger or acquisition. If the motive is for control, the acquiring 
company will pay a premium for the control opportunity, resulting in the 
exchange ratio favouring the target company. However, if the M&A is motivated 
by synergy, the share prices of both corporations should increase upon 
announcement. Prior empirical research has shown that in the overwhelming 
majority of M&A announcements, the target firm enjoys positive and significant 
excess returns. However, the impact on acquirer returns is somewhat mixed; some 
earn small positive abnormal returns while others suffer small losses (Jarrell et al. 
1988; Jensen and Ruback 1983; Kiymaz and Baker 2008; Martynova and 
Renneboog 2008).  
3.3.2InternationalEvidence
Investigations into the wealth effects around a M&A announcement have been 
dominated by event study methodology. The method was developed by Fama et 
al. (1969) who investigated the wealth effects of share splits. Halpern (1973) and 
Mandelker (1974) were among the first researchers to employ event study 
methodology and report the wealth effects for both acquirers and targets. Both 
studies found positive total excess returns around an announcement, with the 
large majority of the gain awarded to the target.  
Later studies continued to find similar results, for example, Dodd and Ruback 
(1977) investigated takeover announcements in the US from 1958 to 1978. The 
study found targets earn positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns 
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(CARs) of +20.89% around the announcement period. Meanwhile, acquiring 
firms earn positive and significant CARs of +2.83%. At the same time, Franks et 
al. (1977) published their study of 70 UK Brewery and Distillery mergers from 
1955 to 1972 and produced similar results.  
A brief summary of results from international general corporate finance studies 
is presented in Table 3.1.21 When prior literature is investigated a common trend 
is evident. Positive and significant CARs for targets and a mixture of 
positive/negative and significant/non-significant for acquirers occurs. Results for 
targets over the three-day event window range from +22.51% reported by Graham 
et al. (2002) in their US study to +12.47% for the UK and European study by 
Martynova and Renneboog (2011).22 Interestingly, it is observed that all results 
for target CARs are significant.   
                                                 
21Table 3.1 is designed to provide a broad snapshot of the results from prior studies, it is not an 
exhaustive list. Furthermore, it only presents studies that employed the market model for 
calculation of announcement returns, this enables us to draw some comparisons with the 
modelling results.  
22 This author accepts that a number of studies cited here may or may not include REITs in their 
data samples. Some do not specifically state if they include or exclude REITs (for example, 
Kiymaz and Baker 2008; Dodd and Ruback 1977). While others identify that they remove firms 
that are classified as Financial Services Firms, which includes REITs (for example, Graham et al. 
2002; Martynova and Renneboog 2011). The aim of the international and Australian general 
corporate finance discussion here is to paint an overall picture of the M&A literature landscape. 
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Table 3.1: Announcement Period Literature – International  
 
 
 
 
Study Sample period 
Event Window 
(days) Type of M&A Sample Size CAR Target (%) CAR Bidder (%) 
CAR Combined 
(%) 
Travlos (1987) US 1972-81 [-10,+10] Merger - scrip 60 -1.60 
  Merger - cash 100 -0.13 
Bradley et al. (1988) US 1963-68 [-5,+5] Tender Offer 51 +18.92* +4.09* +7.78* 
1968-80 133 +35.29* +1.30 +7.08* 
1981-84 52 +35.34* -2.93* +8.00* 
  1963-84 236 +31.77* +0.97* +7.43* 
Smith & Kim (1994) US 1980-86 [-5,+5] Tender Offer 177 +30.19* +0.50 +15.37* 
[-1,0] +15.84* -0.23* +3.79* 
Schwert (1996) US 1975-91 [-42,-1] Merger 959 +11.90* +1.40* 
[-42,-1] Tender Offer 564 +15.60* +1.70* 
Davidson & Cheng (1997) US 1981-87 [-1,+1] All M&A 219 +12.74* 
Cash 123 +13.47* 
Scrip 38 +10.85* 
  Combination 58 +12.35* 
Kang et al. (2000) Japan 1977-93 [-5,+5] All M&A 154 +2.22* 
[-1,0] Related M&A 104 +1.40* 
[-1,0] Unrelated M&A 50 +0.80 
[-1,0] Scrip 95 +1.00* 
  [-1,0] Mixed 59 +1.40* 
Doukas et al. (2001) Sweden 1980-95 [-5,+5] Related M&A 46  +2.74*  
   Unrelated M&A 46  -2.37*  
Andrade et al. (2001) US 1973-98 [-1,+1] All M&A 3688 +16.00* -0.70 +1.80* 
Graham et al. (2002) US 1980-95 [-1,+1] All M&A 356 +22.51* -0.78* +3.40* 
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Table 3.1: Continued 
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This table presents a summary of international event study results around the announcement of M&As. Event Window refers to the number of days in the event study.  
* denotes the study found statistical significance in the result.  
Study Sample period 
Event Window 
(days) Type of M&A Sample Size CAR Target (%) CAR Bidder (%) 
CAR Combined 
(%) 
Forsyth & Raj (2003) UK 1990-98 [-20,+5] Hubris 22 +29.22* -4.13*  
    Other 90 +27.82* +0.27  
Moeller et al. (2004) US 1980-01 [-1,+1] All M&A 12,023  +1.10*  
   Cash 4,862  +1.38*  
   Scrip 2,958  +0.15*  
    Combination 4,203  +1.45*  
Danbolt (2004) UK 1986-91 [0,+20] All M&A 514 +20.10*   
   [-40,+20]   +24.37*   
Kiymaz & Baker (2008) US 1989-03 [-1,0] All M&A 795 Targets +12.55* -0.82*  
  [-10,+10]  869 Bidders +15.71* -1.45*  
  [-30,-1]   +11.45* -0.88*  
   [+1,+30]   +0.74* -1.29*  
Bhagat et al. (2011) 1991-08 [-1,+1] Cross border Acq 698 Bidders  +1.72*  
Emerging countries  [-2,+2]    +2.43*  
   [-5,+5]    +2.17*  
Martynova & Renneboog (2011) 1993-01 [-40,-1] M&As 2,109 Bidders +11.49* +0.39  
UK and Europe  [-1,+1]  760 Targets +12.47* +0.72*  
  [-5,+5]   +15.83* +0.79*  
  [-60,+60]   +26.70* -2.83*  
  [-1,+1] Cash 754 Bidders/405 Targets +15.67* +0.80*  
  [-1,+1] Scrip 285 Bidders/185 Targets +9.22* +0.12  
   [-1,+1] Combination 417 Bidders/92 Targets +14.29* +1.17*  
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Results for bidding firms range from positive and significant CARs of +1.72% 
observed by Bhagat et al. (2011) in their study of cross border M&As from 
emerging countries, to negative and significant CARs of -0.82% reported by 
Kiymaz and Baker (2008) in their study of US announcements. Studies that 
investigated the impacts of payment method show consistently that both targets 
and bidders earn higher excess returns when the acquisition is financed with cash 
rather than scrip. Overall, Table 3.1 highlights the trends in international M&A 
research and shows that positive target CARs are commonly experienced. 
However, the results for bidders remain unclear. 
3.3.3AustralianEvidence
The Australian literature is largely consistent with evidence from international 
studies. Table 3.2 provides a summary of the previous Australian studies and their 
results. Examination of the table shows that the first Australian investigation was 
conducted by Dodd (1976). The study reports abnormal return for targets of 
+25.2% and +0.2% for bidders in the month of the announcement. Walter (1984) 
also reports a significant average excess return of +13.3% for targets around the 
week of the M&A announcement. However, acquirers received insignificant 
negative excess return of -0.3%. Casey et al. (1987) also found insignificant 
negative abnormal returns for bidders of -1.71% over the two-day event window.
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Table 3.2: Announcement Period Literature – Australia   
Study Sample period Event Window Model Type of M&A Sample Size CAR Target (%) CAR Bidder (%) 
Dodd (1976) 1960-70 Month [0] Two-factor model All M&A 136 bidders +25.20* +0.20 
  Month [-1,+1] 58 targets +35.50* +0.30 
Walter (1984) 1966-72 Week [0] CAPM All M&A 383 Targets +13.30* -0.30 
  368 Bidders 
Bishop et al. (1987) 1972-85 Month [-3,+3] Market adjusted model All M&A 1310 +21.00 +6.00 
Casey et al. (1987) 1981-85 Days [-1,0] Market adjusted model  53 +9.03* -1.71 
  Days [-14,0] +14.76* -3.97 
Bellamy & Lewin (1992) 1980-88 Days [-1,+1] Market model All M&A 210 Bidders +16.92* -0.37 
Days [-1,+1] Cash 120 Targets  +1.37* 
Days [-1,+1] Scrip  -1.94* 
Anderson et al. (1994) 1984-88 Month [-6,+6] 0/1 Market model All M&A 412 +18.00* 
Month [-1,+1] Largest 183 +12.24* 
  Month [-1,+1] Smallest 167 +22.43* 
Bugeja & Walter (1995)  1981-89 Days [-60,+1] Market model All M&A 78 +16.03* -1.80 
Cash +17.18* -3.36 
Stock +18.33* +4.67 
  Combination +7.73 -1.91 
da Silva Rosa et al. (2000) 1988-96 Days [-4,+2] Market model Cash 66 +10.09* -0.36 
Stock 29 +8.15* -2.85 
  Combination 11 +13.68* +1.77 
da Silva Rosa et al. (2004) 1990-98 Days [-2,+2] Market model Public 78  +1.11 
    Private 140  +2.70* 
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Table 3.2: Continued 
Study Sample period Event Window Model Type of M&A Sample Size CAR Target (%) CAR Bidder (%) 
Maheswaran & Pinder (2005)  1992-01 Days [-70,+70] Market model All M&A 133 +16.42*  
  Days [-1,+1]    +13.49*  
Bugeja (2005) 1990-00 Days [-10,+10] 0/1 Market model No ind expert 417 +23.81* 
Days [-1,+1] +16.20* 
Days [-10,+10] independent expert 179 +12.66* 
Days [-1,+1] +9.45* 
Shekhar & Torbey (2005) 1994-01 Days [-1,+1] Market model All M&A 118  +1.02* 
  Days [-2,+2]     +0.48* 
Le & Shultz (2007) 1997-04 Days [-60,+60] 0/1 Market model All M&A 110 -8.61* 
Days [-5,+5] -0.95 
Days [-1,+1] +0.16 
Diepold et al. (2008) 1996-03 Days[-1+1] Market model M&As with  26 targets +15.76* +0.05 
Days [-3,+7] anti-trust challenges 31 bidders +17.68* -1.17 
Bugeja & da Silva Rosa (2010) 1996-99 Month [-1,+1] BHAR All M&A 102 +15.06* -2.91* 
Cash 51 +20.61* -2.47 
Stock 31 +7.64* -2.41 
Combination 20 +12.05* -4.80* 
2000-03 Month [-1,+1] BHAR All M&A 103 +22.39* -4.09* 
Cash 50 +28.78* -2.73 
Stock 35 +11.92* -8.92* 
Combination 18 +25.10* +1.47 
Nankervis & Singh (2012) 2000-07 Days [0,+1] Market model Focused M&A 324  +1.605* 
    Diversified M&A 122  +1.364* 
Shams et al. (2013) 2000-10 Days [-1,+1] Jensen's alpha All M&A 2,665 +1.98* 
Public 643 +2.27* 
Private 1,310 +5.78* 
This table presents a summary of Australian event study results around the announcement of M&As. Event Window refers to the number of days in the event study.  
* denotes the study found statistical significance in the result.  
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More recent studies have displayed similar results, Maheswaran and Pinder 
(2005) show target shareholders earn a significant three-day CAR of +13.49% 
around the announcement day. While Le and Shultz (2007) showed that bidding 
firms earn small, insignificant abnormal returns of +0.16%. In contrast, Shekhar 
and Torbey (2005) observed positive and significant excess returns for acquires of 
+1.02%. Finally, Shams et al. (2013) report positive and significant bidders CARs 
of +1.98% over the [-1,+1] event window.  
Studies examining wealth effects for public and private targets have shown 
that bidding firms earn higher excess returns when the target is a private entity (da 
Silva Rosa et al. 2004; Shams et al. 2013). This outcome is consistent with 
international studies (Chang 1998; Moeller et al. 2004). Fuller et al. (2002) 
suggest that this result is due to a liquidity discount associated with private firms 
being acquired by a public bidder. Method of payment studies have also shown 
consistent outcomes with international studies, with both targets and bidders 
earning higher abnormal returns when the acquisition is financed with cash, as 
opposed to scrip (Bellamy and Lewin 1992; da Silva Rosa et al. 2000; da Silva 
Rosa et al. 2004).   
Summarising Table 3.2, the research shows that Australian M&A 
announcements have a positive and significant impact on target shareholders and 
the level of CARs over the two or three-day event window have averaged around 
+15%. In the case of bidders, early research shows insignificant negative excess 
returns. However, more recent studies have displayed positive and significant 
CARs and these results provide some support for the synergy motive for 
Australian M&As.  
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3.3.4RealEstateSectorAnnouncementReturns
Despite the large amount of literature investigating M&As, there has been 
minimal attention given to the real estate sector. In 1987, Allen and Sirmans 
conducted the first study into the wealth effects of REIT M&As. The study 
investigated 38 successful REIT-REIT mergers from 1977 to 1983 to determine if 
the wealth distribution within REIT mergers was the same as for corporate 
M&As. Utilising event study methodology, the study found that REIT bidders 
experienced significant positive CARs of +8.47% in the eleven day event window 
[-10,0] and +5.78% over the [-1,0] period. The abnormal returns for the acquiring 
firms post-announcement were slightly positive, but not significant.23 Allen and 
Sirmans (1987) concluded that the results were due to the unique institutional 
environment of REITs, in that the gains are due to better management capabilities 
of a specialised asset.  
The results exhibited by Allen and Sirmans (1987) are in contrast to studies for 
non-REIT takeovers. For example, Andrade et al. (2001) find small negative 
CARs for bidders over the event window [-1,+1] of -0.37% whilst investigating a 
similar study period of 1973-89, however, the results displayed no statistical 
significance. Morck et al. (1990) also observed non-significant CARs of -0.70% 
over the 1975 to 1987 study period of US M&As.  
 McIntosh et al. (1989) examined the returns for 27 target REIT shareholders 
over the period of 1962-86. The study utilised the Market Adjusted Return 
method instead of the standard market model due to the increasing evidence that 
trusts are sensitive to interest rates in addition to a market factor.24 Results 
                                                 
23 CARs for event window [-40,+40] was +8.71% as compared to +8.00% for the [-40,0] window. 
24 See Allen et al. (2000) and Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2007) for further discussion on interest rate 
sensitivity of REITs. 
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showed a positive and significant abnormal return for target shareholders of 
+2.16% over the event window [-1,0]. McIntosh et al. (1989, p. 145) concluded 
that the results are “consistent with the hypothesis that target REIT shareholders 
experience a positive wealth effect due to the merger announcement”. 
Elayan and Young (1994) investigated the wealth effects for real estate firms 
and REIT M&A announcements between 1972 and 1986. Event study results 
show that REIT targets earn significant CARs of +3.24% over the three day event 
window [-1,+1], while real estate firms earn significant CARs of +5.29%. The 
authors’ investigations of bidder returns showed both sub-samples earn non-
significant excess returns over the three-day event window.25 The authors tested 
the differences in means of the sub-samples and found no statistical significance 
between each. Elayan and Young (1994) concluded that the tax status of REITs 
does not entitle REIT bidders to higher excess returns relative to non-REITs.  
 Campbell et al. (1998) examined 27 completed US REIT mergers from 1990 to 
199826 employing a market-adjusted return model.27 The study reported a 
negative excess return of -1.1% over the [-1,+1] period for bidding firms. Target 
REITs produced positive CARs of +5.2% over the event window [-1,+1]. 
Extending on this research, Campbell et al. (2001) investigated 40 publicly listed 
REIT M&As from 1994 to 1998.28 Results showed that acquirers earn negative 
and significant CARs of -0.6% over the [-1,+1] event window. The CARs of 
target REITs were positive and significant across the three event windows          
([-1,+1] [0,+1] and [0]), at approximately 3%. These results suggest support for 
the hubris hypothesis (Campbell et al. 1998).  
                                                 
25 The CARs for real estate bidders were +0.49% and +0.15% for REIT bidders. 
26 Unfortunately, the statistical significance of these results is not reported. 
27 Daily market adjusted returns were calculated as the difference between the return on the REIT 
and the return on the Wilshire Daily REIT Index. 
28 Interestingly all the transactions were scrip financed. 
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Sahin (2005) investigated 35 REIT M&As over the period 1990 to 1998. The 
study found, consistent with prior REIT research, positive and significant gains to 
target REITs of +4.31% over the short-term event window. Results for acquiring 
firms CARs displayed significant negative excess returns of -1.21%. The study 
was extended to investigate the abnormal dollar returns around the announcement 
period.29 Abnormal dollar returns for bidding REITs, on average, where negative 
US$38.8 million. On the other hand, target REITs averaged gains of about 
US$19.7 million to existing shareholders. The abnormal dollar returns result 
shows that the abnormal dollar loss for bidders is greater than the gain to targets. 
The average abnormal dollar result implies a net loss of US$19.1 million. This 
outcome suggests the existence of the agency and/or hubris motive for US REIT 
M&As.  
 Womack (2012) investigated the wealth effects of REIT M&As from 1980 to 
2007 utilising the market model. The study found targets earn significant CARs 
of +5.69%, while bidders returned negative and significant CARs of -1.14%. 
These results are consistent with Campbell et al. (1998, 2001) and Sahin (2005). 
Womack (2012) concluded that REIT M&As are driven by the inefficient 
management hypothesis. To investigate the robustness of the results, the study 
employed three other models: the raw return model, market adjusted returns and 
bid-ask average return.30 The author noted that differences in published results 
may be due to the different excess return models utilised. Results show that 
overall, all models produced very similar outcomes. All the calculations are the 
                                                 
29 The abnormal dollar return was calculated as the firms market capitalisation, two days prior the 
announcement, multiplied by the CARs over the [-1,+1] event window. 
30 The raw return model is the sum of the firm’s daily return (including dividends) without 
adjustment for market returns. The market adjusted model is the raw returns less the return for the 
market. Finally, the bid-ask spread returns is calculated using the average of the firms closing 
daily bid and ask quotes (Womack 2012). 
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same sign with only slight variations in magnitude. Womack (2012) noted that the 
negative and significant result for REIT-REIT bidders was negative and 
significant across all four models for the three-day event window.  
 Ling and Petrova (2011) examined 161 US REIT M&As from 1994 to 2007 
and showed target REITs earn positive and significant CARs of around 8% over 
the three-day period. This result is higher than previous studies.31 The authors 
suggest the higher observed CARs is due to the higher number of observations in 
their study and that their study period includes only announcements that occurred 
after the post-1992 modern REIT era.32  
 Campbell et al. (2011) examined 132 REIT M&As between 1997 and 2006. 
The results of the event study showed bidders earned insignificant CARs of 
0.00% over the three-day window [-1,+1]. The authors concluded that 
acquisitions do not generally increase bidding REITs shareholder wealth. This 
outcome is further supported by the findings of Ghosh et al. (2012) who over a 
similar time frame, found bidding REITs earn positive but insignificant CARs of 
+0.41%.  
Table 3.3 provides a summary of the prior M&A studies conducted in the real 
estate sector. It is noted that the primary focus of the prior research has been on 
the US market with only a small number of studies investigating the excess 
returns internationally. This table highlights the range of results. It indicates that 
CARs are greater for targets compared to bidders. It suggests the US results find, 
on average, support for the inefficient management hypothesis. However, 
                                                 
31 For example, Elayan and Young (1994), Campbell et al. (2001) and Sahin (2005) all displayed 
three-day CARs ranging from 3.20% to 4.31%. 
32 Campbell et al. (1998) notes that the early 1990’s was the start of a new REIT era in the US, 
with the recognition that economies of scale, lower cost of capital and greater market power saw 
the emergence of larger REITs. Furthermore, Campbell (2002) and Ling and Ryngaert (1997) 
highlight that post-1990s REITs have become much more similar to the rest of the corporate 
world.  
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Anderson et al. (2012) argue that some of the findings in the extant real estate 
literature that are used to support the inefficient management hypothesis may be 
driven by other explanations, such as economies of scale.  
An investigation of 95 international33 M&As of listed property companies 
from 1999 to 2004 was conducted by Eichholtz and Kok (2008). The study found 
excess returns for targets and acquirers were distinctly different for the real estate 
sector. Target firms experienced significant CARs of +8.66% over event days     
[-1,+1]. The authors noted the lower CAR compared to general corporate finance 
studies may be due to the homogeneity of the assets of property companies, 
resulting in a lower potential for synergistic profits. The excess returns to 
acquirers produced small, but positive CARs over the three-day event window. 
Eichholtz and Kok (2008) divided their sample into REIT and non-REIT 
transactions to further investigate the wealth effects within the real estate sector. 
The CARs for REIT mergers returned a significant return of +6.69% over the      
[-1,+1] period. The excess returns for REIT mergers produce small, but 
insignificant, positive CARs for bidding firms of +0.27%. Results show, 
consistent with Womack (2012), the inefficient management hypothesis holds for 
both REITs and non-REITs. 
 Keisers (2009) evaluated a sample of 107 international REIT M&As between 
1990 and 2005. The study tested whether there was a difference in excess returns 
around an announcement, dependent on the geographical location. Results 
showed that US REIT M&As produced positive and significant CARs of +5.62% 
for targets over the three-day event window. This result is comparable to prior US 
studies. However, the non-US REIT sample produced +2.86% significant 
                                                 
33 Countries included: USA, Canada, UK, Australia, Sweden and The Netherlands.
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abnormal returns over the same period. Mean difference tests found the two 
samples to be statistically significant at the 10% level. The study concluded that 
this outcome may be due to the low number of observations in the non-US 
sample.34  
Evaluation of the bidders samples showed that US REITs earn negative and 
significant excess returns of -0.61% compared to non-significant CARs of +0.32 
for the non-US sample. However, the difference in means test was not significant. 
Keisers (2009) did find a statistically significant difference in the CARs on the 
announcement day. The US sample experienced negative abnormal returns of       
-0.28%, compared to +0.69% for non-US bidders. Again the author suggested 
these outcomes may have been due to the low observation numbers in the non-US 
sample.  
 Ooi et al. (2011) were the first authors to examine the wealth effects for both 
Singapore and Japanese REITs that engaged in property acquisitions from 2002 to 
2007.  Although the transactions are not pure M&As, they do provide an insight 
into the market reactions for property acquisitions (the major investment asset of 
REITs). Furthermore, the authors note that the REIT market in Asia was going 
through an aggressive growth-by-acquisition phase during the study period, 
possibly resulting in bidders overpaying for acquisitions and therefore decreasing 
any synergistic benefits.   
Ooi et al. (2011) also highlighted that both the Japan REIT (J-REIT) and 
Singapore REIT (S-REIT) have different regulations to the US market, notably, 
the management structure. The vast majority of J-REITs and S-REITs are 
externally managed leading to “potential conflict of interests between the REIT 
                                                 
34 The non-US sample contained 19 observations, while the US sample contained 60 observations.  
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managers and shareholders” (Ooi et al. 2011, p. 3). The majority of S-REITs and 
J-REITs were formed by property holding companies transferring part of their 
property portfolio to the newly listed REIT. The new REITs continued to buy 
properties from their sponsor, raising concerns about the prices paid and the type 
of property purchased.  Event study results show that acquirers earn positive and 
significant abnormal returns over the three and five-day event windows of 
+0.21% and +0.38% receptively.  The authors concluded that there is evidence of 
synergetic benefits in the Asian REIT market and these benefits are due to 
improved management and economies of scale.  
In the case of the Australian REIT sector (A-REITs), only two studies to date 
have been conducted on the wealth effects around an announcement. Ratcliffe et 
al. (2009) examined 36 A-REIT M&As over the period 1995 to 2008. Results 
showed that targets earn positive and significant excess returns across all the 
event windows examined. The three-day event window returned CARs of 
+4.28%. This is in line with prior US studies, for example Womack (2012), but 
higher than those presented by Keisers’ (2009) non-US sample. In the case of 
acquirer excess returns, the authors found positive CARs across all event 
windows. However, only the three-day (+0.86%) and the five-day (+0.99%) 
windows displayed statistical significance. Ratcliffe et al. (2009) concluded that 
the driver for A-REIT M&As was the synergy motive and that these benefits were 
driven by economies of size and market power. Extending on this study, Ratcliffe 
and Dimovski (2012a) examined 56 A-REIT bidder returns from 1996 to 2010. 
The study found similar results with bidders earning positive and significant 
CARs of +0.97 over the [-1,+1] event period.  
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3.3.5PublicvPrivate–REITM&A
Prior corporate finance research has shown that the excess returns for public-
public M&As are considerably lower than private-public acquisitions. For 
example, Fuller et al. (2002), Moeller et al. (2004) and Shams et al. (2013) find 
that excess returns for public-public M&As are significantly lower than those 
reported for public-private M&As. Chang (1998) suggests the observed difference 
is due to the monitoring activities of public target shareholders and reduced 
information asymmetries.  
Fuller et al. (2002) posit this result is due to a liquidity discount associated 
with private firms being acquired by a public bidder. More specifically, illiquid 
firms are less valuable and thus less attractive targets, providing the acquirers 
with the opportunity to obtain this liquidity discount. Furthermore, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992) suggest that the observed difference may be a result of private 
firms with liquidity restraints. In this respect, restricted sources of finance 
weakens the bargaining power of the target resulting in a significant discount of 
the targets assets. 
Prior research into REITs has produced similar results. Campbell et al. (2001, 
2005, 2011) found positive and significant excess returns for bidders of private 
targets of around +1.5%, compared to negative and significant CARs of 
approximately -0.9% for public-public mergers with US REITs. Furthermore, 
regression analysis undertaken by Campbell et al. (2011) found a statistically 
positive and significant relationship between private M&As and excess returns. 
Keisers (2009) study of international REIT M&As also found negative and 
significant CARs for public-public announcements of -0.76%. Ratcliffe and 
Dimovski (2012a) observed positive and significant excess returns for both 
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public-public and public-private M&As of +0.46% and +2.83% over the three-
day window respectively with A-REITs.  
3.3.6MethodofPayment–REITM&A
It has been well documented in prior M&A research that choice of payment 
has an impact on excess returns, with both parties enjoying greater CARs when 
cash is used as the method of payment (Andrade et al. 2001; Cai et al. 2011; 
Davidson and Cheng 1997; Wansley et al. 1983a). Two hypotheses have been put 
forward to explain the difference in the observed excess returns between the 
methods of payment. First, the tax implication hypothesis suggests that target firm 
shareholders require a higher payment from the bidder to compensate for the 
immediate tax liability that cash bids create (Bugeja and da Silva Rosa 2008; 
Wansley et al. 1983a). The second hypothesis argues that the different signalling 
implications of cash versus stock in that M&As financed with cash reduce the 
asymmetric information problem that is associated with the use of stock or a 
combination (Myers and Majluf 1984). 
It appears that the signalling implications in REIT M&As are limited. Bugeja 
and da Silva Rosa (2008) argue when both the target and bidding firms have 
lower levels of free cash flow, the acquirer is more likely to offer equity rather 
than cash for the acquisition.  Campbell et al. (2001) suggest that the statutory 
requirement of REITs to payout a large majority of their earnings in the form of 
dividends, limits the opportunity to finance acquisitions with internally generated 
funds. This requirement may lessen the signalling implications of using stock as 
the method of payment.  
Womack (2012) concluded that acquiring REITs most preferred method of 
payment is a combination of scrip and cash, therefore the signalling implication 
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of payment method is mitigated. Pierzak (2001, p. 136) concluded that “the 
institutional characteristics of REITs truly make them different from traditional 
corporations”. Ratcliffe et al. (2009) posit that the use of scrip and or a 
combination of scrip and cash as the payment method may suggest a more 
efficient use of scarce resources, in this case, cash. 
Campbell et al. (2001) found that bidding REITs earn significant CARs of 
+2.2% when the acquisition is financed with scrip and or a combination of scrip 
and cash. While cash financed M&As produced smaller, but insignificant excess 
returns of +0.2%. This outcome was further supported by Campbell et al. (2011) 
and Eichholtz and Kok (2008).  In the case of A-REITs the trend is continued, 
both Ratcliffe et al. (2009) and Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2012a) showed that 
combination financed M&As produce positive and significant CARs of around 
+1.5%, while the cash sub-samples produced insignificant excess returns ranging 
from -0.22% to +0.17%.  
3.3.7HostilevFriendly
It is interesting to note the low number of hostile announcements in the REIT 
sector. Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest that potential returns for shareholders 
of target firms are harmed when takeover bids are opposed by target management 
or other actions are taken that diminish the probability of success. Conversely, the 
author’s note that if target management oppose a takeover and this results in a 
higher takeover price or increased share price, shareholders do benefit.  
Campbell et al. (1998, 2001) highlight the absence of hostile attempts, or even 
unsolicited tender offers in their study sample. Allen and Sirmans (1987) note 
only one hostile offer. Eichholtz and Kok (2008) identify two hostile attempts in 
their sample of 95 international property company transactions. Campbell et al. 
 
 
61
(2001, 2005) argue that the regulatory restrictions imposed on REITs; namely, 
ownership configuration, dividend distribution and asset structure, make hostile 
takeover attempts against REITs difficult. Further to this argument, Eichholtz and 
Kok (2008, p. 159) note that the transparency of the REIT structure, “which is so 
beneficial to corporate governance that it makes the market for corporate control 
less important as a governance mechanism”. Campbell et al. (2011) conclude that 
this lack of an active takeover market diminishes the importance of outside 
governance controls and are replaced by internal governance mechanisms.  
3.3.8AnnouncementPeriodReturns–Conclusion
Investigation of the prior real estate literature shows consistently that targets 
earn positive and significant excess returns, however, when compared to studies 
outside the real estate sector they are relatively small. Table 3.3 presents an 
overall summary of the prior announcement period research conducted on the real 
estate sector. Results for acquirers are somewhat inconclusive, ranging from 
negative and significant CARs -1.14% (Womack 2012) to positive and significant 
+5.78% (Allen and Sirmans 1987).  Campbell et al. (1998, p. 6) described the 
results as disappointing and “as a group fit in among the worst results found in the 
non-REIT corporate world”. The authors argued that the results suggest the 
possible existence of ‘hubris’ or ‘managers personal pursuit’.   
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Table 3.3: Announcement Period Literature – Real Estate Sector  
Study 
Sample 
Period 
Event Window 
(days) Sample Size^ Firm Type CAR Targets (%) CAR Bidders (%) 
Allen and Sirmans (1987) US 1977-83 [-10,0] 38T/3B REIT-REIT +8.47* 
    [-1,0]     +10.43 +5.78* 
McIntosh et al. (1989) US 1962-86 [-1,0] 27 REIT targets +2.16* 
8 REIT bidder +3.79* 
      19 Non-REIT bidder +1.48 
Elayan & Young (1994) US 1972-86 [-1,+1] 67T/54B All real estate +5.29* +0.49 
[-20,+20] +12.94* 2.45 
[-1,+1] 23T/25B REIT-REIT +3.24* +0.15 
    [-20,+20]     +4.68* -2.97 
Taylor & Paolone (1997) US 1994-95 [0] 18 REIT-REIT +2.05 
10 MOP scrip/mixed +2.32 
      6 MOP cash +1.62 
Campbell et al. (1998) US 1990-98 [-2,+2] 24T/25B REIT-REIT +5.2 -1.5 
    [-1,+1]     +5.2 -1.1 
Pierzak (2001) US 1994-98 [-1,+1] 179 REIT property acq  0.00 
   110 MOP cash  -0.29 
   69 MOP mixed  +0.47* 
Campbell et al. (2001) US 1994-98 [-1,+1] 40 Public-Public REIT +3.2* -0.6* 
45 Public-Private REIT +1.90* 
8 MOP Private cash +0.20 
      37 MOP Private mixed +2.20* 
Young & Elayan (2002) US 1972-91 [-1,0] 24 REIT-REIT +0.84 
    [-20,+20]     -6.57* 
Campbell et al. (2005) US 1995-01 [-1,+1] 53 Public-Private REIT +1.52* 
Sahin (2005) US 1990-98 [-1,+1] 33T/30B REIT-REIT +4.31* -1.21* 
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Table 3.3: Continued 
Study 
Sample 
Period 
Event Window 
(days) Sample Size^ Firm Type CAR Targets (%) CAR Bidders (%) 
Kirchhoff et al. (2006) International 1995-02 [-1,+1] 34T/50B Real Estate Firms +9.46* -0.56 
    [-20,+20]     -3.86 -1.40 
Eichholtz & Kok (2008) International 1999-04 [-1,+1] 95T/51B Real Estate Firms +8.66* +0.37 
   43 REIT-REIT +6.69* +0.27 
   37T/8B Non-REIT +10.15* +1.51 
   15T/14B MOP REIT cash +10.19* +0.14 
Keisers (2009) International 1990-05 [-1,+1] 79T/93B REIT-REIT +4.95* -0.41 
[-20,+20] +3.90* -1.35* 
[-1,+1] 70 Public-Public -0.76* 
23 Public-Private +0.66 
60T/73B US REIT +5.62* -0.61* 
      19T/20B Non-US REIT +2.86* +0.32 
Ratcliffe et al. (2009) Australia 1995-08 [-1,+1] 36 REIT-REIT +4.28* +0.86* 
[-1,+1] 14 MOP cash +5.01* -0.22 
      22 MOP scrip/mixed +3.90* +1.55* 
Campbell et al. (2011) US 1997-06 [-1,+1] 132 REIT-REIT 0.00 
70 Public-Public -0.95* 
62 Public-Private +1.10* 
24 MOP cash +0.07 
52 MOP scrip -0.88* 
      56 MOP mixed +0.81* 
Ooi et al. (2011) Sign & Japan 2002-07 [-1,+1] 228 REIT property acq +0.21* 
156 J-REIT +0.16 
      72 S-REIT +0.34 
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Table 3.3: Continued 
Study 
Sample 
Period
Event Window 
(days) Sample Size^ Firm Type CAR Targets (%) CAR Bidders (%)
Ling & Petrova (2011) US 1994-07 [-1,+1] 161 REIT-REIT +8.35* 
122 Public-Public +7.70* 
      39 Public-Private +10.38* 
Ratcliffe & Dimovski (2012a) Australia 1996-10 [-1,+1] 56 REIT-REIT  +0.97* 
   30 MOP cash  +0.17 
   26 MOP scrip/mixed  +1.46* 
   44 Public-Public  +0.46* 
   12 Public-Private  +2.83* 
Ghosh et al. (2012) US 1993-10 [-1,+1] 171 REIT-REIT   +0.44 
Womack (2012) US 1980-07 [-1,+1] 94T/76B Real Estate Firms +5.92* -0.76 
   7T/9B MOP cash  11.12* -2.29* 
   67T/52B MOP scrip +2.01 +0.67 
   13T/14B MOP mixed +6.56* -0.91 
      80T/64B REIT-REIT +5.69* -1.14* 
This table presents a summary of Real Estate Sector event study results around the announcement of M&As. Event Window refers to the number of days in the 
event study. ^ B refers to number of bidders in the sample, while T refers to targets. * denotes the study found statistical significance in the result.  
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 Kirchhoff et al. (2006) concluded that M&A deals cannot be considered a clear 
success, but neither can they be considered to have destroyed value. Womack 
(2012) argues that the structure of REITs in terms of long-term leases, predictable 
cash flows and limited excess capacity contribute to the lower levels of observed 
excess returns. In addition, Eichholtz and Kok (2008) suggest that the lower level 
of CARs is possibly due to the homogeneity of the company’s assets resulting in 
lower potential for synergistic benefits.  
The lower CARs may also be due to lower levels of information asymmetry in 
the sector. Feng et al. (2007) argue that in a regulated industry, like REITs, 
management has less discretion and therefore information asymmetry is less 
severe. Hartzell et al. (2006) argue that due to REITs relatively transparent 
structure and tangible assets, valuation of REITs is easier. In addition, Sah and 
Seagraves (2012) contend that because REITs invest principally in large 
identifiable assets, face limitations on retained earnings and have limited 
intangible assets, they may be more transparent than industrial firms. It then 
follows that this increased transparency should decrease the level of information 
asymmetry between management and investors resulting in lower abnormal 
returns. In addition, Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2012b) suggest that the absence of 
hostile takeovers may also be a driving influence on the lower levels of CARs 
reported for REIT M&As. 
The review of the literature within the real estate environment suggests that 
M&As are motivated by managerial synergy. Overall, prior studies show that the 
level of excess gains by targets is greater than the losses experienced by acquirers, 
resulting in positive total gains. However, the impact of hubris and/or agency 
motives cannot be ruled out. The focus of this chapter now turns to the 
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characteristics of firms that may impact on the probability of a firm entering into 
a M&A.   
3.4FirmCharacteristicsofAcquirersandTargets
3.4.1Introduction
As indicated in Section 3.3, the majority of the gains in a M&A announcement 
are in favour of target firms. An understanding of the characteristics that may 
increase the likelihood of a firm becoming a target or bidder is important for both 
policy makers and investors. Investigation into the drivers of M&A 
announcements along with prediction models was developed as an extension of 
the bankruptcy prediction literature (Barnes 1999).  
Powell (1997) describes two benefits of modelling M&A likelihood. First, the 
research can identify certain firm characteristics that may result in the firm being 
involved in a M&A. Second, knowledge of these characteristics can be employed 
to cast light on the motivations of M&A activity and “could provide the basis for 
an investment strategy whereby firms with high estimated probabilities of 
takeover are invested in” (Powell 1997, p. 1010). This section investigates the 
prior research into the firm characteristics that may influence the likelihood of a 
firm entering into a M&A.35 The discussion starts by looking at research across 
different industries. Following this, the real estate literature is discussed; an area 
that has received minimal academic attention.   
                                                 
35 The focus of this study is to examine the drivers/characteristics of A-REITs and real estate firms 
that are involved in M&A announcements. Hence, the focus of the review of the extant literature 
is on the characteristics of firms that enter into a M&A and not on the model’s ability to earn an 
abnormal return from a hold out sample that has been presented in prior research.   
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3.4.2GeneralIndustryStudies
Research into the area of M&A probability has attempted to identify key 
variables that have an influence on takeover likelihood and furthermore to predict 
a M&A announcement. These variables include both financial performance and 
corporate governance measures.36 Table 3.4 provides a snapshot of previous 
literature and the significant characteristics that impact on M&A likelihood.  
3.4.2.1 Financial Performance Characteristics 
Extant literature results consistently show underperformance in operational 
performance increases the likelihood a firm will become a target. For example, 
Stevens (1973) and Barnes (1999) found a negative relationship between target 
probability and firm profitability. Arnull-Almond (2008) and Brar et al. (2009) 
identified a negative relationship between sales growth and the likelihood of 
being acquired. Furthermore, Pasiouras and Gaganis (2007) and Martijn-Cremers 
et al. (2009) provide evidence of a significantly negative correlation between 
return on assets and target probability. In the case of share price performance, 
Palepu (1986) finds a negative relationship between prior share returns and target 
probability.  
                                                 
36 Financial variables include return on assets, profitability/sales, share price return, market-to-
book value, firm size, liquidity and leverage. Corporate governance variables include board 
independence, insider ownership and block-holdings. 
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Table 3.4: Firm Characteristics Literature 
Study Sample period Sample size Model Characteristics Target Influence significance 
Bidder Influence 
significance 
Stevens (1973) US 1966 80 MDA Leverage Negative 
Profitability Negative 
Harris et al. (1982) US 1974-1977 1,306 Probit P/E Ratio Negative 
Leverage Negative 
Size Negative 
Wansley et al. (1983b) US 1973-1980 88 MDA P/E Ratio Negative 
Leverage Negative 
Sales Negative 
MVBV Negative 
Dietrich & Sorensen (1984) US 1968-1977 67 Logit Payout ratio Negative 
Asset turnover Negative 
Size Negative 
Trading volume Positive 
Rege (1984) Canada 1962-1973 88 MDA No significance found   
Palepu (1986) US 1971-1979 419 Logit Average excess return Negative 
Leverage Negative 
Size Negative 
Growth-resource mismatch Positive 
Walter (1994) US 1981-1984 307 Logit MVBV Negative 
Size Negative 
Asset turnover Negative 
Industry relatedness Positive 
Powell (1997) UK 1984-1991 943 Logit Leverage Negative 
Size Negative 
Liquidity Negative 
Free-cash flow Positive 
Gonzalez et al. (1997) Cross border 1981-1990 942T Logit Size Negative Positive 
  991B  Leverage Negative  
    Payout ratio Negative  
    FCF - Positive 
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Table 3.4: Continued 
Study Sample period Sample size Model Characteristics Target Influence significance 
Bidder Influence 
significance 
Barnes (1999) UK 1991-1993 164 Logit Profit/Sales Positive  
    Profit/Equity Negative  
    Activity ratio Positive  
    Sales growth Negative  
O’Sullivan & Wong (1999) UK 1989-1993 116 Logit Percentage insider ownership Negative 
ROA Negative  
North (2001) US 1990-1997 684 Logit Percentage insider ownership Negative  
Non-management block-holding Positive  
Leverage Negative  
Sales growth Negative  
Weir & Laing (2003) UK 1997-1998 332 Logit Percentage non-executive directors Positive  
    Percentage independent directors Positive  
    Institutional holdings Positive  
    MVBV Negative  
Espahbodi & Espahbodi (2003) US 1997 518 Multiple MVBV Negative  
State of Delaware Incorporation Positive  
FCF/Total assets Positive  
Powell (2004) UK 1986-1995 9,420 Logit Liquidity Negative  
Size Negative  
Growth-resource mismatch Positive  
Wheelock & Wilson (2004) US Banks 1987-1999 829 Probit Size - Positive 
Earnings/Assets - Positive 
Tsagkanos et al. (2006) Greece 1995-2000 140 Logit Size Positive 
Productivity Positive 
Pasiouras & Gaganis (2007) Asian Banks 1998-2004 94T Logit Size Negative Positive 
104B ROA Negative Positive 
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Table 3.4: Continued 
Study Sample period Sample size Model Characteristics Target Influence significance 
Bidder Influence 
significance 
Arnull-Almond (2008) Australia 2003-2004 125 Logit ROA Positive  
    Payout ratio Negative  
    Sales growth Negative  
    Leverage Negative  
    Size Positive  
Brar et al. (2009) Europe 1992-2003 984 Logit Dividend yield Positive  
    Size Negative  
    Sales growth Negative  
Martijn-Cremers et al. (2009) US 1981-2004 83,752 Logit MVBV Negative 
Size Negative 
Leverage Positive 
ROA Negative 
Block-holder Positive 
Alzueta & Lucey (2010) UK & US 1999-2008 Varied^ Logit Sales growth Negative 
 Leverage Positive 
 Activity ratio Positive 
Payout ratio Negative 
Size Positive 
Mehrez et al. (2012) European Banks 2000-2006 1071 Logit ROE Negative Positive 
Size Negative Positive 
Growth-resource mismatch Negative Negative 
This table presents a summary of the literature relating to the firm characteristics of targets and acquirers that influence the probability of a firm being involved in a M&A.  
^ Alzueta and Lucey (2010) evaluated characteristics each year over the study period. The average number of observations for the UK sample was 704, while US sample 
averaged 1,780. 
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The evidence of financial performance is further supported by the relationship 
between market-to-book values (MVBV) and target likelihood, with numerous 
studies finding a negative and significant relationship.37 Manne (1965) posits that 
firms with supressed share prices, relative to their assets, is an indication that the 
market believes an alternative management team could employ the firm’s assets 
more efficiently. This argument is further supported by Weir and Laing (2003) 
who propose that the market is pessimistic about future growth prospects for 
firms with low MVBV ratios, therefore, acceptance of a M&A offer is consistent 
with the achievement of shareholder wealth maximisation.  
Other financial variables acknowledged in prior research which impact target 
likelihood include: dividend payout ratio, free-cash flow, firm size and leverage. 
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) and Alzueta and Lucey (2010) observe that firms 
with low dividend payout ratios have a higher probability of becoming a target. 
This result suggests that firms with low payout ratios are accumulating financial 
reserves for future investment opportunities, therefore a more attractive M&A 
target (Arnull-Almond 2008; Gonzalez et al. 1997). In addition, research has 
shown firms with higher levels of free-cash flow have an increased probability of 
being acquired (Powell 1997). 
Research on firm size has consistently shown that smaller firms are more 
likely to be acquired (Mehrez et al. 2012; Palepu 1986; Powell 2004).38 Palepu 
(1986) posits that transaction and integration costs increase as the size of the 
target increases. In addition, larger targets may defend the acquisition, resulting in 
a higher premium and increased costs for the bidding firm. Furthermore, Kooli et 
                                                 
37 For example, Martijn-Cremers et al. (2009), Walter (1994), Wansley et al. (1983b) and Weir 
and Laing (2003) 
38 Measurement of size has varied across different studies, these include net assets, market 
capitalisation along with the natural log of net assets and market capitalisation (Arnull-Almond, 
2008).  
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al. (2003) argue that larger targets have greater bargaining power, resulting in 
higher premiums. Finally, as the size of the target firm increases, the number of 
potential acquirers decreases (Walter 1994). However, Arnull-Almond (2008) and 
Alzueta and Lucey (2010) observe M&A likelihood increases with firm size. 
Arnull-Almond (2008) argues that the result supports the growth maximisation 
hypothesis proposed by Marris (1963). This hypothesis proposes that bidding 
managers are more focused on maximising firm size rather than shareholders 
wealth (Barnes 1999). 
 Lewellen (1971) suggests that firms with low levels of financial leverage may 
signal unutilised debt capacity and therefore be an attractive target. However, 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms with high levels of debt in their capital 
structure may provide acquiring firms with the opportunity to capture synergistic 
benefits. A large majority of the prior literature shows, consistent with the claims 
of Lewellen (1971), that lower leverage increases the odds of a firm being an 
acquisition target.39 Gonzalez et al. (1997) suggest that excess debt capacity of the 
target can be employed to reduce the cost of the acquisition.  
In contrast, Martijn-Cremers et al. (2009) report a positive relationship 
between leverage and acquisition likelihood. The authors found the result 
puzzling, but supported the univariate analysis that showed the average leverage 
of targets was higher than the control group. However, the statistical significance 
disappeared in the sub-sample of successful takeovers. Alzueta and Lucey (2010) 
also found leverage to have a positive impact on target probability across both the 
UK and US samples. The authors concluded that M&As may be characterised as 
firms investing their capital into plans for long term growth. This outcome 
                                                 
39 For example, Arnull-Almond (2008), Harris et al. (1982), Palepu (1986) and Powell (1997). 
 
 
73
supports the claims of Rege (1984 p. 302) that higher levered firms may find it 
difficult to obtain external financing at a low cost, thus a “firm that can provide 
additional financing would be interested in taking over a highly levered firm”. 
In the case of bidder characteristics, prior research has been limited with the 
major focus being on the banking sector. However, these studies have shown 
consistent results with firm size and performance having a positive impact on 
bidder probability. Mehrez et al. (2012) examined European bank M&As, while 
Wheelock and Wilson (2004) studied US banks and Pasiouras and Gaganis 
(2007) Asian banks. All found size and return on assets/equity to be positive and 
significant. Wheelock and Wilson (2004) concluded that acquiring banks are 
generally larger, with a recent history of fast growth, furthermore, Pasiouras and 
Gaganis (2007) established that the size relationship with bidder probability was 
robust over time. Finally, Mehrez et al. (2012) concluded that acquiring banks 
experience greater performance in the lead up to an announcement, compared to 
both non-bidders and targets.   
In a study of US firms involved in cross border acquisitions, Gonzalez et al. 
(1997) also found size to be positively related to bidder likelihood. The study also 
found that higher levels of free cash-flow has a positive impact for acquiring 
likelihood. The authors concluded that bidding firms have financial advantage 
over other firms in terms of liquidity and size. The free cash-flow result supports 
the argument of Jensen (1988) that in the market for corporate control, firms with 
high levels of free cash-flow are more likely to be acquirers.  
3.4.2.2 Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Prior studies have also included corporate governance characteristics to 
measure takeover likelihood. Results show support for the monitoring hypothesis, 
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in that boards with larger independence are more likely to act in the shareholders 
interests (Weir and Laing 2003). North (2001) found the percentage of ownership 
by inside directors and executives had significant negative impact on acquisition 
probability, whilst the level of non-management block-holdings was positively 
related. O'Sullivan and Wong (1999) also found ownership by executive directors, 
excluding the CEO, decreased target likelihood. Weir and Laing (2003) found 
firms with a higher percentage of non-executive directors and larger institutional 
shareholdings were more likely to be targets. Weir and Laing (2003, p. 1750) 
concluded that firms with independent boards “are more likely to accept a wealth-
increasing bid”. 
The evidence presented by prior literature shows, in the majority of cases, that 
firm size and performance40 presents a negative (positive) relationship for target 
(bidder) firms. Trimbath et al. (2001) conclude that the probability of becoming a 
target increases for relatively inefficient firms. Higher financial leverage and 
dividend payout ratios decrease the likelihood of target probability. Finally, 
evidence shows that board independence protects shareholders’ interests in 
relation to accepting a wealth-increasing offer.  
3.4.3RealEstateSectorCharacteristics
Ambrose (1990) employed a sample of non-regulated US industries from 1981 
to 1986 to investigate the influence of companies holding commercial real estate 
assets has on the probability of a company becoming a target.41 Univariate 
analysis found the target sample to have a significantly higher concentration of 
                                                 
40 Prior studies have used varying measures for performance, sales growth, return on equity or 
assets along with share market returns and market-to-book value; however, the impact on M&A 
likelihood has been consistent.  
41 The study excluded public utilities and the financial services industry due to the regulation of 
these industries. This exclusion included REITs. 
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real estate ownership compared to the non-target sample. In addition, the logit 
model displayed a significant, positive relationship between real estate ownership 
and takeover probability. Ambrose (1990) concluded that commercial real estate 
is a distinctly specialised asset and ownership of such assets play an important 
and influential role in the takeover market.  
More recently, both Frank et al. (2011) and Ling and Petrova (2011) focused 
M&A target probability analysis on the US REIT market. Frank et al. (2011) 
examined exit strategies of US REITs from 1996 to 2006. The exit strategies were 
partitioned into public-public M&As, public-private M&As, liquidations and 
other exit strategies. The most common method of exit was via M&A 
(approximately 83% exited via either public-public or public-private M&A).  
Employing logistic regression analysis, Frank et al. (2011) modelled the 
relationship between potential exit and REIT structural characteristics (profit 
margin, leverage, size, specialisation and REIT structure). Results show REITs 
that focus their investment within a particular property type exhibit a higher 
probability of being a target than REITs that diversify across different property 
sectors.  This outcome is consistent with prior literature that diversification has a 
negative impact on the value of REITs (Cronqvist et al. 2001). In addition, Frank 
et al. (2011) observed a negative and significant relationship between target 
probability and REIT size. This result is consistent with studies across various 
industries and suggests that larger REITs are less likely to be a target. Finally, the 
authors found a significant negative correlation between leverage and M&A 
probability. More specifically, a 1% increase in the debt ratio decreases the 
probability of being a target by approximately 45%, this outcome is consistent 
with general studies. 
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Ling and Petrova (2011) examined 161 US REIT targets from 1992 to 2007, of 
which 122 were public-public announcements and 39 public-private. Logistic 
model results showed, consistent with Frank et al. (2011), that size has a negative 
and significant influence on target probability.  In line with Brar et al. (2009), 
Ling and Petrova (2011) also found REITs with high dividend yields relative to 
the non-target sample, have a higher probability of receiving a takeover offer. At 
the same time, the estimated coefficient for the ratio of cash holdings to total 
assets has a negative and significant influence on target probability. This outcome 
suggests that more liquid REITs are less likely to be a takeover target and is 
consistent with general corporate finance studies. For example, Powell (1997, 
2004) found firm illiquidity increases target likelihood.  
Ling and Petrova (2011) also observe a positive relationship between the level 
of institutional ownership and target likelihood. The authors suggest that this 
result is due to institutional investors preferring greater market liquidity and 
higher market capitalisation REITs. This finding is further supported by the 
results for size and cash holdings. Campbell et al. (2011) argue that REIT market 
liquidity and depth allows institutional investors to trade large parcels of shares 
without greatly impacting the share price. 
The above real estate studies have mainly focused their investigation on the 
US market. To date, only two studies have examined the factors that influence 
M&A probability that include M&A announcements outside the US; Eichholtz 
and Kok (2008) and Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013). Eichholtz and Kok (2008) 
examined 95 takeovers of international property companies42 from 1999 to 2004 
and was the first to include bidding firms into the analysis to investigate what 
                                                 
42 The study examined North America (39% of the sample), Europe (46%) and Australia (15%).
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factors impact on the probability of a firm being a bidder. Consistent with bank 
M&A research, results for bidding firms returned a positive and significant 
relationship for size and bidder probability.43 The authors suggested this outcome 
indicates that larger firms may have the resources and efficiencies that make them 
more competent making an acquisition.  
Eichholtz and Kok (2008) observed the degree of financial leverage to have a 
negative impact on bidder probability. This outcome suggests that firms with 
financial slack may find it easier to acquire targets. In addition, excess debt 
capacity can be employed to reduce the cost of the acquisition (Gonzalez et al. 
1997). Finally, portfolio characteristics results showed that firms that 
predominantly invested in the areas of retail and office exhibit a higher 
probability of being a bidder than those that are diversified across property type 
or operate in the area of property development.  
The investigation into the probability of a firm being a target by Eichholtz and 
Kok (2008) showed firms that underperform have a higher probability of being a 
target.44 The authors concluded that these results support the inefficient 
management hypothesis. Furthermore, the authors found that this result was 
consistent for both sub-samples of REITs and non-REITs. In addition the MVBV 
variable displayed a negative relationship with target probability. This signalled 
that firms with lower MVBVs might be undervalued, relative to their asset values, 
and therefore an attractive target (Walter 1994), further supporting the inefficient 
management hypothesis.  
In the area of corporate governance, Eichholtz and Kok (2008) found the level 
of block-holdings to have a positive and significant impact on target probability. 
                                                 
43 Mehrez et al. (2012), Pasiouras and Gaganis (2007) and Wheelock and Wilson (2004) all found 
bidder size increases bidder probability.  
44 Performance was measured by return on assets and share price return. 
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This outcome supports the monitoring hypothesis in that the level of block-
holdings indicates that large shareholders are an effective monitoring mechanism 
and supports the findings of Weir and Laing (2003). However, the amount of 
insider ownership returned a significant negative impact on target likelihood. This 
finding suggests, “that large inside shareholdings entrench managers rather than 
reduce the agency gap” (Eichholtz and Kok 2008, p. 154).  
 Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) have conducted the only study, to date, on the 
Australian REIT sector. Similar to Eichholtz and Kok (2008), the study examined 
the characteristics of both acquirers and targets from 1999 to 2011. Results of the 
logistic model show that size is positively related to target probability. This result 
is in contrast to prior studies across industrial firms, along with the findings of 
Frank et al. (2011) and Ling and Petrova (2011). However, the result is consistent 
with Arnull-Almond’s (2008) study of Australian industrial companies. Ratcliffe 
and Dimovski (2013) suggest that this result is due to the high level of securitised 
commercial grade property in Australia and concluded that major avenue for      
A-REITs to achieve growth is through acquisitions. However, this result suggests 
the possible existence of the agency motive via the growth maximisation 
hypothesis. 
Share price performance in the run up to an announcement was negatively 
related to target probability. More specifically, a one per cent decrease in share 
price return increases the odds of the A-REIT becoming a target by almost 25%. 
Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) also noted, although insignificant, results show 
that lower dividend yielding A-REITs have higher probability of becoming a 
target. Supporting the claims of Arnull-Almond (2008) and Gonzalez et al. (1997) 
that low yielding firms are in a weak financial position. Ratcliffe and Dimovski 
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(2013) concluded, given the combined results, that the inefficient management 
hypothesis holds for A-REIT targets.   
The logit results for acquiring A-REITs showed that leverage has a 
significantly negative influence on the likelihood of an A-REIT being a bidder. 
The odds ratio showed a one per cent decrease in leverage increases the odds by 
97% that the A-REIT will enter into a M&A. The authors concluded that financial 
slack is an important characteristic of A-REIT bidders. This outcome is possibly 
due to the regulatory restriction placed on A-REITs to distribute 100% of their 
earnings, therefore lessening the opportunity to use retained earnings to fund an 
acquisition. Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) further identified that the level of 
shares held by related parties has a negative impact on bidder probability. This 
outcome suggests managerial ownership enables the alignment of interests 
between managers and shareholders in that managers are more prudent in 
accessing an acquisition opportunity.  
3.4.4FirmCharacteristicsofAcquirersandTargets–Conclusion
Examination of the prior real estate literature shows that although the studies 
have utilised different explanatory variables, there are some common themes. The 
degree of financial leverage has a negative impact on both targets and bidders 
M&A probability, with Frank et al. (2011) observing significance for targets; and 
both Eichholtz and Kok (2008) and Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) finding 
significance for bidders. Institutional ownership and block-holdings also have a 
positive impact on target likelihood (Eichholtz and Kok 2008; Ling and Petrova 
2011).  Finally, Eichholtz and Kok (2008) and Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) 
found a strong negative relationship between a targets past-performance and 
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takeover probability, providing support for the inefficient management 
hypothesis.  
However, in contrast to real estate studies, Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) find 
a positive relationship between target likelihood and size. The authors 
hypothesise that this outcome is distinct for the A-REIT market in that a large 
majority of institutional grade property is already securitised in Australia. 
Therefore the only way for A-REITs to grow is through acquisition. The 
following section of this thesis examines the literature regarding the post-bid 
performance of acquirers. 
3.5PostAnnouncementPerformance
3.5.1Introduction
Prior literature in the area of long-term post acquisition performance has 
shown, on average, that acquirers underperform. Jensen and Ruback (1983 p. 20) 
comment that “these post-outcome negative abnormal returns are unsettling 
because they are inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest that changes in 
stock prices overestimate the future efficiency gains from mergers”. Campbell et 
al. (2009) describe this anomaly of post-merger underperformance as troubling 
because it suggests evidence of weak form market efficiency. This section 
discusses the prior literature in the area of post-merger performance for both 
conventional firms and the real estate investment trust area.  
3.5.2InternationalEvidence
 Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) provide an extensive review of the post-acquisition 
literature from 1974 to 1998. The vast majority of early studies employed either a 
market model, market adjusted model, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), or 
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a beta-decile matching portfolio to calculate the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CARs). Results of these early studies show, on average, that acquirers 
earn negative abnormal returns post announcement. The study by Mandelker 
(1974) is generally considered the initial modern assessment of  post M&A 
performance (Agrawal and Jaffe 2000). The study analysed 241 mergers between 
1941 and 1962. Employing a market adjusted model to calculate CARs, results 
showed that bidding firms earn positive and significant CARs of +0.6% over the 
12 month period. In contrast, later studies provided different results. Ellert (1976), 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) and Malatesta (1983) all found negative CARs over the 
post-announcement period utilising the market model in their studies of M&As in 
the US market.45 However, only the results by Malatesta (1983) displayed 
statistical significance.  
 Magenheim and Muller (1988) examined 51 US mergers from 1976 to 1981. 
The excess returns from the market model showed acquirers earn negative and 
significant CARs of -24.37% over the three-year post announcement period. 
However, the authors methodology was criticised by Bradley and Jarrell (1988) 
arguing that the estimated parameters from the market model using monthly share 
return data are non-stationary and inefficient. Bradley and Jarrell (1988) 
examined 78 M&As over the same time period using daily returns for the market 
model and observed acquirers earn insignificant CARs of -16% over the three-
year post acquisition years.   
 Franks and Harris (1989) examined 1,048 UK M&As from 1960 to 1985. 
Market model results showed acquirers earn negative and significant CARs of      
-12.6% over the [0,+24] event window. However, when the authors employed the 
                                                 
45 Ellert (1976) obtained negative CARs of -1.6% over the [+1,+48] month window. Dodd and 
Ruback (1977) returned -1.32% CARs over [+1,+12] event period. Malatesta (1983) [0,+36] event 
window returned negative CARs of -7.6%. 
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market-adjusted model and CAPM to estimate CARs, the results were opposite. 
Market-adjusted model CARs were +4.8% and significant, while the CAPM 
returned significant CARs of +4.5%. Franks and Harris (1989) suggested that the 
difference in results was due to the high alphas estimated by the market model for 
the premerger firm. If acquirers time M&As to take advantage of over-valuation 
of their share price, it then follows that the estimated alphas would be highly 
positive. “Such positive Į’s, if unsustainable, would introduce a negative drift in 
abnormal returns” (Franks and Harris 1989, p. 246).  
 Langetieg (1978) examined 149 US mergers from 1929 to 1969. The study 
employed the CAPM to estimate the post-acquisition abnormal returns over both 
a 12 and 24-month period. Results showed negative and significant CARs of        
-6.59% and -12.86% respectively. This suggests that the results are inconsistent 
with the efficient market hypothesis. However, the author extended the analysis to 
calculate acquirer abnormal returns using a control-firm approach. The excess 
returns were calculated as the difference between the bidding firm’s performance 
and the control firm’s returns. Langetieg (1978) posit that the use of a control 
group would assess the robustness of the impact the M&A had on existing 
shareholders. Results showed that acquiring firms earn negative but insignificant 
CARs of -3.1% and -3.75% over the one and two-year timeframes respectively. 
The author concluded that the control firm approach results are consistent with 
the efficient market hypothesis.   
3.5.2.1 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns Methodology 
The results presented by Langetieg (1978) brought forward the focus on the 
possible disadvantages of the models employed in estimating post merger 
performance. Kothari and Warner (1997), Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. 
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(1999) have criticised the methodologies employed in the early post-M&A studies 
and recommend the use of a buy-and-hold methodology. Barber and Lyon (1997 
p. 342) argue that earlier methods to calculate long-term excess returns “are 
conceptually flawed and/or lead to biased test statistics”.  
Kothari and Warner (1997) argue that the long-term excess returns are 
extremely sensitive to the model employed to generate the parameters to calculate 
the expected returns. This argument is supported by the observations made by 
Franks and Harris (1989). Kothari and Warner (1997) also argue, long-term event 
periods raise the possibility of shifts in these parameters, impacting the excess 
returns and the variances used to estimate the test statistics. These systematic 
shifts in the parameters are more likely to occur when the events are correlated 
with past performance. Therefore, the “failure to use the correct model could 
result in systematic biases and misspecification” (Kothari and Warner 1997, p. 
304). 
The buy-and-hold method for calculating long-term abnormal returns, 
commonly referred to as buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), eliminates the 
problems associated with earlier long-term performance models (Barber and Lyon 
1997). Similar to the method employed by Langetieg (1978), BHAR is calculated 
as the event firms return less the return on an asset or portfolio of assets with an 
appropriate return (Lyon et al. 1999). Barber and Lyon (1997) explain that the 
main difference between CARs and BHARs results from the effect of 
compounding. CARs ignore compounding, while BHARs include the effect of 
compounding.46  
                                                 
46 Barber and Lyon (1997) provide an in-depth discussion on the different results observed when 
CARs or BHARs methodology is employed to calculate long-term performance.  
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Following the research by Kothari and Warner (1997), Barber and Lyon 
(1997) and Lyon et al. (1999), the BHAR methodology became the more accepted 
method for calculating long-term excess returns. Higson and Elliott (1998) and 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) were among the earlier studies to utilise the BHAR 
methodology, in contrast to prior studies employing the market model 
methodology. Both studies found no evidence to support the claims of market 
inefficiency suggested by Jensen and Ruback (1983). Higson and Elliot (1998) 
examined UK M&As over the period 1975 to 1990 and found insignificant 
BHARs of +0.83% over the three-year period. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
examined US M&As over a similar time frame (1961 to 1993) and also found 
insignificant BHARs of -1.0% over the three-year period.  
However, subsequent studies utilising UK data observed significant negative 
BHARs post-M&A announcement. Cosh and Guest (2001), Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003) and Conn et al. (2005) all examined post-bid performance using 
BHAR methodology over similar time frames.47 All three studies observed 
negative and significant BHARs over the three to four-year post announcement 
period, ranging from -7.50% to -16.30%. Gregory and McCorriston (2005) found 
UK firms involved in cross-border M&As experienced negative, but insignificant, 
BHARs of -3.9% over the three-year post window. However, when the authors 
examined cross-border M&As of US targets, they found acquirers earn negative 
and significant BHARs of -9.36%. Finally, Antoniou et al. (2007) observed 
significant negative BHARs for UK acquirers of -8.88% over the two-year post-
announcement period.  
                                                 
47 Cosh and Guest’s (2001) study period was 1985 to 1996. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) 
examined the period of 1983 to 1995 and Conn et al. (2005) examined M&As from 1984 to 2000.  
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Consistent with the UK studies, Betton et al. (2007) examined US M&As from 
1980 to 2003 and found significant negative BHARs of -21.90% over the five-
year post-announcement period. Ang et al. (2008) observed negative and 
significant BHARs of -5.02% in their study of 541 US M&As from 1981 to 2001. 
Following on from these US studies, Bouwman et al. (2009) also detected 
negative and significant BHARs of -7.22%. More recently, Bessembinder and 
Zhang (2013) examined 3,972 US M&As from 1980 to 2005 and found acquirers 
earn negative and significant BHARs of -7.90% over the five-year post 
announcement period.  
The prior literature on post-announcement performance utilising BHAR 
methodology shows, on average, bidders earn negative and significant excess 
returns. Furthermore the analysis has focused on the US and UK markets. Table 
3.5 provides a summary of the results from prior literature utilising BHAR 
methodology, along with the sample size, location and study period. 
 
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Table 3.5: Long-Term Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns Literature 
Study Sample period Event Window (Months) Model Type of M&A Sample Size BHARs (%) 
Higson & Elliot (1998) UK 1975-90 [+1,+24] Size matched All M&A 776 -1.14 
  [+1,+36] BHAR  722 +0.83 
Mitchell & Stafford (2000) US 1961-93 [0,+36] Size & MVBV match All M&A 2068 -1.00 
   BHAR Cash 1039 +6.40* 
    Scrip 1029 -8.40* 
Cosh & Guest (2001) UK 1985-96 [+1,+48] Size & MVBV match Hostile  58 -4.00 
    BHARs Friendly 123 -22.10* 
Sudarsanam & Mahate (2003) UK 1983-95 [+2,+36] Size & MVBV match BHARs All M&A 519 -14.76* 
    Cash 97 +5.51 
    Scrip 103 -22.55* 
Gregory & McCorriston (2005) UK 1985-94 [0,+36] MVBV Match BHARs Cross-border M&A 333 -3.90 
Conn et al. (2005) UK 1984-00 [+1,+36] Size & MVBV match Public Target 576 -19.78* 
   BHARs Private Target 2628 -4.78 
Ang & Cheng (2006) US 1984-01 [0,+36] Size & MVBV match Cash 241 -2.06 
   BHARs Scrip 350 -12.45* 
Black et al. (2007) US 1985-95 [+1,+36] Size & MVBV match Cross-border M&A 361 -13.20* 
   BHARs Domestic M&A 1285 +0.67 
Antoniou et al. (2007) UK 1987-04 [0,+24] Size & MVBV match All M&A 1110 -8.88* 
   BHARs Public Target 125 -11.76* 
    Private Target 621 -5.28 

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Table 3.5: Continued 
Study Sample period Event Window (Months) Model Type of M&A Sample Size BHARs (%) 
Betton et al. (2007) US 1980-03 [0,+60] Size & MVBV match BHARs All M&A 11483 -21.9* 
Ang et al. (2008) US 1981-01 [0,+36] Size, MVBV &  All M&A 541 -5.02* 
   Industry match BHARs    
Savor & Lu (2009) US 1962-00 [0,+36] Size, MVBV &  Cash 723 +1.60 
   Industry match BHARs Scrip 1050 -13.10* 
Dutta & Jog (2009) Canada 1993-02 [+1,+36] Size & MVBV match All M&A 1077 +0.1 
   BHARs Public Target 322 -3.0 
    Private Target 371 -6.0* 
Bouwman et al. (2009) US 1979-02 [0,+24] Size & MVBV match All M&A 2944 -7.22* 
   BHARs Cash 1156 -0.55 
    Scrip 1269 -13.19* 
Croci et al. (2010) UK 1990-05 [0,+36] Size & MVBV match BHARs All M&A 785 -4.23 
Chi et al. (2011) China 1998-03 [+1,+6] Market adjusted BHARs All M&A 1148 +0.03 
Datta et al. (2013) Europe 1990-06 [0,+36] Size & MVBV match BHARs Utility Sector M&A 95 -4.80 
Bessembinder & Zhang (2013) US 1980-05 [0,+60] Size & MVBV match BHARs All M&A 3972 -7.90* 
Table 3.5 provides a summary of prior international general industry literature examining the long-term post-bid performance of bidding firms utilising BHAR 
methodology. Event Window refers to the number of months in the event study. * denotes the study found statistical significance in the result.  
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3.5.2.2 Three-Factor Model Abnormal Returns 
 Fama (1998) argues that long-term return performance calculations are 
sensitive to the methodology employed. The author suggests that the examination 
of long-term returns should not be based on BHAR methodology. Because “the 
systematic errors that arise with imperfect expected return proxies – the bad 
model problem – are compounded with long-horizon returns” (Mitchell and 
Stafford 2000, p. 288). In addition, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) discuss that the 
BHAR method ignores any cross-sectional dependence of the over-lapping excess 
returns of individual event firms. They argue that major corporate events cluster 
through time and by industry, resulting in the positive cross-correlation of excess 
returns.  
Fama (1998) advocates the use of an asset-pricing model that calculates 
monthly excess returns across time. Fama and French (1993) propose that the 
three-factor asset-pricing model can therefore be employed to examine long-term 
abnormal performance because the returns can be described by the size and book-
to-market factors. Any cross-correlation of the abnormal returns are accounted for 
in the portfolio variance (André et al. 2004; Mitchell and Stafford 2000). In 
addition, the model poses “fewer statistical problems than long-term BHARs” 
(Fama 1998, p. 295).  
One of the earliest researchers to employ the three-factor model was Gregory 
(1997), who examined UK M&As from 1984 to 1992. Results showed bidders 
earn negative and significant mean monthly abnormal returns (ARs) of -0.75%. 
This result was supported by later studies examining US acquirers (Gaspar et al. 
2005; Mitchell and Stafford 2000) and Canadian M&As (André et al. 2004). All 
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three studies report negative and significant mean monthly ARs ranging from       
-0.20% to -0.75%.  
However, Moeller et al. (2004) examined US bidders over a similar time 
period as Gaspar et al. (2005) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) with an extensive 
data set of 12,023 observations.48 The study observed insignificant non-negative 
monthly ARs. Similarly, the Croci et al. (2010) study of UK M&As from 1990 to 
2005 also reported insignificant mean monthly ARs.  
Subsequent studies employing the three-factor model display mixed results. 
For example, Bouwman et al. (2009), Dutta and Jog (2009) and Latorre et al. 
(2014), all observed positive and significant mean monthly ARs, ranging from 
+0.52% to +0.70%, in their studies of the US, Canadian and Spanish M&A 
markets respectively. In contrast, Alexandridis et al. (2006) report significantly 
negative excess returns of -1.02% in their UK study and Alexandridis et al. 
(2012) find US bidders earn negative and significant mean ARs of -0.25%. Table 
3.6 provides a summary of the prior international literature that has employed the 
three-factor model to access post-announcement performance.  
                                                 
48 Moeller et al. (2004) study period extended from 1980 to 2001. Gaspar et al. (2005) examined 
190 public M&As from 1980 to 1999 and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) data set comprised of 
2,068 announcements from 1961 to 1993.  
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Table 3.6: Long-Term Three-Factor Model Abnormal Returns Literature 
Study Sample period Event Window (Months) Type of M&A Sample Size Mean ARs (%) 
Gregory (1997) UK 1984-92 [0,+24] All M&A 452 -0.75* 
Mitchell & Stafford (2000) US 1961-93 [0,+36] All M&A 2068 -0.20* 
   Cash 1039 -0.09 
   Scrip 1029 -0.33* 
Ang & Kohers (2001) US 1984-96 [0,+36] Private Targets 657 +0.01 
Moeller at al. (2004) US 1980-01 [0,+36] All M&A 12023 +0.02 
   Cash 4862 +0.10 
   Mixed Payment 4203 -0.01 
   Public Target 2642 +0.04 
   Private Target 5583 +0.03 
André et al. (2004) Canada 1980-00 [0,+36] All M&A 143 -0.75* 
   Cash 62 -0.16 
   Scrip 49 -1.50* 
Gaspar et al. (2005) US 1980-99 [0,+24] Public Targets 190 -0.40* 
Conn et al. (2005) UK 1984-00 [+1,+36] Public Targets 576 -0.40* 
   Private Targets 2628 -0.08 
Alexandridis et al. (2006) UK 1993-98 [0,+36] Public Targets 164 -1.02* 
Dube & Glascock (2006) US 1975-96 [0,+36] Cash 249 +0.06 
   Scrip 264 -0.10 
Savour & Lu (2009) US 1962-00 [0,+36] Cash 723 -0.10 
   Scrip 1050 -0.40* 
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Table 3.6: Continued 
Study Sample period Event Window (Months) Type of M&A Sample Size Mean ARs (%) 
Dutta & Jog (2009) Canada 1993-02 [0,+36] All M&A 241 +0.70* 
   Cash 142 +0.60* 
   Scrip 34 -0.60 
Petmezas (2009) UK 1984-02 [0,+36] All M&A 1230 -0.54* 
   Public Target 118 -0.33 
   Private Target 1112 -0.50* 
   Cash 692 -0.27 
   Scrip 83 -1.91* 
Bouwman et al. (2009) US 1979-02 [0,+24] All M&A 252 +0.66* 
Croci et al. (2010) UK 1990-05 [0,+36] All M&A 785 -0.12 
Alexandridis et al. (2012) US 1993-07 [0,+36] All M&A 3170 -0.25* 
   Cash 672 -0.04 
   Scrip 1525 -0.39* 
Louis (2013) US 1992-09 [0,+24] Scrip Public Target 2315 -0.35* 
   Scrip Private Target 2087 -0.62* 
Datta et al. (2013) Europe 1990-06 [0,+36] Utility Sector M&A 95 -0.23 
Latorre et al. (2014) Spain 1990-11 [0,+24] All M&A 92 +0.52* 
   Public Target 30 +0.74* 
   Private Target 62 +0.15 
Table 3.6 provides a summary of prior international general industry literature examining the long-term post-bid performance of bidding firms utilising the three-factor 
methodology. Event Window refers to the number of months in the event study. * denotes the study found statistical significance in the result.  
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Comparing these results with BHAR outcomes suggest possible 
methodological problems associated with measuring post-M&A performance in 
the long-run. A number of studies identify the possible differences in methods 
and therefore to test the robustness of their results the studies employed both 
methods. Conn et al. (2005) observed negative and significant post-announcement 
performance across both methods.49  
Both Croci et al. (2010) and Datta et al. (2013) detected insignificant excess 
returns in both methodologies. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) report negative post-
announcement performance for both models, however, only the three-factor 
model detected significance. Dutta and Jog (2009) present positive and significant 
ARs from the three-factor model, but insignificant positive BHARs. Finally, 
Bouwman et al. (2009) produced completely contrasting results. Three-factor 
average monthly ARs were +0.66% and significant (equating to a cumulative 
average AR of +15.84% over the two-year event period), compared to a negative 
and significant BHAR of -7.22%. Unfortunately, the authors did not provide an 
explanation for the contrasting results.  They did, however, cite Loughran and 
Ritter (2000) that “since different methods have different powers of detecting 
abnormal performance, there should be differences in abnormal return estimates 
across different methodologies” (Bouwman et al. 2009, pp. 654-5). 
It appears that employing both methodologies provides robustness to the 
results of some studies, however, it remains apparent that prior post-
announcement performance studies make it difficult to draw strong conclusions. 
On average, the results across both methods of accessing long-term returns 
suggest market inefficiency.  
                                                 
49 The three-year BHAR was -19.78%, compared to a cumulative average abnormal return of        
-14.4% for the three-factor model.  
 
 
93
3.5.3AustralianEvidence
Table 3.7 presents a summary of Australian studies of post-M&A 
performance. The first study was conducted by Dodd (1976) who examined the 
one-year post CARs for successful acquirers from 1960 to 1970. Results showed, 
consistent with early international studies, bidders earn negative and significant 
abnormal returns. McDougall and Round (1986) provided further support to the 
findings of Dodd (1976). Employing a market model methodology, results 
showed acquirers earn negative and significant CARs of -18.0% over the five-
year post-event period. McDougall and Round (1986, p. 189) concluded that 
M&As “appear to have been caused by so-called managerial motives, or by the 
desire to develop or enhance market power”. 
Subsequent studies employing market model methodology have also observed 
consistent results for bidders post-M&A. Both Bellamy and Lewin (1992) and 
Nankervis and Singh (2012) find acquires earn negative and significant CARs in 
the long-term post period. In contrast, Dullard and Hawtrey (2008) find bidders 
earn positive and significant CARs of +10.57% over the [0,+36] event window. 
The authors conclude that M&As in Australia improve the share price 
performance of acquirers. However, Dullard and Hawtrey (2008) noted, their 
results may be subject to size bias and the market model employed for the long-
term analysis.  
The study by Brown and da Silva Rosa (1998) was the first Australian 
investigation to employ the BHAR methodology. The study found that after 
controlling for the bias described by Barber and Lyon (1997), acquiring firms 
earn insignificant excess returns over the [+6,+36] post-event period. Brown and 
da Silva Rosa (1998, p. 36) conclude that “the long-term performance of the 
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acquiring firms in the post-merger period is consistent with the proposition that 
the market for corporate control is informationally efficient”.  
 Duong and Izan (2012) also employed BHAR methodology to examine 1,184 
Australian M&As from 1980 to 2004. The study found no significant evidence of 
post-acquisition underperformance. However, the authors extended the analysis to 
examine the impact merger waves may have on bidder performance. Results 
showed that M&As occurring during a merger wave resulted in negative and 
significant long-run BHARs of -2.53% over the [0,+18] event window. In 
contrast, M&As occurring outside a merger wave period returned BHARs of 
+4.58%, however, the result was not significant. The authors concluded that 
acquisitions made during merger waves provide evidence for the hubris and 
agency motives for M&As. 
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Table 3.7: Long-Term Post Announcement Literature – Australia  
Study Sample period Event Window (Months) Model Type of M&A Sample Size Result (%) 
Dodd (1976) 1960-70 [+1,+12] Two-factor model Successful M&As 136 -6.60* 
  CARs 
McDougall & Round (1986) 1974-81 [0,+60] Market model Successful M&As 88 -18.0* 
   CARs    
Brown & da Silva Rosa (1998) 1974-96 [+6,+36] Size matched Takeovers 415 -3.00 
   BHAR    
Bellamy & Lewin (1992) 1980-88 [0,+6] Market model Cash M&As 69 -2.32 
   CARs Scrip M&As 43 -39.61* 
da Silva Rosa et al. (2000) 1988-96 [0,+24] Size matched Cash M&As 68 -6.91^ 
   BHAR Scrip M&As 27 -20.40^ 
Dullard & Hawtrey (2008) 2001-03 [0,+36] Market model All M&As 45 +10.57* 
   CARs    
Nankervis & Singh (2012) 2000-07 [0,+12] Market model All M&As 446 -12.63* 
   CARs Cash 247 -9.68* 
    Combo 96 -19.86* 
    Diversified 122 -8.79* 
    Focused 324 -14.07* 
Duong & Izan (2012) 1980-04 [0,+12] Size matched  All M&A 1184 +0.99 
  [0,+18] BHAR   +1.52 
Table 3.7 presents a summary of prior Australian general industry literature examining the long-term post-bid performance of bidding firms. Event Window refers to the 
number of months in the event study. * denotes the study found statistical significance in the result. ^ calculated from the Authors table 5 as the difference between 
experimental sample less the control portfolio.
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Australian research results show some consistency with international studies, 
in that the choice of methodology can have an impact on the observed abnormal 
returns. Studies that have estimated CARs have found, on average, bidders wealth 
is adversely impacted post the M&A. However, studies utilising BHAR 
methodology do not find sufficient evidence to suggest the post-bid phenomenon 
holds for Australian M&As.50 
Fama (1998) argues that market efficiency should not be discarded. The author 
suggests that an efficient market produces different types of events that 
individually cause share prices to over or under-react. The under-reaction will be 
approximately as frequent as the over-reaction in an efficient market. If these 
anomalies are split randomly between each other, they are consistent with market 
efficiency. Furthermore, it appears that the long-term return anomalies that 
suggest market inefficiency are sensitive to a number of factors. These include the 
methodology (Bessembinder and Zhang 2013; Martynova and Renneboog 2008), 
the different markets examined (e.g. US versus Europe), the different time periods 
studied and possibly the different datasets. This study now examines the post-
acquisition excess returns literature for acquirers when separated by payment 
method and target type.  
3.5.4MethodofPayment
Short-term event studies have consistently shown that bidders earn improved 
abnormal returns around the announcement when the M&A is financed with cash 
(Andrade et al. 2001; Cai et al. 2011; Moeller and Schlingemann 2005). Savor 
and Lu (2009) suggest that managers try to time the market by paying for an 
                                                 
50 It is interesting to note that during the literature search, this study was unable to identify an 
Australian study on long-term post-M&A excess returns that employed the three-factor 
methodology.  
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acquisition with scrip when they believe their share price is overvalued. The 
authors argue that the most overvalued firms have the greatest incentive to enter 
into a M&A before the market discovers the mispricing. It therefore follows that 
the market will reprice the acquirer in long-term post-announcement period, 
resulting in negative abnormal returns.   
Prior studies have, on average, shown that method of payment has an 
important impact on port-announcement performance. Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) show acquisitions financed with scrip earn negative and significant excess 
returns across both the BHAR and three-factor methods. On the other hand, 
bidders earn positive and significant BHARs for using cash as the payment 
method.51  
Later studies have also found scrip financed M&As result in long-term 
negative and significant abnormal returns, regardless of methodology. For 
example, Savor and Lu (2009) observe BHARs of -13.10% and mean monthly 
ARs of  -0.40% over the three-year post-announcement period. Similarly, Ang 
and Cheng (2006) report BHARs of -12.45%. Finally, Petmezas (2009) show, 
over the three-year window, bidders earn negative average monthly ARs of           
-1.91%.  
Results for cash financed M&As show, at worst, acquirers earn negative but 
insignificant excess returns. Results range from positive and significant average 
monthly ARs of +0.60% (Dutta and Jog 2009) to insignificant negative BHARs 
of -2.06% (Ang and Cheng 2006). In the Australian context, the results are 
consistent. Both da Silva Rosa et al. (2000) and Nankervis and Singh (2012) 
observe greater post-announcement under-performance for scrip financed M&As.  
                                                 
51 Mitchell and Stafford (2000) three-factor model results for cash were insignificant.  
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Overall, the results on post-announcement abnormal returns support the 
signalling hypothesis proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984). Prior literature 
provides strong evidence that payment method has a significant impact on long-
term excess returns and supports the conclusion by da Silva Rosa et al. (2000, p. 
68) that “relative performance of acquiring firms in the post-bid long-term is 
systematically related to method of payment”. 
3.5.5PublicvPrivateTargets
Event studies around the announcement have demonstrated that acquirers of 
private targets enjoy higher excess returns, compared to public (Fuller et al. 2002; 
Moeller et al. 2004; Shams et al. 2013). Fuller et al. (2002) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992) argue that private firms have liquidity constraints and thus less 
attractive targets, weakening the bargaining power of the target resulting in a 
significant discount of their assets.  
Prior post-announcement research on the type of target has presented mixed 
results. For example, Moeller et al. (2004) report insignificant non-negative ARs 
for both public and private targets in their three-factor model. While both 
Antoniou et al. (2007) and Conn et al. (2005) observe bidders of public targets 
earn negative and significant ARs and insignificant returns for private 
acquisitions.  
In contrast, Dutta and Jog (2009) find bidders of private targets earn negative 
and significant BHARs of -6.0%, compared to insignificant BHARs of -3.0% for 
public targets. However, the significance for private targets disappears in their 
three-factor model. Petmezas (2009) detected negative and significant average 
monthly ARs of -0.50% for private targets and insignificant ARs for public 
targets. Finally, Latorre et al. (2014) reports significant mean monthly ARs of 
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+0.74% for acquirers of public targets, compared to insignificant excess returns 
for public targets of +0.15% .  
It appears that, on average, bidders of private targets suffer greater in the post-
announcement period. Chang and Tsai (2013) argue that private targets have 
higher levels of undisclosed information, due to a limited operating record and 
lack of public pricing making it difficult for investors to evaluate the value of the 
acquisition. It then follows, that acquirers excess returns around the 
announcement reflects investors over-optimism around announcement, but are 
reversed in the long-run (Antoniou et al. 2008; Petmezas 2009).  
3.5.6RealEstateSectorPostǦAnnouncementPerformance
 Sahin (2005) was the first researcher to investigate the long-term performance 
of acquiring US REITs utilising both BHAR and three-factor asset pricing 
methodology over the three-year post announcement period. The study examined 
30 REIT M&As from 1994 to 1998. BHARs results over the three-year event 
window were +3.56%, however the result was not significant. The median BHAR 
was significant at the 10% level and positive (+11.62%). These outcomes provide 
support for the synergy motive for REIT M&As. In contrast, three-factor model 
results showed acquirers earn mean monthly ARs of -0.50%, however, again the 
result lacked statistical significance.  
Following on from Sahin (2005), Campbell et al. (2009) conducted only the 
second investigation into the long-term wealth effects of M&As within the US 
REIT sector. The study consisted of 114 M&A announcements between 1994 and 
2001. Campbell et al. (2009, p. 105) tested if “the anomaly of post-merger 
underperformance observed in conventional firms applies to the case of REITs”. 
The study observed negative and significant BHARs of -9.9% over the five-year 
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post-acquisition period. The study also calculated BHARs of +0.3% for the 12 
month period and -1.5% for 36 months, however neither result displayed 
statistical significance. Campbell et al. (2009) concluded that the results confirm 
that post-acquisition underperformance of US REITs is consistent with those 
observed in more general corporate finance studies and provide support for the 
hubris and/or agency motive. 
3.5.7PostǦAnnouncementPerformance–Conclusion
A review of the literature indicates, on average, that long-term post-bid 
performance for acquirers decreases shareholder value. Two reasons for this 
phenomenon have been suggested in the literature. First, long-term studies may be 
subject to methodological problems (Bessembinder and Zhang 2013). Early 
studies utilising short-term event study methodology to calculate long-term excess 
returns introduce the possibility of changes in the parameters used to estimate 
abnormal returns and also impacting the variance values used to estimate the test 
statistics (Kothari and Warner 1997). Studies utilising BHAR methodology to 
match acquiring firms with a control sample may also face problems due to the 
“impossibility to isolate the pure takeover effect from the impact of other events 
occurring in the years subsequent to the acquisition” (Martynova and Renneboog 
2008, p. 2164). In addition, the BHAR method ignores any cross-sectional 
dependence of the overlapping abnormal returns of event firms (Mitchell and 
Stafford 2000).  
Fama and French (1993) advocate the use of the three-factor asset pricing 
model to examine long-term abnormal performance. However. Barber and Lyon 
(1997) argue that the three-factor model has two disadvantages. First, the 
regression requires a minimum of five observations of post-event returns, creating 
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a positive survivor bias among the remaining sample acquirers. Second, the 
regression model “assumes that a firm’s market, size, and book-to-market 
characteristics are stable over time” (Barber and Lyon 1997, p. 356). If the 
observed results are due to methodological problems, then the conclusions 
regarding post-bid wealth destruction may be misleading.  
The second explanation suggests the existence of hubris and/or agency motives 
for the M&A. BHAR results show, on average, shareholders of bidding firms are 
worse off in the long-run, while three-factor model results are somewhat 
ambiguous. Further examination of the literature shows that mode of payment has 
a significant impact on post-announcement excess returns. Acquisitions financed 
with scrip result in significant long-term negative abnormal returns, regardless of 
methodology, while cash acquisitions are, at worst, negative and insignificant.  
On the other hand, results partitioned by target type are varied. Some studies 
show that acquirers of private firms enjoy greater post-announcement excess 
returns compared to public targets (Antoniou et al. 2007; Conn et al. 2005). While 
other studies observe the opposite result (Latorre et al. 2014; Petmezas 2009). 
Chang and Tsai (2013) suggest this result is due to the information asymmetries 
of targeting privately held firms and investors over-optimism around 
announcement are reversed in the long-run (Antoniou et al. 2008; Petmezas 
2009). 
In the area of real estate research post-bid, the results are inconclusive. To 
date, only two studies have been completed with conflicting results. Sahin (2005) 
observed insignificant abnormal returns over the three-year post-announcement 
period. While Campbell et al. (2009) observe negative and significant BHARs of 
-9.9% over the five-year post-bid period. However, neither study examined the 
 
 
102
impact of payment method or target type. It is the aim of this study to add to the 
existing literature in the real estate sector on the long-term post acquisition 
performance of acquirers and to examine the impacts of the type of target and 
method of payment with a sample of M&As from the Australian real estate 
market. 
3.6Conclusion
This chapter has provided a discussion on the findings from the extant 
literature across the three periods of investigation into M&As within both the real 
estate sector and conventional firms. Literature has been presented on shareholder 
wealth impacts around the announcement of a M&A, along with the literature 
relating to the characteristics of both bidders and targets to identify the probability 
of a firm being involved in a M&A. Finally, assessment of the impacts on 
shareholder value for acquirers in the post-bid period has been discussed.  
Review of this literature shows targets from the real estate sector earn positive 
and significant abnormal returns around the announcement. This outcome is 
consistent with research on conventional firms. However, the level of excess 
returns is lower for REITs. Findings suggest the results may be due to the 
homogeneity of the REITs assets and therefore lower levels of information 
asymmetry in the sector (Eichholtz and Kok 2008; Sah and Seagraves 2012). 
Research on REIT acquirers is inconclusive, ranging from significantly positive 
CARs of +5.78% (Allen and Sirmans 1987) to negative and significant -1.14% 
(Womack 2012). Leading to varying conclusions on the drivers of M&As in the 
REIT sector. Some suggesting the existence of hubris and/or agency issues 
(Campbell et al. 1998; Womack 2012). While the limited research in the 
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Australian REIT sector shows support for the synergy motive (Ratcliffe and 
Dimovski 2012a; Ratcliffe et al. 2009).  
The second section of this chapter discusses the literature regarding the 
characteristics of REITs being targets or bidders. Results show underperforming 
firms have an increased probability of being targets (Eichholtz and Kok 2008; 
Ratcliffe and Dimovski 2013). The degree of financial leverage displays a 
negative relationship with both bidder and target probability (Eichholtz and Kok 
2008; Frank et al. 2011). Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) conclude that financial 
slack is an influential factor in M&A probability for REITs.  
Overall, the prior literature suggests that targets are in a weak financial 
position. This outcome supports the inefficient management hypothesis as the 
driver for the real estate sector to capture possible synergistic gains from M&As. 
However, it is also observed that there is no strong evidence on acquirer 
performance and bidder probability. Both Eichholtz and Kok (2008) and Ratcliffe 
and Dimovki (2013) observe a positive relationship between share price 
performance and acquirer probability, however neither study displays statistical 
significance.  
The final area of literature reviewed examined the post-bid performance of 
acquiring firms. Research into conventional firms showed, on average, that long-
term post-announcement shareholder performance is negative. Two possible 
scenarios have been identified in the literature to explain this phenomenon. First, 
possible methodological errors in the models used to access long-term 
performance. The second suggests the existence of the hubris and/or agency 
motive for M&As. Investigation to date into post-bid performance by REITs has 
been inconclusive.  
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The focus of this thesis is to examine the motives for M&As within the 
Australian real estate sector, with particular attention paid to A-REITs. The study 
begins by examining the markets short-term reaction to the announcement. 
Following this assessment, the thesis investigates the characteristics of these firms 
and the impact on the probability that a firm will enter into a M&A. Finally, the 
post-bid performance of the acquiring firms will be accessed to identify if M&As 
in the Australian REIT sector add value to existing shareholders in the long-run. 
This study is unique in that it will be the first, to this author’s knowledge, to 
combine and examine M&As in the Australian real estate sector over three 
distinct phases.  
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Chapter 4: Data Collection  
4.1Introduction
This chapter describes the data collection and filtering process employed to 
identify observations for the three analytical investigations employed by this 
thesis. The data collection process starts by identifying M&A announcements for 
Australian firms classified as Real Estate under the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) industry group. Merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements 
where identified from the Connect 4 Takeovers Database over the period of 
January 1995 to July 2013.52 An additional search was conducted using the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) announcements to identify any omitted 
announcements from the Connect 4 Takeovers Database.  
Information regarding the announcement date payment method and value of 
the acquisition where collected from the respective bidders and targets 
statements.53 Share price information for both parties was obtained from 
Bloomberg and DatAnalysis Database. All accounting data employed in the 
studies (for example; leverage, property type investment and book value of 
equity) where all collected using the Financial Data search tab in the DatAnalysis 
Database. Any missing values or unusual values where crosschecked against the 
individual firms annual/semi-annual report. Data for market index and sector 
index was collected from Thomson Financial-Data Stream.  
                                                 
52 This study did not identify any M&A announcements in 1995. 
53 To confirm announcement date, each transaction was cross-referenced with the ASX 
announcements database. If an announcement occurred after the close of trade, the following 
trading day was employed as day 0. 
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Finally, only announcements with a value of greater than $10 million were 
included in the sample. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the number of 
announcements per year over the study period. It can be seen that consolidation 
within the real estate sector starting gathering momentum in 1999. The highest 
number of announcements occurred in 2004. This momentum continued until 
2007. The onset of the GFC in late 2007/early 2008 saw the number of M&As fall 
dramatically and remain low through to the end of the study period.  
Table 4.1: Number M&A Announcements by Year 
Year # Announcements Year # Announcements 
1996 2 2005 6 
1997 0 2006 16 
1998 1 2007 19 
1999 12 2008 2 
2000 13 2009 5 
2001 13 2010 6 
2002 2 2011 6 
2003 13 2012 5 
2004 23 2013 2 
Table 4.1 presents the number of M&A announcements per year over the study period.  
 
After development of the full M&A sample, the observations were partitioned 
into either Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs) or Real Estate 
Management and Development (REMD) firms. The division of the full sample 
was based on their classification under the GICS system and the ASX.  
4.2M&AAnnouncementPeriod
For bidders and targets to be included in the short-term event study the 
following screens where employed: 
x the firm daily share prices must be listed for the period beginning 150 
trading days prior the announcement and ending 20 days after the 
announcement, a total 171 days; 
x there must be an absence of large-scale confounding events occurring 
within five trading days of the announcement; and,  
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x firms must have full accounting data (leverage, specialisation, 
shareholdings, directors and management structure) available from their 
respective annual/semi-annual reports prior the announcement.  
Interest rate data for the two-factor model abnormal returns calculations was 
collected from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) website (www.rba.gov.au). 
A total of 100 targets and 99 bidders where identified that met the above criteria 
for the Australian real estate sector. Partitioning off the sample into M&A 
announcements where both parties are classified as A-REITs (or, in the case of a 
private counterparty, an unlisted property trust) resulted in 55 A-REIT acquirers 
and 61 targets. Ratcliffe et al. (2009) and Campbell et al. (2005) argue that 
although the number of observations is small compared to M&A studies on 
conventional firms, the sample has the advantage that all announcements are 
drawn from the same sector. This allows the researcher to focus on the variables 
of interest without having to control for other concerns that may impact the results 
in studies of M&As across different industries.  
4.3PreǦM&AAnnouncementPeriod
Implementation of the pre-M&A logit model requires the identification of two 
dates. The first date, similar to event study methodology, is the date of the 
announcement and is defined as the “announcement date”. This section of 
investigation is concerned with the characteristics of Australian real estate firms 
that are involved in a M&A announcement, not the resultant outcome and impact 
on shareholders wealth. The second date of importance in the development of the 
sample is the “information date” (Ambrose 1990) and is defined as the month end 
prior to the M&A announcement and at least 30 days prior the announcement date 
(Eichholtz and Kok 2008; Ratcliffe and Dimovski 2013).  
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After identification of the announcement and information dates, bidders and 
targets where subjected to the following screens: 
x both bidders and targets have three-years of continuous monthly share 
price data prior the information date; 
x firms must have three-years of accounting data available from their 
respective annual reports prior the information date; and, 
x there must be an absence of large-scale confounding events occurring in 
the three-years prior the information date.54  
After screening, the real estate sample included 72 targets and 48 acquirers. A 
random sample of control firms, from the same sector, is temporally matched to 
both targets and bidders.55 Temporal matching involves randomly assigning two 
control firms to each acquirer and target with matching information dates 
(Ambrose 1990). Firms are excluded from the control sample if: 
x they themselves where involved in a M&A during the sample period; 
x have missing accounting and share price data; and,  
x the firm was not continuously listed.   
The final sample for the real estate sector logit model is 216 targets and 144 
bidders, allowing a control firm to be in the sample more than once. Finally, 
screening the sample into where both parties are A-REITs resulted in 162 targets 
and 105 acquirers, again allowing a control A-REIT to be included in the sample 
more than once.  
                                                 
54 For example, a firm that is involved in multiple M&As that occur within three-years of each 
other will require the removal of the later announcement, as the data collection period covers the 
earlier announcement.  
55 Section 5.4.3 provides further discussion on the development of the control firm portfolios.
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4.4PostǦM&AAnnouncementPeriod
The third analytical study involves the examination of long-term bidder 
shareholder wealth post-announcement of the M&A. The study calculates the 
excess returns over three event windows; one, two and three-years. The screening 
process employed in this study was: 
x the firm monthly share prices must be available for a minimum period of 
twelve months after the announcement month, to a maximum of 36 
months;  
x there must be an absence of large-scale confounding events occurring 
during the post-announcement period;56 and, 
x accounting data available from their respective annual/semi-annual reports 
prior the announcement. 
This initial screening resulted in 83 observations for the one-year event 
window. The two-year window comprises 65 observations, while the three-year 
period contains 51 observations. The differences in the number of observations 
across the three periods are due to the first filtering requirement. For example, if a 
bidder makes an announcement in July 2001 and another in October 2002, the 
2001 announcement would only be included in the one-year excess return 
calculations. The abnormal returns would not be calculated for the two and three-
year periods, because they overlap the October 2002 announcement. However, the 
October 2002 announcement has no overlapping post-announcement periods and 
therefore excess returns would be calculated for the one, two and three-year event 
windows. 
                                                 
56 For example, a firm that is involved in multiple M&As that occur, at a minimum, within one-
year of each other will require the removal of the earlier announcement, as the data collection 
period covers the later announcement. Lyon et al. (1999) claim a lack of independence is 
generated from overlapping returns, yielding mis-specified test statistics.   
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In relation to the buy-and-hold methodology, the study is required to construct 
a matching/control portfolio. The control firms are again selected from the same 
sector and are subject to the same filtering processes described above, with the 
additional constraint that the control firm is not involved in a M&A during the 
sample period.  
Consistent with the previous analytical investigations, the sample is filtered 
further into A-REIT bidders. This process resulted in 65 observations for the one-
year period, 49 observations for the two-year and 35 observations for the three-
year event window.   
4.5Conclusion
This chapter has presented the data collection and filtering processes employed 
in the three analytical investigations conducted in this thesis. Table 4.2 provides a 
pictorial snapshot of the listed property landscape over the investigation period. 
The entire sample is displayed and from this it is easy to identify patterns and 
trends in relation to announcement dates, payment method and acquisitions value. 
The table also identifies the announcements that are included in each of the 
studies. The following chapter presents and discusses the methodologies 
employed in the announcement period study, the pre-acquisition study and the 
post-announcement study.   
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Table 4.2: Real Estate Sector M&A Announcements 
       Ann. Period Study Pre-Ann. Study Post-Ann. Study 
Target CODE Bidder CODE Ann Date Offer Type 
Offer Value 
($M) Target Bidder Target Bidder Bidder 
GEM retail GET General Property Trust GPT 2/04/96 Combo $426.50 俵 俵   俵 GEM commercial  GCP General Property Trust GPT 2/04/96 Combo $458.56 俵   
LG Industrial Property Trust LGI Colonial Industrial PT CIP 20/11/98 Combo $121.43 俵 俵  俵 俵 
Mirvac Ltd MRV Mirvac Group* MGR 12/04/99 Scrip $432.59 俵  俵  
俵 Mirvac Property Trust MPT Mirvac Group* MGR 12/04/99 Scrip $540.39 俵  俵  
Capital Property Trust CPL Mirvac Group* MGR 12/04/99 Scrip $607.19 俵  俵  
Capcount Property Trust CPY Goodman Hardie Ind PT GHP 28/04/99 Combo $288.05 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
Australian Comm Prop Trust ACY Stockland  SGP 8/06/99 Cash $155.86 俵 俵  俵  
BT Hotel Group BHT Principal Hotels Australia  Private 26/08/99 Cash $255.33 俵  俵   
BT Sydney Development Trust BTS Principal Office Fund POF 1/09/99 Combo $357.00 俵 俵  俵  
Armstrong Jones Ind Fund AJS Prime Industrial PT PIP 8/09/99 Scrip $131.40 俵 俵  俵 俵 
Armstrong Jones Office Fund AJO Prime Credit PT PRP 8/09/99 Scrip $306.23 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
Walker Corp Ltd WKC Australand ALZ 25/10/99 Cash $238.08 俵 俵 俵  俵 
Colonial First State Retail PT CMF Colonial Prop Grp* CFT 9/11/99 Scrip $400.27 俵  俵  
俵 Colonial First State Comm PT COC Colonial Prop Grp* CFT 9/11/99 Scrip $302.31 俵  俵  
Colonial First State Ind PT CIP Colonial Prop Grp* CFT 9/11/99 Scrip $356.09 俵    
Tyndall Property Trust TPT Meridian Inv Trust  MRD 23/02/00 Combo $46.63 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
Advance Property Fund APF Mirvac Group MGR 8/03/00 Scrip $646.87 俵 俵 俵   
Pacific Century Hotels Trust Private Thakral Holdings Ltd THG 10/03/00 Cash $42.90  俵  俵 俵 
Citie Centre Ltd CIE Villa World Ltd VWD 27/03/00 Scrip $20.93 俵 俵 俵  俵 
AV Jennings  AVJ MPH Ltd Private  1/05/00 Cash $111.92 俵  俵   
Flinders Industrial Prop Trust FIT Stockland  SGP 11/05/00 Scrip $277.06 俵 俵   俵 
Challenger Prop Income Trust  CGP Challenger Prop Nom P/L Private 18/05/00 Cash $175.65 俵     
St Lukes Group Ltd  SLG Westfield Trust WFT 31/05/00 Cash $906.96 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
BT Property Trust BTP BT Office Trust BTO 6/07/00 Scrip $497.40 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
Paladin Commercial Trust PDC Commercial Inv Trust CIT 13/07/00 Scrip $405.76 俵 俵 俵  俵 
Paladin Industrial Trust PID Industrial Inv Trust IIT 13/07/00 Scrip $169.53 俵 俵 俵  俵 
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Table 4.2: Continued  
       Ann. Period Study Pre-Ann. Study Post-Ann. Study 
Target CODE Bidder CODE Ann Date Offer Type 
Offer Value 
($M) Target Bidder Target Bidder Bidder 
Macquarie Industrial Trust MIP Goodman Hardie Ind PT GHP 15/08/00 Scrip $281.44 俵 俵 俵  俵 
Armstrong Jones Retail Fund AJR ING Real Estate Int Inv Private 20/11/00 Cash $323.50 俵  俵  
Sea World Property Trust SWD Warner Sea World Units VRL 9/04/01 Cash $86.47 俵 俵 俵   
Fini Pty Ltd  Private Mirvac Group MGR 13/04/01 Combo $14.00  俵   俵 
Delfin Group DEL Lend Lease Group LLC 27/04/01 Cash $169.39 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
MTM Media Ent Trust MME Sunderton Pty Ltd Private 7/05/01 Cash $27.60 俵     
CT Retail Investment Trust  CTT Prime Retail Group PRX 10/05/01 Cash $24.98 
俵 
俵 
俵 
俵 俵 
CT Retail Investment Trust  CTT Tyndall Meridian Trust TMT 10/05/01 Cash $24.98 俵 俵 俵 
CT Retail Investment Trust  CTT Centro Properties Group CEP 10/05/01 Cash $42.00 俵 俵 俵 
Hudson Pacific Group  HPG Hudson Investment Group HGL 28/05/01 Combo $23.18 俵 俵  俵 俵 
Australian Comm Prop Trust ACY Stockland  SGP 18/06/01 Cash $177.29 俵 俵    
Tourism Asset Holdings Ltd TLA Bainton Pty Ltd  Private 21/06/01 Cash $215.23 俵  俵   
Ipoh Ltd IPH Reco Bay P/L Private 14/09/01 Cash $259.65 俵  俵   
Homemaker Retail Group HRP General Property Trust GPT 19/09/01 Cash $206.50 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
PA Property Trust PAT James Fielding Holdings  Private 9/10/01 Scrip $61.00 俵  俵   
2 Park Street Trust TPS Macquarie Office Trust MOF 8/11/01 Cash $168.65 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
Property Trust of Australasia  PYT Stockland  SGP 21/11/01 Cash $63.71 俵  俵   
Colonial First State PT Grp CFT Cmwealth Prop Off Fund CPA 30/07/02 Combo $1,065.72 俵 俵  俵 俵 Colonial First State PT Grp CFT CFS Retail Property Trust CFX 30/07/02 Combo $666.62 俵  俵 俵 
Ipoh Ltd  IPH Reco Bay NSW P/L Private  14/03/03 Cash $290.45 俵     
CPA Industrial Portfolio Private Macq Goodman Ind Trust MGI 2/04/03 Cash $475.00  俵  俵 俵 
CPA Industrial Portfolio Private Macq Goodman Mgmt MGM 2/04/03 Cash $25.00  俵  俵  
Balmoral Corp Ltd BMR Formrace P/L Private  28/04/03 Cash $11.62 俵  俵   
AMP Shopping Centre Trust ART Westfield Trust WFT 20/05/03 Cash $1,459.48 俵 俵 俵   
Principal Office Fund POF Investa Property Group IPG 22/05/03 Combo $1,492.91 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
AMP Diversified Property Trust ADP Stockland  SGP 28/05/03 Combo $1,689.28 俵 俵 俵  俵 
Prudential Investment Co  PIA FEXCO Inv Aus  Private  28/05/03 Cash $14.10 俵  俵   
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Table 4.2: Continued  
       Ann. Period Study Pre-Ann. Study Post-Ann. Study 
Target CODE Bidder CODE Ann Date Offer Type 
Offer Value 
($M) Target Bidder Target Bidder Bidder 
MCS Property Ltd Private Centro Properties Group CEP 7/07/03 Cash $193.50  俵   俵 
AMP Industrial Trust  AIP Macq Goodman Mgmt MGM 11/07/03 Scrip $429.35 俵  俵  俵 
Australand Whsale PT # 1 Private Australand  ALZ 20/08/03 Combo $142.10  俵  俵 俵 
Australian Growth Prop Ltd AGH Trans Tasman Prop P/L Private 22/08/03 Cash $256.39 俵  俵   
Watt Portfolio Private Prime Retail Group PRX 27/08/03 Cash $162.00  俵    
Forest Place Group Ltd FPG FKP Property Group FKP 7/11/03 Cash $41.29 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
Fleetwood Parks Pty Ltd Private Aspen Group APZ 1/04/04 Cash $28.00  俵   俵 
Westfield Trust WFT Westfield Group* WDC 23/04/04 Scrip $9,605.53 俵  俵  
俵 Westfield America Trust WFA Westfield Group* WDC 23/04/04 Scrip $11,157.00 俵  俵  
Westfield Holdings Ltd WSF Westfield Group* WDC 23/04/04 Scrip $8,588.28 俵  俵  
General Property Trust GPT Lend Lease Group LLC 25/05/04 Combo $6,834.97 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
ICA Property Group Private Valad Property Group VPG 27/05/04 Combo $28.00  俵   俵 
P&O Australian Resorts Private General Property Trust GPT 7/07/04 Cash $226.00  俵    
S8 Ltd  SEL City Pacific Ltd CIY 14/07/04 Scrip $98.52 俵 俵  俵 俵
Principal America Office Trust PAO Macquarie Office Trust MOF 19/07/04 Combo $857.83 俵 俵 俵  俵
Prime Retail Group PRX Centro Properties Group CEP 27/07/04 Scrip $583.13 俵 俵 俵   
Deutsche Diversified Trust DDF DB RReef Trust* DRT 4/08/04 Scrip $1,305.56 俵  俵  
俵 Deutsche Office Trust DOT DB RReef Trust* DRT 4/08/04 Scrip $1,400.62 俵  俵  
Deutsche Industrial Trust DIT DB RReef Trust* DRT 4/08/04 Scrip $662.93 俵  俵  
Ronin Property Group RPH Multiplex Group MXG 27/09/04 Combo $1,082.74 俵 俵 俵  俵 
Australand Whsale PT # 3 Private Australand  ALZ 29/09/04 Cash $98.00  俵    
GPT Split Trust  GSTIN Lend Lease LLC 1/10/04 Cash $49.84 俵  俵   
James Fielding Group JFG Mirvac Group MGR 12/10/04 Scrip $471.90 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
AMF Bowling Centers Private Macq Leisure Trust  MLE 18/10/04 Cash $67.40    俵 俵 
Macq Goodman Ind Trust MGI Macq Goodman Group* MGQ 19/10/04 Scrip $3,797.17 俵    俵 
Macq Goodman Mgmt MGM Macq Goodman Group* MGQ 19/10/04 Scrip $948.06 俵     
General Property Trust GPT Stockland  SGP 8/11/04 Scrip $8,460.53  俵    
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Table 4.2: Continued  
       Ann. Period Study Pre-Ann. Study Post-Ann. Study 
Target CODE Bidder CODE Ann Date Offer Type 
Offer Value 
($M) Target Bidder Target Bidder Bidder 
Kramont Portfolio US Lstd CNPR Group CNP 20/12/04 Cash $812.47  俵  俵 俵 
Travelodge Hotel Group Private JF Meridian Trust JFM 31/12/04 Cash $92.61  俵  俵 俵 
 Horizon Bay Chartwell  Private ING Comm Living Grp  ILF 19/07/05 Cash $154.05  俵   俵 
Australand Whsale PT # 4 & 5 Private Australand  ALZ 2/08/05 Cash $393.00  俵   俵 
Millers Self Storage Private Valad Property Group VPG 14/10/05 Cash $107.55  俵   俵 
Grand Hotel Group GHG Mulpha Private  18/10/05 Cash $219.89 俵  俵   
Abacus Div Income Fund Private Abacus Property Group ABP 6/12/05 Scrip $240.00  俵  俵 俵 
Arlington Securities Private Macq Goodman Ind Trust MGI 9/12/05 Cash $379.00  俵    
Oceanis Group Private MFS Livng & Lsure Grp MPY 13/02/06 Cash $150.00  俵  俵 俵 
MFS Property Trust Private MFS Diversified Group MFT 17/02/06 Scrip $80.00  俵    
Villa World Ltd  VWD MFS Diversified Group MFT 21/04/06 Combo $204.63 俵  俵   
Consolidated Properties Gp P/L Private Trinity Consolidated Grp TCQ 10/05/06 Scrip $25.35  俵   俵 
Eurinpro International SA Private Goodman Group  GMG 25/05/06 Combo $597.00  俵    
Heritage Prop Inv REIT US Lstd Centro Retail Group CER 10/07/06 Cash $2,456.38  俵    
Main Event Ent Holdings Inc Private Ardent Leisure Group AAD 28/08/06 Cash $67.00  俵    
Summit Canada REIT US Lstd ING Industrial Fund IIF 31/08/06 Cash $995.00  俵  俵 俵 
S8 Ltd SEL MFS Ltd MFS 4/09/06 Combo $571.74 俵 俵  俵  
Village Life Ltd VLL Sunnycove Mgmt Ltd SCV 7/09/06 Scrip $20.93 俵 俵   俵 
Cromwell Div Prop Trust fund  Private Cromwell Corp Limited CMW 23/10/06 Scrip $1,000.00  俵  俵 俵 
Grand Hotel Group GHG Tuan Sing (Australia) P/L  Private 2/11/06 Cash $362.18 俵     
Tourism & Leisure Trust TLT Toga Accom Fund Trust 2 Private 21/11/06 Cash $23.15 俵  俵   
Akeler Holdings SA Private Macq Goodman Inst Trust GMG 14/12/06 Cash $122.00  俵    
Benchmark Assisted Living Private General Property Trust GPT 14/12/06 Cash $549.50  俵   俵 
Panthers Entertainment Group Private ING Real Estate Ent Fund IEF 22/12/06 Cash $85.00  俵   俵 
Halladale Group plc UK Lstd Stockland  SGP 7/02/07 Cash $427.00  俵   俵 
Caversham Property Group Private Aspen Group APZ 8/02/07 Cash $239.00  俵   俵 
New Plan Realty Trust Inc US Lstd Centro Properties Group  CNP 28/02/07 Cash $2,395.36  俵   俵 
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Table 4.2: Continued  
       Ann. Period Study Pre-Ann. Study Post-Ann. Study 
Target CODE Bidder CODE Ann Date Offer Type 
Offer Value 
($M) Target Bidder Target Bidder Bidder 
Bakehouse Quarter Fund  BQF Pelorus Property Group*  PPI 28/02/07 Cash $75.31 俵 俵 俵  俵 
Tishman Spyer Bvrly Hills Fnd Private Tishman Office Fund TSO 20/03/07 Cash $418.05  俵   俵 
S8 Property Trust SPR MFS Diversified Group MFT 28/03/07 Cash $63.62 俵 俵   俵 
Rosemound Dev Ltd Private Goodman Group  GMG 12/04/07 Cash $840.00  俵   俵 
Macquarie ProLogis Trust MPR ProLogis Ind Fnd Private 17/04/07 Cash $1,239.14 俵  俵   
Tourism Holdings Ltd NZ Lstd MFS Livng & Lsure Grp MPY 30/04/07 Cash $247.00  俵   俵 
Investa Property Group IPG Morgan Stanley Bidco Private 31/05/07 Cash $4,698.65 俵  俵   
Multiplex Group MXG Brookfield Asset Mgmt US Lstd 12/06/07 Cash $4,228.88 俵  俵   
Scarborough  Private Valad Property Group VPG 25/06/07 Cash $2,000.00  俵   俵 
Australian Hotel Fund AHO Tobar Trust Private 9/07/07 Cash $22.15 俵  俵   
Fincorp Private Becton Property Group  BEC  16/07/07 Combo $170.00  俵   俵 
Goodlife Health Club Private Ardent Leisure Group AAD 31/07/07 Cash $60.00  俵   俵 
Mirvac Ind Fund & Ret Pfolio Private Mirvac R Estate Inv Trst MRZ 7/08/07 Cash $94.10  俵  俵 俵 
Centro Shopping America Trust CSF Centro Retail Group CER 24/08/07 Scrip $1,185.18 俵 俵 俵  俵
Halverton & Hamburg Trust Private General Property Trust GPT 7/12/07 Cash $99.10  俵   俵
PRM Property Group Pty Ltd  Private RCL Group RLG 20/12/07 Cash $16.10  俵   俵 
European Inv Global Prop Trust EIG EII Global Property Fund  Private 18/07/08 Scrip $15.53 俵     
Babcock & Brown Comm Grp BBC Prime Retirement PT PTN 4/09/08 Scrip $309.57 俵 俵 俵   
Mirvac REIT MRZ Mirvac Group MGR 12/05/09 Combo $400.48 俵 俵  俵  
Macarthur Cook Ltd MCK AIMS Holdings P/L Private 15/05/09 Cash $11.57 俵  俵   
Tishman Speyer Office Fund TSO MIRELF III Aust  Private 13/07/09 Cash $101.53 俵  俵   
Lend Lease Prime Life group  LLP Lend Lease Group LLC 28/09/09 Cash $338.19 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
Challenger Japan Trust CKT Challenger Life Ltd Private  9/12/09 Cash $160.27 俵     
Record Realty US Trust Private Real Estate Cap US PT RCU 29/01/10 Cash $20.00  俵  俵 俵 
Macquarie Office Management  Private Charter Hall Group CHC 29/01/10 Combo $297.00  俵  俵 俵 
Macarthur Cook Ind Prpty Fnd MIF HRPT REIT US Lstd 3/05/10 Cash $43.33 俵     
Westpac Office Trust WOT Mirvac Group MGR 7/07/10 Cash $414.65 俵 俵   俵 
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Table 4.2: Continued  
       Ann. Period Study Pre-Ann. Study Post-Ann. Study 
Target CODE Bidder CODE Ann Date Offer Type 
Offer Value 
($M) Target Bidder Target Bidder Bidder 
Aevum Ltd AVE Stockland  SGP 2/08/10 Cash $266.26 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
ING Industrial Fund IIF Goodman Group GMG 28/10/10 Cash $1,415.37 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
EDT Retail Trust EDT EPN GP LLC Private 10/03/11 Cash $423.03 俵  俵   
Oaks Hotel & Resorts OAK Minor International Ltd Private 21/03/11 Cash $60.84 俵  俵   
Rabinov Property Trust RBV Growthpoint Prop Aust GOZ 13/04/11 Scrip $49.59 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
Valad Property Group  VPG Blackstone Real Estate  Private 29/04/11 Cash $207.19 俵  俵   
Abacus Storage Fund Private Abacus Property Group ABP 8/12/11 Combo $92.95  俵  俵 俵 
Living & Leisure Aust Grp LLA Merlin Ent Grp Private 19/12/11 Cash $140.13 俵  俵   
Tishman Speyer Office fund TSO US Office Holdings Private 10/02/12 Cash $308.66 俵     
Thakral Holdings Ltd THG Brookfield Asset Mgmt  Private 19/04/12 Cash $409.76 俵  俵   
Real Estate Cap US PT RCU Woolley GAL II P/L Private 17/05/12 Cash $46.47 俵     
Fenix Fitness Clubs Private Ardent Leisure Group AAD 13/09/12 Cash $60.90  俵   俵 
Australand ALZ General Property Trust GPT 10/12/12 Cash $1,882.25 俵 俵 俵 俵 俵 
CIC Australia Ltd CNB Peet Ltd  PPC 10/04/13 Cash $75.47 俵 俵 俵 俵  
Commonwealth Prop Off Fnd CPA Dexus Property Group DXS 25/07/13 Combo $2,699.05 俵 俵 俵 俵  
This table displays a summary of the Australian real estate sector M&A announcements, along with the announcement date and payment method. 俵 
observation has been used in the particular analytical study identified as “Announcement Period”, “Pre-Announcement Period” and “Post-Announcement Period. * denotes 
the forming of a new entity from the merger (internalisation).   
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Chapter 5: Methodologies 
5.1Introduction
This chapter presents the methodologies employed in the three analytical 
investigations of the thesis. First, the short-term event study methodology is 
discussed. This method allows the researcher to examine the impact the merger 
and acquisition (M&A) announcement on the market values of both targets and 
bidders (Corrado and Truong 2008). The short-term event study measures the 
abnormal returns to existing shareholders over a forty-one day event period (from 
twenty days prior the M&A announcement, to twenty days post).  
The second analytical method discussed is the pre-M&A announcement logit 
model. The logit probability model allows for the identification of company 
characteristics that have an impact on M&A likelihood (Dietrich and Sorensen 
1984). An understanding of these characteristics that may influence M&A 
probability is important to investors and policy makers.  The third analytical study 
examines the long-term post-announcement performance of bidding firms. The 
study employs two methodologies for detecting long-term abnormal returns. The 
first is the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) method described by Barber 
and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999). The second is the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor abnormal returns model described by Sahin (2005) and 
Moeller et al. (2004). The abnormal returns are estimated over the one, two and 
three-year post-announcement period.  
The overall aim of the study is to identify the underlying motive(s) for M&As 
within the Australian listed property sector and more specifically, Australian Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs). By examining the M&A process across the 
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three phases may provide an improved understanding of who are the likely 
bidders and targets, the impact on shareholders wealth around the announcement 
and the longer-term performance of the acquirers.  
5.2AnnouncementPeriodAbnormalReturnsEventStudy
Model
5.2.1Introduction
In the area of short-term event study methodology, two pioneering papers by 
Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) introduced the methodology to the 
accounting and finance landscape. Short-term event study methodology has seen 
many advances over the years, but the core components of the method can be 
found in these early papers (Corrado 2011). Corrado (2011) further identifies that 
the success of these early papers is a result of the use of the ‘market model’ which 
was developed after the introduction of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
by Sharpe (1964). The event study methodology employed in this study is 
described by Brown and Warner (1985) and is used to measure the excess returns 
to both bidding and target firm shareholders around the announcement of a M&A 
announcement.  
5.2.2EventDay
Early event studies of M&As employed the date of the final approval by 
shareholders as the event date (day 0), for example, (Ellert 1976; Langetieg 1978; 
Mandelker 1974). However, the impact on shareholders is expected to occur on or 
before the day in which the takeover is publicly announced (Dodd and Ruback 
1977). Therefore, the event date in this study is the set as the day that the 
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announcement is made public.57 The announcement day is considered as “day 0” 
or t = 0 and is consistent with Bradley et al. (1988) and Andrade et al. (2001).  
5.2.3EventWindow
All event studies examine the excess returns on the actual day of 
announcement, along with the day following the announcement. This is designed 
to capture the impact on the share prices as the news spreads to a wider audience. 
The day proceeding the announcement day is also often included to capture any 
possible information leakage. Therefore, this study reports the excess returns for 
the one-day [0], three-day [-1,+1] and five-day [-2,+2] windows.   
To investigate the robustness of the results and to provide comparison with 
previous real estate M&A literature, the event windows are extended. It is 
expected that the longer event windows will capture any possible information 
leakage or rumors in the weeks leading up to the announcement along with the 
trading days post announcement as the market adjusts to any further information 
relating the M&A. The additional windows reported are [-20,0], [0,+20] and        
[-20,+20].  
5.2.4EstimationPeriod
For the event period to estimate excess returns, a comparison period needs to 
be constructed. The comparison period is considered to be a ‘normal period’ of 
trade for the securities which are expected to not be influenced by the event 
(Peterson 1989). This allows for the estimation of the expected returns during the 
event window, given a particular returns generating model. The excess or 
abnormal return is then the difference between the observed return and the 
                                                 
57 In the case of an announcement occurring after the close of trade on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX), the following trading day is used as day 0. 
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expected return. The market model is employed to estimate the parameters 
(coefficients) for the estimation of the expected returns during the event window. 
Peterson (1989) discusses that deciding on the length of the estimation period is 
subjective and essentially up to the researcher. The researcher has to weigh up the 
benefits and costs of a longer estimation period (i.e. improved predication model 
versus model parameter instability).  
Estimation periods for daily studies typically range from 100 to 300 days 
(Peterson 1989). A review of prior real estate literature shows that estimation 
periods range from 80 days (Allen and Sirmans 1987) to 250 days (Kirchhoff et 
al. 2006) with a mean period of 125 days. To allow comparisons with prior 
research, this study employs an estimation period of 120 days. Starting 150 days 
before and finishing 30 days prior the announcement date (t-150, t-30). The time 
line for the estimation and event period is represented in Figure 5.1: 
Figure 5.1: Event Study Timeline. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the timeline for the short-term event study period. Days -150 to -30 are used to 
estimate the comparison period for the event firm. The event period is calculated over days -20 
to +20, where day 0 is the event day, the day the M&A announcement is made public. 

5.2.5MarketModel
To implement the event study methodology the market model described by 
Brown and Warner (1985) is employed. This method explicitly accounts for the 
risk associated with the market and mean returns. First, the actual daily stock and 
market index return for each day in the sample period are calculated as: 
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ܴ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ݈݊൫ ௜ܲǡ௧Ȁ ௜ܲǡ௧ିଵ൯               ሺͳሻ 
ܴ௠ǡ௧ ൌ ݈݊൫ ௠ܲǡ௧Ȁ ௠ܲǡ௧ିଵ൯              ሺʹሻ 
 
Where: 
  Ri,t is the observed return for firm i on day t; 
  Rm,t is the observed return for the market index, S&P/ASX200,58 on day t; 
  Ln is the natural log; 
  Pi,t is the price of firm i on day t; and 
  Pm,t is the price of the market index on day t. 
The market model is estimated for each company over a 120-day estimation 
period. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to determine the 
parameter estimation. The following market model is employed: 
ܧ൫ܴ௜ǡ௧൯ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜൫ܴ௠ǡ௧൯ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ݐ ൌ ͳǡ ʹǡ ǥ ǡ ܶ     ሺ͵ሻ 
Where:  
  E(Ri,t) is the estimated return on security i on day t; 
  Įi is the intercept term; 
  ȕi is the slope coefficient; 
  Rm,t is the observed return for the market index, S&P/ASX200, on day t; 
  İi,t is the standard error term; and 
T is the number of periods in the estimation period. 
 
It has been widely recognised that nonsynchronous trading has the potential to 
bias the OLS estimation of the parameters using daily returns for securities 
(Heggen and Gannon 2008; Peterson 1989). This potential bias is particularly 
                                                 
58 S&P/ASX200 is the investable benchmark for the Australian equity market. The index is 
comprised of the top 200 stocks listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. 
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relevant in Australian markets (Heggen and Gannon 2008). Non-synchronicity 
refers to the scenario where a firm’s observed information set (denoted by its 
closing price) differs from its true information set (denoted by the time of last 
trade), and is commonly the result of infrequent or thin trading. 
There have been a number of adjustments to alleviate this bias put forward; the 
most widely recognised are Dimson (1979) and Scholes and Williams (1977). 
This study employs the Scholes and Williams (1977) adjusted beta method. The 
Scholes-Williams procedure involves the estimation of three OLS regression 
models using the T daily share returns within the estimation period (Peterson 
1989): 
ܧ൫ܴ௜ǡ௧൯ ൌ ߙ௜ଵ ൅ ߚ௜ଵ൫ܴ௠ǡ௧൯ ൅ ߝଵǡ௧ݐ ൌ ͳǡ ʹǡ ǥ ǡ ܶ    ሺͶሻ 
ܧ൫ܴ௜ǡ௧൯ ൌ ߙ௜ଶ ൅ ߚ௜ଶ൫ܴ௠ǡ௧ାଵ൯ ൅ ߝଶǡ௧ݐ ൌ ͳǡ ʹǡ ǥ ǡ ܶ െ ͳ  ሺͷሻ 
ܧ൫ܴ௜ǡ௧൯ ൌ ߙ௜ଷ ൅ ߚ௜ଷ൫ܴ௠ǡ௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ߝଷǡ௧ݐ ൌ ʹǡ ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ܶ   ሺ͸ሻ 
The Scholes-Williams adjusted beta is then formed as follows: 
ߚ௜ௌௐ ൌ ሺఉ೔భାఉ೔మାఉ೔యሻሺଵାଶఘሻ                ሺ͹ሻ 
Where: 
Rm,t+1 is the return on market in period t+1; 
Rm,t-1 is the return on market in period t-1; 
ȕik is the estimated OLS coefficients for k =1, 2, and 3; 
ȕiSW is the adjusted Scholes-Williams beta; and 
ȡ is the estimated OLS coefficient of Rm,t on Rm,t-1 (the correlation 
coefficient);59 
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The corresponding Scholes-Williams adjusted alpha (DiSW) is formed as 
follows: 
 
      ሺͺሻ 
 
5.2.6TwoǦFactorModel
McIntosh et al. (1989) employed a market adjusted return model to estimate 
excess returns. The authors cited an increase in evidence that real estate assets are 
sensitive to interest rates and unexpected rates of inflation in addition to market 
factors. This suggestion has been supported by later studies. For example, Allen 
et al. (2000) provided evidence of a significant inverse relationship between REIT 
returns and interest rates. In the case of A-REITs, Newell (2005) observed an 
increase in the sensitivity of A-REIT returns to interest rate changes. Ratcliffe and 
Dimovski (2007) also found evidence that higher long-term interest rates have a 
significantly negative impact on A-REIT returns. Given this evidence, this 
analysis employs a two-factor asset pricing model described by Stone (1974) to 
estimate the coefficients during the estimation period.  
Stone (1974) argues that a two-index model is useful in that it captures the 
effect of systematic interest rate risk and improves the concept of equity risk. 
Furthermore, Stone (1974) also argues that many interest rate sensitive firms have 
high dividend yields and generally exhibit greater collinearity with bond markets. 
This procedure will allow further testing the robustness of the results from the 
market model method, and possibly highlighting if interest rate risk is a 
consideration in the market for corporate control. 
ߙܹ݅ܵ ൌ ൬
ͳ
ܶ െ ʹ൰ ൥෍ܴ݅ǡݐ െ ൭ߚܹ݅ܵ ෍ܴ݉ǡݐ
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Similar to the market model method, the two-factor model was estimated for 
each company over a 120-day estimation period. Ordinary least squares 
regression is used to determine the parameter estimation. The following two-
factor model is employed: 
ܧ൫ܴ௜ǡ௧൯ ൌ ߙ௜ଵ ൅ ߚ௜൫ܴ௠ǡ௧൯ ൅ ߚ௝ሺ݅௧ሻ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ݐ ൌ ͳǡ ʹǡ ǥ ǡ ܶ  ሺͻሻ 
Where:  
 E(Ri,t) is the estimated return on security i on day t; 
 Įi is the intercept term; 
 ȕi is the slope coefficient for market returns; 
 ȕj is the slope coefficient for interest rates; 
 Rm,t is the observed return for the market index, S&P/ASX200, on day t; 
it is the observed residual return for 10-year Commonwealth Government 
bonds;  
 İi,t is the standard error term; and 
T is the number of periods in the estimation period. 
5.2.7ExcessReturns
The abnormal, or excess return for an individual security for a given period is 
then calculated as the difference between the observed return during the event 
period and the expected return predicted by either the market model or the two-
factor model. The abnormal return (AR) of the individual security of firm i in the 
event window is defined as:        
  ܣܴ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܴ௜ǡ௧ െ ܧ൫ܴ௜ǡ௧൯                ሺͳͲሻ 
 
 
 
 
125
The average abnormal return (AARt) on a portfolio of N securities for the event 
window is defined as: 
                     
             ሺͳͳሻ
 
The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) is estimated for any interval 
[t1:t2] during the event window T as: 
            
ሺͳʹሻ
 
The event window T is 41 days (T = [-20,+20]), where t = [0] denotes the day 
the M&A is announced. 
5.2.8StatisticalTests
Finally the statistical significance of the calculated excess returns (AR and 
CAR) is tested during an event window. This step is necessary for testing the 
hypotheses related to the market reaction to the M&A announcement. A standard 
cross-sectional test statistic is estimated; first the standardised excess return is 
calculated by dividing each AR in the event window by its estimation period 
standard deviation: 
 
ܣ ෠ܴ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ஺ோ೔ǡ೟ఙ൫஺ோ೔ǡ೟൯                 ሺͳ͵ሻ 
 
 
ܣܣܴݐ ൌ
ͳ
ܰ෍ܣܴ݅ǡݐ
ܰ
݅ൌͳ
ܥܣܴሾݐͳǣݐʹሿ ൌ ෍ ܣܣܴ݅ǡݐ
ሾݐͳǣݐʹሿ
 
 
126
Where: 
 
                        ሺͳͶሻ
 
and                      ሺͳͷሻ
 
 The test statistic for the AR on any given day is given by: 
ሺͳ͸ሻ
 
Where:  
Nt is the number of sample securities for time period t. 
The test statistic for the CARs during the event window is given by: 
 
                        ሺͳ͹ሻ
 
Where:  
Lt is the number of abnormal returns that have been accumulated in the 
event window. 
5.3AnnouncementPeriodAbnormalReturnsRegressionModel
Following the event study investigation, this study focuses on A-REIT M&A 
announcements to explore the possible drivers of the observed excess returns for 
both A-REIT bidders and targets. An ordinary least squares regression model is 
employed. The independent variables are selected based on prior literature along 
with variables unique to the A-REIT sector. The independent variables are 
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regressed against the three-day event window [-1,+1] excess returns obtained 
from the market model. The regression models are: 
ܥܣܴ஻௜ௗௗ௘௥௦ ൌ ߙ ൅ߚଵܪܪܴܱܲܲ ൅ ߚଶܮܧܸ ൅ ߚଷܯܩܯܶ ൅ ߚସܴܲܫܸ ൅
ߚହܴܧܮܵܫܼܧ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ ൅ ߚ଻ܱܶܲ͵ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܰܰܧܺܧܥ ൅
ߚଽܩܨܥ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܯܱܲ ൅ ߝ                 ሺͳͺሻ 
ܥܣ்ܴ௔௥௚௘௧௦ ൌ ߙ ൅ߚଵܪܪܴܱܲܲ ൅ ߚଶܮܧܸ ൅ ߚଷܯܩܯܶ ൅ ߚସܴܲܫܸ ൅
ߚହܵܫܼܧ ൅ ߚ଺ܱܶܲ͵ ൅ ߚ଻ܱܰܰܧܺܧܥ ൅ ߚ଼ܩܨܥ ൅
ߚଽܯܱܲ ൅ ߝ                    ሺͳͻሻ 
The following sections provide discussions on prior literature regarding the 
explanatory variables employed in the regression modelling along with the 
hypothesized impact they will have on the dependent variable.  
5.3.1AssetDiversification
The fundamental motivation for diversification is to reduce exposure to 
fluctuations in economic activity. Empirical evidence often exposes a significant 
negative relationship between diversification and firm value across multiple 
industries (Hedander 2005). Capozza and Seguin (1999) suggest diversification 
across property type leads to potential higher agency costs in diversified REITs. 
Ooi et al. (2011) and Allen and Sirmans (1987) posit that specialised REITs, 
either by property type or location, have the expertise to identify mismanaged 
REITs of similar type. This may result in higher excess returns to acquiring firms 
when the target is the same type of REIT as the acquirer.  
Allen and Sirmans (1987) found a statistically significant difference in the 
excess returns of focused and diversified mergers. Related mergers produced a 
CAR of +6.63%, as compared to +4.61% for unrelated acquisitions. Measurement 
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of diversification/specialisation is calculated using the Hirscham-Herfindahl 
index (Hirscham 1964) and is defined as: 
  ܪܪܴܱܲܲ ൌ σ ݓ௜ଶ௜                 ሺʹͲሻ 
Where:  
wi = the proportion of an A-REITs portfolio invested in property type i.  
This measure shows how diversified or focused the A-REIT is. A score close 
to zero means the A-REIT is highly diversified, whereas a score close to one is a 
focused A-REIT. Given prior research it is expected a focused M&A will earn 
higher CARs. 
5.3.2FinancialLeverage
The degree of financial leverage (LEV) is calculated as Financial Debt 
/(Financial Debt + Equity)60 for both targets and bidders. Jensen (1986) proposed 
that firms with higher degrees of financial leverage make better investment 
choices due to their lower levels of financial-slack or free-cash flow. This view is 
supported by Maloney et al. (1993, p. 189) who conclude “that debt improves 
managerial decision making”. In the case of REITs, Campbell et al. (2001) found 
no significant relationship between bidder abnormal returns and leverage. The 
authors suggest that this result is due to the REIT institutional structure and the 
restriction it placed on REIT’s free-cash flow.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that highly levered firms provide bidding firms 
with the opportunity to capture synergistic benefits. Campbell et al. (2001) found 
a positive and significant relationship between excess returns and target REIT 
leverage. The authors posit that highly levered REITs (with low historical growth 
rates) may find it difficult to reduce their leverage levels due to the high payout 
                                                 
60 Financial debt includes both long- and short-term debt.  
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ratios required by law. It then follows that if merging is a way to escape this debt-
driven entrapment, then gains to both parties should be greater. Prior research 
suggests that the results of this study should show a positive relationship between 
CARs and leverage for both parties. 
5.3.3ManagementStructure
As discussed in Chapter 2, the management structure of a REIT can be divided 
into two categories; internally or externally managed. Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) 
and Greer and Parker (2005) argue that the internal management structure for 
REITs better aligns the interests of both management and shareholders. This 
alignment results in lower agency costs and enhanced performance. Capozza and 
Seguin (2000) provide evidence that internally managed REITs outperformed 
their externally managed counterparts. In addition, the study found that external 
REITs are priced at a discount relative to internally managed REITs.  
Given the prior literature, it is hypothesized that internally managed A-REIT 
bidders are expected to earn higher abnormal returns than externally managed    
A-REIT acquirers. In the case of target A-REITs, a positive relationship is also 
expected, due to process of the M&A being less burdened by the need to 
negotiate with a third party; that is, the management company. Management 
structure (MGMT) is a dummy variable indicating the management structure of 
the A-REIT, 1 if the A-REIT is internally managed, 0 otherwise. 
5.3.4PrivatevPublic
Corporate finance literature has consistently demonstrated that the excess 
returns for acquirers of private targets are considerably higher than public-public 
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acquisitions.61 Chang (1998) suggests that this outcome is due to the monitoring 
activities of public target shareholders and reduced information asymmetries. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that private firms facing liquidity constraints 
and limited funding sources have weaker bargaining power resulting in the targets 
assets being obtained at a significant discount. Extending on this argument, Fuller 
et al. (2002) suggest illiquid firms are less valuable and thus less attractive 
targets, providing the acquirers with the opportunity to obtain this liquidity 
discount.   
Prior research into REITs has produced similar results, Campbell et al. (2011) 
finds positive and significant excess returns for public-private bidders of +1.1%, 
compared to negative and significant CARs of -0.95% for public-public 
mergers.62 Furthermore, the regression analysis found a statistically positive and 
significant relationship between private M&As and excess returns. In the case of 
target REITs, Ling and Petrova (2011) find that public-public M&As earn CARs 
of +7.70% and +10.38% for private-public. A dummy variable of 1 is used to 
identify public-private acquisitions. This study expects public-private M&A to 
have a positive impact on excess returns.  
5.3.5RelativeSizeandFirmSize
Firm size (SIZE) is calculated as the natural log of the A-REITs market 
capitalization on the day prior to the M&A announcement. Prior research by 
Campbell et al. (2001) found REIT bidder size has a significant negative impact 
on excess returns. The authors concluded that larger REITs may overpay in an 
                                                 
61 For example, see Fuller et al. (2002), Moeller et al. (2004) and Shams et al. (2013). 
62 This result is consistent with Campbell et al. (2001, 2005). 
 
 
131
acquisition. This result is further supported by Ooi et al. (2011) who also found a 
negative relationship between bidder size and excess returns.  
Draper and Paudyal (2006) argue that the decision to acquire smaller firms, 
that are less well known by investors, is strongly related to enhancing shareholder 
wealth. However, the decision to target larger firms may be a result of the growth 
maximisation hypothesis in that bidding firms are more focused on increasing 
firm size and prestige (Marris 1963). In the case of target REITs, Ling and 
Petrova (2011) found that target size has negative and significant impact on the 
likelihood of a REIT being a target. Given this, it is hypothesized that larger       
A-REIT targets will attract a higher premium from acquirers in the attempt to 
achieve the acquisition, resulting in a positive relationship between target size and 
excess returns.   
Relative size (RELSIZE) of the acquisition is controlled for by dividing the 
M&A deal size by the bidder’s equity market value, calculated on the day prior 
the announcement.63 Prior research has provided evidence of a significant positive 
relationship between relative size and bidder’s abnormal returns, for example; 
Asquith et al. (1983), Kiymaz and Baker (2008), Loderer and Martin  (1990), 
Moeller et al. (2004) and Shams et al. (2013). Kooli et al. (2003) argue greater 
relative size delivers greater bargaining power to targets and improved capacity 
for economies of scale and recombination. Agrawal et al. (1992) posit that 
acquiring a larger target has the prospective to be a more important event for the 
bidder than acquiring a smaller target.  
                                                 
63 Relative size is only estimated for the acquires model, due to a number of target firms being 
acquired by private firms and therefore acquirer size was unable to be obtained. 
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Campbell et al. (2001) found similar evidence of a positive and significant 
relationship between bidding REITs excess returns and relative size.64 In light of 
prior research, this study expects the coefficient for SIZE to display a negative 
(positive) relationship with the CARs for acquiring (target) A-REITs and 
RELSIZE, in the bidders model, to exhibit a positive relationship.   
5.3.6CorporateGovernance
Fama and Jensen (1983) and Ling and Petrova (2011) argue that increased 
monitoring can lessen some of the managerial agency problems and therefore 
may pressure target managers to negotiate the maximum value possible. In the 
area of real estate research, Friday and Sirmans (1998) provide evidence of a 
positive relationship between board independence and performance. Anglin et al. 
(2013) also find evidence that corporate governance characteristics, such as board 
size and independence are effective monitoring mechanisms in REITs. These 
results suggest that if board independence is an effective monitoring tool of 
managerial decision making, it follows that highly independent boards will be 
associated with higher M&A gains (Campbell et al. 2011).   
Campbell et al. (2011) hypothesise that the relationship between corporate 
governance measures and excess returns may not hold for firms in regulated 
industries. Campbell (2002) suggests that this decrease in importance holds for 
REIT M&As due to their regulatory environment. This is supported by the lack of 
hostile takeovers among REITs, which has been documented by Allen and 
Sirmans (1987), Campbell et al. (2001), and Eichholtz and Kok (2008).  
                                                 
64 The author’s coefficient result was negative, however, the measure for relative size was 
estimated as acquirer size divided by target size, the opposite approach employed by prior 
research. Therefore, for comparison of results this study notes this to be a positive result.  
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The results presented by Campbell et al. (2011) provide support for the 
argument that the relationship between REIT excess returns and corporate 
governance is diminished. Results showed that board independence has a positive, 
but insignificant relationship. The measure for shareholder concentration (block-
holdings) returned a negative coefficient but the result was only significant in the 
public-public subsample model. The authors suggest that this result may be due to 
the liquidity preference of large block-holders, such as financial institutions. 
These institutional investors desire market liquidity and depth, allowing them to 
buy or sell large positions without impacting share price. Mergers provide a way 
to increase market depth, however this improved depth “may not be important to 
small investors, therefore creating different incentives for the two classes of 
owners” (Campbell et al. 2011, p. 473) 
To investigate this relationship, two independent variables are employed to 
measure as proxies for monitoring. First, the percentage of non-executive 
directors (NONEXEC) and second, the percentage of shareholdings held by the 
top three investors (TOP3).   
5.3.7GlobalFinancialCrisis
Dimovski (2009) and Newell and Peng (2009) highlight the significant impact 
the GFC had on the market values of the A-REIT sector. The A-REIT sector 
market capitalisation fell by over 65% from February 2007 to February 2009 with 
BDO (2009) providing evidence that the A-REIT sector started to show 
significant impacts of the GFC in December 2007. Dimovski (2009) found 
evidence of a shift in the systematic risk of A-REITs post December 2007. The 
impact was further highlighted by Dimovski and O’Neill (2012) who identified an 
increase in volatility of the A-REIT sector post December 2007. Furthermore, 
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Zarebski and Dimovski (2012) noted that the limited funding opportunities due to 
very low liquidity in debt markets and falling asset values had a dramatic impact 
on the A-REIT sector.  
Therefore, to capture the possible impact on the excess returns from the GFC, 
a dummy variable of 1 for M&A announcements that occur post December 2007 
is included. This study expects post December 2007 announcements to have a 
positive impact on target and negative on acquirer CARs due to the greater 
uncertainty and volatility in the sector.   
5.3.8MethodofPayment
As discussed in Chapter 3, prior M&A studies have consistently shown that 
both parties enjoy higher excess returns when cash is used as the method of 
payment.65 In the case of bidders, this impact is hypothesized to be minimal 
compared to non-REIT transactions. A-REITs statutory requirement to payout a 
large majority of their earnings, limits the opportunity to finance acquisitions with 
internally generated funds.66 This may lessen the negative implications of using 
stock as the method of payment (Campbell et al. 2001). This is further supported 
by Womack (2012) who found cash financed acquisitions returned a negative 
coefficient for bidding REITs. The author concluded that REITs most preferred 
method of payment is a combination of scrip and cash, this result suggests that the 
signalling implication of payment method is mitigated for bidding REITs. 
In the case of target REITs, Womack (2012) found cash financed M&As 
resulted in significant excess returns of +11.12% for cash financed M&As, 
compared to +2.01% for scrip over the three-day event window. This result is 
                                                 
65 For example, see Andrade et al. (2001), Cai et al. (2011), Davidson and Cheng (1997) and 
Wansley et al. (1983a) 
66 The regulatory minimum payout varies with different countries. For example, US minimum 
payout is 95%, whereas Australia has a requirement of 100% of the trust income.
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consistent with general corporate finance studies, for example, Martynova and 
Renneboog (2011) reported significant CARs of +13.92% and +7.39% for cash 
and scrip financed acquisitions respectfully. Furthermore, regression model 
results showed a negative and significant relationship between scrip financed 
M&As and excess returns. MOP is a binary variable for the method of payment, 1 
if cash is used to finance the merger, otherwise 0.  
Table 5.1 displays a summary of the explanatory variables employed in the 
regression modelling. The hypothesized relationship, definition and extant 
evidence from both non-REIT and REIT studies is presented.  
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Table 5.1: Summary of CAR Regression Model Explanatory Variables 
Variable Definition  
Prior Research Predicted sign 
Acquirers 
Predicated sign 
Targets non-REIT REIT 
HHPROP Measurement of asset focus is 
calculated using the Hirscham-
Herfindahl index (Hirscham 1964). A 
value close to 1 is a specialised A-
REIT. 
Significant positive relationship between 
specialised M&As and excess returns 
(Hedander 2005). 
Specialisation by property type has a 
positive impact on excess returns (Allen & 
Sirmans 1987; Ooi et al. 2011). 
Positive Positive 
LEV Degree of financial leverage is 
defined as: Financial debt/(Financial 
debt + equity). 
Jensen (1986) and Maloney et al. (1993) 
posit that firms with higher degrees of 
leverage make improved managerial 
decisions. 
Campbell et al. (2001) argues that due to 
the institutional structure of REITs leverage 
should have minimal impact on bidders. 
However, for targets, if M&As are a way to 
escape the debt-driven entrapment, then 
gains to both parties should be positive. 
Positive Positive 
MGMT Management structure is divided into 
internally and externally managed 
REITs. A dummy variable of 1 is 
used if the A-REIT is internally 
managed. 
N/A Capozza & Seguin (2000) show that 
externally managed REITs under-perform 
and are priced at a discount. Greer & Parker 
(2005) argue that internally managed REITs 
have lower agency problems and greater 
financial flexibility. 
Positive Positive 
PRIV A dummy variable of 1 is employed 
to identify a M&A were one party is 
an unlisted property trust. 
Fuller et al. (2002) & Moeller et al. 
(2004) show CARs are higher for M&As 
for public-private. Chang (1998) argue 
this is due to the monitoring activities of 
public targets. Fuller et al. (2002) 
suggests the liquidity discount theory. 
Prior REIT research also shows higher 
CARs are observed in public-private 
announcements (Campbell et al. 2001, 
2005, 2011; Ling & Petrova 2011). 
Positive Positive 
RELSIZE Relative size calculated as the deal 
value divided by the acquirers market 
value. 
Positive relationship between bidder 
CARs and relative size (Shams et al. 
2013). Greater relative size gives greater 
bargaining power to targets and improved 
capacity for economies of scale (Koolie et 
al. 2003). 
Campbell et al. (2001) found a significant 
positive relationship for REITs. 
Positive N/A 
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Table 5.1: Continued 
Variable Definition  
Prior Research Predicted sign 
Acquirers 
Predicated sign 
Targets non-REIT REIT 
SIZE Natural log of the A-REITs market 
capitalisation on the day prior the 
announcement. 
Draper and Paudyal (2006) larger firms 
attempting to increase size might be 
susceptible to empire building. 
Bidder size negatively related to CARs, 
suggesting larger REITs overpay (Campbell 
et al. 2001; Ooi et al. 2011). Larger targets 
are able to attract a higher premium (Ling 
& Petrova 2011). 
Negative Positive 
TOP3 Percentage of shares held by the top 3 
investors. 
Increased monitoring can lessen 
managerial agency problems (Fama & 
Jensen 1983). 
Anglin et al. (2013) show corporate 
governance characteristics are effective 
monitoring mechanisms in REITs. 
However, Campbell et al. (2009) finds the 
importance of corporate governance & 
M&A excess returns is diminished in 
REITs, due to the regulatory environment 
REITs operate in. 
Positive Positive 
NONEXEC Percentage of non-executive 
directors. 
Positive Positive 
GFC Dummy variable of 1 for M&A 
announcements occurring after 
December 2007. 
N/A Post GFC saw a dramatic increase in the 
volatility of the A-REIT sector (Dimovski 
and O'Neill 2012). 
Negative Positive 
MOP Dummy variable of 1 for M&As 
financed with cash. 
Cash as the payment method has a strong 
positive relationship with both targets and 
bidders CARs (Andrade et al. 2001; Cai 
et al. 2011). 
Signalling implications of payment method 
is mitigated for bidding REITs (Campbell 
et al. 2001; Womack 2012). REIT target 
results show a positive relationship with 
CARs and cash payments (Womack 2012). 
Prior REIT research 
suggests a negative 
relationship. 
Positive 
This table provides a summary of the independent variables employed in the regression modelling. Definitions of the variable calculations, along with prior 
research conducted on these variables within both non-REIT and REIT literature are presented. Also included is the expected relationship between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables for both targets and bidders.  
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5.4PreM&AAnnouncementLogitModel
5.4.1Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 3, it has been well documented that the share price of 
a target firm tends to increase around the announcement of a M&A, with target 
shareholders earning positive and significant excess returns between 20% and 
30% (Kiymaz and Baker 2008; Martynova and Renneboog 2008). Therefore, the 
ability to identify M&A targets successfully in advance could form the basis of a 
successful investment strategy (for example, Palepu 1986; Powell 2001, 2004). 
This section discusses and identifies the characteristics of firms that may impact 
on the likelihood of a M&A announcement.  
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) identify a number of studies that report 
positive excess returns of around 18% in the month prior to the announcement, 
and the excess returns often exceed the announcement returns themselves. These 
results suggest that the announcements are anticipated, and result from insider 
trading, rumours or information leakages. In addition, an understanding of firm 
characteristics that may influence the likelihood of a firm being involved in a 
M&A is important to policy makers along with investors. However, Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) posit that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the market 
to predict potential targets even three to six months prior to the announcement.  
5.4.2LogitProbabilityModel
Chapter 3 (Section 3.4) described the previous research in identifying variables 
that may influence M&A likelihood. Studies have been identified in the literature 
as far back as the 1970’s and include US research by Simkowitz and Monroe 
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(1971) and Stevens (1973). These early studies employed a Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis (MDA) which was developed to evaluate bankruptcy classification and 
prediction (Altman 1968). Stevens (1973) provided evidence that takeover 
prediction was feasible. However, Rege (1984, p. 301) raised concerns about the 
MDA methodology and concluded that their study “cannot differentiate between 
companies which are likely to be taken over and those which are not likely to be 
taken over”.  
Following on from the work by Rege (1984), the adoption of discrete choice 
modelling became the method of choice for M&A probability. Harris et al. (1982) 
employed probit analysis which indirectly has an underlying decision framework. 
The authors argued that the use of probit analysis allows for explicit firm 
characteristics to have a fluctuating effect on the probability of being a M&A 
target. Discrete choice modelling was an improvement on earlier studies that 
utilised MDA methodology (Harris et al. 1982). Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) 
employed a logit probability model based on the study by Ohlson (1980) in the 
bankruptcy prediction literature. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984 p. 398) argued that 
the “logit estimation allows a comparison of the relative importance of the 
explanatory variables in determining the likelihood of merger”. Following the 
study by Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), the logit method has become the preferred 
discrete choice model (for example, Barnes 1999; Palepu 1986; Powell 1997, 
2004).  
The choice of the logit model over MDA is mostly due to the multivariate 
normality assumption made by MDA. MDA is dependent on the assumption that 
independent variables are normally distributed. Logit modelling allows the direct 
interpretation of the independent variables coefficients, while MDA coefficients 
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are only unique up to a factor, therefore making interpretation of their statistical 
significance difficult (Dietrich and Sorensen 1984). To allow comparison with 
prior research this study employs a logit probability model. This allows the study 
to specify the functional relationship between a firm’s characteristics and the 
likelihood of the firm being involved in a M&A announcement.67 This part of the 
study is concerned with the characteristics of the firms that are involved in an 
announcement, not the impact on shareholders wealth and the actual outcome.  
The logistic regression model is estimated in which the dichotomous 
dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the firm was involved in a M&A 
announcement. The parameters of each of the bidder and target models are 
estimated using the STATA statistical package (Kohler and Kreuter 2012): 
ܲሺܶܣܴܩǡ ݅ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܵܫܼܧ ൅ ߚଶܴܧܶ ൅ ߚଷܸܣܴ ൅ ߚସܮܧܸ ൅ ߚହܦܫܸܻܫܧܮܦ ൅
ߚ଺ܯܸܤܸ ൅ ߚ଻ܨܨܱ ൅ ߚ଼ܨܥܨ ൅ߚଽܪܪܴܱܲܲ ൅ߚଵ଴ܵܪܴ ൅
ߚଵଵܱܶܲ͵ ൅ ߚଵଶܯܩܯܶ ൅ ߚଵଷܴܲܧܩܨܥ      ሺʹͳሻ 
ܲሺܤܫܦǡ ݅ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܵܫܼܧ ൅ ߚଶܴܧܶ ൅ ߚଷܸܣܴ ൅ ߚସܮܧܸ ൅ ߚହܦܫܸܻܫܧܮܦ ൅
ߚ଺ܯܸܤܸ ൅ ߚ଻ܨܨܱ ൅ ߚ଼ܨܥܨ ൅ߚଽܪܪܴܱܲܲ ൅ߚଵ଴ܵܪܴ ൅
ߚଵଵܱܶܲ͵ ൅ ߚଵଶܯܩܯܶ ൅ ߚଵଷܴܲܧܩܨܥ      ሺʹʹሻ 
Where TARG is assigned the value of 1 if the firm was a target during the 
sample period, otherwise 0. BID is also a binary value, 1 if the firm made a M&A 
offer during the sample period. The independent variables are selected based on 
prior research and to possibly identify the motive for M&As in the Australian real 
estate sector. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are three main motives for M&As: 
                                                 
67 As described by Amborse (1990), Palepu (1986) and Powell (2001). 
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synergy, hubris and agency.68 Identifying the variables of importance for firms 
that increase M&A likelihood may help to understand the motives.  
5.4.3EstimationSample
Logistic modelling requires the selection of an estimation sample; that is, a 
sample of firms that were not involved in a M&A announcement. These firms are 
assigned a value of 0 in models (21) and (22). This study follows the method 
proposed by Eichholtz and Kok (2008) and Ambrose (1990) of selecting the 
estimation sample. A sample of control firms is temporally matched to each target 
and bidder in the sample period. Temporal matching involves selecting two 
control firms for each observation with the same information date. The 
information date is defined as the month end prior the announcement and at least 
30 days prior the announcement date (Ratcliffe and Dimovski 2013). Ambrose 
(1990) posits that temporal matching eliminates the problems of matching firm 
data across varying time periods and therefore allows for a direct comparison 
between sub-groups without having to adjust for accounting practices or business 
or economic cycles.   
The preceding sections survey the firm characteristics employed in the logit 
model, the prior research relating to these characteristics and the expected impact 
on M&A likelihood.  
5.4.4FirmSize
SIZE is defined as the natural log of the market capitalisation of the firm on 
the information date. In the majority of cases, prior research has found size to 
                                                 
68 It is difficult to design a test for the hubris motive. Prior research notes that the hubris motive 
results in management miss-valuation of the synergistic gains (Roll 1986). Therefore, the impact 
of hubris would not be observed until post announcement/completion.  
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have a negative impact on target likelihood (Brar et al. 2009; Powell 2004). 
Palepu (1986) argues that this negative relationship is due to greater transaction 
costs as the size of the target increases. In contrast, Barnes (1999) posits that 
management is primarily focused on increasing the size of their company, 
resulting in a positive relationship. Arnull-Almond (2008) and Tsagkanos et al. 
(2006) both find a positive and significant relationship between size and target 
probability. Arnull-Almond (2008) concluded that this outcome supports the 
growth maximisation hypothesis. However, in the case of REIT research, both 
Frank et al. (2011) and Ling and Petrova (2011) found that larger REITs are less 
likely to become M&A targets.   
Research on acquirers size shows a positive and significant relationship; for 
example, Pasiouras and Gaganis (2007) and Wheelock and Wilson (2004). 
Gonzalez et al. (1997) concluded that larger firms have a financial advantage in 
acquiring other firms. This outcome is supported by real estate research. 
Eichholtz and Kok (2008) observed a strong positive relationship between firm 
size and bidder probability. Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) find a 1% increase in 
A-REIT size increases the odds of being an acquirer by 13.8% and concluded 
“that larger REITs have more market power in M&As and have an economies of 
scale advantage for integrating the targets assets” (Ratcliffe and Dimovski 2013, 
p. 452). Given the extant literature, this study hypothesizes a negative (positive) 
relationship between size and targets (bidders).  
5.4.5SharePriceReturn
RET is defined as the average monthly share price return from three-years 
prior the M&A information date. Prior research has found share price 
underperformance has a significant impact on target probability (Eichholtz and 
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Kok 2008; Palepu 1986). The inefficient management hypothesis suggests target 
management is not operating effectively, resulting in the inefficient use of 
resources. Therefore M&As are motivated by the need to replace the targets 
management and improve the use of their resources (Agrawal and Jaffe 2003).  
In the case of bidding firms, both Mehrez et al. (2012) and Pasiouras and 
Gaganis (2007) provided evidence that banks with greater performance have a 
higher bidder likelihood.69 Eichholtz and Kok (2008) identified a positive 
relationship between bidder probability and monthly share price return in the lead 
up to an announcement; however, the variable did not display statistical 
significance. Given the prior research, the study hypothesizes a negative 
(positive) relationship between share price return and target (bidder) probability.   
5.4.6SharePriceVariability
Share price variability (VAR) is calculated as the average monthly variance of 
the firms returns over three-years prior the M&A information date. Eichholtz and 
Kok (2008) note that real estate firms are less sensitive to market movements than 
other sectors. The authors found a negative and significant relationship between 
share price variability and M&A likelihood for both bidders and targets. This 
outcome suggests that firms with greater volatility are less likely to be involved in 
a M&A. However, Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) note that an increase in trading 
volumes and volatility may signal that a M&A is underway. This study expects a 
negative relationship between volatility and M&A probability for both parties.  
                                                 
69 Mehrez et al. (2012) employed return on equity as the proxy for performance, while Pasiouras 
and Giaganis (2007) used return on assets.  
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5.4.7FinancialLeverage
The degree of financial leverage (LEV) in the firms capital structure is defined 
as Financial Debt minus Cash/Shareholders equity averaged over three years of 
annual reports prior to the information date.70  The majority of prior results for 
leverage shows a negative relationship with target likelihood,71 suggesting that 
financial slack may be attractive to a bidding firm (Lewellen 1971). In addition, 
Gonzalez et al. (1997) identifies that unutilised target debt capacity can be used to 
reduce acquisition costs. Prior research in real estate M&As also displays a 
negative relationship between leverage and target probability. However, only 
Frank et al. (2011) display statistical significance. Campbell et al. (2001) suggest 
that highly geared REITs (with low growth rates) could find it difficult to reduce 
debt levels due to the high regulatory payout requirements. 
Eichholtz and Kok (2008) found the level of gearing for real estate firms has a 
negative relationship with bidder probability. Similarly, Ratcliffe and Dimovski 
(2013) also found a negative and significant relationship for A-REIT acquirers. 
These outcomes suggest firms with lower debt levels may find it easier to acquire 
targets and that financial slack is important. A negative relationship is expected 
for both bidder and target likelihood and leverage, given the prior evidence. 
5.4.8DividendYield
The dividend yield (DIVYIELD) of the sample firms is averaged over three 
years prior the information date. Arnull-Almond (2008) and Alzueta and Lucey 
                                                 
70 Financial debt includes both long-term and short-term debt. 
71 For example: Alzueta and Lucey (2010), Arnull-Almond (2008), Palepu (1986) and Powell 
(1997). 
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(2010) argue that low dividend yielding firms utilise retained earnings to 
create/maintain financial slack to take advantage of investment opportunities. 
This increases target likelihood since such new investment is likely to increase the 
performance and growth of the newly combined firm. On the other hand, lower 
yielding firms may signal financial underperformance (Barnes 1999). 
However, Smith Jr and Watts (1992) argue that smaller dividend payments 
reduce target probability because the growth opportunities act as a defence. This 
argument is supported by Brar et al. (2009), who find a positive and significant 
relationship with dividend yield. In the case of REITs, Ling and Petrova (2011) 
also report a positive and significant relationship and concludes that higher 
yielding REITs are attractive M&A targets. Therefore, this study expects a 
positive coefficient for target probability and dividend yield. Accordingly, for 
acquirers the opposite is hypothesized, acquiring REITs value the ability to use 
cash to finance an acquisition, therefore a negative relationship should exist.  
5.4.9MarketǦtoǦBookValue
Market-to-book value (MVBV) is the firms closing share price on the last day 
of the financial year divided by the shareholders equity presented in the annual 
reports, averaged over three reporting periods prior the information date. The 
MVBV ratio represents a value strategy employed by investors (La Porta et al. 
1997). MVBV has been employed in numerous studies as a proxy for 
underperformance (Ling and Petrova 2011; Martijn-Cremers et al. 2009; Walter 
1994; Wansley et al. 1983). Powell (1997) argues that firms with low market 
values relative to their book values would be considered a ‘bargain’ and therefore 
more likely to be a target. Eichholtz and Kok (2008) find a negative and 
significant relationship between targets and MVBV, supporting the inefficient 
 
 
146
management hypothesis. Therefore a negative coefficient is theorized for target 
firms.  
A high MVBV suggests that firms are in a superior financial position and 
therefore a lower risk premium. Fama and French (1992, 1995) argue that the 
lower risk premium is due to higher earnings, lower financial leverage and lower 
earnings volatility. In addition, Lakonishok et al. (1994) suggest that firms with a 
high  MVBV are overpriced relative to their risk return characteristics. Given the 
prior literature, this study expects a positive relationship between MVBV and 
bidder probability. 
5.4.10Liquidity
Ling and Petrova (2011) suggest that firms with low liquidity may signal weak 
financial position. Both Powell (2004) and Ling and Petrova (2011) find a 
negative and significant relationship between liquidity and target likelihood. In 
addition, Powell (2004) also highlights a positive relationship between leverage 
and target probability. The author suggests these outcomes combined are due to a 
growth resource mismatch. More specifically, firms with high growth 
opportunities, but low resources to finance the growth have a higher probability 
of becoming a target. In contrast, Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) observe a 
positive relationship between liquidity and target likelihood. The authors argue 
that targets with high liquidity have low investment opportunities and therefore 
are more likely to be taken over. 
 Gonzalez et al. (1997) find that mature firms with higher liquidity have an 
increased probability of being a bidder. This outcome suggests that larger firms, 
with improved liquidity, are in a superior financial position. However, it may also 
be argued that high liquidity suggests low growth opportunities. Therefore, the 
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one way to grow is through acquisition. In the case of real estate research, 
Eichholtz and Kok (2008) found a positive, but insignificant relationship between 
liquidity and bidder likelihood. In addition, Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) 
identified a positive and significant relationship between cash holdings and        
A-REIT bidder probability.  
This study employs two measures of liquidity, funds from operations divided 
by EBITDA (FFO) and free cash-flow as proportion of total assets (FCF). Both 
variables are averaged over a three-year period prior the information date. It is 
hypothesized that a negative (positive) relationship between targets (bidders) will 
be observed.  
5.4.11Diversification/Specialisation
As described in Section 5.3.1, the motivation for diversification is to reduce 
exposure to variations in economic activity. Measurement of the level of 
specialisation across property type (HHPROP) is calculated using the Hirscham-
Herfindahl index (Hirscham 1964) as presented by equation (20) in Section 5.3.1. 
Frank et al. (2011) provides evidence the diversified REITs exhibit a lower 
probability of being targets. Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) also find that the 
probability of an A-REIT becoming a target increases by 67% for specialised    
A-REITs. However, the variable lacked statistical significance. Finally, the 
authors found a positive, but insignificant, relationship between bidders and 
specialisation. Therefore, this study expects to observe a positive relationship 
between property type focus and M&A likelihood for both targets and acquirers.  
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
5.4.12CorporateGovernance
Consistent with the announcement period analysis, the logit model controls for 
corporate governance.72  It is argued that monitoring of management can decrease 
agency problems (Fama and Jensen 1983; Ling and Petrova 2011). Weir and 
Laing (2003) find evidence that the presence of a large block of external 
shareholders or independence of the board increases the probability of a firm 
being a target. However, Ambrose and Megginson (1992) find no evidence of a 
relationship between takeover probability and large shareholder blocks. 
Therefore, to test if the motivation for M&As is driven by the agency motive, this 
study includes two control variables. SHR is defined as the percentage of shares 
held by directors and their related parties plus the percentage of shares held by the 
management company. Eichholtz and Kok (2008) report that insider holdings 
have a significant negative impact of target probability. In the case of bidders, 
Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) find a significant negative relationship with insider 
holdings. These outcomes suggest that large insider holdings entrench managers 
(North 2001). 
TOP3 is defined as the percentage of shares held by the top three shareholders. 
Shivdasani (1993) argues that larger shareholders perform an effective role of 
managerial monitoring. This is supported by the findings of Eichholtz and Kok 
(2008) who report a positive and significant relationship between blockholdings 
and REIT target likelihood. In addition, Ling and Petrova (2011) observe a 
significant positive relationship between institutional holdings and target 
                                                 
72 See Section 5.3.6 for further discussion on the literature regarding corporate governance and 
managerial monitoring.  
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probability. In the case of bidders, Eichholtz and Kok (2008) find an insignificant 
negative relationship between shareholder concentration and bidder probability.   
5.4.13ManagementStructure
As discussed in Section 5.3.3, the management structure (MGMT) of the       
A-REITs is divided into internally and externally managed structures. A dummy 
variable of 1 indicates an internally managed structure, 0 otherwise. Ambrose and 
Linneman (2001) argue that externally managed REITs are less competitive than 
their counterparts. Tan (2004) identified that internally managed REITs have 
lower costs of capital, improved management, reduced agency costs and no fee 
leakage. Both Eichholtz and Kok (2008) and Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) 
report a negative (positive) relationship between targets (bidders) and internal 
management. However, only Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) observed a 
significant coefficient for the acquirers’ sample. Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013, p. 
455) conclude “that externally managed A-REITs are unable to compete with an 
internally managed A-REIT”. Given this, this study expects internally managed 
A-REITs to have an advantage in M&As. Furthermore, externally managed       
A-REITs should be more likely to become a M&A target.  
5.4.14GlobalFinancialCrisis
As discussed in Section 5.3.7, the GFC had a significant impact on the 
Australian real estate sector and, more specifically, A-REITs. To capture this 
impact the variable PREGFC is employed. PREGFC is a dummy variable of 1 if 
the announcement occurred before December 2007. Ratcliffe and Dimovski 
(2013) find a positive and significant relationship between bidder likelihood and 
pre-GFC. The authors conclude that the A-REIT market prior the GFC was an era 
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of M&As. In addition, Dimovski (2009) suggests that the GFC has caused a 
structural shift in the A-REIT sector. A positive relationship is expected for both 
targets and bidders given the period of high uncertainty and volatility during (and 
post) the GFC.  
5.4.15IndustryRelativeRatios
Prior studies have discussed the importance of adjustments being made to the 
independent variables to account for different industry effects (Powell 2001; 
Arnull-Almond 2008). However, by focusing on the real estate sector, and more 
centrally A-REITs, allows the current study to focus on the independent variables 
of interest without controlling for industry effects that may impact the results 
(Campbell et al. 2005). Ling and Petrova (2011) argue that industry effects may 
be the driver for mixed results in prior studies that have attempted to identify 
M&A probability using firm level data from multiple industries.  
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the independent variables employed in the 
logit modelling. The hypothesized relationship, definition and extant evidence 
from both non-REIT and REIT studies are presented.  
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Table 5.2: Summary of Logit Explanatory Variables 
Variable Definition  
Prior Research Predicted sign 
Acquirers 
Predicated sign 
Targets non-REIT REIT 
SIZE Natural log of the A-REITs 
market capitalisation on the 
information day. 
Brar et al. (2009), Powell (2004) negative impact 
on target probability. However, Arnull-Almond 
(2008) finds positive, suggesting growth 
maximisation hypothesis. Pasiouras & Gaganis 
(2007) larger firms have advantage in acquiring 
other firms. 
Ling & Petrova (2011) negative impact on target 
probability. Ratcliffe & Dimovski (2013) find 
positive. Bidders display positive relationship 
(Eichholtz & Kok 2008). 
 
Negative Positive 
RET Monthly average share price 
return 3 years prior information 
date. 
Share price performance has significant negative 
impact on target likelihood (Palepu, 1986). 
Bidding probability increases with performance 
(Mehrez et al. 2012). 
Frank et al. (2011) & Eichholtz & Kok (2008) 
both find significant negative relationship for 
targets. Ratcliffe & Dimovski (2013) find 
positive coefficient for acquirers. 
Negative Positive 
VAR Average variance of share price 
over 3 years prior information 
date.  
Dietrich & Sorensen (1984) increase trading 
volumes & volatility may signal a M&A is 
underway. 
Eichholtz & Kok (2008) REITs less sensitive to 
market movements that other sectors.  
Negative Negative 
LEV Degree of financial leverage is 
defined as: (Financial debt 
minus cash) /(Shareholders 
equity). 
Jensen (1986) & Maloney et al. (1993) posit that 
firms with higher degrees of leverage make 
improved managerial decisions. 
Low leverage signals unused debt capacity which 
may be attractive to bidders (Lewellen 1971) 
Frank et al. (2011) significant negative 
relationship for targets.  
Ratcliffe & Dimovski (2013) & Eichholtz & Kok 
(2008) negative relationship for bidders. 
Suggesting financial slack is important for 
REITs. 
Negative Negative 
DIVYIELD Dividend yield averaged over 
three years prior. 
Arnull-Almond (2008) & Alzueta & Lucey 
(2010) argue low yielding firms use retained 
earnings to finance growth opportunities, thus 
increasing target likelihood. However, Smith Jr & 
Watts (1992) argue growth opportunities act as a 
defence. 
Ling & Petrova (2011) find significant positive 
relationship with targets. Suggesting higher 
yielding REITs are attractive targets.   
Positive Negative 
MVBV Share price/book value of 
shareholders equity, averaged 
over three years. 
MVBV used proxy for performance (Walter 
1994). Firms with low MVBV would be 
considered a bargain (Powell 1997).  
Eichholtz & Kok (2008) negative & significant 
relationship with targets.  
Negative Positive 
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Table 5.2: Continued 
Variable Definition  
Prior Research Predicted sign 
Acquirers 
Predicated sign 
Targets non-REIT REIT 
FFO Average over three years of: 
(Funds from 
operations/EDITDA). 
Powell (2004) observed negative relationship 
between liquidity and target probability. 
Gonzalez et al. (1997) larger firms with greater 
liquidity are in a superior financial position, 
therefore higher probability of being a bidder. 
Ling & Petrova (2011) low liquidity REITs signal 
weak financial position.  
Ratcliffe & Dimovski (2013) argue highly liquid 
REITs suggest low growth opportunities, thus 
one way to grow is via M&As. 
Negative Positive 
FCF Average over three years of: 
(Free cash-flow/Total assets). 
Walter (1994) found industry relatedness has 
positive impact on target likelihood. 
Specialisation by property type increases 
likelihood of being a target or bidder (Frank et al. 
2011; Ratcliffe & Dimovski 2013). 
Negative Positive 
TOP3 Percentage of shares held by 
the top 3 investors. 
Increased monitoring can lessen managerial 
agency problems (Fama & Jensen 1983). Positive 
relationship with high levels of external 
shareholders (Weir & Laing 2003). 
Corporate governance characteristics are effective 
monitoring mechanisms in REITs (Anglin et al. 
2013).  
Large blockholdings increase target probability 
(Eichholtz & Kok 2008).  
Large insider holdings have negative impact on 
M&A likelihood (Ratcliffe & Dimovski 2013; 
Eichholtz & Kok 2008). 
Positive Positive 
SHR Percentage of shares held 
directors & related parties. 
Negative Negative 
MGMT Management structure is 
divided into internally and 
externally managed REITs. A 
dummy variable of 1 is used if 
the A-REIT is internally 
managed. 
N/A External REITs are less competitive (Ambrose & 
Linneman 2001).  Ratcliffe & Dimovski (2013) 
find internal REITs have significant positive 
impact on bidder likelihood.  
Negative Positive 
PREGFC Dummy variable of 1 for M&A 
announcements occurring 
before December 2007. 
N/A Ratcliffe & Dimovski (2013) find significant 
positive relationship with bidders. Concluded pre-
GFC was an era of M&As in A-REIT sector. 
Positive Positive 
This table provides a summary of the independent variables employed in the logistic modelling. Definitions of the variable calculations, along with prior research conducted 
on these variables within both non-REIT and REIT literature are presented. Also included is the expected relationship between the explanatory variable and M&A likelihood. 
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5.5PostǦAnnouncementAbnormalReturnsEventStudyModels
5.5.1Introduction
The final area of investigation into M&As within the Australian real estate 
sector (and more specifically A-REITs) is the long-term post announcement 
performance of acquiring firms. As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.5) post-
acquisition results from prior research on conventional firms have shown that 
bidders earn significantly negative long-term abnormal returns (Bessembinder 
and Zhang 2013; Gregory 1997; Sudarsanam and Mahate 2003). Campbell et al. 
(2009 p. 106) describe these results as puzzling “because it constitutes prima 
facie evidence of weak form market inefficiency”.  
This section presents the two methodologies employed in the post-
announcement study. The first method calculates the buy-and-hold excess returns 
in the post-announcement event periods. The second method is based on the Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor model, which estimates the average monthly 
abnormal returns. Gregory (1997) and Limmack (1997) discuss that the choice of 
event study methodology to access long-term performance can have an important 
impact on the level of abnormal returns. Therefore, utilising two different 
methods will enable the study to test the robustness of the post-M&A 
performance of acquirers.  
5.5.2EventMonth
Consistent with short-term event study investigations, the study must firstly 
identify the date of the M&A announcement. Following Campbell et al. (2009), 
the event month [t = 0] for the study is set as the month end in which the M&A is 
announced.   
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5.5.3EventStudyPeriods
Long-term event studies examine the abnormal performance of firms over an 
extended horizon period. This process is in contrast to short-term event studies 
that measure abnormal returns around the day of an announcement. This study 
examines three long-term post announcement event windows. Excess returns are 
estimated over the one, two and three year windows,73 with the event period 
starting the month end after the announcement of the M&A.  
5.5.4BuyǦandǦHoldAbnormalReturns
 Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) document that the use of a buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) method is superior to using a cumulative 
abnormal returns method when accessing long-term performance. The cumulative 
abnormal returns method yields miss-specified statistical test and ignores the 
effects of monthly compounding.74  
To calculate BHARs, the study needs to firstly identify an appropriate 
benchmark (non-event) control sample. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. 
(1999) argue that the choice of the control sample has an important impact on the 
empirical power and the test statistics resulting in biased outcomes. The authors 
document that the use of a reference portfolio, such as an equally weighted 
market index or size decile portfolios can yield spurious test statistics. This is due 
to: new listing bias, rebalancing bias and skewness bias.  
New listing bias arises in long-run event studies when the control sample that 
constitutes an index, may include new firms that began trading after the event 
                                                 
73 The decision to set three-years as the longest event window was to enable the study to have 
sufficient observations. A five-year window (or longer) would have reduced the sample size to an 
unacceptable level.  
74 See also Ritter (1991). 
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(Barber and Lyon 1997; Kothari and Warner 1997). Rebalancing bias occurs 
because the compounded returns of a market index are typically calculated with 
periodic rebalancing while the event firm returns are compounded without 
rebalancing (Barber and Lyon 1997).75 Finally, Barber and Lyon (1997) show that 
long-run abnormal returns are positively skewed.  
To control these biases, Lyon et al. (1999) recommend the construction of 
control portfolios. This method involves matching event firms with the control 
portfolio. Following Lyon et al. (1999) and Campbell et al. (2009), this study 
identifies all non-event firms available for the study period. The firms are then 
ranked on market size and then market-to-book value. Market size is calculated as 
the number of shares on issue times the closing share price one calendar month 
before the event occurrence. Market-to-book value is calculated as the firm’s 
market value, divided by the book value of the firm reported in their annual report 
prior the M&A announcement.  
The event firm is then matched to three non-event firms that comprise the 
control portfolio that is closely equivalent to size and market-to-book value and 
the control sample is then matched to the event firm for the full buy-and-hold 
period.76 This “approach yields well-specified test statistics because it alleviates 
the new listing, rebalancing and skewness biases” (Barber and Lyon 1997, p. 
343). In addition, utilising control portfolios from the same industry decreases 
possible “inaccuracies resulting from missing pricing factors that may have 
varying effects across industries” (Campbell et al. 2009, p. 108).  
                                                 
75 An equally weighted market index is compounded monthly with rebalancing of the firms that 
make up the index. Maintaining equal weightings, shares that have performed better than the 
market are sold, while shares that have underperformed are purchased. The rebalancing leads to a 
bias in the population mean for BHARs calculations (Barber and Lyon 1997). 
76 Barber and Lyon (1997) describe the parameters for matching the event firm to the portfolio 
should lie within the range of 70% to 130% of size and market-to-book value.
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The BHARs are then calculated as the difference between the monthly returns 
over the event period of the event firm less the control portfolio:   
ܤܪܣܴ௜ ൌෑ൫ͳ ൅ ܴ௜ǡ௧൯ െ ൫ܤܪܴோ௉ǡ௜൯ሺʹ͵ሻ
்
௧ୀଵ
 
Where: 
ܤܪܴோ௉ǡ௜ ൌ ෍
ൣς ൫ͳ ൅ ௝ܴǡ௧൯௧்ୀଵ ൧
݊
௡
௝ୀଵ
ሺʹͶሻ 
BHARi is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for event firm i over the time 
period T;  
Ri,t is the monthly total return for event firm i in month t; 
Rj,t is the monthly total return for non-event firm j in month t; 
n is the number of non-event firms that make up the control portfolio; and 
BHRRP,i is the arithmetic average compounded monthly return of the control 
portfolio. 
5.5.5StatisticalTests
The statistical significance of the BHARs is calculated for each event window. 
This step is to test the null hypothesis that the BHARs are equal to zero. This 
study employs two statistical tests to access the robustness of the BHARs 
significance. The first is a traditional test statistic: 
ݐ஻ு஺ோ ൌ
ܤܪܣ்ܴതതതതതതതതതത
ߪሺܤܪܣ்ܴሻȀξܰ
ሺʹͷሻ 
                                       
Where: 
ܤܪܣܴതതതതതതതത்is the samples mean BHAR calculated over time period T; 
ı(BHART) is the cross-sectional sample standard deviation; and 
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N is the number of event observations.  
 Barber and Lyon (1997) provide evidence that long-term BHARs are 
positively skewed resulting in negatively biased t-statistics. To adjust for the 
potential skewness bias when BHARs are calculated using control portfolios, 
Lyon et al. (1999) advocate the use of a skewness-adjusted t-statistic: 
ݐ௦௔ ൌ ξܰ ൬ܵ ൅
ͳ
͵ ߛොܵ
ଶ ൅ ͳ͸ܰ ߛො൰ ሺʹ͸ሻ 
Where: 
ܵ ൌ ܤܪܣܴ
തതതതതതതത்
ߪሺܤܪܣ்ܴሻሺʹ͹ሻ 
and, 
ߛො ൌ σ ሺܤܪܣܴ௜௧ െ ܤܪܣ்ܴሻ
തതതതതതതതതതതଷ௡௜ୀ௡
ܰߪሺܤܪܣ்ܴሻଷ ሺʹͺሻ 
The calculation of ߛො is an estimate of the coefficient of skewness and ξܰܵis 
the standard t-statistic (Lyon et al. 1999) of equation (25).  
5.5.6ThreeǦFactorModelAbnormalReturns
The second methodology employed to identify post-announcement 
performance is the three-factor model developed by Fama and French (1993). 
Asset pricing research has shown that the three-factor model has strong empirical 
support in determining share price movements (Brailsford et al. 2012). Banz 
(1981) was one of the first researchers to document an inverse relationship 
between share returns and firm size, while Fama and French (1992) provide 
evidence that portfolios ranked by book-to-market ratios perform differently. The 
three-factor model is implemented by regressing the post-announcement monthly 
excess returns of the acquiring firm against a market factor, a size factor and a 
book-to-market factor: 
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ܴ௜ǡ௧ െ ௙ܴǡ௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ܴܯܴܨ௧ ൅ ݏ௜ܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ݄௜ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ሺʹͻሻ 
Where: 
Ri,t is the return on security i in month t; 
Rf,t is the return on the 180-day Bank Accepted Bill Rate in month t; 
Įi is the intercept term; 
RMRFt is the excess return on the value-weighted market index; 
SMBt is the return difference between the portfolios of small and large firms 
in month t; 
HMLt is the return difference between the portfolios of high and low book-
to-market firms in month t; and 
İi,t is the standard error term. 
The intercept, Įi, is the variable of interest in the model and measures the mean 
monthly abnormal return of the event firm. The null hypothesis is that the 
intercept is equal to zero. A positive intercept indicates the sample firm has 
outperformed, after controlling for market, size and book-to-market factors 
(Barber and Lyon 1997).  
Because the focus of the study is on the A-REIT sector, calculation of the 
factors is developed from the A-REIT universe.77 Excluding conventional firms 
from the estimation of the factors removes any possible noise within the factors 
that may not be relevant to the A-REIT sector. The market index employed is the 
S&P/ASX200 A-REIT index. This index captures the price movements of those 
entities classified as A-REITs on the Australian Securities Exchange.  
                                                 
77 Calculation of the factors for the real estate sample, which included REMDs and A-REITs, was 
done by including both firm types into the real estate universe. The factors for the A-REIT sample 
only included A-REITs in the market universe.  
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The calculation of the SMB and HML factors follows Brailsford et al. (2012) 
and Fama and French (1993). At the end of June each year all A-REITs listed on 
the ASX are ranked by market capitalisation. The top 30% of firms are then 
labelled the large portfolio, while the bottom 30% are grouped as the small 
portfolio. The proceeding monthly returns are then computed for each firm and an 
equally weighted monthly return portfolio is calculated. The SMB factor is then 
estimated by subtracting the returns of the large firms portfolio from the small 
firms portfolio. This process is then repeated every year from 1996 to 2013. Firms 
involved in a M&A during the year each portfolio is created or in three preceding 
years are removed from the universe because the inclusion of these firms would 
bias the statistical tests towards observing no excess returns (Bouwman et al. 
2009). 
Calculation of the HML factor is identical to the SMB process. However, in 
this case the universe is ranked each year by the firm’s book-to-market ratio. 
Book-to-market data is collected from the Datanalysis database for each firm. 
Any firm with a negative book-to-market value is removed from the universe 
(Bouwman et al. 2009; Brailsford et al. 2012). The HML factor is than calculated 
as the difference between the returns on the high book-to-market and low book-
to-market portfolios. Again, after each 12 months the process is repeated and new 
portfolios are formed.  
 Mitchell and Stafford (2000) establish that there is cross-sectional correlation 
of individual event firms when estimating long-term abnormal returns. Bouwman 
et al. (2009) discuss that by employing the three-factor model automatically 
accounts for cross-sectional correlations in the portfolio variance at each point in 
time.  
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Another advantage of the three-factor model is that it does not require size and 
book-to-market data for the event firms, while the BHAR method requires this 
data (Barber and Lyon 1997). Furthermore, Barber and Lyon (1997) demonstrate 
large firms or firms with low book-to-market values may have common share 
returns that more closely follow the returns of small firms or high book-to-market 
firms. The three-factor model captures this pattern of returns, however, BHAR 
method using the size and book-to-market matching process will not reflect this 
relationship.  
5.6Conclusion
This chapter has presented the methodologies employed across the three 
analytical investigations conducted within the thesis. The short-term event study 
method is employed to examine the wealth effects to existing shareholders around 
the M&A announcement. Implementation of the logit model allows the study to 
examine the firm characteristics that have an impact on the likelihood of a firm 
entering into a M&A. Finally, examination of the post-acquisition performance of 
A-REITs will identify the long-term wealth effects for shareholders.   
Examining the three M&A phases will shed more light on the underlying 
motivation(s) for M&As within the A-REIT sector. The following three chapters 
present and discuss the results for the announcement period study, pre-acquisition 
study and the post-announcement study. 
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Chapter 6: M&A Announcement Results and Discussions 
6.1Introduction
This chapter presents the event study results around the announcement of a 
M&A in the Australian real estate sector. Figure 6.1 displays, on a time line, the 
focus of discussion in this chapter in relation to the overall area of examination of 
the thesis.78 The study starts by investigating the wealth effects of M&A 
announcements within the Australian real estate sector. The investigation then 
divides the sample into Australian REIT and non-REIT M&As.79  
Figure 6.1: Thesis study timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 presents a time-line of the M&A study periods across the three analytical studies of this 
thesis. The circled section represents the focus of the presentation of results in this chapter. 
 
Results for the full sample show that both targets and bidders earn positive and 
significant abnormal returns around the announcement period, with targets 
enjoying the majority of the gains. Announcement abnormal returns for the        
A-REIT sub-sample are lower than the non-REIT sub-sample, possibly due to 
lower levels of information asymmetries within the A-REIT sector. Combined 
                                                 
78 Figure 6.1 is replicated from Figure 1.1 presented in Chapter 1. The figure depicts the different 
phases of the M&A timeline that are analytically investigated within this thesis. 
79A-REIT observations are defined as both parties classified as A-REITs, or, in the case of private 
counterparties, unlisted property trust (i.e. private REIT). Observations where at least one (or 
both) party (parties) are classified as a Real Estate Management and Development (REMD) firm 
are referred to as non-REIT. 
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excess returns for targets and acquirers are positive and significant across all 
event windows.  Results for the study support the synergy motive (or value 
maximising theory) for M&As. In contrast to general corporate finance studies, 
evidence of the signalling impact of using cash or scrip to finance a M&A is 
mitigated in the A-REIT sector. It is hypothesized that this outcome is due to the 
regulatory requirements of A-REITs to payout 100% of their trust income in the 
form of dividends to avoid paying tax at the company level.  
To investigate the possible driver for the synergy motive, a regression analysis 
of the observed A-REIT excess returns against a number of explanatory variables 
described in Chapter 5 was performed. In contrast to US REIT studies by Ghosh 
et al. (2012) and Campbell et al. (2001), regression model results show that size is 
an important variable for bidding A-REITs and has a positive impact on acquirers 
abnormal returns. In the case of A-REIT targets, results also show that size is an 
important factor. These results suggest that the synergistic benefit of A-REIT 
M&As may be due to increased economies of size.  
Consistent with general industry and REIT research, evidence shows that 
diversification as a reason for M&As has a negative impact on excess returns. 
Finally, the study finds that financial slack is important for bidding A-REITs, and 
this outcome is in contrast to the free-cash flow theory of Jensen (1986). 
However, the result supports the claims of Ghosh et al. (2012) that increased 
financial leverage implies higher financial distress, therefore making it difficult 
for A-REITs to finance a M&A with external debt. 
6.2EventStudyResults–M&AAnnouncement
This section presents and discusses the results of the event study analysis 
described in Chapter 5. First, the calculated abnormal returns for both acquirers 
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and targets around the announcement date are presented. Second, the sample is 
sectioned and results for non-REIT and A-REIT abnormal returns are discussed. 
Lastly, focusing on A-REIT M&As, the study investigates the wealth effects for 
method of payment and public versus private counterparties.  
6.2.1OverallRealEstateSector
Figure 6.2 displays the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of both target and 
acquirer portfolios. The graph shows that neither party earns abnormal returns 
over the period of twenty days to around six days prior the announcement. A 
slight rise in CARs for targets can be seen, starting around day [-6], suggesting 
some possible information leakage. The CARs on announcement day for both 
parties increase, with targets enjoying a large jump. Post announcement excess 
returns for targets continue to rise and maintain a steady growth in CARs up to 
twenty days after the event.  
For acquiring firms, the graph shows after an initial increase in the excess 
returns in the days following the announcement, the CARs then start to fall after 
day [+2]. The CARs remain reasonably flat until 14 days after the announcement. 
After this point it can be seen that the excess returns drop close to zero in the final 
days of the event period. Martynova and Renneboog (2011) suggests this outcome 
is due to the market revising the potential takeover synergies of the announcement 
once more information about the M&A is revealed. 
Shulka and Gekara (2010) note that if there is uncertainty about the 
announcement the reaction by the market is an ongoing process as new 
information is released. This result suggests that the market, at first, regards the 
M&A announcement as a positive signal for the bidding firm. However, as time 
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moves forward, the abnormal returns are eroded, possibly due to the release of 
new information about the proposal and a re-pricing of the acquirer. 
Figure 6.2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Market Model) 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the 100 targets portfolio and 99 
bidders portfolio M&A announcements from 1996-2013 over event window [-20,+20]. 
Calculation of CAR is obtained using the market model discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Table 6.1 describes the daily average abnormal return (AAR) and the CARs, 
calculated using the market model for the two portfolios over the full event period 
[-20,+20].80 Acquiring firms earn positive and significant AARs on the 
announcement day of +1.13% and significant positive AARs on day -1 of 
+0.24%. However, on day +3 they earn significant negative AARs of -0.70%, this 
result may be due to over-reaction to the announcement by the market on the 
announcement day. Further support for re-pricing of acquirers is observed in 
day’s +14 and +20 both displaying negative and significant AARs. 
Target shareholders experience significant AARs of +6.55% on the 
announcement day; this is a consistent result with prior real estate M&A studies 
(Eichholtz and Kok 2008; Kirchhoff et al. 2006). It is also found that the AAR for 
                                                 
80 Appendix tables A.1 and A.2 present the three-day AARs for each of the individual 
observations for bidders and targets respectively.  
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day +1 to be +1.60% and significant, suggesting that the market is continuing to 
digest the information regarding the announcement. As is the case with the bidder 
outcomes, the results indicate that targets earn negative and significant AARs of   
-0.38% two-days after the announcement, again suggesting a possible over-
reaction to the M&A announcement. Finally, it can be seen that the AARs for day 
[-1] are positive and significant (+1.03%), and this points to some possible 
information leakage regarding the M&A announcement. McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997) suggest that M&As often result from a strategic planning process, thus 
information from the pending announcement may have been leaked to or 
predicted by the market.  It may also be the case that equity analysts contest with 
each other to reveal information ahead of public release (Atiase 1985).  
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Table 6.1: Daily Average Abnormal Returns for Bidders and Targets 
(Market model) 
  Bidders N = 99 Targets N = 100 
Day AAR (P-value) CAR AAR (P-value) CAR 
-20 -0.01% (0.933) -0.01% +0.14% (0.835) +0.14% 
-19 +0.07% (0.783) +0.06% -0.44% (0.369) -0.30% 
-18 -0.11% (0.936) -0.05% +0.01% (0.709) -0.29% 
-17 -0.15% (0.627) -0.20% -0.19% (0.342) -0.48% 
-16 +0.20% (0.323) +0.00% +0.14% (0.985) -0.34% 
-15 -0.07% (0.800) -0.07% -0.22% (0.529) -0.56% 
-14 -0.11% (0.254) -0.18% -0.10% (0.288) -0.66% 
-13 -0.11% (0.495) -0.29% -0.07% (0.887) -0.73% 
-12 +0.08% (0.853) -0.21% -0.15% (0.569) -0.88% 
-11 +0.02% (0.627) -0.19% -0.09% (0.937) -0.97% 
-10 +0.22% (0.315) +0.03% +0.16% (0.111) -0.81% 
-9 -0.12% (0.664) -0.09% +0.01% (0.598) -0.80% 
-8 +0.01% (0.919) -0.08% +0.56% (0.199) -0.24% 
-7 +0.04% (0.129) -0.04% -0.22% (0.278) -0.46% 
-6 +0.16% (0.865) +0.12% +0.52% (0.245) +0.06% 
-5 -0.03% (0.695) +0.09% +0.38% (0.291) +0.44% 
-4 +0.03% (0.488) +0.12% +0.62% (0.020)** +1.06% 
-3 -0.14% (0.759) -0.02% +0.24% (0.384) +1.30% 
-2 +0.12% (0.389) +0.10% +0.05% (0.231) +1.35% 
-1 +0.24% (0.025)** +0.34% +1.03% (0.000)*** +2.38% 
0 +1.13% (0.000)*** +1.47% +6.55% (0.000)*** +8.93% 
1 +0.26% (0.378) +1.73% +1.60% (0.000)*** +10.53% 
2 -0.35% (0.213) +1.38% -0.38% (0.069)* +10.15% 
3 -0.70% (0.000)*** +0.68% +0.25% (0.183) +10.40% 
4 +0.17% (0.455) +0.85% +0.14% (0.739) +10.54% 
5 +0.34% (0.096)* +1.19% +0.03% (0.621) +10.57% 
6 -0.05% (0.602) +1.14% +0.01% (0.246) +10.58% 
7 +0.02% (0.919) +1.16% -0.06% (0.595) +10.52% 
8 +0.14% (0.554) +1.30% +0.27% (0.185) +10.79% 
9 +0.01% (0.605) +1.31% +0.09% (0.541) +10.88% 
10 -0.13% (0.527) +1.18% +0.63% (0.239) +11.51% 
11 -0.15% (0.680) +1.03% -0.22% (0.191) +11.29% 
12 -0.12% (0.144) +0.91% +0.34% (0.030)** +11.63% 
13 -0.02% (0.170) +0.89% -0.39% (0.016)** +11.24% 
14 -0.40% (0.008)*** +0.49% +0.42% (0.307) +11.66% 
15 +0.10% (0.723) +0.59% -0.09% (0.500) +11.57% 
16 -0.16% (0.658) +0.43% +0.03% (0.808) +11.60% 
17 +0.14% (0.917) +0.57% +0.22% (0.433) +11.82% 
18 +0.26% (0.285) +0.83% +0.40% (0.132) +12.22% 
19 -0.22% (0.162) +0.61% -0.04% (0.742) +12.18% 
20 -0.46% (0.006)*** +0.13%   -0.24% (0.452) +11.94% 
This table presents the average abnormal return (AAR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
over the 41-day event period around M&A announcement. Day 0 represents the date of 
announcement. Calculation of AAR utilises the market model discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * 
show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
 
To investigate the wealth effects further, the CARs are calculated over a 
number of different event windows [-20,+20], [-20,0], [0,+20], [-2,+2], [-1,+1] 
and [0]. The results are displayed in Table 6.2, Panel A shows the CARs for the 
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acquiring firms for both the market model and the two-factor model, whilst Panel 
B provides the target results. Both models of investigation display similar results 
for targets and bidders, providing robustness to the results. However, it also 
suggests that interest rates do not appear to have an influence on excess returns in 
a M&A announcement.  This outcome is in contrast to prior REIT research into 
the impact of interest rates and returns. For example, Allen et al. (2000) found 
higher interest rates have a negative and significant impact on REIT returns in 
their US study. In an Australian context, prior research has provided similar 
results, Newell (2005) and Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2007) provided evidence that 
higher interest rates have a negative and significant impact on A-REIT returns.  
Table 6.2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
Panel A:  Bidders Market Model   Two-Factor Model 
No. Obs 99 CAR (P-value) CAR (P-value) 
[-20,+20] +0.13% (0.601) -0.33% (0.718) 
[-20,0] +1.46% (0.024)** +1.27% (0.039)** 
[0,+20] -0.20% (0.867) -0.50% (0.756) 
[-2,+2] +1.40% (0.000)*** +1.36% (0.000)*** 
[-1,+1] +1.63% (0.000)*** +1.50% (0.000)*** 
[0] +1.13% (0.000)*** +1.11% (0.000)*** 
Panel B:  Targets Market Model Two-Factor Model 
No. Obs 100 CAR (P-value) CAR (P-value) 
[-20,+20] +11.94% (0.000)*** +12.02% (0.000)*** 
[-20,0] +8.91% (0.000)*** +8.72% (0.000)*** 
[0,+20] +9.58% (0.000)*** +9.68% (0.000)*** 
[-2,+2] +8.84% (0.000)*** +8.82% (0.000)*** 
[-1,+1] +9.18% (0.000)*** +9.06% (0.000)*** 
[0]   +6.55% (0.000)***   +6.39% (0.000)*** 
Table 6.2 displays the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the six event windows. Panel A 
displays the results for the 99 bidding firms, Panel B shows the results for the 100 target firms 
over the study period 1995-2013. CARs are calculated using the market model and the two-factor 
model discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively.  
 
Comparing the results for the CARs prior to and post announcement shows 
that bidders earn positive and significant CARs of +1.46% for the market model 
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and +1.27% for the two-factor model in the event window [-20,0]. Post 
announcement returns are negative, but not significant. This result suggests that 
there may be some information leakage within the market prior to announcement.  
Cai et al. (2011) find in their study strong support for anticipation effects in 
bidding activities. Martynova and Renneboog (2011 p. 240) also find evidence of 
takeover information leakage “as some investors or insiders trade on private 
information or rumours”.  
The results of this study are consistent with the findings of Martynova and 
Renneboog (2011) who find positive excess returns for bidders prior to the 
announcement and posit industry relatedness has a positive impact on acquirer 
CARs pre-announcement. However, prior real estate research by Elayan and 
Young (1994) points to different results over similar event windows. The authors 
found that bidding real estate firms earn negative, but insignificant, CARs of        
-0.3% in the [-20,-2] window and positive and significant CARs of +2.7% over 
the [+2,+20] period.  
Short-term event windows ([-2,+2], [-1,+1] and [0]) show acquiring firms earn 
positive and significant CARs across both models. The three-day event window 
produces +1.40% CARs for the market model and +1.36% CARs for the two-
factor model. Prior research has presented mixed results for bidding firms in the 
real estate sector. Eichholtz and Kok (2008) found real estate bidders earn 
positive CARs of +0.37% around the [-1,+1] window, but the result was not 
statistically significant. While Kirchhoff et al. (2006) discovered bidders returned 
a negative CAR of -0.56% over the same window, again the result lacked 
statistical significance.  
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The short-term event window results support the findings of Eichholtz and 
Kok (2008) who concluded that M&A announcements in the listed real estate 
sector have a positive market reaction for bidding firms compared to the findings 
in other sectors. For example, Chang (1998) and Kiymaz and Baker (2008) find 
evidence that bidders earn negative and significant CARs around a M&A 
announcement. More recent studies by Martynova and Renneboog (2011) and Cai 
et al. (2011) have shown that bidding firms earn positive and significant CARs 
around the [-1,+1] window of +0.72% and +0.71% respectively. Furthermore, 
Shams et al. (2013) found Australian bidding firms earn positive and significant 
CARs of +1.98% over the same event period. Excess returns for the forty-one day 
event period are mixed. The market model shows CARs of +0.13%, while the 
two-factor model results are -0.33%, neither display statistical significance. These 
results differ to the findings of Young and Elayan (2002), who find acquirers earn 
negative and significant CARs of -2.6% over the same event period.    
Panel B displays the results for target firms. Consistent with prior real estate 
research, targets enjoy positive and significant CARs across all six event 
windows. Kirchhoff et al. (2006) showed targets earn significant CARs of 
+9.46% and Eichholtz and Kok (2008) reported +8.66% CARs over the [-1,+1] 
event window. CARs for the market model produced a significant excess return 
of +9.18% and +9.06% for the two-factor model. Kirchhoff et al. (2006) found 
target firms earn negative insignificant CARs over the longer event window        
[-20,+20] of -3.86%. In contrast, Table 6.2 shows targets earn positive and 
significant CARs of almost +12% from both models over the same window. 
Consistent with this study, Elayan and Young (1994) found targets earn positive 
and significant excess returns of +12.9% over the [-20,+20] event period.  
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Whilst the CARs are positive, the level of the returns are lower than reported 
in prior M&A studies in general corporate finance. For example, Andrade et al. 
(2001); Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Kiymaz and Baker (2008) display CARs 
of between +10% and +23% in their studies. Eichholtz and Kok (2008) suggest 
that this lower level of CARs is possibly due to the homogeneity of the assets of 
property companies resulting in lower potential for synergistic benefits. Womack 
(2012) further supports these claims and suggests that the long-term leases, 
predictable cash flows and limited excess capacity contribute to the lower CARs.  
The results of the event study provide support for the argument that M&As in 
the real estate sector produce positive and significant aggregate excess returns as 
displayed in Table 6.3. The aggregate CARs are positive and significant across all 
event windows, both bidders and targets earn excess returns of approximately 
+3.8% on the announcement date and approximately +6% for the full event 
period. This result is in contrast to Womack (2012), who showed insignificant 
CARs of +0.40% around announcement and +0.94% over the [-20,+20] event 
window. In summary, the results of the current study provide further verification 
of the synergy motive.  
Table 6.3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns – Combined  
All Parties Market Model   Two-Factor Model 
No. Obs 199 CAR (P-value) CAR (P-value) 
[-20,+20] +6.06% (0.000)*** +5.74% (0.000)*** 
[-20,0] +5.20% (0.000)*** +5.04% (0.000)*** 
[0,+20] +4.71% (0.000)*** +4.46% (0.000)*** 
[-2,+2] +5.14% (0.000)*** +5.12% (0.000)*** 
[-1,+1] +5.42% (0.000)*** +5.30% (0.000)*** 
[0] +3.85% (0.000)*** +3.76% (0.000)*** 
Table 6.3 provides the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the six event windows for the 
combined sample of 199 targets and bidding firms over the study period 1995-2013. CARs are 
calculated using the market model and the two-factor model discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * 
show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
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6.2.2GlobalFinancialCrisis
As discussed in Chapter 2, the financial crisis had a devastating effect on 
market values throughout the world. The real estate sector and more specifically 
the REIT sector experienced large losses in their market values. To investigate the 
possible impact of the GFC, the sample is divided between pre and post crisis, 
using December 2007 as the break point.  
It is acknowledged that the number of observations post GFC is extremely low 
and drawing any strong conclusions would be problematic. However, it is felt that 
this is an important time within the history of real estate and is an area for future 
research once additional announcements occur. The results are displayed in Table 
6.4.81 Bidders earn positive and significant CARs prior the GFC of around +1.6% 
during the shorter event windows. Post GFC results show that bidders earn 
positive and significant CARs of +1.81% around the three-day event window and 
+0.39% in the pre-announcement period. The remainder of the event windows 
display negative, but insignificant excess returns.82 
Results for targets pre-GFC are positive and significant across all event 
windows. However, the levels are lower when compared to the entire sample 
period. For example, pre-GFC excess returns are +6.32% over the three-day 
window, compared to +9.18% for the full study period. Examining post-GFC 
excess returns, the CARs are positive and significant across all windows and the 
level of CARs is considerably larger than the pre-GFC period. Event window      
[-1,+1] CARs post-GFC are +20.31% compared to +6.32% pre-GFC, also the 41 
                                                 
81 Only the CARs and p-values from the market model are reported, two-factor model results are 
highly comparable.
82 This result is most likely due to the low number of observations. 
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day event window CARs for post-GFC are +21.76% compared to +9.42% pre-
GFC.  
Table 6.4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns – Pre and Post-GFC 
  Bidders   Targets 
Panel A:  Obs CAR (P-value) Obs CAR (P-value) 
Pre-GFC 86 78 
[-20,+20] +0.34% (0.556) +9.42% (0.000)*** 
[-20,0] +1.69% (0.019)** +6.19% (0.000)*** 
[0,+20] -0.03% (0.961) +7.35% (0.000)*** 
[-2,+2] +1.58% (0.000)*** +5.94% (0.000)*** 
[-1,+1] +1.57% (0.000)*** +6.32% (0.000)*** 
[0] +1.32% (0.000)*** +4.12% (0.000)*** 
  Bidders   Targets 
Panel B:  Obs CAR (P-value) Obs CAR (P-value) 
Post-GFC 13 22 
[-20,+20] -0.93% (0.215) +21.76% (0.001)*** 
[-20,0] +0.39% (0.019)** +19.54% (0.000)*** 
[0,+20] -1.82% (0.766) +18.26% (0.000)*** 
[-2,+2] -0.13% (0.790) +20.15% (0.000)*** 
[-1,+1] +1.81% (0.000)*** +20.31% (0.000)*** 
[0]   -0.49% (0.435)     +16.03% (0.000)*** 
Table 6.4 presents the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the six event windows. Panel A 
displays the results for both bidders and targets pre-GFC, Panel B shows the results for bidders 
and targets post-GFC. GFC cut off date was set at December 2007. CARs reported are calculated 
using the market model discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively.  
This result may be accounted for by the suppressed market values during and 
post-GFC. More specifically, the A-REIT sector recorded an average premium to 
net tangible assets (NTA), at its peak, of over 80% in March 2007. During the 
height of the crisis, the average fell to a 33% discount in May 2009. By 
November 2011, the average discount to NTA was 11% (Wist 2011). Given this, 
it is hypothesised that acquiring firms identified under-priced targets and made a 
M&A offer closer to the value of the underlying assets, resulting in higher CARs.  
6.2.3AǦREITsExcessReturns
To test the market for corporate control within the A-REITs sector, the sample 
was divided into announcements where both parties are classified as A-REITs, or 
 
 
173
in the case of private counterparties, an unlisted property trust. The focus of this 
study here is the wealth effects of A-REIT M&As.83 
  Table 6.5 shows that A-REIT bidders earn positive and significant excess 
returns around the announcement period across both models, with three-day 
CARs of +1.10% for the market model and +1.02% for the two-factor model. 
Prior research on bidding REITs has been mixed. Sahin (2005) showed bidding 
REITs experience significant negative CARs of -1.21% over the three-day 
window. Campbell et al. (2001) also found bidding REITs earn negative and 
significant CARs of -0.6%. Keisers (2009) and Campbell et al. (1998) observed 
negative CARs over the event period [-1,+1], however, both results lacked 
statistical significance. In contrast, Ooi et al. (2011) found positive and significant 
three-day CARs of +0.21% in their study of Japanese and Singapore REIT 
markets. Finally Allen and Sirmans (1987) showed that bidding REITs earn 
positive and significant excess returns of +5.78% over the [-1,0] event window. 
The results of this study may be driven by the recognition that size and asset 
growth are avenues for A-REITs to improve returns and attract capital (MIS 
2006).  
Examining the full 41 day event window it can be seen that A-REIT bidders 
earn negative CARs of -0.69% for the two-factor model and -1.30% for the 
market model, however neither displays statistical significance. This suggests 
that, although the market sees the announcement as positive around the shorter 
event windows (e.g. [-1,+1] window), over the longer period, the gains are lost. 
This result is similar to Keisers (2009) who displayed a negative and significant 
CAR of -1.35% over the 41-day event window. However, lower than Young and 
                                                 
83 Observations were at least one (or both) party (parties) are classified as a Real Estate 
Management and Development firm are referred to as non-REIT. 
 
 
174
Elayan (2002) who observed significant CARs of -6.57% over the [-20,+20] 
window. This result is possibly due to the market over-reacting to the 
announcement and therefore revaluing the bidding firms. Alternatively, as more 
information is released to the market post the announcement day, investors are 
able to access the M&A and price the bidding A-REITs more effectively. This is 
further evident in examination of the pre and post-announcement windows. 
Across both models, A-REIT bidders earn positive and significant CARs of 
approximately +1% in the [-20,0] event period. However, the [0,+20] window 
shows that bidders earn negative excess returns of -1.12% and -1.64% for the 
market model and two-factor model respectively, although neither display 
statistical significance.  
Table 6.5: Bidder Cumulative Abnormal Returns – A-REIT v Non A-REIT 
Panel A: Obs Market Model   Two-Factor Model 
A-REIT 55 CAR (P-value) CAR (P-value) 
[-20,+20] -0.69% (0.277) -1.30% (0.577) 
[-20,0] +1.04% (0.000)*** +0.96% (0.019)** 
[0,+20] -1.12% (0.227) -1.64% (0.124) 
[-2,+2] +1.01% (0.000)*** +0.98% (0.006)*** 
[-1,+1] +1.10% (0.000)*** +1.02% (0.001)*** 
[0] +0.61% (0.001)*** +0.65% (0.000)*** 
Panel B: Obs Market Model   Two-Factor Model 
Non A-REIT 44 CAR (P-value) CAR (P-value) 
[-20,+20] +1.27% (0.001)*** +0.97% (0.001)*** 
[-20,0] +2.15% (0.000)*** +1.85% (0.000)*** 
[0,+20] +0.84% (0.260) +0.79% (0.201) 
[-2,+2] +1.84% (0.000)*** +1.77% (0.000)*** 
[-1,+1] +2.23% (0.000)*** +2.03% (0.000)*** 
[0]   +1.71% (0.000)***   +1.67% (0.000)*** 
This table shows the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the six event windows. Panel A 
displays the results for the 55 A-REIT bidding firms, Panel B shows the results for the 44 non    
A-REIT bidding firms over the study period 1995-2013. CARs are calculated using the market 
model and the two-factor model discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * show statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
Panel B of Table 6.5 provides the results for non-REIT acquirers; the results 
are similar to A-REIT bidders in that the CARs around the announcement period 
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are positive and significant. However, the level of CARs is slightly higher across 
all event windows. For example, the market model shows non-REIT acquirers 
earn +1.71%, compared to +0.61% for A-REIT bidders on the announcement day. 
Comparing the results to prior real estate literature, Young and Elayan (2002) and 
Elayan and Young (1994) both showed acquirers in the real estate sector earn 
positive and significant CARs of +0.69% and +0.49% respectively over the [-1,0] 
event window. Eichholtz and Kok (2008) also show positive, but insignificant, 
CARs for real estate firms over the [-1,+1] window of +1.51%.  
Evaluation of pre-announcement CARs provides similar outcomes to the       
A-REIT results. With the [-20,0] event window showing positive and significant 
CARs of +2.15 % for the market model and +1.85% for the two-factor model. 
However, in contrast, non-REIT bidders earn positive CARs over event window 
[0,+20] for both models, although neither displays statistical significance. This 
result contradicts the findings of Young and Elayan (2002) who found bidding 
firms earn negative and significant CARs post announcement of -2.21%, but 
found no significance pre-announcement.   
Table 6.6 shows the results for targets when separated by industry 
classification. Results show that the excess returns for target shareholders are 
positive and significant across all windows and for both models for A-REIT and 
non-REIT M&As. A-REIT targets earn positive and significant excess returns of 
almost +8% for both models around the three-day event window. This result is 
consistent with prior REIT research. For example, Campbell et al. (1998) showed 
target REITs earn positive CARs of +5.20%; while Eichholtz and Kok (2008) and 
Keisers (2009) both provided positive and significant CARs around the three-day 
window of +6.69% and +4.95% respectively.     
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Examining the full 41 day event period for A-REITs, results show targets earn 
positive and significant CARs of around +7.5%, consistent with Keisers (2009) 
and Elayan and Young (1994). However, the results are in contrast to McIntosh et 
al. (1989), who found targets earn excess returns of +16.30% over the [-20,+20] 
event period. The difference in these US studies results can be attributed to the 
impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Prior to the Act, REITs were not permitted 
to be self-managed entities and were passive, static investment vehicles offering 
shareholders advantages of liquidity and portfolio diversification within the 
property sector (Ling and Ryngaert 1997). Since 1986, REITs have become more 
dynamic, self-managed entities and similar to the rest of the corporate world 
(Campbell 2002).  
Table 6.6: Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns – A-REIT v Non A-REIT  
Panel A: Obs Market Model   Two-Factor Model 
A-REIT 61 CAR (P-value) CAR (P-value) 
[-20,+20] +7.55% (0.000)*** +7.61% (0.000)*** 
[-20,0] +6.60% (0.000)*** +6.17% (0.000)*** 
[0,+20] +6.88% (0.000)*** +7.24% (0.000)*** 
[-2,+2] +7.75% (0.000)*** +7.81% (0.000)*** 
[-1,+1] +7.96% (0.000)*** +7.99% (0.000)*** 
[0] +5.93% (0.000)*** +5.81% (0.000)*** 
Panel B: Obs Market Model Two-Factor Model 
Non A-REIT 39 CAR (P-value) CAR (P-value) 
[-20,+20] +18.42% (0.000)*** +18.54% (0.000)*** 
[-20,0] +12.23% (0.000)*** +12.43% (0.000)*** 
[0,+20] +13.63% (0.000)*** +13.36% (0.000)*** 
[-2,+2] +10.44% (0.000)*** +10.31% (0.000)*** 
[-1,+1] +11.05% (0.000)*** +10.21% (0.000)*** 
[0]   +7.45% (0.000)***   +7.24% (0.000)*** 
Table 6.6 presents the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the six event windows. Panel A 
displays the results for the 61 A-REIT target firms, Panel B shows the results for the 39 non       
A-REIT target firms over the study period 1995-2013. CARs are calculated using the market 
model and the two-factor model discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * show statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
Panel B shows that non-REIT targets also earn positive and significant CARs 
across the six event windows. However, the level is considerably greater than the 
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A-REIT sample. This result supports the findings of Eichholtz and Kok (2008) 
who documented lower CARs for REIT M&As. Excess returns for non-REIT 
targets are more in line with prior Australian studies across different industries; 
for example, Maheswaran and Pinder (2005) show target shareholders earn a 
significant three-day CAR of +13.49%.  
The observed lower CARs for A-REIT M&As, both targets and acquirers, may 
be due to lower levels of information asymmetry in the sector.  Hartzell et al. 
(2006) posit that REITs are easy to value due to their tangible assets and 
relatively transparent structure. Sah and Seagraves (2012) argue that because 
REITs invest principally in large, identifiable assets, face limitations on retained 
earnings and have limited intangible assets, they may be more transparent than 
industrial firms. This increased transparency should decrease the level of 
information asymmetry between management and investors. Furthermore, Feng et 
al. (2007) suggested that in a regulated industry, like REITs, management has less 
discretion and therefore information asymmetry is less severe. Therefore, to 
examine the impacts on shareholder wealth around the announcement, the 
remainder of this chapter focuses on A-REIT M&As to help identify the 
underlying motivation(s). 
6.2.4MethodofPayment
To further investigate the excess returns around announcement the A-REIT 
sample is divided into payment method. Research has shown that choice of 
payment has an impact on excess returns. Both parties enjoy higher excess returns 
when the M&A is financed with cash.84 As presented in Chapter 3, there are two 
                                                 
84 For example, Andrade et al. (2001); Davidson and Cheng (1997); Travlos (1987) and Wansley 
et al. (1983a) 
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hypotheses for the difference in the observed excess returns between the methods 
of payment. First, the different signalling implications of cash versus stock 
(Myers and Majluf 1984) and, second, the tax implication hypothesis (Bugeja and 
da Silva Rosa 2008; Wansley et al. 1983a).  
In the case of REITs, prior research has shown that bidding firms earn higher 
excess returns when scrip and/or a combination of scrip and cash is used to 
finance the acquisition. For example, Campbell et al. (2011) provided evidence of 
positive and significant CARs of +0.81% when scrip/combination financed 
acquisitions. However, when cash is utilised as the method of payment, bidders 
earn insignificant CARs of +0.07% over the [-1,+1] event window. Ratcliffe et al. 
(2009) provided similar results when investigating A-REIT M&As, determining 
that scrip/combination deals produced significant excess returns of +1.55% 
compared to cash financed deals of negative -0.22% over the three-day window.  
Table 6.7 shows the CARs for bidding A-REITs when separated by method of 
payment. Consistent with prior REIT research, the results show that acquirers 
earn higher and greater significant excess returns when the acquisition is financed 
by scrip and/or a combination of scrip and cash. When cash is used as the method 
of payment, bidding firms earn negative CARs of -1.81% for the market model 
and -1.99% for the two-factor model over the 41 day event window. It appears 
that these negative returns are being driven by the post event window [0,+20]. 
Both models show negative and significant CARs of approximately -2%. Excess 
returns around the shorter time periods show positive and significant CARs of 
around +0.5% for the [-1,+1] event window.  
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Table 6.7: A-REIT Acquirers by Method of Payment 
Panel A: Obs Market Model   Two-Factor Model 
Cash 28 CAR (P-value) CAR (P-value) 
[-20,+20] -1.81% (0.019)** -1.99% (0.017)** 
[-20,0] +0.67% (0.324) +0.66% (0.499) 
[0,+20] -2.06% (0.082)* -2.16% (0.083)* 
[-2,+2] +0.46% (0.025)** +0.41% (0.054)* 
[-1,+1] +0.48% (0.004)*** +0.44% (0.010)** 
[0] +0.41% (0.257) +0.48% (0.181) 
Panel B: Obs Market Model Two-Factor Model 
Scrip/Combo 27 CAR (P-value) CAR (P-value) 
[-20,+20] +0.48% (0.964) -0.59% (0.661) 
[-20,0] +1.44% (0.001)*** +1.27% (0.068)* 
[0,+20] -0.13% (0.962) -1.10% (0.666) 
[-2,+2] +1.57% (0.000)*** +1.57% (0.002)*** 
[-1,+1] +1.75% (0.000)*** +1.63% (0.000)*** 
[0] +0.82% (0.000)*** +0.76% (0.000)*** 
Table 6.7 presents the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) by method of payment for bidding firms 
over the six event windows. Panel A displays the results for the 28 A-REIT cash financed M&As, 
Panel B shows the results for the 27 A-REIT scrip/combo financed M&As over the study period 
1995-2013. CARs are calculated using the market model and the two-factor model discussed in 
Chapter 5. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
Panel B of table 6.7 shows the excess returns for bidding firms when scrip 
and/or a combination of scrip and cash is used as method of payment. Acquirers 
earn positive CARs across all event windows. CARs around and prior to the 
announcement are positive and significant. The market model shows significantly 
positive CARs of +1.75% over the three-day event window and +1.44% for the   
[-20,0] period.  Finally, it can be seen that the CARs are higher across all event 
windows for both models when compared to Panel A.  
This result is consistent with Pierzak (2001) who provides evidence that excess 
returns are greater for REITs using scrip or a combination compared to REITs 
using cash payments. Therefore, the asymmetric information problem for method 
of payment is greatly reduced for REITs. When compared to general corporate 
finance findings on method of payment, Pierzak (2001, p. 136) concludes that 
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“the institutional characteristics of REITs truly make them different from 
traditional corporations”.  
 Campbell et al. (2001) suggest that this difference in REIT results compared to 
more general corporate finance studies is due to a REITs legal requirement to pay 
out a large majority of their earnings.85 This limits the opportunity to finance 
acquisitions with internally generated funds and therefore may lessen the negative 
implications of using stock/combination as the payment method. Ratcliffe et al. 
(2009) conclude that bidding shareholders identify the synergistic benefits of     
A-REIT M&As but value that acquiring A-REITs are able to preserve cash. This 
study concludes that this result is due to the institutional characteristics of          
A-REITs and the efficient use of scarce resources, a result supported by prior 
REIT research (Campbell et al. 2001; Pierzak 2001).  
Excess returns for target A-REITs by method of payment are displayed in 
Table 6.8. The CARs are positive and highly significant across all event windows 
for both the payment methods and both models. Panel A shows that targets earn 
higher CARs across all event windows when cash is utilised as the method of 
payment, compared to scrip/combination in Panel B. The market model shows 
that targets earn positive CARs of +12.22% for cash financed mergers, compared 
to positive CARs of +5.31% for scrip/combination financed acquisitions over the 
[-1,+1] event period.  
This result is consistent with prior REIT research. For example, Eichholtz and 
Kok (2008) showed that targets earn positive and significant CARs of +10.19% 
when the M&A is financed with cash compared to +4.80% when financed with 
scrip/combination over the same window. This study also finds that the majority 
                                                 
85 US REITs are required to pay out 95% of the trusts earnings; however, for A-REITs it is 100%, 
limiting the access for A-REITs to internally generated funds even more than their US 
counterparts. 
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of the excess returns for cash financed deals are observed on the day of the M&A 
announcement, +11.44% CARs on day [0] under the market model compared to 
+13.38% for the full [-20,+20] event window.  
Table 6.8: A-REIT Targets by Method of Payment 
Panel A: Obs Market Model   Two-Factor Model 
Cash 23 CAR (P-value) CAR (P-value) 
[-20,+20] +13.38% (0.000)*** +14.34% (0.000)*** 
[-20,0] +12.27% (0.000)*** +11.45% (0.000)*** 
[0,+20] +12.54% (0.000)*** +14.02% (0.000)*** 
[-2,+2] +12.26% (0.000)*** +12.53% (0.000)*** 
[-1,+1] +12.22% (0.000)*** +12.43% (0.000)*** 
[0] +11.44% (0.000)*** +11.13% (0.000)*** 
Panel B: Obs Market Model Two-Factor Model 
Scrip/Combo 38 CAR (P-value) CAR (P-value) 
[-20,+20] +3.92% (0.000)*** +3.42% (0.000)*** 
[-20,0] +3.08% (0.000)*** +2.89% (0.000)*** 
[0,+20] +3.36% (0.002)*** +3.03% (0.003)*** 
[-2,+2] +4.95% (0.000)*** +4.88% (0.000)*** 
[-1,+1] +5.31% (0.000)*** +5.23% (0.000)*** 
[0] +2.51% (0.000)*** +2.49% (0.000)*** 
This table shows the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) by method of payment for target firms 
over the six event windows. Panel A displays the results for the A-REIT cash financed M&As, 
Panel B shows the results for the A-REIT scrip/combo financed M&As over the study period 
1995-2013. CARs are calculated using the market model and the two-factor model discussed in 
Chapter 5. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
 
Results show that target shareholders enjoy higher CARs when the M&A is 
financed with cash and this is consistent with both prior general corporate finance 
literature (Chen et al. 2011; Martynova and Renneboog 2011) and REIT literature 
(Eichholtz and Kok 2008; Womack 2012). Target method of payment results 
support the tax implication hypothesis, in that REITs are often held for their 
income yield. Cash M&A results in the loss of this tax effective income stream 
and potentially crystallises an immediate capital gain tax liability (Bugeja and da 
Silva Rosa 2008). Therefore, acquirers offer a higher cash price for the target     
A-REIT resulting in higher excess returns on the announcement day. 
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6.2.5PublicvPrivate–AǦREITBidderReturns
Previous studies into REIT M&As have shown that bidding REITs earn mixed 
results when the target is a publically listed REIT, ranging from +5.78% (Allen 
and Sirmans 1987) to -1.21% (Sahin 2005). However, when the target is private, 
results have consistently shown that acquiring firms have the opportunity to earn 
positive excess returns. For example, Campbell et al. (2001, 2005) show that 
acquirers earn positive and significant excess returns of +1.9% and +1.52% 
respectfully. 
Table 6.9, Panel A, shows that bidding A-REITs announcing the acquisition of 
a public target earn positive and significant CARs of +0.63% under the market 
model over the [-1,+1] event window.  The two-factor model also provides 
evidence of positive and significant CARs of +0.49%. This result is in contrast to 
previous REIT studies that have reported on public-public REIT M&As. For 
example, both Campbell et al. (2011) and Keisers (2009) provided results of 
significant and negative abnormal returns of -0.95% and -0.76% respectfully. The 
observed results here provide further support for the synergy motive of M&As in 
the A-REIT sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183
Table 6.9: A-REIT Acquirers – Private v Public Targets 
Panel A: Obs Market Model   Two-Factor Model 
Public Target 41 CAR (P-value) CAR (P-value) 
[-20,+20] -0.08% (0.096)* -0.87% (0.385) 
[-20,0] +0.63% (0.000)*** +0.42% (0.000)*** 
[0,+20] -0.54% (0.550) -1.14% (0.345) 
[-2,+2] +0.66% (0.000)*** +0.59% (0.000)*** 
[-1,+1] +0.63% (0.000)*** +0.49% (0.000)*** 
[0] +0.17% (0.156) +0.15% (0.165) 
Panel B: Obs Market Model Two-Factor Model 
Priv Target 14 CAR (P-value) CAR (P-value) 
[-20,+20] -2.46% (0.249) -2.56% (0.253) 
[-20,0] +2.27% (0.628) +2.51% (0.546) 
[0,+20] -2.80% (0.170) -3.10% (0.151) 
[-2,+2] +2.01% (0.093)* +2.13% (0.162) 
[-1,+1] +2.47% (0.033)** +2.59% (0.025)** 
[0] +1.92% (0.005)*** +1.97% (0.004)*** 
Table 6.9 presents the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for acquirers by type of target over the 
six event windows. Panel A displays the results for the 41 A-REIT public/public M&As, Panel B 
shows the results for the 14 A-REIT public/private M&As over the study period 1995-2013. 
CARs are calculated using the market model and the two-factor model discussed in Chapter 5. 
***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
Results in Panel B of Table 6.9 display the excess returns for bidders when the 
target is a privately owned property trust. Results show that bidding A-REITs 
earn positive and significant CARs of +2.47% for the market model and +2.59% 
for the two-factor model over the three-day event window. These results are 
slightly higher than those presented by Campbell et al. (2001, 2005, 2011) who 
showed bidding REIT earn excess returns ranging from +1.1% to +1.9%. Keisers’ 
(2009) results were even lower with REIT bidders in private acquisitions earning 
+0.66% over the same event window; unfortunately the result lacked statistical 
significance. However, it is noted that the difference in result may be due to the 
low number of observations, compared to prior studies; for example, Campbell et 
al. (2011) identified 62 observations in their study.  
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6.2.6Summary
The findings of the event study analysis shows that both targets and bidders 
earn positive and significant excess returns around a M&A announcement, with 
the majority of the gains going to the target shareholders. Results for target CARs 
are consistent with prior real estate studies, for example, Eichholtz and Kok 
(2008) and Keisers (2009). However, when compared to general corporate 
finance studies the level of CARs is lower. It is hypothesised that this result is due 
to increased transparency of the sector resulting in lower levels of information 
asymmetries, supporting the claims of Sah and Seagraves (2012) and Feng et al. 
(2007).  In contrast, bidding A-REITs earn positive and significant excess returns 
and prior studies have found mixed results in this area. These results suggest that 
M&A announcements in the Australian REIT sector are driven by the synergy 
motive, the driver of the synergy motive is investigated in the regression analysis.     
Finally, results show that acquiring firms that finance their acquisition by scrip 
and/or combination of scrip and cash earn higher excess returns when compared 
to M&As financed with cash. This result is in contrast to general corporate 
finance studies and rejects the signalling implications of using cash to finance a 
M&A. However, this result is consistent with prior REIT M&A investigations. It 
suggests that acquiring shareholders identify the synergistic benefits of the M&A 
and value that the acquiring A-REIT is able to preserve cash.  In the case of the 
target method of payment abnormal returns, this study finds support for the tax 
implication hypothesis. 
6.3RegressionModelResults
To identify the possible drivers for the synergistic gains in A-REIT M&As, 
ordinary least squares regression is employed. The relationship of targets and 
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bidders excess returns is modelled against the independent variables discussed in 
Chapter 5. The three-day CARs [-1,+1] are regressed against asset focus, the 
degree of financial leverage, management structure, private acquisitions, relative 
size, size, shareholder concentration, the GFC, method of payment and the 
percentage of non-executive directors. Standard diagnostic tests are run to 
examine the model for normality, omitted variables, hetroskedasticity and model 
specification.  
6.3.1AǦREITBidderRegressionResults
Table 6.10 presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
employed in the regression model. It is observed that the average bidding A-REIT 
is moderately focused in their investment by property type with a HHPROP value 
of 0.75. The size variable shows that the average size of bidding A-REITs is over 
$2 billion. This outcome is greater than the average size reported by both 
Campbell et al. (2001) and Eichholtz and Kok (2008) who showed a mean bidder 
size of $1.39 billion and $1.599 billion respectively. However, the median size is 
just over $1 billion, suggesting the presence of some larger A-REITs in the data. 
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Table 6.10: Bidder Descriptive Statistics for Regression Model 
HHPROP LEV MGMT PRIV RELSIZE SIZE TOP3 GFC MOP NONEXEC 
 Mean 0.750 0.230 0.491 0.255 0.530 2047.0 0.298 0.145 0.473 0.652 
 Median 1.000 0.224 0.000 0.000 0.297 1035.1 0.242 0.000 0.000 0.710 
 Max 1.000 0.447 1.000 1.000 5.911 8962.4 0.790 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 Min 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 45.3 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Std Dev 0.294 0.087 0.505 0.440 0.864 2273.0 0.163 0.356 0.504 0.247 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables employed in the regression model for 55 bidding A-REIT M&A announcements from 1996-2013.  
 
Table 6.11: Bidder Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
HHPROP LEV MGMT PRIV RELSIZE SIZE TOP3 GFC MOP NONEXEC 
HHPROP 1.000  
LEV 0.207 1.000  
MGMT -0.259 0.231 1.000  
PRIV 0.024 0.424 0.011 1.000  
RELSIZE 0.117 0.321 0.060 0.275 1.000  
SIZE -0.174 0.067 0.296 -0.363 -0.218 1.000  
TOP3 0.188 0.371 0.236 0.072 0.017 -0.026 1.000  
GFC -0.210 0.302 0.317 0.114 -0.143 0.170 0.072 1.000  
MOP 0.154 0.142 0.017 0.199 -0.259 0.249 -0.033 0.023 1.000  
NONEXEC 0.046 0.241 0.306 0.014 -0.222 0.349 0.063 0.105 0.155 1.000 
Table 6.11 shows the correlation coefficient matrix of the independent variables for 55 A-REIT acquirer announcements from 1996-2013. 
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The relative size variable shows that the average bidder is almost twice the size 
of the value offered for the target, with a mean of 0.530. This outcome is 
considerably lower than those presented by Shams et al. (2013) in their Australian 
study across various industries, with the average bidder being approximately 11 
times the size of the target. Corporate governance measures show that the average 
shareholder concentration of bidding A-REITs, as measured by the top three, is 
almost 30%, while the percentage of non-executive directors is over 65%. In 
comparison, both Campbell et al. (2011) and Eichhotlz and Kok (2008) both 
reported a mean of 60% for the percentage of non-executives.  
In regression analysis, a number of the independent variables may exhibit high 
levels of correlation and this correlation may have an impact on their explanatory 
power. Table 6.11 provides a correlation matrix of the explanatory variables. 
Examination of Table 6.11 shows that none of the independent variables exhibit 
high levels of correlation.  
Table 6.12 displays the results for the regression model described in Chapter 5. 
The independent variables are regressed against the three day A-REIT excess 
returns presented in Table 6.5. Standard diagnostic tests are run to examine for 
normality, misspecification and hetroskedasticity and these tests are reported in 
the table along with the R-squared and adjusted R-squared.  Model 1 shows the 
results when all of the independent variables are employed. RELSIZE is positive 
and highly significant. This result is consistent with prior general finance studies86 
and supports the argument of Agrawal et al. (1992) who suggest that acquiring a 
larger target has the potential to be a more important event for the bidder than 
acquiring a smaller target.  
                                                 
86 For example, Kiymaz and Baker (2008); Moeller et al. (2004) and Shams et al. (2013). 
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The variable PRIV is positive and significant at the 10% level, this outcome is 
consistent with the event study results and the results presented by Ghosh et al. 
(2012) and supports the liquidity discount theory proposed by Fuller et al. (2002). 
Finally, LEV has a negative and significant impact on bidder excess returns. This 
outcome is in contrast to the free-cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) who claims 
that firms with high levels of leverage make enhanced investment decisions due 
to their lower levels of free-cash flow or financial-slack. However, the result is 
consistent with prior Australian research by Shams et al. (2013) who found a 
negative and significant relationship.  
In model 2 both MOP and GFC are removed, as it appears that these variables 
do not contribute to the explanatory power of the model.87 The R-squared 
(adjusted R-squared) for model 2 is 34.8% (23.5%) compared to 34.9% (20.1%) 
for model 1. The results are consistent with model 1, both RELSIZE and PRIV 
display a positive and significant relationship with A-REIT bidder excess returns, 
while the LEV variable remains significant and negative. However, model 2 still 
displays signs of hetroskedasticity, Whites Test has a p-value of 0.047. 
Furthermore, the Jerque-Bera test shows signs of non-normality, p-value of 0.047. 
Model 3 is presented after investigation of the non-normality of model 2. One 
outlier was identified and removed. The outlier observation identified had a 
residual value of more than two standard deviations from the mean residuals and 
therefore was causing the Jarque-Bera problem. The remaining tests for 
misspecification and hetroskedasticity show model 3 is an improved fit, both the 
R-squared and adjusted R-squared have increased to 41.7% and 32.8% 
respectively.  
                                                 
87 Both MOP and GFC display high p-values of 0.976 and 0.862 respectfully in model 1. 
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Table 6.12: Bidder Regression Model Results 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coef (P-value)   Coef (P-value)   Coef (P-value)   
Obs. 55# Obs. 55# Obs. 54^ 
Intercept -0.018 (0.091)* -0.018 (0.093)* -0.025 (0.012)** 
HHPROP 0.014 (0.211) 0.014 (0.151) 0.016 (0.061)* 
LEV -0.091 (0.036)** -0.094 (0.025)** -0.104 (0.006)*** 
MGMT 0.007 (0.220) 0.007 (0.233) 0.009 (0.106) 
PRIV 0.012 (0.079)* 0.013 (0.089)* 0.010 (0.116) 
RELSIZE 0.012 (0.000)*** 0.013 (0.001)*** 0.014 (0.000)*** 
SIZE 0.002 (0.171) 0.002 (0.257) 0.002 (0.291) 
TOP3 0.019 (0.384) 0.019 (0.272) 0.038 (0.026)** 
MOP -0.001 (0.976) 
GFC -0.002 (0.862) 
NONEXEC 0.016 (0.139) 0.016 (0.201) 0.021 (0.063)* 
         
R-squared 0.349 0.348 0.417 
Adj R-
squared 0.201 0.235 0.328 
Jarque-Bera 3.175 (0.204) 9.671 (0.047)** 1.153 (0.562) 
White Test 19.148 (0.038)** 47.678 (0.047)** 34.405 (0.791) 
Ramsey 
Reset Test 19.105 (0.136) 18.834 (0.155) 14.919 (0.137) 
Table 6.12 presents the regression of three-day CARs of bidding A-REITs, using ordinary least 
squares, on selected explanatory variables for 55 M&As from 1996-2013. HHPROP is the 
Hirscham-Herfindahl Index, LEV is the degree of financial leverage, MGMT is a dummy variable 
indicating the management structure of the A-REIT, MOP is a dummy variable for the method of 
payment, 1 = cash. PRIV is a dummy variable if the target firm is privately held, GFC is a 
dummy variable if the announcement occurs after the GFC, RELSIZE is the ratio of the value of 
the target divided by the bidding A-REITs market capitalisation and SIZE is the natural log of the 
market value of the bidding A-REIT. TOP3 is the percentage value held by the top three 
shareholders, NONEXEC is the percentage of non-executive directors. ***, **, * show statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. # signifies p-values reported after 
applying White hetroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance adjustment. ^ defines 
the removal of outliers.  
 
Results from model 3 provide robustness to the findings from model 1 with 
relative size remaining positive and significant. Although this result is consistent 
with prior corporate finance studies across varying industries it is in contrast to 
prior REIT research by Campbell et al. (2001) who found relative size has a 
negative and significant impact on bidder excess returns. However, later studies 
by Campbell et al. (2011) and Ghosh et al. (2012) found no significant 
relationship between excess returns and relative size. Pierzak (2001) presented 
 
 
190
evidence that REITs involved in larger acquisitions, relative to their size, have a 
tendency to pay more for the acquisition.  
Results for RELSIZE support the claims by Kooli et al. (2003), who argue that 
higher relative size provides improved capacity for economies of scale. Further 
support for the economies of scale result is observed in the SIZE variable. The 
market size of the acquirer is positive across all models, although insignificant. 
These results combined suggest that the synergistic benefits of A-REIT M&As is 
a result operational synergies, more specifically, economies of scale and market 
power. This outcome is in contrast to the study of US REIT M&As by Ghosh et 
al. (2012) who found a negative and significant relationship between size and 
excess returns and concluded that larger REITs are susceptible to empire building.  
Model 3 also shows that the degree of financial leverage is still negative and 
significant, although now it is significant at the 1% level. Prior REIT research by 
Campbell et al. (2011) and Ghosh et al. (2012) both found the degree of leverage 
had a negative impact on bidder CARs, however the results lacked statistical 
significance.  Ghosh et al. (2012) discuss that the negative relationship between 
acquirer excess returns and leverage may indicate higher levels of financial 
distress. Therefore making it more difficult for REITs to finance a M&A with 
external debt. Finally, this result supports the findings of Hardin and Wu (2009) 
who provide evidence that REITs with higher leverage levels decreases the 
likelihood of the REIT being a bidder. It is noted that the significance for PRIV in 
model 3 has disappeared, although the coefficient remains positive.  
The HHPROP in model 3 is now significant at the 10% level and positive and 
this suggests bidding A-REITs that target firms that concentrate the majority of 
their investment in one property type enjoy higher excess returns. This result 
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supports the claims by Ooi et al. (2011) and Allen and Sirmans (1987) that 
focused REITs have the ability to identify mismanaged REITs of similar type. 
Furthermore, Capozza and Seguin (1999) argue that diversification across 
property type can result in higher agency costs. 
Interestingly, model 3 now shows that the corporate governance variables 
(TOP3 and NONEXEC) are both positive and significant. This result is in 
contrast to Campbell et al. (2011) who posit that the relationship between REIT 
excess returns and corporate governance is diminished due to the lack of an active 
REIT takeover market. Campbell et al. (2011) suggest this outcome is a result of 
the lack of hostile takeovers observed in REIT M&As.88 This study also notes the 
lack of hostile announcements in the sample, with only six of the 55 
announcements considered unfriendly/hostile. However, these results suggest that 
board independence and shareholder concentration are effective monitoring tools 
for management. The NONEXEC result supports the findings of Eichholtz and 
Kok (2008) who provide evidence of a positive and significant relationship 
between board independence and bidder likelihood. It also supports the claims of 
Li et al. (2001) that REIT managers are motivated to undertake acquisitions that 
enhance share value.  
6.3.2AǦREITTargetRegressionResults
Table 6.13 displays the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables 
employed in the A-REIT target regression model. The degree of focus for target 
A-REITs (HHPROP) is slightly higher than the bidders level, 0.889 versus 0.750. 
This suggests that A-REITs M&As may not be driven by the diversification 
argument. Also the average level of financial leverage and board independence is 
                                                 
88 See: Allen and Sirmans (1987); Campbell et al. (2001) and Eichholtz and Kok (2008). 
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comparable to the values observed for acquirers. The mean size for target           
A-REITs is approximately $780 million, compared to over $2 billion for bidding 
A-REITs. Comparing size with previous REIT studies, Ling and Petrova (2011) 
showed a mean size value of $898 million, while Campbell et al. (2001) reported 
$581 million average size.  Finally, the mean percentage of shares held by the top 
three investors is 44%, compared to 29.8% for acquirers.  
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Table 6.13: Target Descriptive Statistics for Regression Model 
HHPROP LEV MGMT PRIV SIZE TOP3 GFC MOP NONEXEC 
 Mean 0.889 0.238 0.133 0.394 787.3 0.440 0.183 0.383 0.634 
 Median 1.000 0.222 0.000 0.000 355.0 0.383 0.000 0.000 0.710 
 Max 1.000 0.439 1.000 1.000 7806.7 0.957 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 Min 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 22.6 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.221 0.104 0.343 0.497 1436.8 0.217 0.390 0.490 0.280 
Table 6.13 provides the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables employed in the regression model for 61 target A-REITs involved in a M&A announcement from 
1996-2013. 
 
Table 6.14: Target Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
HHPROP LEV MGMT PRIV SIZE TOP3 GFC MOP NONEXEC 
HHPROP 1.000  
LEV -0.019 1.000  
MGMT -0.087 0.224 1.000  
PRIV 0.028 0.334 0.265 1.000  
SIZE -0.018 0.015 -0.009 0.259 1.000  
TOP3 0.219 0.099 0.106 -0.082 -0.206 1.000  
GFC -0.022 0.676 0.068 0.124 -0.174 0.063 1.000  
MOP 0.333 0.455 0.195 0.168 -0.163 0.489 0.424 1.000  
NONEXEC 0.242 0.077 0.120 -0.025 0.021 0.138 0.121 0.215 1.000 
Table 6.14 presents the correlation coefficient matrix of the independent variables for the 61 target A-REIT announcements from 1996-2013. 
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Similar to the bidder regression model, the correlation relationship of the 
explanatory variables is investigated. Table 6.14 displays the correlation matrix 
and shows that the variables LEV and GFC exhibit a moderate level of 
correlation, 0.676. This study therefore needs to be aware of and adjust for this 
relationship in the presentation and discussion of the regression model results.  
Regression model results are presented in Table 6.15. Model 1 includes all 
independent variables. Results show that property type focus has a positive and 
significant impact on target excess returns, this result is consistent with the results 
for the bidders regression in model 3 and further suggests that diversification 
across different property types is value destroying. The SIZE variable is positive 
and highly significant. This result is consistent with the argument of Draper and 
Paudyal (2006) who suggest that larger targets are able to extract a higher 
premium from the bidding firm.  
The management variable is positive and significant in model 1, this outcome 
supports the hypothesis that the acquisition of an internally managed A-REIT is 
less burdened by the need to negotiate with the management company. 
Furthermore, Greer and Parker (2005) posit that an internally managed REIT has 
lower agency problems, provides greater financial flexibility in debt financing 
and allows expansion opportunities into new areas. As a result, bidding A-REITs 
are prepared to pay a higher premium for internally managed targets. 
The variable GFC has a positive and significant impact on excess returns, this 
outcome is supported by the increased volatility of the A-REIT sector post GFC. 
Furthermore, LEV is found to be negative and significant, suggesting that lower 
levered A-REIT targets are able to extract higher premiums in an announcement 
and that financial slack is an important factor for the A-REIT sector. This 
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outcome supports the financial synergy motive, in that unused debt capacity 
provides financial synergy to both firms (Sudarsanam et al. 1996). However, as 
identified in Table 6.14, there is a high correlation relationship between these two 
variables. Therefore, this outcome is further examined in model 2.  The tests for 
model 1 show that the model does not suffer from hetroskedasticity and the 
residuals have a normal distribution. However, the model suffers from 
misspecification, the Ramsey Reset Test has a p-value less than 1%.   
The misspecification suggested by the Ramsey Reset Test in model 1 is 
investigated and it is identified that not only are LEV and GFC highly related, but 
both variables were causing this problem.89 Model 2 presents the results with both 
LEV and GFC removed, the Ramsey Reset Test now shows that the model does 
not suffer from misspecification. It can be seen that the R-squared and adjusted R-
squared have fallen significantly from 54.5% and 46.3% in model 1 to 25.6% and 
15.6% in model 2.  
Results show that both SIZE and HHPROP remain positive and significant in 
model 2, however the degree of significance for SIZE is now only at the 10% 
level. Furthermore, the significance of the management variable is no longer 
evident. The MOP variable now shows signs of significance and is positive. This 
outcome supports the findings in the event study, with target shareholders 
receiving higher excess returns when cash is used to finance the acquisition. The 
regression result further supports the tax implication hypothesis. 
However, it is now noted that the model shows signs of hetroskedasticity, 
Whites Test has a p-value of 0.019, so the reported p-values are after the White 
                                                 
89 The model was re-run, firstly with GFC and without LEV then with LEV and without GFC. The 
Ramsey Reset Test still displayed signs of model misspecification, with p-values of less than 1% 
and less than 2% respectfully.  
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adjustment. In addition, the Jarque-Bera test shows signs of non-normality (p-
value of 0.000); these issues are addressed in model 3.  
To overcome the non-normality and hetroskedasticity problems of model 2 this 
study investigated the residuals of the 61 observations. Seven of the observations 
had a residual value, from the regression model, of more than two standard 
deviations away from the mean. The NONEXEC variable is also removed in 
model 3 as it does not appear to add value to the model.90 The standard diagnostic 
tests are all now showing that model 3 is an improved fit, the R-squared and 
adjusted R-squared values have also improved considerably from model 2.  
Table 6.15: Target Regression Model Results 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coef (P-value) Coef (P-value) Coef (P-value) 
Obs. 61 Obs. 61# Obs. 54^ 
Intercept -0.028 (0.589) -0.042 (0.266) -0.019 (0.408) 
HHPROP 0.096 (0.014)** 0.065 (0.028)** 0.060 (0.015)** 
LEV -0.314 (0.019)** 
MGMT 0.068 (0.013)** 0.050 (0.232) 0.031 (0.068)* 
PRIV 0.022 (0.229) 0.018 (0.478) -0.016 (0.178) 
SIZE 0.015 (0.000)*** 0.008 (0.087)* 0.016 (0.000)*** 
TOP3 0.025 (0.668) -0.016 (0.820) -0.056 (0.058)* 
GFC 0.168 (0.001)*** 
MOP 0.017 (0.439) 0.054 (0.020)** 0.025 (0.052)* 
NONEXEC -0.017 (0.472) 0.002 (0.948) 
         
R-squared 0.545 0.256 0.445 
Adj R-squared 0.463 0.156 0.372 
Jarque-Bera 0.653 (0.721) 15.581 (0.000)*** 2.784 (0.249) 
White Test 57.201 (0.171) 44.018 (0.077)* 22.027 (0.518) 
Ramsey Reset 
Test 7.721 (0.000)*** 8.735 (0.159) 3.320 (0.572) 
Table 6.15 presents the regression of three-day CARs of target A-REITs, using ordinary least 
squares, on selected explanatory variables for 61 M&As from 1996-2013. HHPROP is the 
Hirscham-Herfindahl Index, LEV is the degree of financial leverage, MGMT is a dummy variable 
indicating the management structure of the A-REIT, MOP is a dummy variable for the method of 
payment, 1 = cash. PRIV is a dummy variable if the bidding firm is privately held, GFC is a dummy 
variable if the announcement occurs after the GFC and SIZE is the natural log of the market value of 
the target A-REIT. TOP3 is the percentage value held by the top three shareholders, NONEXEC is 
the percentage of non-executive directors. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. # signifies p-values reported after applying White hetroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors and covariance adjustment. ^ defines the removal of outliers.  
                                                 
90 The p-value for NONEXEC was 0.948 in model 2.  
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The results from model 3 provide robustness to the findings and the size and 
focus of the A-REIT target remains positive and significant. The SIZE result 
supports the claim by Kooli et al. (2003) that larger targets have greater 
bargaining power and improved capacity for economies of scale and 
recombination. Similar to model 1, the MGMT variable is positive and 
significant, further supporting the hypothesis internally managed targets are less 
complex than their externally managed counterparts and the claims by Greer and 
Parker (2005).  
The method of payment variable has also remained positive and significant in 
model 3, again providing further support for the tax implication hypothesis. 
Interestingly, the TOP3 variable now displays significance and is negatively 
related to target excess returns. This outcome is supported by Eichholtz and Kok 
(2008) who found that insider holdings have a negative impact of target abnormal 
returns and suggested that higher insider holdings deter takeovers. Furthermore, 
this result may indicate that large inside holdings entrench managers rather than 
reduce agency gap as described by North (2001) and Song and Walkling (1993). 
6.4Conclusion
The results of the event study analysis support the synergy motive for A-REIT 
M&As with both targets and bidders earning positive and significant excess 
returns around the announcement. Results for target CARs are consistent with 
prior international real estate studies, for example, Eichholtz and Kok (2008) and 
Kirchhoff et al. (2006). However, when compared to general corporate finance 
studies, the level of CARs is lower. This result is due to the transparency of the 
sector resulting in lower levels of information asymmetries (Sah and Seagraves 
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2012).  Bidding A-REITs also earn positive and significant excess returns, prior 
studies have found mixed results.   
Results show that acquiring A-REITs that finance their acquisition by scrip 
and/or combination of scrip and cash earn higher excess returns compared to 
cash. This result is in contrast to studies across conventional firms and rejects the 
signalling implications of using cash to finance a M&A. However, these results 
are consistent with other REIT M&A investigations, suggesting that acquiring 
shareholders identify the synergistic benefits of the M&A but value that the       
A-REIT is able to preserve cash.  Results for method of payment for target         
A-REITs support the tax implication hypothesis. 
Regression modelling was performed to investigate the possible drivers for the 
synergy motive. Evidence is presented that relative size has positive impact on 
bidding A-REITs excess returns and provides improved capacity for economies of 
scale (Kooli et al. 2003). The degree of financial leverage has a negative impact 
on bidder returns and this relationship is possibly due to increased borrowing 
indicating higher financial distress, making it difficult for REITs to finance a 
M&A with external debt (Ghosh et al. 2012). Finally, evidence that board 
independence and shareholder concentration are effective monitoring tools for 
bidding A-REIT management is identified.  
Regression model results for A-REIT targets show that size has a positive 
impact on CARs, implying that larger targets have greater bargaining power and 
improved capacity for economies of scale and recombination. Results also show 
that diversification as a reason for M&As is value destroying. Internally managed 
A-REIT targets enjoy higher CARs, suggesting that internally managed A-REITs 
have lower agency problems and greater financial flexibility (Greer and Parker 
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2005). The method of payment outcome provides support for the tax implication 
hypothesis, with target CARs being positively related to cash financed 
acquisitions. Finally, some support, although not strong, is found that shareholder 
concentration has a negative impact on excess returns, indicating a possible 
entrenchment of managers. Combining the regression results for both parties it is 
therefore concluded that the synergistic benefit of A-REIT M&As is due to 
increased economies of scale and is supported by Ooi et al. (2011).  
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Chapter 7: Pre-M&A Announcement Results and 
Discussions 
7.1Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the logistic regression model conducted on 
announcements of M&As in the Australian real estate sector from 1999 to 2013. 
The aim of this investigation is to identify the impact different firm characteristics 
have on the probability of a firm being either a target or acquirer. The timeline in 
Figure 7.1 indicates the focus of this chapter in relation to the overall areas 
examined in this thesis.91  
 
Figure 7.1: Thesis study timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 presents a time-line of the M&A study periods across the three analytical studies of this 
thesis. The circled section represents the focus of the presentation of results in this chapter. t refers 
to years.  
 
This chapter begins with an examination of the firm characteristics of both 
bidders and targets involved in a M&A announcement. First the characteristics of 
firms within the Australian real estate sector are examined. The chapter then 
                                                 
91 Figure 7.1 is a replication of figure 1.1 from Chapter 1 presenting the overall timeline of the 
analytical investigation conducted within the thesis.  
t = -3 
Pre-announcement 
logistic regression 
study. 
Post-announcement 
performance study. 
t = 0 t = +3 
Announcement 
returns event 
study. 
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isolates the sample into Australian Real Estate Investment Trust (A-REIT) 
announcements.92  
As discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1, the ability to identify firm 
characteristics that may impact on the probability of a firm being a target or 
bidder could form the basis of a successful investment strategy (e.g., Palepu 1986; 
Powell 2001, 2004). In addition, an understanding of firm characteristics that 
influence the likelihood of a firm being involved in a M&A may provide a deeper 
understanding of the motives for M&As in the Australian real estate sector. The 
results presented in this chapter add to the limited literature in this area.  
7.2UnivariateAnalysis 
 Table 7.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the targets, bidders and control 
firms employed in the investigation. The table compares the financial 
characteristics and governance structures. This preliminary analysis is executed 
by performing a difference in means test, assuming unequal variances, to examine 
if the mean values of the explanatory variables differ significantly between the 
groups.93 Panel A displays the results for target real estate firms. Interestingly, 
target firms are larger, on average, than the control sample and significant. This 
result is in contrast to the findings by Frank et al. (2011). The outcome is further 
investigated in the logistic model. 
 The return variable shows that target performance is significantly less than the 
control group. This outcome is consistent with prior real estate and general 
industry research (Eichholtz and Kok 2008; Palepu 1986). In addition, targets 
                                                 
92 A-REIT observations are defined as both parties classified as publicly traded A-REITs, or, in 
the case of private counterparties, an unlisted property trust (i.e. private A-REIT). 
93 As discussed by Eichholtz and Kok (2008), the difference in means calculations are indicative 
only. There is no allowance for important differences between the firms in the calculations. 
Therefore, some of the difference in means and their significance may be spurious. 
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have a lower market-to-book value (MVBV) ratio compared to the non-target 
control sample, although the difference in means is not significant. These findings 
combined provide some support for the inefficient management hypothesis. Panel 
A also shows that targets have significant lower levels of insider holdings (SHR). 
This result suggests that target management has less control and possibly lower 
agency problems. This outcome is further supported by the blockholdings 
variable (TOP3). Although not significant, targets have higher levels of TOP3, 
suggesting that large external holdings are an effective monitoring mechanism 
(Anglin et al. 2013). 
 Panel B of Table 7.1 displays the summary statistics for the bidders model. 
Consistent with Eichholtz and Kok (2008) and Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013), 
acquirers, on average, are larger. Eichhotlz and Kok (2008) argue that larger firms 
have greater market power in M&As and have economies of scale advantage for 
incorporating the targets assets. Both corporate governance variables (SHR and 
TOP3) are significantly lower for acquirers, compared to the control sample. This 
result is consistent with Eichholtz and Kok (2008) who found bidders have lower 
levels of insider holdings. However, Campbell et al. (2011) argue that higher 
levels of insider ownership have a positive impact on acquiring REIT abnormal 
returns. This finding is also explored in more detail in the logistic model results.  
 Panel C compares the difference in means between the target and acquirers 
samples. It can be seen that bidders are significantly larger than the target sample. 
Both the RET and MVBV means are, on average, significantly higher for the 
acquirers. In addition, bidders have lower leverage and these results suggest that 
bidding firms are in a superior financial position. Targets are more focused by 
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property type, supporting the evidence provided in Frank et al. (2011), that 
diversified REITs exhibit a lower probability of being targets. 
Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics and Difference in Means Tests 
Panel A Targets (n = 72)  Control Group (n = 144)   
Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD 
Diff. in 
Means (P-value) 
SIZE 19.52 19.54 1.49  19.07 19.14 1.79 0.45 (0.052)* 
RET  -0.57 -0.04 2.07  0.24 0.35 2.27 -0.82 (0.008)*** 
VAR  1.61 0.24 4.16  1.60 0.37 3.62 0.01 (0.987) 
LEV 0.70 0.46 0.74  0.91 0.47 1.52 -0.21 (0.186) 
DIVYIELD  7.32 7.71 3.18  7.84 7.25 14.70 -0.52 (0.682) 
MVBV 1.02 0.96 0.76  1.15 0.96 1.24 -0.14 (0.312) 
FFO  18.88 81.75 675.5  48.16 84.13 253.24 -29.28 (0.723) 
FCF  0.98 2.86 11.7  -0.61 1.43 10.27 1.59 (0.329) 
HHPROP 0.87 1.00 0.23  0.83 1.00 0.25 0.04 (0.236) 
SHR  22.57 15.76 23.36  31.18 29.15 24.46 -8.61 (0.013)** 
TOP3  63.15 34.65 181.2  44.11 41.15 28.85 19.03 (0.377) 
PREGFC 0.79 1.00 0.41  0.79 1.00 0.41 0.00 (0.175) 
MGMT 0.39 0.00 0.49  0.48 0.00 0.50 -0.09 (0.500) 
Panel B Bidders (n = 48)  Control Group (n = 96)   
 Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD 
Diff. in 
Means (P-value) 
SIZE 20.63 20.55 1.49  20.04 20.07 1.66 0.59 (0.034)** 
RET  0.40 0.47 2.49  -0.11 0.17 2.26 0.51 (0.238) 
VAR  1.21 0.25 2.13  0.97 0.31 1.44 0.24 (0.485) 
LEV 0.48 0.38 0.42  0.60 0.39 0.56 -0.12 (0.174) 
DIVYIELD  7.81 7.64 4.07  7.78 7.99 3.98 0.03 (0.977) 
MVBV 1.36 1.06 1.09  1.21 0.992 1.22 0.15 (0.471) 
FFO  76.01 72.95 54.53  111.29 91.49 345.65 -35.28 (0.331) 
FCF  0.91 1.59 5.78  0.26 2.54 10.51 0.65 (0.633) 
HHPROP 0.78 1.00 0.28  0.82 1.00 0.26 -0.04 (0.471) 
SHR  15.44 8.11 18.63  25.66 23.84 19.12 -10.21 (0.003)*** 
TOP3  30.61 27.49 15.89  37.45 35.35 15.93 -6.85 (0.017)** 
PREGFC 0.77 1.00 0.42  0.77 1.00 0.42 0.00 (0.101) 
MGMT 0.58 1.00 0.49  0.44 0.00 0.49 0.14 (0.500) 
Panel C Bidders (n = 48)  Targets (n = 72)   
 Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD 
Diff. in 
Means (P-value) 
SIZE 20.63 20.55 1.49  19.52 19.54 1.49 1.11 (0.000)*** 
RET  0.40 0.47 2.49  -0.57 -0.04 2.07 0.97 (0.027)** 
VAR  1.21 0.25 2.13  1.61 0.24 4.16 -0.40 (0.487) 
LEV 0.48 0.38 0.42  0.70 0.46 0.74 -0.22 (0.041)** 
DIVYIELD  7.81 7.64 4.07  7.32 7.71 3.18 0.49 (0.483) 
MVBV 1.36 1.06 1.09  1.02 0.96 0.76 0.34 (0.063)* 
FFO  76.01 72.95 54.53  18.88 81.75 675.5 57.13 (0.477) 
FCF  0.91 1.59 5.78  0.98 2.86 11.7 -0.07 (0.856) 
HHPROP 0.78 1.00 0.28  0.87 1.00 0.23 -0.09 (0.074)* 
SHR  15.44 8.11 18.63  22.57 15.76 23.36 -7.13 (0.066)* 
TOP3  30.61 27.49 15.89  63.15 34.65 181.2 -32.54 (0.134) 
PREGFC 0.77 1.00 0.42  0.79 0.00 0.41 -0.02 (0.789) 
MGMT 0.58 1.00 0.49  0.39 1.00 0.49 0.19 (0.037)** 
This table displays the descriptive statistics and preliminary results for the comparison between 
targets, bidders and the control sample of real estate M&As from 1999-2013. Difference in means 
test is conducted assuming unequal variances. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively.  
 
 
204
 The management result suggests that internally managed firms are more likely 
to be bidders. This outcome supports the claims of Ambrose and Linneman 
(2001) that internally managed REITs are more competitive in terms of cost of 
capital and rental revenue. Supporting the MGMT findings, the level of SHR is 
significantly lower for bidders. Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) suggest that        
A-REITs with high levels of related party ownership are often externally 
managed. Overall, the univariate results suggest that prior performance, size and 
shareholder concentration are important characteristics in M&A likelihood.  
7.3LogisticRegressionResults
7.3.1TargetsLogisticResults–RealEstateSector
 High levels of correlation between the independent variables may impact on 
their explanatory power in logistic modelling. Arnull-Almond (2008) finds that 
high correlations in logistic modelling can result in the parameters being 
inefficiently estimated and variables displaying insignificance when in fact may 
have greater explanatory power. Table 7.2 presents a correlation matrix of the 
independent variables employed in the target logit model.94 Examination of Table 
7.2 shows that none of the explanatory variables exhibit high levels of 
collinearity. Consistent with Arnull-Almond (2008), this result suggests that the 
independent variables are theoretically free from collinearity issues and therefore 
are employed in the univariate analysis and the logistic regression model.  
  
                                                 
94 Appendix Table B.1 presents the correlation matrix for the A-REIT targets only sample. 
Consistent with the all targets matrix, none of the variables display high levels of collinearity.  
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Table 7.2: Targets Correlation Coefficient Matrix – Real Estate Sector 
SIZE RET VAR LEV DIVYIELD MVBV FFO FCF HHPROP SHR TOP3 PREGFC 
SIZE 1.000 
RET 0.201 1.000 
VAR -0.207 0.002 1.000 
LEV -0.177 0.051 0.171 1.000 
DIVYIELD -0.058 -0.116 0.119 -0.018 1.000 
MVBV 0.246 0.240 -0.101 0.129 -0.055 1.000 
FFO 0.079 0.157 -0.075 -0.176 0.055 -0.024 1.000 
FCF 0.010 0.014 0.021 -0.184 0.403 0.029 0.051 1.000 
HHPROP -0.080 -0.052 -0.016 -0.033 -0.005 0.082 -0.102 0.046 1.000 
SHR -0.326 0.059 0.110 0.157 0.077 0.034 -0.065 0.031 0.028 1.000 
TOP3 -0.136 -0.012 0.008 0.001 0.010 -0.008 0.003 -0.003 -0.098 0.045 1.000 
PREGFC -0.005 0.314 -0.443 -0.132 -0.001 0.173 0.058 -0.011 0.085 -0.006 0.011 1.000 
The correlation coefficient matrix of the explanatory variables for all target announcements from 1999-2013.  
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 Table 7.3 presents the results for the logistic regression model for all real 
estate targets. The focus of this study is on the significance of the estimated 
coefficients and not the model’s ability to predict a target or bidder from a hold 
out sample (Eichholtz and Kok 2008; Palepu 1986). A positive sign for a 
coefficient indicates that an increase in the corresponding variable increases the 
likelihood of a M&A (Powell 1997). Conversely, a negative sign indicates the 
opposite .The Log likelihood value tests the null hypothesis that all parameters of 
the model are simultaneously equal to zero. The statistic is distributed Ȥ2 with the 
degrees of freedom equalling the number of parameters in the model. The p-value 
is less than 1%, therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. The Pseudo R2 value is 
10.3% and provides a measure of the explanatory power of the model and is 
similar to the R2 value in a normal linear regression model. 
Table 7.3: Target Logistic Estimation Results – Real Estate Sector 
No. Obs. = 216  
Variable Coef. (P-value) 
INTERCEPT -8.263 (0.003)*** 
SIZE 0.323 (0.006)*** 
RET -0.256 (0.004)*** 
VAR 0.065 (0.230) 
LEV -0.022 (0.917) 
DIVYIELD -1.896 (0.257) 
MVBV -0.193 (0.281) 
FFO -0.004 (0.914) 
FCF 2.814 (0.125) 
HHPROP 0.833 (0.209) 
SHR -1.491 (0.106) 
TOP3 1.277 (0.314) 
PREGFC 0.845 (0.095)* 
   
Log likelihood -123.325  
Pseudo R2 0.103  
LR Ȥ2 28.32  
Prob. > Ȥ 2       0.005***  
This table displays the results of the logit regression model for the probability of all real estate 
firms being a target from 1999-2013. The explanatory variables are defined in Chapter 5, Section 
5.3. The Log likelihood ratio tests the null hypothesis that all parameters of the model are 
simultaneously equal to zero. The Prob> Ȥ 2 value rejects the null hypothesis. The Pseudo R2 is 
the analogue of the R2 in a OLS regression model. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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 Consistent with the univariate analysis, Table 7.3 shows that size is positively 
related to target likelihood. This result provides some support for the agency 
motive for M&As, more specifically, the growth maximisation hypothesis 
proposed by Marris (1963). This hypothesis argues that bidding firm managers 
are more concerned with maximising the firm size rather than shareholder wealth. 
The pre-GFC variable is positive and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that 
real estate M&A activity was greater prior to the onset of the GFC and that the 
GFC had an important impact on the sector.  
 Share price performance is significantly negatively related to target 
probability. This outcome is consistent with the findings of Eichholtz and Kok 
(2008) and provides support for the inefficient management hypothesis. The 
coefficient for MVBV, although not significant, suggests firms with low market-
to-book values are in a weak financial position consistent with the findings of 
Eichholtz and Kok (2008). Considering the coefficients for both MVBV and share 
price return together provides further support for the inefficient management 
hypothesis.  
7.3.2TargetLogisticResults–AǦREITs
 To examine the drivers for M&As in the A-REIT sector, the sample was 
filtered to Australian REIT announcements. This filtering allows for a clearer 
examination of the A-REIT sector. Table 7.4 displays the logit model results for 
A-REIT targets with Panel A showing the results for the full A-REIT sample. The 
Log likelihood probability test is again significant and the explanatory power is 
slightly higher than the results presented in Table 7.3 (12.9% versus 10.3%). 
Consistent with the univariate analysis and Table 7.3,     A-REIT return is 
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significantly negatively related to target probability, consistent with the study of 
US REITs by Frank et al. (2011).  
Table 7.4: Targets Logistic Estimation Results – A-REITs  
 Panel A (N = 162)  Panel B (N = 147) 
Variable Coef. (P-value)  Coef. (P-value) 
INTERCEPT -7.584 (0.016)**  -3.847 (0.044)** 
SIZE 0.318 (0.027)**  0.161 (0.066)* 
RET -0.229 (0.025)**  -0.131 (0.028)** 
VAR 0.096 (0.102)  0.053 (0.121) 
LEV -0.105 (0.764)  -0.054 (0.771) 
DIVYIELD -2.593 (0.148)  -1.543 (0.163) 
MVBV -0.656 (0.363)  -0.316 (0.346) 
FFO 0.150 (0.089)*  0.083 (0.099)* 
FCF 5.426 (0.036)**  3.000 (0.048)** 
HHPROP 0.635 (0.377)  0.239 (0.593) 
SHR -1.490 (0.178)  -0.781 (0.165) 
TOP3 0.538 (0.667)  0.237 (0.576) 
MGMT -0.363 (0.407)  -0.161 (0.548) 
PREGFC 1.137 (0.076)*  0.615 (0.102) 
    
Log likelihood -89.823   -82.666  
Pseudo R2 0.129   0.116  
LR Ȥ2 26.58   21.80  
Prob. > Ȥ 2    0.014**     0.058*  
This table displays the results of the logit regression model for the probability of A-REITs being a 
target from 1999-2013. The explanatory variables are defined in Chapter 5, Section 5.3. The Log 
likelihood ratio tests the null hypothesis that all parameters of the model are simultaneously equal 
to zero. The Prob> Ȥ 2 value rejects the null hypothesis. The Pseudo R2 is the analogue of the R2 in 
a OLS regression model. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
Size remains positive and significant for A-REIT target probability, this 
outcome is in contrast to Frank et al. (2011) but consistent with Ratcliffe and 
Dimovski (2013). The result may be due to a change in the regulatory 
environment associated with the introduction of the Managed Investments Act 
1998. The Act paved way for externally managed A-REITs to merge with their 
management companies to become self-managed (Dimovski 2010). This result 
suggests that there may have been a push by A-REITs to achieve greater size.95 
This outcome is consistent with the discussion in Chapter 2, in which it was 
suggested that Australia has a high level of institutional grade property that has 
                                                 
95 For example, the data sample includes the stapling of DB RREEF Trust (now known as Dexus 
Property Group) and the Westfield Group.  
 
 
209
already been securitised. Consequently, asset growth and size are important areas 
for A-REITs to improve returns and attract capital (MIS 2006; Ratcliffe et al. 
2009). 
In contrast to the univariate analysis and all target results, the liquidity 
variables (FCF and FFO) are now significant and positive for A-REIT targets. 
This result is in contrast to Ling and Petrova (2011) who found a negative 
relationship between liquidity and target probability. However, Espahbodi and 
Espahbodi (2003) argued that targets with high liquidity may indicate low 
investment opportunities and therefore more likely to be an attractive target.  
The coefficients for liquidity (positive), leverage (negative) and dividend yield 
(negative) provide some support to the claims of Arnull-Almond (2008) and 
Alzueta and Lucey (2010). The authors argue that low dividend yielding firms 
utilise retained earnings to create/maintain financial slack to take advantage of 
investment opportunities. This increases their likelihood of becoming a target 
since such new investment is likely to increase the performance and growth of the 
firm. This study, however, does acknowledge that the variables leverage and 
dividend yield are not statistically significant.  
The pre-GFC variable is positive and significant, suggesting that target 
likelihood was greater before the onset of the GFC. This outcome is consistent 
with Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) who conclude that prior to the GFC the       
A-REIT sector went through a period of M&As. This result supports Dimovski’s 
(2009) conclusions that the GFC caused a structural shift in the A-REIT market.96 
Finally, it is noted that the SHR variable displayed significance in the univariate 
                                                 
96 It should be noted that the pre-GFC result may be due to the number of observations post the 
GFC. The sample contains 33 observations after the GFC and 129 prior the GFC. This is an area 
for further research as more M&A announcements occur. 
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analysis. It is not significant in the logit model, however the coefficient is the 
same sign as predicted in Chapter 5.  
Panel B of table 7.4 indicates the results of the logit model after the removal of 
target A-REITs that were involved in a stapling merger. More specifically, these 
mergers occurred when the externally managed A-REIT was merged with the 
management arm to form an internally advised A-REIT.97 The results provide 
robustness to the initial results, in that larger A-REITs with lower returns but high 
liquidity have a higher probability of becoming a target. It is noted that the p-
value for size is now only significant at the 10% level. It is hypothesised that this 
is due to a number of the stapling observations being in the higher range for firm 
size.98 However, it does provide further evidence that the focus of A-REITs was 
to achieve greater size. In addition, the result supports the claim above that the 
introduction of the Managed Investments Act 1998 had a significant impact on the 
A-REIT sector. 
The odds ratio results for A-REIT targets are presented in Table 7.5.99 This 
ratio indicates the impact on the probability of a firm being involved in M&A if 
there is one unit of change in an independent variable, while holding all other 
variables constant.100 Panel A displays the odds ratio for the full sample, while 
Panel B presents that odds ratios for the target sample after removing A-REITs 
involved in a stapling merger. The Hosmer-Lemeshow variable shows the models 
goodness of fit, the related p-value is calculated from the chi-square distribution 
                                                 
97 The stapling of these A-REITs is still effectively a merger in its definition as the firms are 
subject to ASX listing rules in relation to disclosure and shareholder approval.  
98 For example, Westfield Trust ($7.2b) and Westfield America Trust ($7.8b) were stapled with 
Westfield Holdings Limited to form Westfield Group. Deutsche Diversified Trust ($1.3b), 
Deutsche Industrial Trust ($1.4b) and Deutsche Office Trust ($0.6b) were stapled to form DB 
RREEF Trust (now known as Dexus Property Group). 
99 The odds ratio results for the full sample of targets are not presented here, the aim of the 
research is to focus on the A-REIT sector, a purer study. However, for the readers’ benefit, 
appendix Table B.3 provides the odds ratio results for the full sample.  
100 Percentage change in probability is calculated as: (odds ratio - 1) x 100.  
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test. The p-value is greater than 5% for both Panels A and B, therefore the model 
is not statistically different from the observed values.  
Table 7.5: Targets Odds Ratio Results – A-REITs  
 Panel A (N = 162)  Panel B (N = 147) 
Variable Odds Ratio (P-value)  Odds Ratio (P-value) 
INTERCEPT 0.001 (0.016)**  0.021 (0.044)** 
SIZE 1.375 (0.027)**  1.175 (0.066)* 
RET 0.795 (0.025)**  0.877 (0.028)** 
VAR 1.100 (0.102)  1.054 (0.121) 
LEV 0.901 (0.764)  0.947 (0.771) 
DIVYIELD 0.075 (0.148)  0.214 (0.163) 
MVBV 0.519 (0.363)  0.729 (0.346) 
FFO 1.162 (0.089)*  1.086 (0.099)* 
FCF 1.056 (0.036)**  1.030 (0.048)** 
HHPROP 1.886 (0.377)  1.269 (0.593) 
SHR 0.225 (0.178)  0.458 (0.165) 
TOP3 1.713 (0.667)  1.267 (0.576) 
MGMT 0.695 (0.407)  0.851 (0.548) 
PREGFC 3.119 (0.076)*  1.849 (0.102) 
    
Log likelihood -89.823   -82.666  
Pseudo R2 0.129   0.116  
LR Ȥ2 26.58   21.80  
Prob. > Ȥ 2     0.014**     0.058*  
Hosmer-Lemeshow Ȥ 2 4.239   8.657  
Prob. > Ȥ 2 0.834   0.372  
This table presents the odds ratio results for target A-REITs from 1999 to 2013. The odds ratio 
depicts what impact a one unit of change in an explanatory variable will have on the probability of 
the A-REIT being a target, whilst holding all other variables constant. The explanatory variables 
are defined in Chapter 5, Section 5.3. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test measures the goodness of fit of 
the logistic model. The test statistic asymptotically follows a Ȥ2 distribution with n-2 degrees of 
freedom.  If the p-value is not significant, the null hypothesis that the model is not statistically 
different from the observed values is accepted, implying that the model is a good fit. ***, **, * 
show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Results show that a one unit increase in size,101 while holding all other 
variables constant, increases the probability of becoming a target by 37.5% for 
Panel A and 17.5% for Panel B. A one percentage point increase in the average 
monthly return of an A-REIT decreases the probability of being a target by 
20.5% and 12.3% for Panels A and B respectively.  
The odds ratio results for the measures of liquidity show that a one unit 
increase in funds from operations as a percentage of EBITDA increases target 
probability by 16.2% for the full sample. While a one unit increase in free-cash 
                                                 
101 Measured as the natural log of the A-REITs market capitalisation. 
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flow as fraction of total assets increases target likelihood by 5.6%.  Finally, the 
pre-GFC odds ratio result shows that A-REITs target probability was 212% 
higher before the GFC. It should be noted that the pre-GFC independent variable 
is a binary variable. Therefore a one-unit change in the variable is somewhat 
impossible as the ‘cut-off’ point is a date in time that has passed. However, the 
result does further support the claims of Dimovski (2009) and Ratcliffe and 
Dimovski (2013) discussed above.  
Overall the logistic results for A-REIT targets suggest that A-REITs with weak 
financial performance but high levels of liquidity are attractive targets. This result 
suggests that the inefficient management hypothesis may be a driver for A-REITs 
being targeted in a M&A announcement. In addition, the results show that 
increasing size is an important driver of A-REIT M&A activity. However, this 
result may indicate the existence of an agency motive via the growth 
maximisation hypothesis described by Marris (1963). 
7.3.3BiddersLogisticResults–RealEstateSector
 Similar to the targets logistic model, a correlation matrix of the independent 
variables is presented in Table 7.6.102 Examination of the table shows that the 
variables SHR and TOP3 display a high level of correlation (0.784). It is therefore 
important to be aware of this relationship and adjust accordingly in the 
discussions and presentation of the results.   
  
                                                 
102 Appendix Table B.2 presents the correlation matrix for the A-REIT bidders sample. 
Examination of this tables shows, consistent with the real estate sector bidders variables, a high 
correlation exists between SHR and TOP3, 0.731.  
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Table 7.6: Bidders Correlation Coefficient Matrix – Real Estate Sector 
SIZE RET VAR LEV DIVYIELD MVBV FFO FCF HHPROP SHR TOP3 PREGFC 
SIZE 1.000 
RET -0.036 1.000 
VAR -0.193 -0.267 1.000 
LEV -0.207 -0.168 0.319 1.000 
DIVYIELD 0.045 -0.397 0.225 0.276 1.000 
MVBV 0.062 0.403 0.063 0.201 -0.357 1.000 
FFO 0.089 -0.222 0.018 0.261 0.262 -0.040 1.000 
FCF 0.095 -0.046 0.179 -0.163 -0.103 0.038 -0.232 1.000 
HHPROP -0.053 0.087 -0.149 0.024 -0.142 0.130 -0.102 0.074 1.000 
SHR -0.341 0.208 0.044 0.135 -0.155 0.147 0.031 0.060 0.222 1.000 
TOP3 -0.284 0.186 0.100 0.080 -0.192 0.127 0.006 0.283 0.193 0.784 1.000 
PREGFC -0.215 0.506 -0.508 -0.205 -0.267 0.167 -0.148 -0.282 0.253 0.170 0.088 1.000 
The correlation coefficient matrix of the explanatory variables for real estate sector bidder announcements from 1999-2013.  
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 Table 7.7 presents the results for the logistic regression model for real estate 
sector bidders. Panel A presents the results for all the explanatory variables, while 
Panels B and C adjust for the collinearity between SHR and TOP3. The Log 
likelihood test of the null hypothesis is rejected. The p-values across the three 
panels are below the 10% critical level. The Pseudo R2 value remains stable at 
around the 10% level across the three panels.  
Table 7.7: Bidders Logistic Estimation Results – Real Estate Sector 
No. Obs. = 144 Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
Variable Coef (P-value)  Coef (P-value)  Coef (P-value) 
INTERCEPT -4.650 (0.185)  -4.891 (0.151)  -4.914 (0.153) 
SIZE 0.193 (0.200)  0.196 (0.188)  0.236 (0.112) 
RET 0.222 (0.074)*  0.225 (0.070)*  0.185 (0.112) 
VAR 0.294 (0.073)*  0.290 (0.077)*  0.296 (0.061)* 
LEV -0.421 (0.409)  -0.415 (0.414)  -0.458 (0.372) 
DIVYIELD 0.039 (0.580)  0.043 (0.522)  0.024 (0.707) 
MVBV 0.047 (0.811)  0.051 (0.797)  0.023 (0.902) 
FFO 0.002 (0.986)  -0.001 (0.995)  -0.006 (0.954) 
FCF 0.013 (0.649)  0.010 (0.698)  0.109 (0.473) 
HHPROP 0.017 (0.981)  0.009 (0.991)  -0.108 (0.883) 
SHR -0.033 (0.108)  -0.037 (0.006)***    
TOP3 -0.007 (0.772)     -0.036 (0.019)** 
PREGFC 0.536 (0.434)  0.533 (0.437)  0.517 (0.447) 
      
Log likelihood -81.257  -81.299  -82.635 
Pseudo R2 0.113  0.113  0.098 
LR Ȥ2 20.80  20.72  18.05 
Prob. > Ȥ 2 0.053*  0.036**  0.081* 
This table displays the results of the logit regression model for the probability of all real estate firms 
being a bidder from 1999-2013. The explanatory variables are defined in Chapter 5, Section 5.3. The 
Log likelihood ratio tests the null hypothesis that all parameters of the model are simultaneously 
equal to zero. The Prob> Ȥ 2 value rejects the null hypothesis. The Pseudo R2 is the analogue of the 
R2 in a OLS regression model. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
In contrast to the univariate analysis, both shareholder return and share price 
variance are both positive and significant, however the significance for RET 
disappears in Panel C. This outcome suggests that bidders are in a strong financial 
position. The VAR result is investigated further in the A-REIT logit results. 
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Bidder size is positive, but insignificant, which again is in contrast to the 
univariate results. The proxies for corporate governance (SHR and TOP3) are 
both negative and significant in Panels B and C respectively. These results imply 
that real estate firms with lower levels of blockholdings and management 
ownership have a higher probability of being a bidder.  
7.3.4BidderLogisticResults–AǦREITs
Similar to the logistic model for targets, table 7.8 presents that results for the     
A-REITs sample. Panel A presents the results for all of the explanatory variables, 
Panels B and C are adjusted for the collinearity between SHR and TOP3. In 
addition, the variable for property type focus (HHPROP) has been removed as it 
appears to have little explanatory value (p-value of 0.978 in Panel A).  
Table 7.8: Bidders Logistic Estimation Results – A-REITs   
No. Obs. = 105 Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
Variable Coef (P-value)  Coef (P-value)  Coef (P-value) 
INTERCEPT -5.809 (0.256)  -6.549 (0.179)  -7.461 (0.149) 
SIZE 0.235 (0.265)  0.239 (0.244)  0.326 (0.119) 
RET 0.620 (0.064)*  0.630 (0.054)*  0.632 (0.054)* 
VAR 0.699 (0.046)**  0.713 (0.043)**  0.654 (0.037)** 
LEV 0.486 (0.692)  0.513 (0.652)  0.101 (0.732) 
DIVYIELD 0.068 (0.623)  0.074 (0.565)  0.121 (0.399) 
MVBV -0.484 (0.307)  -0.475 (0.303)  -0.477 (0.283) 
FFO -0.416 (0.481)  -0.489 (0.464)  -0.356 (0.519) 
FCF 0.046 (0.281)  0.034 (0.401)  0.056 (0.161) 
HHPROP 0.026 (0.978)       
SHR -0.052 (0.117)  -0.071 (0.003)***    
TOP3 -0.033 (0.383)     -0.076 (0.006)*** 
MGMT 0.635 (0.326)  0.609 (0.327)  0.843 (0.187) 
PREGFC 1.722 (0.096)*  1.719 (0.083)*  1.653 (0.085)* 
      
Log likelihood -49.830  -50.201  -51.035 
Pseudo R2 0.254  0.249  0.236 
LR Ȥ2 34.01  33.26  31.59 
Prob. > Ȥ 2 0.001***  0.000***  0.002*** 
This table displays the results of the logit regression model for the probability of A-REITs being a 
bidder from 1999-2013. The explanatory variables are defined in Chapter 5, Section 5.3. The Log 
likelihood ratio tests the null hypothesis that all parameters of the model are simultaneously equal to 
zero. The Prob> Ȥ 2 value rejects the null hypothesis. The Pseudo R2 is the analogue of the R2 in a 
OLS regression model. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
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Consistent with Table 7.7, RET is positive and significant, however, it is now 
significant in Panel C. This result is consistent with prior logistic research in the 
banking sector by Mehrez et al. (2012) and Pasiouras and Gaganis (2007), who 
both found improved performance increases bidder likelihood. Furthermore, this 
outcome has not been previously documented in REIT research. Eichholtz and 
Kok (2008) and Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) both identify a positive 
coefficient, but neither report statistical significance.  
PREGFC is positive and now significant at the 10% level, further supporting 
the claims of Dimovski (2009) and Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013). The insider 
holdings variable (SHR) is negative and significant in Panel B and this result 
supports the findings of North (2001) who argues that large insider holdings 
entrench management. Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) found a significant 
negative relationship between insider holdings and bidder likelihood. The number 
of shares held by the top three investors (TOP3) is also negative and significant in 
Panel C. This result is consistent with the findings in Anglin et al. (2013) that 
external ownership is an effective monitoring mechanism for REITs. The results 
of the corporate governance variables suggest that the agency motive may-not be 
a driver of A-REIT bidders.  
The study also finds a positive coefficient for the management variable, 
although the variable is not significant. Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013) suggest 
that the corporate governance variables and management results are related. More 
specifically, A-REITs with high levels of shareholder concentration and insider 
ownership are often externally managed. This implies that the management 
company often holds a large ownership stake in the externally managed A-REIT. 
The authors argue that internally managed A-REITs have a comparative 
 
 
217
advantage over their external counterparts in offering target shareholders a better 
price, due to no management fee leakage. This argument is further supported by 
Capozza and Seguin (2000) and Greer and Parker (2005) who note that internally 
managed REITs have lower agency costs, lower cost of capital and greater 
financial flexibility in debt funding.  
In addition, Panel C of Table 7.1 shows a significant difference in means for 
the MGMT variable for the targets and acquirers samples, suggesting that 
internally managed A-REITs are more likely to be bidders. “Therefore, an 
internally managed REIT would be able to outbid (or offer a better price upfront, 
thus resulting in no counter-bidding) due to its more efficient structure” (Ratcliffe 
and Dimovski 2013, p. 455). 
Share price variance has a significant positive impact on bidder probability 
across all models. However, Dimovski and O'Neill (2012) identify a sharp 
increase in share price volatility post the GFC. The authors showed that the share 
price return standard deviation for A-REITs involved in a private placement from 
2006 to 2007 was 1.4%. Compared to 4.8% for the period 2008 to 2011, an 
increase of almost 250%. Furthermore, Appendix Table B.2 shows moderate 
collinearity between VAR and PREGFC (-0.503). To investigate if the VAR 
result was being driven by the impact of the GFC a logit model was run for all 
observations prior the GFC. The results are displayed in Appendix Table B.4 and 
show that share price variability is no longer significant. Share price return, 
insider holdings and shareholder concentration remain statistically significant.103 
                                                 
103 It is interesting to note that the management variable in Panel B of Appendix Table B.4 is now 
positive and significant. This outcome provides some additional support to the combined 
outcomes for SHR, TOP3 and management structure having a related impact on bidder 
probability.  
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It is concluded that the volatility result was being driven by the A-REIT sector 
volatility experienced during (and post) the GFC.  
To account for the VAR outcome and to further test the robustness of the 
results, a new logit model was run after removing VAR. These results are 
presented in Table 7.9. It can be seen that share price return remains significant 
and positive. Both insider holdings and shareholder concentration have a negative 
impact on bidder probability. These results provide robustness to the original 
findings for share price return and corporate governance. Finally, it is noted that 
the PREGFC variable is no longer significant. It appears that the relationship 
between VAR and PREGFC may have been driving this result in Table 7.8.  
Table 7.9: Bidders Logistic Estimation Results – A-REITs (without VAR)  
No. Obs. = 105 Panel A  Panel B 
Variable Coef (P-value)  Coef (P-value) 
INTERCEPT -5.779 (0.252)  -4.743 (0.323) 
SIZE 0.255 (0.213)  0.169 (0.397) 
RET 0.431 (0.031)**  0.337 (0.054)* 
LEV -0.064 (0.954)  0.401 (0.714) 
DIVYIELD 0.216 (0.110)  0.159 (0.193) 
MVBV -0.180 (0.580)  -0.125 (0.692) 
FFO -0.577 (0.322)  -0.781 (0.223) 
FCF 0.048 (0.204)  0.027 (0.484) 
SHR    -0.063 (0.005)*** 
TOP3 -0.065 (0.009)***    
MGMT 0.876 (0.135)  0.689 (0.241) 
PREGFC 0.489 (0.538)  0.679 (0.452) 
    
Log likelihood -54.518  -53.650 
Pseudo R2 0.184  0.197 
LR Ȥ2 24.63  26.36 
Prob. > Ȥ 2 0.006***  0.003*** 
This table displays the results of the logit regression model for the probability of A-REITs being a 
bidder from 1999-2013 after the removal of the VAR variable. The explanatory variables are defined 
in Chapter 5, Section 5.3. The Log likelihood ratio tests the null hypothesis that all parameters of the 
model are simultaneously equal to zero. The Prob> Ȥ 2 value rejects the null hypothesis. The Pseudo 
R2 is the analogue of the R2 in a OLS regression model. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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The log odds ratio for A-REIT bidders is presented in Table 7.10.104 Results 
show that a one percentage point increase in share price return, while holding all 
other variables constant, increases the odds of an A-REIT being a bidder by 
approximately 54% in Panel A and 40% in Panel B. A one-percentage point 
increase in the number of shares held by related parties’ decreases bidder 
probability by 6.1%. Finally, the TOP3 log odds variable shows bidder 
probability decreases by 6.3% if there is a one-percentage point increase in 
shareholder concentration. The corporate governance results further support prior 
research that managerial ownership decreases M&A likelihood (Eichholtz and 
Kok 2008; North 2001).   
Table 7.10: Bidders Odds Ratio Results – A-REITs 
No. Obs. = 105 Panel A  Panel B 
Variable Odds Ratio (P-value)  Odds Ratio (P-value) 
INTERCEPT 0.003 (0.252)  0.009 (0.323) 
SIZE 1.290 (0.213)  1.184 (0.397) 
RET 1.539 (0.031)**  1.401 (0.054)* 
LEV 0.938 (0.954)  1.493 (0.714) 
DIVYIELD 1.241 (0.110)  1.172 (0.193) 
MVBV 0.835 (0.580)  0.882 (0.692) 
FFO 0.562 (0.322)  0.458 (0.223) 
FCF 1.049 (0.204)  1.027 (0.484) 
SHR    0.939 (0.005)*** 
TOP3 0.937 (0.009)***    
MGMT 2.401 (0.135)  1.992 (0.241) 
PREGFC 1.631 (0.538)  1.972 (0.452) 
    
Log likelihood -54.518  -53.650 
Pseudo R2 0.184  0.197 
LR Ȥ2 24.63  26.36 
Prob. > Ȥ 2 0.006***  0.003*** 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Ȥ 2 11.292  9.038 
Prob. > Ȥ 2 0.185  0.339 
This table presents the odds ratio results for bidding A-REITs from 1999 to 2013. The odds ratio 
depicts what impact a one unit of change in an explanatory variable will have on the probability 
of the A-REIT being a bidder, whilst holding all other variables constant. The explanatory 
variables are defined in Chapter 5, Section 5.3. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test measures the 
goodness of fit of the logistic model. The test statistic asymptotically follows a Ȥ2 distribution 
with n-2 degrees of freedom.  If the p-value is not significant, the null hypothesis that the model 
is not statistically different from the observed values is accepted, implying that the model is a 
good fit. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                                                 
104 The odds ratio results for the full sample of bidders is not presented here as the aim of the 
research is to focus on the A-REIT sector, a purer study. However for the readers benefit, 
Appendix Table B.5 provides the odds ratio results for the full sample.  
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 Furthermore, as discussed earlier, it is hypothesised that the corporate 
governance measures and management results are related, in that externally 
managed A-REITs often have high levels of internal ownership. The results 
suggest, consistent with Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2013), that internally managed 
A-REITs are more efficient than their externally managed counterparts when it 
comes to M&As.  
7.4Conclusion
 Results of the logistic regression model for A-REIT targets show that share 
price underperformance increases target likelihood. This study also finds that     
A-REITs with higher levels of liquidity increase the probability of being a target. 
This outcome suggests that firms with high liquidity have low investment 
opportunities (Espahbodi and Espahbodi 2003). This study concludes that the 
management synergy motive (inefficient management hypothesis) is a driver for 
A-REITs being targeted in a M&A announcement.  
 Results show that firm size increases target likelihood and this outcome 
supports the growth maximisation hypothesis (Marris 1963) and may indicate the 
existence of agency issues. However, as discussed, it is suggested that this 
outcome is a result of the Managed Investments Act 1998 that paved the way for 
self-managed A-REITs. In addition, asset growth and size are important areas for 
A-REITs to improve returns and attract capital (MIS 2006; Ratcliffe et al. 2009). 
Furthermore, the study finds a negative relationship between corporate 
governance and bidder probability. This outcome suggests that bidding A-REITs, 
with improved monitoring, are more prudent in accessing a M&A opportunity, 
therefore, reducing the influence of the agency motive. Finally, the firm size 
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result is consistent with the event study results presented in Chapter 6. More 
specifically, the regression model showed a positive and significant relationship 
with target size and excess returns.   
 Results for the characteristics of bidders indicate that improved share price 
performance has a positive relationship with acquirer probability. A one 
percentage point increase in average monthly returns increases bidder probability 
by over 50%. This suggests that bidding firms are in a healthy financial position, 
possibly due to enhanced management or asset performance. Results also suggest 
that internally managed A-REITs are more efficient and/or have a comparative 
advantage over their external counterparts in M&As.  
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Chapter 8: Post-M&A Announcement Results and 
Discussions 
8.1Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the long run wealth impacts on bidding 
firm shareholders. The analysis begins by examining the excess returns for the 
listed real estate sector; following this the sample is filtered down to A-REIT 
acquirers. Within the analysis, the impacts of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), 
method of payment and public versus private counter parties are assessed. Figure 
8.1 highlights the focus of this chapter within the overall context of the thesis.105   
Figure 8.1: Thesis study timeline 
 
 
 
 







Figure 8.1 presents a time-line of the M&A study periods across the three analytical studies of this 
thesis. The circled section represents the focus of the presentation of results in this chapter. 
Consistent with prior literature (Ang et al. 2008; Betton et al. 2007; Gregory 
1997), results show that A-REIT bidders earn negative and significant abnormal 
returns (ARs) in the post-announcement period. The evidence suggests that a 
major driver, in more recent times, for the observed negative excess returns can 
be attributed to the GFC. Results show that acquirers earned negative and highly 
                                                 
105 Figure 8.1 is a replication of Figure 1.1 presenting the overall timeline of the investigation 
conducted by this thesis.  
Pre-announcement 
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study. 
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performance study 
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significant ARs during the GFC period. While pre-GFC results display positive 
and significant ARs across both methodologies.  
There are several explanations as to why ARs were negative during the GFC 
period. First was a result of the high uncertainty and volatility within the A-REIT 
sector. Second, high levels of unsustainable borrowings and higher risk exposures 
of A-REITs were brought forward as a result of the structural change in the 
sector. Third, at the height of the crisis a large number of A-REITs reported 
property write-downs of over 20% (BDO 2009). These factors, on top of 
integrating the targets assets, compounded bidders under-performance.  
Division of the sample by method of payment show A-REIT acquirers earn 
negative and significant ARs for cash financed deals. Compared to insignificant 
negative ARs for deals financed with scrip and/or combination of scrip and cash. 
However, partitioning of the sample by the GFC shows cash financed M&As 
return positive and significant excess returns across both models in the pre-GFC 
period, while post-M&A performance that extended into the GFC display 
negative and significant ARs. Results for scrip/combination remain insignificant 
across both models and sub-periods.  
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns results over the full study period for A-REIT 
bidders by type of target show that acquirers significantly underperform in the 
two and three-year post-announcement event windows, regardless of whether the 
target is private or public. However, similar to the cash payment results, it is 
observed that the full sample results are being driven by acquirers whose return 
calculations extend over the December 2007 to March 2009 period.  
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8.2PostǦAnnouncementAbnormalReturns
This section discusses the results of the post-bid excess returns. Chapter 5 
outlined the methodologies used in this analysis. Measurement of post-
announcement performance of acquirers is measured using the buy-and-hold 
method and the three-factor asset-pricing model. The initial discussion centres on 
the results for acquirers within the Australian real estate sector. This area has not 
been examined previously in the literature. Results are discussed for both the full 
sample period and the impacts of the GFC. Following this, the study focuses on 
the long-term wealth effects for A-REIT bidders. Again the impacts of the GFC 
are examined along with payment method and type of counterpart.  
8.2.1BuyǦandǦHoldAbnormalReturns–RealEstateSector
Panel A of Table 8.1 presents the results for the long-term post-announcement 
calculations using the buy-and-hold methodology for the Australian real estate 
sector over the one, two and three-year event periods. Bidding firms earn 
negative, but insignificant BHARs of -3.83% over the post twelve month period. 
However, both the two and three-year BHAR periods are negative and significant 
(-17.10% and -19.50% respectively). This outcome is consistent with prior studies 
of conventional firms in the US (Ang et al. 2008; Bessembinder and Zhang 2013) 
and the UK (Conn et al. 2005; Sudarsanam and Mahate 2003). Jensen and Ruback 
(1983) argue that these results are inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest 
future gains from M&As are overestimated by the market at the time of the 
announcement.  
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Table 8.1: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns – Real Estate Sector  
 Panel A: 1996:2012 One Year (83 obs) Two Year (65 obs) Three Year (51 obs) 
BHAR -3.83% -17.10% -19.50% 
(P-value) (0.167) (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
(Skewness-adjusted 
p-value) (0.169) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Panel B: 1996:2007  One Year (56 obs) Two Year (38 obs) Three Year (25 obs) 
BHAR +2.58% -9.31% -7.18% 
(P-value) (0.405) (0.169) (0.415) 
(Skewness-adjusted 
p-value) (0.390) (0.156) (0.384) 
Panel C: 2008:2012 One Year (27 obs) Two Year (27 obs) Three Year (26 obs) 
BHAR -17.12% -28.07% -31.35% 
(P-value) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
(Skewness-adjusted 
p-value) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
This table shows the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for acquiring Real Estate firms over 
the study period of January 1996 to December 2012. BHARs are calculated over the one, two and 
three-year post-announcement periods. Panel A shows the BHARs calculations for full sample 
period. Panel B shows the BHARs calculations up to December 2007. Panel C shows all BHARs 
calculations that occurred after December 2007. BHARs are calculated using the size and MVBV 
matched approach described by Lyon et al. (1999). Significance p-values are calculated using a 
standard t-statistic and a skewness-adjusted t-statistic as discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * show 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
The BHARs for announcements occurring prior- and post-December 2007 are 
calculated to investigate any possible differences between the two periods. Panel 
B shows the BHARs for the pre-GFC sample, while Panel C displays post-GFC 
results.106 The results are distinctly different between the pre- and post-GFC 
samples. The pre-GFC sample displays insignificant BHARs across all three-time 
periods. However, Panel C shows negative and highly significant BHARs for the 
one, two and three-year periods, ranging from -17.12% in year one to -31.35% for 
three-years. These outcomes indicate that the GFC had a significant impact on the 
Australian real estate sector.  
                                                 
106 For an observation to be included in the pre-GFC sub-sample, the time period for calculating 
BHARs must finish before December 2007. For example, an announcement occurring in 2006 
would be included in the pre-GFC sample for one-year BHARs, but the two and three-year 
BHARs (which cover the GFC period) would be included in the post-December 2007 sub-sample. 
This process was employed to capture the impacts the GFC had on the sector. 
 
 
226
8.2.2ThreeǦFactorModelAbnormalReturns–RealEstateSector
Table 8.2 provides the results for the post-announcement performance of 
acquirers using the three-factor model described in Chapter 5. Employing this 
methodology enables the study to test the robustness of the BHARs results in 
Table 8.1. The intercept from the regression model measures the mean monthly 
abnormal return and is the variable of focus in the results.107  
Panel A shows the results for the full study period. In contrast to the BHAR 
results, the one-year event window displays significant negative mean monthly 
ARs of -1.5%, which corresponds to -18% over the twelve-month period (1.5% x 
12). Both the two and three-year event periods are also negative and significant, 
consistent with the BHAR results. The results are consistent with prior research 
on conventional firms utilising the three-factor model. For example, studies of 
UK post-M&A performance by Gregory (1997) and Antoniou et al. (2007) both 
reported significant mean monthly abnormal returns. In contrast, Moeller et al. 
(2004) observed insignificant ARs in their US study and Dutta and Jog (2009) 
found positive and significant ARs for Canadian announcements.  









                                                 
107 The three-factor model measures monthly excess returns, while the BHAR method is a buy-
and-hold investment strategy. Therefore, the number of observations listed in the three-factor 
model are reflective of the monthly returns of the bidders sample. For example, a sample of 15 
bidders over a three-year period results in 540 monthly observations (15 bidders x 36 months). 
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Table 8.2: Three-Factor Model – Real Estate Sector 
 Panel A:  One Year (996 obs) Two Year (1560 obs) Three Year (1836 obs) 
1996:2012 Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.015 (0.000)*** -0.016 (0.000)*** -0.017 (0.000)*** 
RMRF 1.447 (0.000)*** 1.683 (0.000)*** 1.572 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.201 (0.029)** 0.072 (0.421) -0.179 (0.024)** 
HML -0.031 (0.725) 0.205 (0.021)** 0.275 (0.003)*** 
R2 0.189  0.208  0.249  
Adj. R2 0.186  0.205  0.247  
Panel B:  One Year (672 obs) Two Year (912 obs) Three Year (900 obs) 
1996:2007  Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.001 (0.633) -0.006 (0.006)*** -0.017 (0.000)*** 
RMRF 0.617 (0.000)*** 0.786 (0.000)*** 1.312 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.165 (0.021)** 0.043 (0.449) 0.137 (0.094)* 
HML -0.149 (0.047)** -0.037 (0.547) -0.036 (0.652) 
R2 0.055  0.078  0.166  
Adj. R2 0.051  0.075  0.164  
Panel C:  One Year (324 obs) Two Year (648 obs) Three Year (936 obs) 
2008:2012 Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.029 (0.004)*** -0.017 (0.070)* -0.021 (0.001)*** 
RMRF 1.727 (0.000)*** 1.864 (0.000)*** 1.621 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.320 (0.181) 0.192 (0.281) -0.283 (0.023)** 
HML 0.143 (0.456) 0.318 (0.052)* 0.389 (0.001)*** 
R2 0.213  0.212  0.266  
Adj. R2 0.143  0.208  0.263  
This table presents the results of the three-factor model ordinary least squares regression using 
monthly data for real estate bidders over the sample period of 1996 to 2012 as described in chapter 
5. RMRF is the excess return on the market portfolio, SMB is the return difference between a 
portfolio of small and large firms, HML is return difference between the portfolios of high and low 
book-to-market shares. The INTERCEPT measures the mean monthly abnormal return. The 
number of observations represents monthly bidder excess returns over the event windows. Panel A 
shows the calculations for the full study period. Panel B presents the results up to December 2007 
(pre-GFC) and Panel C shows results for the post-GFC sub-period. ***, **, * show statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
It is noted that the magnitude of the excess returns from the three-factor model 
are higher than the BHARs results. Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that 
different methodologies have different powers of detecting excess returns and 
therefore produce differences in their estimates of abnormal performance.  
Similar to Table 8.1, the impacts of the GFC are examined in Panels B and C 
of Table 8.2.  Consistent with the BHAR calculations, bidders earn insignificant 
ARs over the one-year event window in the pre-GFC period. However, both the 
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two and three-year periods now display statistical significance, the mean monthly 
abnormal return over the two-year period is -0.6% and -1.7% for the three-year 
window. 
Mean monthly excess returns in panel C are negative and significant across all 
three-event windows. In addition, the magnitude of the negative abnormal returns 
are greater than the pre-GFC sample, for example, the mean monthly abnormal 
return for the two-year event period in Panel B is -0.6%, compared to -1.7% in 
Panel C. These outcomes confirm the BHAR results in table 8.1 and further 
indicate that the GFC had a significant impact on the market for corporate control 
in the Australian real estate sector. This impact is examined in more detail in the 
A-REIT sample. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, the focus of the study is 
centred on M&As by A-REITs. Focusing on this sector provides a purer study, 
without the added noise that may be included by examining both A-REITs and 
real estate management and development companies in the one sample.  
8.2.3BuyǦandǦHoldAbnormalReturns–AǦREITs
The long-term post-bid BHARs for the A-REIT sample are presented in Table 
8.3. Panel A displays the results for the full sample period. Consistent with the 
overall real estate sector results, A-REIT bidders earn insignificant negative 
BHARs over the one-year post period. BHARs for both the two and three-year 
periods are negative and significant (-8.21% and -12.27% respectively). The 
magnitude of the negative excess returns is, however, lower than those presented 
in Table 8.1.  
Comparing these results with prior US REIT research, Sahin (2005) observed 
positive and insignificant BHARs of +3.56% over the three-year period.  
Campbell et al. (2009) detected insignificant BHARs over the one and three-year 
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event windows, while the five-year post-bid period returned a negative and 
significant BHAR of -9.9%.  
Table 8.3: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns – A-REITs  
 Panel A: 1996:2012 One Year (65 obs) Two Year (49 obs) Three Year (35 obs) 
BHAR -2.95% -8.21% -12.27% 
(P-value) (0.246) (0.034)** (0.002)*** 
(Skewness-adjusted 
p-value) (0.220) (0.019)** (0.002)*** 
Panel B: 1996:2007 One Year (43 obs) Two Year (29 obs) Three Year (17 obs) 
BHAR +3.77% +2.57% +0.01% 
(P-value) (0.055)* (0.471) (0.998) 
(Skewness-adjusted 
p-value) (0.015)** (0.381) (0.928) 
Panel C: 2008:2012 One Year (22 obs) Two Year (20 obs) Three Year (18 obs) 
BHAR -16.07% -23.85% -23.86% 
(P-value) (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
(Skewness-adjusted 
p-value) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
This table shows the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for acquiring A-REITs over the 
study period of January 1996 to December 2012. BHARs are calculated over the one, two and 
three-year post-announcement periods. Panel A shows the BHARs calculations for full sample 
period. Panel B shows the BHARs calculations up to December 2007. Panel C shows all BHARs 
calculations that occurred after December 2007. BHARs are calculated using the size and MVBV 
matched approach described by Lyon et al. (1999). p-values are calculated using a standard t-
statistic and a skewness-adjusted t-statistic as discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * show statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
The outcomes from these results suggest that the synergistic benefits, as 
reflected by positive and significant CARs, observed around the announcement 
period presented in Chapter 6 are eroded in the post-acquisition period. If this is 
the case, the results imply the existence of hubris and/or agency issues. However, 
as identified in Table 8.1, the influence of the GFC needs to be examined before 
any strong conclusions can be drawn.   
Panels B and C of Table 8.3 partitions the BHARs for announcements 
occurring prior and post-December 2007 to investigate any differences between 
the two periods. Pre-GFC results show that A-REIT bidders earn positive and 
significant BHARs of +3.77% over the one-year period. Both the two and three-
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year periods are positive but insignificant. This result provides support for the 
synergy motive for A-REIT M&As in the pre-GFC period.  
In contrast, the post-GFC BHARs are highly negative and significant across all 
three periods. Ranging from -16.07% for the one-year window to -23.86% for the 
three-year period. It appears that the negative and significant BHARs observed in 
Panel A of Table 8.3 is being driven by the post-December 2007 results. This 
outcome highlights the structural change in the A-REIT sector as a result of the 
GFC.  
The outcomes presented in Table 8.3 support the conclusion that A-REIT 
acquirers experienced negative and significant abnormal performance post-
announcement and that this outcome was being driven by the impacts of the GFC. 
These results support the claims of Betton et al. (2007) who suggest that negative 
post-bid abnormal returns may be due to a negative industry shock. However, one 
would expect an industry shock like the GFC to impact non-merged firms as well. 
This outcome may be due to the high uncertainty and volatility in the A-REIT 
sector during this period, making it more difficult to integrate the assets of the 
target firm and achieve any possible synergistic benefits.  
In addition, Rose (2011) highlights that Australian commercial property values 
were exceptionally high in 2006/2007. With the onset of the GFC, a large number 
of A-REITs re-valued their property portfolios. In 2009, approximately 40% of   
A-REITs reported property valuation write-downs of greater than 20%, with an 
average sector write-down of 16% (BDO 2009). It is hypothesised that, in 
addition to the problems with integrating the targets assets, over-payment for 
property assets prior to the GFC and subsequent revaluations compounded the 
under-performance.   
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Further insights into the impacts of the financial crisis are investigated in 
Figure 8.2. This figure presents the indexed returns for the acquirers and non-
acquirers portfolio over the study period. The figure shows that the bidders 
portfolio closely tracks the control portfolio from 1996 to October 2005. Between 
October 2005 and October 2007, the bidders portfolio actually outperforms the 
control sample. However, it is clearly evident that after December 2007 both 
portfolios sharply declined with the acquirers’ sample falling at a greater rate. 
Dimovski (2009) identifies December 2007 as the trigger point for the start of the 
financial crisis for Australian REITs. Figure 8.2 supports the findings of 
Dimovski (2009) and clearly shows a structural break in the A-REIT sector.  
The impacts of the GFC continue until March 2009, after which both the 
acquirers and non-bidder control portfolios begin to recover. However, the 
recovery for the bidders portfolio was not as fast as the non-bidders. As identified 
in Chapter 2, the Australian share market hit its low in early March 2009. The 
reversal of the downward trend occurred as governments around the globe 
injected funds into their economies. The announcements of economic stimulus 
packages by the Australian government, along with China, were the main catalyst 
for the recovery in the Australian share market (Atkinson 2011).  
Consistent with the overall Australian share market, the A-REIT sector also 
rebounded from its low in March 2009. BDO (2010) observed a dramatic fall in 
A-REIT volatility in 2009 compared to 2008. PCA (2010) suggest that the 
recovery of the sector was due to A-REITs focusing on their core business of 
rental returns and lower risk exposures. As highlighted in Chapter 2, a large 
number of A-REITs rebalanced their balance sheets through assets sales and 
capital raisings during the GFC (Dimovski and O'Neill 2012; Newell and Peng 
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2009). This restructuring resulted in a large fall in leverage levels, decrease in 
exposure to international property markets and a reduction in higher risk activities 
(for example, property development), resulting in a decrease in the risk profile of 
the sector (BDO 2010). This study therefore concludes, that there are three 
distinct sub-periods of activity within the overall analysis. These are pre-
December 2007, January 2008 to March 2009 and April 2009 onwards.  
Figure 8.2: Indexed Returns – A-REIT Bidders v Non-Bidders 
Figure 8.2 presents the indexed returns, starting at 100 in 1996, over the study period. Returns 
from the bidding A-REITs and the non-bidding portfolio are collected from the data set used to 
calculate the BHARs.

Figure 8.3 shows the A-REIT M&A announcements by year employed in the 
study. It can be seen that consolidation activity within the sector gathered 
momentum in 1999. However, there were no M&A observations from 2008 to 
2009 as the impacts of the financial crisis took effect on A-REITs. Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008, p. 2419) identify that M&A activity “is usually disrupted by a 
steep decline in stock markets and a sub-sequent recession”. Figure 8.3 supports 
the structural break observed in Figure 8.2 at the onset of the crisis. 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
01
/0
4/
19
96
01
/0
3/
19
97
01
/0
2/
19
98
01
/0
1/
19
99
01
/1
2/
19
99
01
/1
1/
20
00
01
/1
0/
20
01
01
/0
9/
20
02
01
/0
8/
20
03
01
/0
7/
20
04
01
/0
6/
20
05
01
/0
5/
20
06
01
/0
4/
20
07
01
/0
3/
20
08
01
/0
2/
20
09
01
/0
1/
20
10
01
/1
2/
20
10
01
/1
1/
20
11
01
/1
0/
20
12
01
/0
9/
20
13
Bidders
Non-bidders
 
 
233
Duong and Izan (2012) examined the long-term wealth effects of Australian 
M&As by conventional firms when the announcement occurs during a merger 
wave.  The authors found that acquisitions made in the first half of a merger wave 
enjoy better abnormal returns than those made in the second half. The 18 month 
BHARs for acquisitions in the first half were -0.09%, compared to -5.62% for the 
second half.108  
Figure 8.3: Long-Term M&A Announcements by Year – A-REITs 
Figure 8.3 shows the A-REIT M&A announcements, by year, employed in the study.  
Given the observed structural break in the data set, the post December 2007 
sub-sample was further divided into two periods. Any post-announcement 
abnormal returns calculations that extend over the period of January 2008 to 
March 2009 are classified as being during the GFC sub-sample. While 
calculations occurring after March 2009 are classified as the post-GFC sub-
sample. Table 8.4 presents the results for these two sub-samples.  
Panel A shows the BHAR results for post-announcement returns that extend 
past December 2007. The excess returns are negative and significant across all 
                                                 
108 Duong and Izan (2012) found both BHAR values to be statistically significant, however, the 
two results were not significantly different from each other.  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
M&A Announcements
 
 
234
three-event windows, ranging from -20.27% in the one-year model to -29.53% for 
the three-year. This result is consistent with Duong and Izan (2012), that M&As 
occurring late in a merger wave earn lower excess returns. Panel B results show 
that acquirers earn negative and significant BHARs in the two-year window. Both 
one and three-year periods are insignificant.109 However, an outlier observation 
was identified in the two-year sample. Real Estate Capital US Property Trust had 
a BHAR value of -120.02%, more than three standard deviations away from the 
mean BHAR. After removing this observation the BHAR result was negative but 
insignificant value of -14.47%.  
Comparing Panel A and B results suggests that the negative BHARs in Table 
8.3 (Panel C) are being driven by post-announcement returns that extend across 
the financial crisis period. Panel C displays the BHAR results over the full study 
period, excluding the GFC. The excess returns are insignificant across all three-
event periods.110  
Results for A-REIT bidders prior the onset of the GFC suggest that the motive 
for M&As was the synergy motive. One-year BHARs are positive and significant, 
while the two and three-year BHARs are positive, but insignificant. Conversely, it 
is evident that A-REIT acquirers were severely punished by investors after the 
onset of the GFC. The results from the BHAR modelling show that, after 
accounting for the GFC, the A-REIT sector is informationally efficient.  
                                                 
109 It is acknowledged that the post-March 2009 period has limited number of observations. This 
thesis is therefore aware of this limitation and acknowledges that drawing any strong conclusions 
for these results is difficult.   
110 The two-year BHAR result remains insignificant after adjusting for the outlier observation 
noted in the two-year post-March 2009 sub-sample. The BHAR was -0.35% with skewness 
adjusted p-value of 0.932. 
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Table 8.4: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns Separated by GFC– A-REITs  
 Panel A: During-GFC One Year (13 obs) Two Year (13 obs) Three Year (14 obs) 
BHAR -20.27% -20.78% -29.53% 
(P-value) (0.008)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
(Skewness-adjusted  
p-value) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Panel B: Post-GFC One Year (9 obs) Two Year (7 obs) Three Year (4 obs) 
BHAR -10.01% -29.55% -4.03% 
(P-value) (0.228) (0.090)* (0.751) 
(Skewness-adjusted  
p-value) (0.200) (0.101) (0.863) 
Panel C: Excl. GFC One Year (52 obs) Two Year (36 obs) Three Year (21 obs) 
BHAR +1.38% -3.67% -0.76% 
(P-value) (0.537) (0.437) (0.851) 
(Skewness-adjusted  
p-value) (0.539) (0.391) (0.850) 
This table shows the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for acquiring A-REITs over the sub-
periods. BHARs are calculated over the one, two and three-year post-announcement periods. 
Panel A shows the BHARs calculations for any observation whose returns extend over the period 
of January 2008 to March 2009. Panel B shows the BHARs calculations after March 2009. Panel 
C show BHARs calculations excluding the period January 2008 to March 2009. BHARs are 
calculated using the size and MVBV matched approach described by Lyon et al. (1999). p-values 
are calculated using a standard t-statistic and a skewness-adjusted t-statistic as discussed in 
Chapter 5. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
As discussed previously, it is hypothesised that the results are due to the high 
uncertainty and volatility within the A-REIT sector during the financial crisis. In 
addition, the high number of property write-downs by A-REITs during this 
period, compounded the post-announcement negative excess returns for acquirers. 
To test the robustness of the BHAR results, the study now examines the post-
announcement excess returns utilising the three-factor model. 
8.2.4ThreeǦFactorModelAbnormalReturns–AǦREITs
The long-term post-bid three-factor model ARs for the A-REIT sample are 
presented in Table 8.5. The full sample period is displayed in Panel A. A-REIT 
bidders exhibit negative and significant ARs in the two-year event window. The 
intercept is negative, but insignificant, for the one and three-year periods.  This 
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outcome varies slightly to the BHAR results, which displayed significantly 
negative BHARs over the three-year model. However, this result is consistent 
with prior US REIT research by Sahin (2005), who reported an insignificant 
negative intercept over the three-year post-event period.  
Table 8.5: Three-Factor Model – A-REITs  
 Panel A:  One Year (780 obs) Two Year (1176 obs) Three Year (1260 obs) 
1996:2012 Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.004 (0.152) -0.005 (0.049)** -0.001 (0.947) 
RMRF 1.114 (0.000)*** 1.257 (0.000)*** 1.365 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.081 (0.236) 0.127 (0.034)** 0.078 (0.238) 
HML -0.056 (0.391) 0.115 (0.051)* 0.214 (0.001)*** 
R2 0.251  0.305  0.336  
Adj. R2 0.248  0.304  0.334  
Panel B:  One Year (516 obs) Two Year (696 obs) Three Year (612 obs) 
1996:2007  Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT 0.005 (0.012)** 0.003 (0.093)* 0.001 (0.748) 
RMRF 0.584 (0.000)*** 0.745 (0.000)*** 0.790 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.063 (0.251) 0.036 (0.354) 0.051 (0.174) 
HML -0.081 (0.168) -0.035 (0.406) -0.045 (0.261) 
R2 0.092  0.162  0.224  
Adj. R2 0.087  0.159  0.220  
Panel C:  One Year (264 obs) Two Year (480 obs) Three Year (648 obs) 
2008:2012 Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.014 (0.067)* -0.011 (0.096)* -0.004 (0.525) 
RMRF 1.247 (0.000)*** 1.366 (0.000)*** 1.452 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.071 (0.648) 0.261 (0.040)** 0.146 (0.189) 
HML 0.0253 (0.855) 0.214 (0.052)* 0.286 (0.006)*** 
R2 0.269  0.298  0.347  
Adj. R2 0.261  0.294  0.344  
This table presents the results of the three-factor model ordinary least squares regression using 
monthly data for A-REIT bidders over the sample period of 1996 to 2012 as described in Chapter 
5. RMRF is the excess return on the A-REIT index, SMB is the return difference between a 
portfolio of small and large A-REITs, HML is return difference between the portfolios of high and 
low book-to-market A-REITs. The INTERCEPT measures the mean monthly abnormal return. 
The number of observations represents monthly bidder excess returns over the event windows. 
Panel A shows the calculations for the full study period. Panel B presents the results up to 
December 2007 (pre-GFC) and Panel C shows results for the post-GFC sub-period. ***, **, * 
show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
Results for bidders separated by pre- and post-GFC are displayed in Panels B 
and C of Table 8.5 respectively. Pre-GFC abnormal returns are positive across all 
three-event periods, and both the one and two-year models are statistically 
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significant. This result supports the BHAR conclusions that prior to the onset of 
the GFC, A-REIT M&As were driven by the synergy motive. Post-GFC results 
show, consistent with the BHAR model, that acquirers earn negative and 
significant abnormal returns across both the one and two-year event periods. 
However, in contrast the three-year window is now insignificant.  
The study further examines the excess returns over the GFC period. The results 
are presented in Table 8.6. Consistent with the BHAR model, acquirers earn 
negative and significant excess returns during the GFC period in the one-year 
event window. Conversely, the two and three-year periods are insignificant. Post 
March 2009 long-term ARs are comparable with Table 8.4, with only the two-
year event period displaying a negative and significant intercept. However, again 
the significance disappears after removing the outlier observation.  
Panel C shows the ARs for the full sample, excluding the GFC period. As with 
the BHAR results, both the two and three-year periods are insignificant. It is 
observed, however, that the one-year period AR is positive and significant. The 
mean monthly AR over the twelve-month period is +0.4%.   
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Table 8.6: Three-Factor Model Separated by GFC –A-REITs  
 Panel A:  One Year (156 obs) Two Year (312 obs) Three Year (504 obs) 
During-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.022 (0.082)* -0.005 (0.638) 0.007 (0.370) 
RMRF 1.219 (0.000)*** 1.425 (0.000)*** 1.461 (0.000)*** 
SMB -0.009 (0.973) 0.288 (0.085)* 0.139 (0.294) 
HML 0.068 (0.761) 0.317 (0.036)** 0.339 (0.009)*** 
R2 0.256  0.291  0.344  
Adj. R2 0.241  0.284  0.340  
Panel B:  One Year (108 obs) Two Year (168 obs) Three Year (144 obs) 
Post-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.001 (0.821) -0.010 (0.083)* -0.001 (0.700) 
RMRF 0.817 (0.001)*** 1.123 (0.000)*** 1.306 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.082 (0.714) 0.150 (0.379) 0.069 (0.553) 
HML -0.049 (0.729) -0.039 (0.731) 0.082 (0.299) 
R2 0.121  0.181  0.431  
Adj. R2 0.096  0.165  0.419  
Panel C:  One Year (624 obs) Two Year (864 obs) Three Year (756 obs) 
Excl. GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT 0.004 (0.051)* -0.001 (0.921) 0.000 (0.890) 
RMRF 0.641 (0.000)*** 0.847 (0.000)*** 0.918 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.063 (0.243) 0.052 (0.213) 0.034 (0.334) 
HML -0.077 (0.148) -0.050 (0.223) -0.006 (0.864) 
R2 0.102  0.169  0.276  
Adj. R2 0.097  0.166  0.273  
Table 8.6 presents the results of the three-factor model ordinary least squares regression using 
monthly data for A-REIT bidders over the different sub-periods. RMRF is the excess return on the 
A-REIT index, SMB is the return difference between a portfolio of small and large A-REITs, HML 
is return difference between the portfolios of high and low book-to-market A-REITs. The 
INTERCEPT measures the mean monthly abnormal return. The number of observations 
represents monthly bidder excess returns over the event windows. Panel A shows the AR 
calculations for any observation whose returns extend over the period of January 2008 to March 
2009. Panel B shows the AR calculations after March 2009. Panel C show AR calculations 
excluding the period January 2008 to March 2009. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
Overall, the results from the three-factor model support the BHAR findings. 
Prior to the GFC, there is evidence that A-REIT acquisitions were not value 
destroying for shareholders. However, it is observed that the period of the 
financial crisis is a significantly different period in the evaluation of the long-term 
performance of A-REIT bidders. The post March 2009 period shows some 
indication that the M&A market in the A-REIT sector is recovering, possibly due 
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to the refocussing of A-REITs on their core business. However, due to low 
observations, it is difficult to obtain a strong conclusion for this sub-period.  
Before this study moves to examine payment method and target type in 
relation to post-announcement excess returns, it must be highlighted that in some 
of the sub-periods the number of observations are very low. This study 
acknowledges that one cannot draw strong conclusions. The overall aim of this 
investigation is to identify if M&As in the A-REIT sector are beneficial to 
shareholders in the long run. There is sufficient evidence from the overall sample 
that the A-REIT market was experiencing a period of consolidation up until 2007 
and during this period A-REIT M&As were not value destroying.  
The onset of the financial crisis in late 2007 triggered the end of the A-REIT 
merger period, with no M&A announcements within the data sample until 2010. 
Therefore the impacts of this time in history for A-REIT M&As must be 
accounted for in the presentation of the results. As time moves forward and more 
observations become available, researchers will be able to examine the post-crisis 
M&A market with more rigour. These results can then be compared to the pre-
crisis period to see if the structural change by A-REITs111 has had an impact on 
long-term post-announcement performance.  
 
8.3MethodofPayment–AǦREITs
Prior research into post-announcement performance has shown that acquirers 
who finance the acquisition with cash enjoy higher excess returns. For example, 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) show that acquirers earn positive and significant 
                                                 
111 As identified above, the GFC caused many A-REITs to restructure their balance sheets, 
resulting in decreased debt levels, decreased exposure internationally, reductions in higher risk 
activities and a refocus on their core activity of rental revenue. 
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BHARs of +6.40% over the three-year post acquisition period. Petmezas (2009), 
employing the three-factor model, observed negative, but insignificant monthly 
ARs for cash acquisitions. This is compared to negative and significant ARs of     
-1.91% per month for scrip financed M&As also over the three-year event 
window.  
 Savor and Lu (2009) argue that bidding firms in a superior financial position 
prior to the announcement will use scrip (or combination of scrip and cash) to 
finance an acquisition because they know that their shares are overvalued. The 
decision to use scrip as the payment method signals to the market this 
overvaluation, resulting in negative post-announcement excess returns.  
8.3.1MethodofPayment–BuyǦandǦHoldAbnormalReturns
Table 8.7 presents the BHARs for A-REIT acquirers, separated by method of 
payment. Panel A shows the excess returns for cash financed M&As, while Panel 
B provides the BHARs for acquisitions financed by scrip and/or a combination of 
scrip and cash. A-REITs that employ cash as the payment method suffer negative 
and significant BHARs across the two and three-year periods, with a three-year 
BHAR of -23.47%. This result is in contrast to prior studies on conventional 
firms.  
Panel B shows that A-REIT bidders earn negative, but insignificant BHARs 
across all three-study windows. In contrast, prior studies have found bidders 
employing scrip experience negative and significant BHARs post-announcement 
of around -13% (Ang and Cheng 2006; Savor and Lu 2009). Results for method 
of payment by A-REITs are consistent with the announcement period CAR 
results displayed in Chapter 6. Where bidding A-REITs earn negative and 
significant CARs of -1.81% over the forty-one day event window [-20,+20] for 
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cash financed M&As. Compared to positive, but insignificant CARs of +0.48% 
for scrip/combination. 
Table 8.7: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns – A-REITs Method of Payment 
Panel A: Cash 
 One Year (34 obs) Two Year (27 obs) Three Year (16 obs) 
BHAR -4.70% -11.17% -23.47% 
(P-value) (0.263) (0.087)* (0.000)*** 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.238) (0.059)* (0.001)*** 
Panel B: Scrip/Combo 
 One Year (31 obs) Two Year (22 obs) Three Year (19 obs) 
BHAR -1.02% -4.58% -2.83% 
(P-value) (0.713) (0.194) (0.543) 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.665) (0.192) (0.525) 
Table 8.7 presents the BHARs for acquiring A-REITs over the study period of January 1996 to 
December 2012, separated by method of payment. Scrip/Combo represents acquisitions financed 
with scrip and/or a combination of scrip and cash. BHARs are calculated over the one, two and 
three-year post-announcement periods. BHARs are calculated using the size and MVBV matched 
approach described by Lyon et al. (1999). p-values are calculated using a standard t-statistic and a 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic as discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * show statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
8.3.2MethodofPayment–ThreeǦFactorModelAbnormalReturns
Results from the three-factor model abnormal returns for payment method are 
presented in Table 8.8. Panel A provides the results when cash is used to finance 
the acquisition. Consistent with the BHARs results, A-REIT bidders earn a mean 
monthly negative and significant ARs of -0.8% per month over the two-year 
event period. However, in contrast to the BHARs outcomes, the three-year 
window is not significant and furthermore the intercept is positive. Panel B shows 
the excess returns results for scrip and/or a combination payment method. The 
results are consistent with the BHARs model; acquirers earn insignificant ARs 
over all three-event windows.  
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Table 8.8: Three-Factor Model – A-REITs Method of Payment 
 Panel A:  One Year (408 obs) Two Year (648 obs) Three Year (576 obs) 
Cash Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.006 (0.174) -0.008 (0.078)* 0.002 (0.721) 
RMRF 1.134 (0.000)*** 1.289 (0.000)*** 1.463 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.036 (0.726) 0.085 (0.321) 0.115 (0.315) 
HML -0.014 (0.891) 0.218 (0.011)** 0.335 (0.002)*** 
R2 0.249  0.333  0.364  
Adj. R2 0.243  0.329  0.361  
Panel B:  One Year (372 obs) Two Year (528 obs) Three Year (684 obs) 
Scrip/Combo Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.001 (0.757) -0.002 (0.567) -0.001 (0.778) 
RMRF 1.009 (0.000)*** 1.067 (0.000)*** 1.127 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.159 (0.042)** 0.218 (0.006)*** 0.074 (0.278) 
HML -0.134 (0.077)* -0.081 (0.291) 0.011 (0.880) 
R2 0.242  0.199  0.224  
Adj. R2 0.236  0.195  0.220  
This table presents the results of the three-factor model ordinary least squares regression using 
monthly data for A-REIT bidders over the sample period of 1996 to 2012 as described in Chapter 
5, divided by payment method. Scrip/Combo represents acquisitions financed with scrip and/or a 
combination of scrip and cash. RMRF is the excess return on the A-REIT index, SMB is the return 
difference between a portfolio of small and large A-REITs, HML is return difference between the 
portfolios of high and low book-to-market A-REITs. The INTERCEPT measures the mean 
monthly abnormal return. The number of observations represents monthly bidder excess returns 
over the event windows. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively.  
These results suggest that the signalling impacts for method of payment 
described by Savor and Lu (2009) may not hold for A-REITs. As pointed out in 
Chapter 2, A-REITs are required to payout 100% of the trusts earnings in the 
form of dividends to avoid taxation at the company level. Campbell et al. (2001) 
and Pierzak (2001) argue that this requirement limits the opportunity to finance a 
M&A with internally generated funds therefore minimises the negative 
implications of using scrip as the payment method.  
8.3.3MethodofPayment–BuyǦandǦHoldAbnormalReturns(Global
FinancialCrisis)
As identified above, the GFC period had an important impact on the long-term 
post-announcement performance. Consistent with the overall sample, the data is 
divided into three sub-periods: pre, during and post-GFC. Results for the sample 
 
 
243
excluding the GFC period are also presented. This enables the study to examine 
the impacts of payment method on buy-and-hold abnormal returns, whilst 
allowing for the GFC. Table 8.9 displays the BHARs results for cash financed 
M&As divided across the sub-periods, while Table 8.10 presents the results for 
M&As financed with scrip and/or a combination of scrip and cash.  
Panel A of Table 8.9 shows that A-REIT bidders that use cash as the method 
of payment earn positive and significant BHARs of +7.66% over the one-year 
event window in the pre-GFC period. The two-year window is positive, but 
insignificant. The results for cash post-announcement BHARs whose returns 
extend across the GFC are displayed in Panel B. Bidder abnormal returns across 
all three-event periods are negative and significant.  The one-year window 
BHARs is -17.08%, while the two-year period is -20.67% and -31.40% BHARs 
for the three-year window. These outcomes provide further evidence of a 
structural change in the A-REIT market.  
Panel C provides the post-GFC results, both one and three-year BHARs are 
insignificant. The two-year period displays significance, however, similar to the 
BHARs results in Table 8.4, after removal of the outlier the result becomes 
insignificant. Finally, Panel D shows the BHAR results excluding the financial 
crisis. All three-event periods are insignificant, one-year excess returns are 
+2.05%.  
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Table 8.9: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns – A-REITs Cash Financed 
M&As  
Panel A: Pre-GFC 
 One Year (16 obs) Two Year (12 obs) Three Year (2 obs) 
BHAR +7.66% +8.48% -7.98% 
(P-value) (0.053)* (0.255) (0.158) 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.023)** (0.246) (0.158) 
Panel B: During-GFC 
 One Year (12 obs) Two Year (11 obs) Three Year (11 obs) 
BHAR -17.08% -20.67% -31.40% 
(P-value) (0.023)** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** 
Panel C: Post-GFC 
 One Year (6 obs) Two Year (4 obs) Three Year (3 obs) 
BHAR -12.91% -43.96% -4.73% 
(P-value) (0.258) (0.103) (0.792) 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.317) (0.059)* (0.817) 
Panel D: Excluding GFC 
 One Year (22 obs) Two Year (16 obs) Three Year (5 obs) 
BHAR +2.05% -4.63% -6.03% 
(P-value) (0.652) (0.645) (0.586) 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.653) (0.596) (0.621) 
Table 8.9 presents the BHARs for cash financed acquisitions portioned by the GFC. Panel A 
displays the BHARs prior December 2007. Panel B shows the BHAR calculations for any 
observation whose returns extend over the period of January 2008 to March 2009. Panel C shows 
the BHAR calculations after March 2009. Panel D shows BHAR calculations excluding the period 
January 2008 to March 2009. BHARs are calculated using the size and MVBV matched approach 
described by Lyon et al. (1999). p-values are calculated using a standard t-statistic and a 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic as discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * show statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
Results from table 8.9 show that the negative and significant BHARs observed 
in table 8.8 (Panel A) are a result of the financial crisis sub-period. These results 
are consistent with the findings in Section 8.2.3. To examine the cash payment 
results further, the study calculated the indexed returns of the bidders and non-
bidders sample. The result is presented in Figure 8.4.  
It is evident that A-REIT bidders outperform the A-REIT control sample from 
October 2004 to September 2009. This outcome supports the findings for the one-
year pre-GFC BHAR results in Panel A of Table 8.9. Consistent with Figure 8.2, 
after the onset of the GFC, acquirers severely underperformed their non-bidding 
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counterparts. This significant underperformance supports the results in Panel B of 
Table 8.9. 
Figure 8.3: Indexed Returns – A-REIT Bidders v Non-Bidders (Cash 
Financed M&As)

Figure 8.3 presents the indexed returns for A-REIT acquirers versus the control sample for cash 
financed M&As, starting at 100 in the year 2000 (the first observation to employ cash). Returns 
from the bidding A-REITs and the non-bidding portfolio are collected from the data set used to 
calculate the BHARs. 
Scrip/combination financed M&A BHAR results, partitioned around the GFC 
period are presented in Table 8.10. Panel A shows acquirers earn insignificant 
BHARs across all three event windows. Ranging from +1.46% over the one-year 
period, to -1.59% for the two-year window. Consistent with the pre-crisis period, 
BHAR results, excluding the GFC, show insignificant excess returns across all 
event windows. Results extending over and post the financial crisis are presented 
in Panels B and C, however it can be seen that both periods have low 
observations, thus no conclusions can be drawn.  
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Table 8.10: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns – A-REITs Scrip/Combination 
Financed M&As 
Panel A: Pre-GFC 
 One Year (27 obs) Two Year (17 obs) Three Year (15 obs) 
BHAR +1.46% -1.59% +1.08% 
(P-value) (0.469) (0.587) (0.810) 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.501) (0.648) (0.817) 
Panel B: During-GFC 
 One Year (1 obs) Two Year (2 obs) Three Year (3 obs) 
BHAR -58.51% -21.41% -22.68% 
(P-value) Not Reported Not Reported (0.191) 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) Not Reported Not Reported (0.251) 
Panel C: Post-GFC 
 One Year (3 obs) Two Year (5 obs) Three Year (1 obs) 
BHAR -4.21% -10.33% -1.94% 
(P-value) (0.733) (0.581) Not Reported 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.748) (0.621) Not Reported 
Panel D: Excluding GFC 
 One Year (30 obs) Two Year (20 obs) Three Year (16 obs) 
BHAR +0.89% -2.90% +0.89% 
(P-value) (0.668) (0.450) (0.832) 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.690) (0.411) (0.838) 
Table 8.10 presents the BHARs for scrip and/or combination financed acquisitions portioned by 
the GFC. Panel A displays the BHARs prior December 2007. Panel B shows the BHAR 
calculations for any observation whose returns extend over the period of January 2008 to March 
2009. Panel C shows the BHAR calculations after March 2009. Panel D shows BHAR 
calculations excluding the period January 2008 to March 2009. BHARs are calculated using the 
size and MVBV matched approach described by Lyon et al. (1999). p-values are calculated using 
a standard t-statistic and a skewness-adjusted t-statistic as discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * show 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
The indexed returns for scrip/combination financed M&As are displayed in 
Figure 8.4. Prior to December 2007, A-REIT bidder returns track the control 
sample, supporting the insignificant BHARs observed in Table 8.10. Post-
December 2007, returns again fall dramatically for acquirers, however, it is noted 
that the bidder returns appear to recover at the same pace as the non-bidder 
control sample. Again it is emphasised that the number of observations of bidders 
in this period is extremely low and thus the results should be treated with caution.  
 

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Figure 8.4: Indexed Returns – A-REIT Bidders v Non-Bidders 
(Scrip/Combination Financed M&As) 
Figure 8.4 shows the indexed returns for A-REIT acquirers versus the control sample for 
scrip/combination financed M&As, starting at 100 in the year 1996 (the first observation to 
employ scrip/combination). Returns from the bidding A-REITs and the non-bidding portfolio are 
collected from the data set used to calculate the BHARs. 
8.3.4MethodofPayment–ThreeǦFactorModelAbnormalReturns(Global
FinancialCrisis)
Results from the three-factor model abnormal returns for payment method 
divided across the GFC are presented in Tables 8.11 and 8.12. Panel A of Table 
8.11 shows the ARs for cash financed acquisitions pre-December 2007. 
Consistent with the BHAR results, one-year excess returns are positive for cash 
financed M&As, however the value is no longer significant.  The mean monthly 
AR for the two-year event period is +0.6% and significant. Buy-and-hold 
methodology returned a positive BHAR of +8.48% over the same period, but 
lacked statistical significance. Overall, both models suggest that A-REIT bidders 
employing cash as the payment method enjoy improved long-term post-
announcement returns in the pre-GFC period.  
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Panel B of Table 8.11 presents the cash financed long-term excess returns that 
extend into the financial crisis period. Consistent with the BHAR results, 
acquirers earn negative ARs over the one and two-year event windows. Despite 
this, only the one-year period displays statistical significance. Panel C shows the 
excess returns for M&As announced after March 2009. The two-year event period 
shows A-REIT bidders earn significant mean monthly abnormal returns of -1.6%. 
However, similar to the BHAR results, the significance disappears after removal 
of the outlier observation.112 Panel D presents the abnormal returns results, 
excluding the financial crisis period. All three-event periods are statistically 
insignificant and this outcome supports the findings from the BHAR method.  
 
 












 
                                                 
112 The mean monthly abnormal return changes to -0.4% with a p-value of 0.337 after Real Estate 
Capital US Property Trust is removed from the model.  
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Table 8.11: Three-Factor Model Abnormal Returns – A-REITs Cash 
Financed M&As  
 Panel A:  One Year (192 obs) Two Year (288 obs) Three Year (72 obs) 
Pre-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT 0.006 (0.128) 0.006 (0.056)* 0.001 (0.871) 
RMRF 0.698 (0.000)*** 0.663 (0.000)*** 0.241 (0.471) 
SMB 0.048 (0.582) 0.047 (0.524) 0.539 (0.004)*** 
HML -0.110 (0.261) -0.032 (0.701) -0.319 (0.086)* 
R2 0.114  0.082  0.118  
Adj. R2 0.101  0.072  0.079  
 Panel B:  One Year (144 obs) Two Year (264 obs) Three Year (396 obs) 
During-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.029 (0.076)* -0.011 (0.328) 0.007 (0.417) 
RMRF 1.141 (0.000)*** 1.342 (0.000)*** 1.489 (0.000)*** 
SMB -0.066 (0.827) 0.128 (0.446) 0.085 (0.566) 
HML 0.267 (0.316) 0.414 (0.007)*** 0.431 (0.003)*** 
R2 0.218  0.325  0.369  
Adj. R2 0.198  0.317  0.364  
Panel C:  One Year (72 obs) Two Year (168 obs) Three Year (108 obs) 
Post-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.005 (0.603) -0.016 (0.058)* -0.002 (0.645) 
RMRF 0.763 (0.019)** 1.281 (0.000)*** 1.131 (0.000)*** 
SMB -0.184 (0.567) 0.084 (0.755) -0.022 (0.839) 
HML 0.066 (0.751) -0.045 (0.817) 0.071 (0.335) 
R2 0.116  0.179  0.491  
Adj. R2 0.076  0.152  0.476  
Panel D:  One Year (264 obs) Two Year (384 obs) Three Year (180 obs) 
Excl. GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT 0.004 (0.313) -0.001 (0.696) -0.001 (0.808) 
RMRF 0.746 (0.000)*** 0.919 (0.000)*** 0.989 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.030 (0.729) 0.069 (0.368) 0.216 (0.029)** 
HML -0.091 (0.283) -0.081 (0.304) -0.048 (0.534) 
R2 0.119  0.129  0.242  
Adj. R2 0.109  0.122  0.229  
Table 8.11 displays the results of the three-factor model ordinary least squares regression using 
monthly data for cash financed M&As partitioned around the GFC. Panel A displays the ARs 
prior December 2007. Panel B shows the AR calculations for any observation whose returns 
extend over the period of January 2008 to March 2009. Panel C shows the AR calculations after 
March 2009. Panel D shows AR calculations excluding the period January 2008 to March 2009. 
Three-factor model abnormal returns are calculated over the one, two and three-year post-
announcement periods. RMRF is the excess return on the A-REIT index, SMB is the return 
difference between a portfolio of small and large A-REITs, HML is return difference between the 
portfolios of high and low book-to-market A-REITs. The INTERCEPT measures the mean 
monthly abnormal return. The number of observations represents monthly bidder excess returns 
over the event windows. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively.  




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Table 8.12: Three-Factor Model Abnormal Returns – A-REITs 
Scrip/Combination Financed M&As  
 Panel A:  One Year (324 obs) Two Year (408 obs) Three Year (540 obs) 
Pre-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. Coef. (p-val) Coef. 
INTERCEPT 0.004 (0.094)* 0.002 (0.635) 0.000 (0.780) 
RMRF 0.508 (0.000)*** 0.803 (0.000)*** 0.841 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.094 (0.162) 0.008 (0.850) -0.005 (0.889) 
HML -0.065 (0.364) -0.008 (0.856) -0.010 (0.782) 
R2 0.249  0.287  0.305  
Adj. R2 0.242  0.282  0.301  
Panel B:  One Year (12 obs) Two Year (24 obs) Three Year (108 obs) 
During-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.049 (0.351) 0.023 (0.519) 0.005 (0.758) 
RMRF 1.357 (0.105) 1.771 (0.001)*** 1.335 (0.000)*** 
SMB -1.796 (0.133) 1.251 (0.038)** 0.329 (0.266) 
HML -1.178 (0.160) -0.263 (0.628) -0.021 (0.943) 
R2 0.765  0.231  0.261  
Adj. R2 0.677  0.178  0.240  
Panel C:  One Year (36 obs) Two Year (120 obs) Three Year (36 obs) 
Post-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT 0.005 (0.495) 0.001 (0.874) 0.000 (0.982) 
RMRF 0.766 (0.003)*** 0.784 (0.000)*** 1.948 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.156 (0.408) 0.146 (0.207) 0.404 (0.241) 
HML -0.066 (0.649) -0.063 (0.491) 0.091 (0.689) 
R2 0.197  0.221  0.429  
Adj. R2 0.142  0.195  0.375  
Panel D:  One Year (360 obs) Two Year (480 obs) Three Year (576 obs) 
Excl. GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT 0.004 (0.067)* 0.001 (0.628) 0.001 (0.811) 
RMRF 0.552 (0.000)*** 0.793 (0.000)*** 0.913 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.104 (0.095)* 0.038 (0.349) -0.052 (0.891) 
HML -0.065 (0.284) -0.025 (0.524) 0.009 (0.825) 
R2 0.108  0.263  0.302  
Adj. R2 0.101  0.258  0.298  
Table 8.12 displays the results of the three-factor model ordinary least squares regression using 
monthly data for scrip and/or combination financed M&As partitioned around the GFC. Panel A 
displays the ARs prior December 2007. Panel B shows the AR calculations for any observation 
whose returns extend over the period of January 2008 to March 2009. Panel C shows the AR 
calculations after March 2009. Panel D shows AR calculations excluding the period January 2008 
to March 2009. Three-factor model abnormal returns are calculated over the one, two and three-
year post-announcement periods. RMRF is the excess return on the A-REIT index, SMB is the 
return difference between a portfolio of small and large A-REITs, HML is return difference 
between the portfolios of high and low book-to-market A-REITs. The INTERCEPT measures the 
mean monthly abnormal return. The number of observations represents monthly bidder excess 
returns over the event windows. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively.  
Table 8.12 provide the results from the three-factor model for the payment 
method of scrip/combination. Panel A shows A-REIT bidders earn significant 
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excess returns over the one-year model in the pre-GFC period.113 This outcome is 
in contrast to the BHAR one-year results, which detected no statistical 
significance. The two and three-year event periods are, however, consistent with 
the BHAR results. Panel D presents the ARs for scrip/combination, excluding the 
GFC period.114 The one-year three-factor model shows a positive and significant 
mean monthly AR of +0.4%. The remaining event periods are also positive but 
insignificant.  
The results presented from both methodologies provide evidence that the 
negative excess returns observed over full sample period for cash financed M&As 
are driven by GFC period. After allowing for the crisis period, the study finds 
positive and significant long-term post-announcement abnormal returns for cash 
bidders prior to the onset of the financial crisis. This supports the signalling 
hypothesis. The three-factor model also identifies positive and significant ARs in 
the pre-GFC two-year post announcement event window for scrip and/or 
combination financed M&As.  
A possible explanation for the observed differences in excess returns for cash 
financed M&As in the pre and during-GFC periods is a result of the balance sheet 
restructuring by A-REITs encouraged by the GFC. Newell and Peng (2009) 
identify a majority of A-REITs used equity raisings to reduce debt levels over this 
period. Dimovski and O'Neill (2012) observed a significant increase in the 
average amount of funds raised via private placement during and post-GFC. 
Zarebski and Dimovski (2012) indicate that limited funding opportunities, due to 
low liquidity levels in the debt markets and falling asset values, had a dramatic 
                                                 
113 Petmezas (2009) identified negative and significant ARs of -0.59% for M&As by conventional 
firms using a combination of scrip and cash.  
114 As discussed previously, both during and post financial crisis periods have extremely low 
observations. Thus they are not discussed. They are, however, presented for the readers benefit. 
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impact on the A-REIT sector. Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2014) show that existing 
A-REIT shareholders experience negative and significant abnormal returns of       
-5.39% over the [0,+10] event window following a private placement 
announcement occurring after December 2007.   
It is hypothesised that A-REIT bidders who financed acquisitions with cash 
shortly before the GFC resulted in low levels of cash holdings within these 
entities. These A-REITs were then forced to raise funds through capital markets 
to finance their capital structure. As a result, they experienced greater 
underperformance than the acquirers employing scrip/combination. The study 
will now examine the impacts on acquirer post-announcement performance when 
the target is either publically listed or private. 
8.4PublicvPrivateTargets–AǦREITs
Prior post-announcement research across conventional firms on the type of 
target has presented mixed results. For example, Moeller et al. (2004) observe 
insignificant acquirer post-performance for both public and private targets. While 
Antoniou et al. (2007) find acquirers of public targets earn negative and 
significant ARs and insignificant returns for private acquisitions. Finally, 
Petmezas (2009) detected negative and significant average monthly ARs for 
private targets and insignificant returns for public targets.  
These outcomes are in contrast to prior announcement period results divided 
by target type. Prior studies have, on average, shown bidding firms earn high ARs 
around the announcement when the target is private (Chang 1998; Fuller et al. 
2002; Shams et al. 2013). Antoniou et al. (2008) suggests that investor over-
optimism results in positive returns around announcement, but these are reversed 
in the long run.  
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8.4.1PublicvPrivateTargets–BuyǦandǦHoldAbnormalReturns
Buy-and-hold results for A-REIT acquirers of public or private targets are 
presented in Table 8.13. Bidders of publically listed targets earn negative BHARs 
across all three periods. Statistical significance is detected at the 10% level for the 
two and three-year windows from the skewness-adjusted test statistic method.  
Table 8.13: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns – A-REITs Public v Private 
Panel A: Public 
 One Year (39 obs) Two Year (30 obs) Three Year (23 obs) 
BHAR -3.06% -5.06% -8.31% 
(P-value) (0.334) (0.124) (0.102) 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.257) (0.096)* (0.089)* 
Panel B: Private 
 One Year (26 obs) Two Year (19 obs) Three Year (12 obs) 
BHAR -2.78% -13.19% -19.86% 
(P-value) (0.524) (0.131) (0.001)*** 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.537) (0.098)* (0.003)*** 
Table 8.13 presents the BHARs for acquiring A-REITs over the study period of January 1996 to 
December 2012, separated by target type. Panel A shows the results for bidders of public targets, 
while Panel B displays the excess returns for private targets. BHARs are calculated over the one, 
two and three-year post-announcement periods. BHARs are calculated using the size and MVBV 
matched approach described by Lyon et al. (1999). p-values are calculated using a standard t-
statistic and a skewness-adjusted t-statistic as discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * show statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
Panel B presents the BHARs for bidders of private targets. Similar to Panel A, 
the ARs are negative across all three periods, with both the two and three-year 
models returning statistical significance. However, it is observed that bidders of 
private targets experience greater abnormal underperformance compared to Panel 
A. BHARs for private targets over the two and three-year models is -13.19% and 
-19.86% respectively, compared to -5.06% and -8.31% abnormal returns for 
public targets. 
This result displays some consistency with Dutta and Jog (2009) who observed 
negative and significant BHARs for private targets of -6.0%, compared to 
insignificant BHARs of -3.0% for public targets over the three-year post-
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announcement period. The outcomes from Table 8.13 suggest there is greater 
information uncertainty with private targets, compared to public. Chang and Tsai 
(2013) argue that the acquisition of private targets is associated with greater 
undisclosed information because private firms have no public trading price. 
Therefore a limited operating record for investors to appraise the value of the 
M&A. This results in subsequent revaluations by investors, as more information 
regarding the private target is made available.  
Similar to the payment method section, the indexed returns were calculated for 
bidders of public and private targets and are presented in Figures 8.5 and 8.6. It 
can be seen in Figure 8.5 that the returns for acquirers of public targets closely 
follow the non-bidders control sample up until December 2007. There are two 
periods during this time that bidders returns outperform non-bidders. The first 
period is from August 2001 to June 2004 and the second is October 2006 to 
September 2007.  
It is again symptomatic of the structural change in the A-REIT landscape as a 
result of the GFC. Both non-bidders and bidders suffered significant falls during 
this period, however, consistent with the full sample, acquirers were more 
severely impacted than the non-bidder control sample. Furthermore, since the low 
in March 2009, the non-bidders control sample recovered at a faster pace.   
 

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Figure 8.5: Indexed Returns – A-REIT Bidders v Non-Bidders (Public 
Targets) 
Figure 8.5 shows the indexed returns for A-REIT acquirers versus the control sample for public 
targets, starting at 100 in the year 1996. Returns from the bidding A-REITs and the non-bidding 
portfolio are collected from the data set used to calculate the BHARs. 
Figure 8.6 indicates acquirers of private targets in the pre-GFC period 
experienced a greater volatility in their returns compared to non-bidders. 
Acquirers underperformed the control sample from March 2000 to September 
2004. However, from November 2004 to December 2007, acquirers outperformed 
non-bidders. This outcome may indicate the lack of statistical significance in the 
BHARs for private targets in the pre-GFC period of Table 8.15. The impacts of 
the GFC are again evident; the bidders sample underperforms the control sample 
during this period and, consistent with public targets, does not recover as quickly.  
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Figure 8.6: Indexed Returns – A-REIT Bidders v Non-Bidders (Private 
Targets) 

Figure 8.6 shows the indexed returns for A-REIT acquirers versus the control sample for private 
targets, starting at 100 in the year 2000 (first observation to acquire a private target). Returns from 
the bidding A-REITs and the non-bidding portfolio are collected from the data set used to 
calculate the BHARs. 
As with the full sample and method of payment samples, Figures 8.5 and 8.6 
identify three distinct periods for A-REIT bidders when examined by target type. 
Table 8.14 presents the BHARs for A-REIT bidders of public targets separated 
across the three sub-periods. Panel A shows the BHARs for the pre-crisis period. 
A-REIT bidders of public targets earn positive and significant excess returns of 
+3.19% over the twelve month post-announcement period.   
Panel B shows the excess returns over the period January 2008 to March 2009, 
while Panel C shows the BHARs after March 2009. It can be seen, despite low 
observation numbers, that the significant BHARs in Panel A of Table 8.13 are 
due to the financial crisis period. Panel D presents the excess returns, excluding 
GFC observations. The BHARs are insignificant across all event periods.  
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The results across the three sub-periods are consistent with Figure 8.5. In the 
pre-crisis period, A-REIT acquisitions are not value destroying for shareholders, 
with some evidence of significant excess returns. The structural break of the 
financial crisis resulted in negative and significant BHARs in the post-
announcement period extending over the GFC. Post-March 2009, results confirm 
the slower recovery of acquirers, relative to the non-bidders sample.    
Table 8.14: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns – A-REITs Public Targets 
Panel A: Pre-GFC 
 One Year (30 obs) Two Year (21 obs) Three Year (15 obs) 
BHAR +3.19% -0.18% +0.60% 
(P-value) (0.044)** (0.944) (0.892) 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.039)** (0.949) (0.898) 
Panel B: During-GFC 
 One Year (4 obs) Two Year (5 obs) Three Year (5 obs) 
BHAR -42.28% -23.83% -37.15% 
(P-value) (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.024)** (0.009)*** (0.002)*** 
Panel C: Post-GFC 
 One Year (5 obs) Two Year (4 obs) Three Year (3 obs) 
BHAR -9.18% -7.21% -4.73% 
(P-value) (0.174) (0.569) (0.746) 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.317) (0.634) (0.817) 
Panel D: Excluding GFC 
 One Year (35 obs) Two Year (25 obs) Three Year (18 obs) 
BHAR +1.42% -1.31% -0.29% 
(P-value) (0.431) (0.663) (0.947) 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.446) (0.665) (0.946) 
Table 8.14 presents the BHARs for acquirers of public targets portioned by the GFC. Panel A 
displays the BHARs prior December 2007. Panel B shows the BHAR calculations for any 
observation whose returns extend over the period of January 2008 to March 2009. Panel C shows 
the BHAR calculations after March 2009. Panel D shows BHAR calculations excluding the period 
January 2008 to March 2009. BHARs are calculated using the size and MVBV matched approach 
described by Lyon et al. (1999). p-values are calculated using a standard t-statistic and a 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic as discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * show statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Buy-and-hold results for bidders of private targets partitioned by the three sub-
periods are presented in Table 8.15. Panel A shows that acquirers of private 
targets earn insignificant non-negative BHARs across the one and two-year event 
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windows in the pre-GFC time frame. In addition, the level of BHARs for private 
targets are higher than those presented for public targets. Post-announcement 
excess returns across the financial crisis period are negative and significant for the 
three event windows. Ranging from -10.49% in year one to -21.49% for the three 
years.  Similar to the public target outcomes, the negative BHARs observed in 
Panel B of Table 8.13 are a result of the financial crisis.115  
Table 8.15: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns – A-REITs Private Targets 
Panel A: Pre-GFC 
 One Year (13 obs) Two Year (8 obs) Three Year (2 obs) 
BHAR +5.11% +9.82% -4.37% 
(P-value) (0.353) (0.375) Not Reported 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.328) (0.374) Not Reported 
Panel B: During-GFC 
 One Year (9 obs) Two Year (8 obs) Three Year (9 obs) 
BHAR -10.49% -18.88% -21.49% 
(P-value) (0.044)** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.145) (0.034)** (0.012)** 
Panel C: Post-GFC 
 One Year (4 obs) Two Year (3 obs) Three Year (1 obs) 
BHAR -11.05% -59.34% -1.94% 
(P-value) (0.475) (0.016)** Not Reported 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.562) (0.023)** Not Reported 
Panel D: Excluding GFC 
 One Year (17 obs) Two Year (11 obs) Three Year (3 obs) 
BHAR +1.31% -9.04% -3.56% 
(P-value) (0.823) (0.510) (0.753) 
(Skewness-
adjusted p-value) (0.825) (0.485) (0.746) 
This table presents the BHARs for acquirers of private targets portioned by the GFC. Panel A 
displays the BHARs prior December 2007. Panel B shows the BHAR calculations for any 
observation whose returns extend over the period of January 2008 to March 2009. Panel C shows 
the BHAR calculations after March 2009. Panel D shows BHAR calculations excluding the period 
January 2008 to March 2009. BHARs are calculated using the size and MVBV matched approach 
described by Lyon et al. (1999). p-values are calculated using a standard t-statistic and a 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic as discussed in Chapter 5. ***, **, * show statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                                                 
115 The extremely low observations in the post-GFC period (Panel C) limit any strong conclusions. 
In addition, the significance for the two-year period disappears after removing of the outlier 
observation identified in the full sample.  
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BHAR results for target type are consistent with the full sample and method of 
payment sample, in that the GFC excess returns are negative and significant. 
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that, excluding the GFC period, A-REIT 
M&As are not value destroying for bidding shareholders.  
8.4.2PublicvPrivateTargets–ThreeǦFactorModelAbnormalReturns
Three-factor model abnormal returns separated by target type are presented in 
Table 8.16. Acquirers of public targets earn negative ARs across the three time 
periods. However, in this instance, the one-year window is now statistically 
significant while the significance observed in the BHAR model for the three-year 
period is not evident in the three-factor model. This result is in contrast to prior 
long-term studies on conventional firms employing the three-factor model. For 
example, Moeller et al. (2004) observed an insignificant mean monthly abnormal 
return of +0.04% in their US study. Dutta and Jog (2009) study of Canadian 
M&As also found insignificant monthly excess return of +0.4%. 
In contrast to the BHAR results, acquisition of private targets shows no 
statistical significance across all event windows. Furthermore, the result is also in 
contrast to Petmezas’s (2009) study of UK private acquisitions which observed 
negative and significant average monthly AR of -0.5%. However, the outcome is 
consistent with Moeller et al. (2004) who detected no significant abnormal post-
acquisition performance for bidders of private targets.  
 


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Table 8.16: Three-Factor Model Abnormal Returns – A-REITs Public v 
Private 
 Panel A:  One Year (468 obs) Two Year (720 obs) Three Year (828 obs) 
Public Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.008 (0.024)** -0.006 (0.056)* -0.002 (0.667) 
RMRF 1.358 (0.000)*** 1.257 (0.000)*** 1.571 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.125 (0.195) 0.294 (0.002)*** 0.198 (0.020)** 
HML -0.005 (0.958) -0.056 (0.458) 0.102 (0.226) 
R2 0.249  0.250  0.300  
Adj. R2 0.244  0.247  0.297  
Panel B:  One Year (312 obs) Two Year (456 obs) Three Year (432 obs) 
Private Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT 0.001 (0.863) -0.004 (0.347) 0.001 (0.823) 
RMRF 0.946 (0.000)*** 1.239 (0.000)*** 1.217 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.036 (0.701) -0.047 (0.619) -0.089 (0.403) 
HML -0.116 (0.209) 0.294 (0.001)*** 0.369 (0.000)*** 
R2 0.280  0.367  0.398  
Adj. R2 0.272  0.363  0.393  
This table presents the results of the three-factor model ordinary least squares regression using 
monthly data for A-REIT bidders over the sample period of 1996 to 2012 as described in Chapter 
5, divided by target type. Panel A displays results for bidders of public targets, while panel B 
displays the excess returns for private targets. RMRF is the excess return on the A-REIT index, 
SMB is the return difference between a portfolio of small and large A-REITs, HML is return 
difference between the portfolios of high and low book-to-market A-REITs. The INTERCEPT 
measures the mean monthly abnormal return. The number of observations represents monthly 
bidder excess returns over the event windows. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively.  
Results utilising the three-factor method suggest that bidders of public targets 
are worse off than those acquiring private firms. This is in contrast to the BHAR 
results. However, as identified in previous discussions, the impacts of the 
financial crisis need to be considered.  Table 8.17 presents the three-factor model 
results, separated into the three sub-periods.  
One year post-M&A abnormal returns in the pre-crisis period are positive and 
significant, consistent with the BHAR results. A-REIT acquirers earn a mean 
monthly AR of +0.3%. Both the two and three year event windows are non-
negative. However, in contrast to the BHAR model, the three-factor model does 
not detect any significance in abnormal returns during the crisis period.  
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Table 8.17: Three-Factor Model Abnormal Returns – A-REITs Public 
Targets 
 Panel A:  One Year (360 obs) Two Year (504 obs) Three Year (540 obs) 
Pre-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT 0.003 (0.062)* 0.001 (0.696) 0.000 (0.750) 
RMRF 0.599 (0.000)*** 0.814 (0.000)*** 0.809 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.041 (0.442) 0.007 (0.829) 0.006 (0.859) 
HML 0.002 (0.976) 0.004 (0.921) -0.018 (0.641) 
R2 0.141  0.267  0.279  
Adj. R2 0.134  0.262  0.274  
Panel B:  One Year (48 obs) Two Year (120 obs) Three Year (180 obs) 
During-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.059 (0.102) -0.003 (0.892) 0.017 (0.311) 
RMRF 1.872 (0.006)*** 1.697 (0.000)*** 1.905 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.105 (0.892) 0.949 (0.006)*** 0.643 (0.025)** 
HML 0.459 (0.494) -0.078 (0.793) 0.131 (0.640) 
R2 0.229  0.216  0.331  
Adj. R2 0.176  0.197  0.319  
Panel C:  One Year (60 obs) Two Year (96 obs) Three Year (108 obs) 
Post-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.003 (0.569) 0.000 (0.874) -0.002 (0.645) 
RMRF 0.898 (0.000)*** 0.913 (0.000)*** 1.131 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.072 (0.651) 0.096 (0.207) -0.022 (0.838) 
HML 0.003 (0.981) -0.011 (0.491) 0.071 (0.335) 
R2 0.384  0.350  0.491  
Adj. R2 0.351  0.329  0.476  
Panel D:  One Year (420 obs) Two Year (600 obs) Three Year (648 obs) 
Excl. GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT 0.002 (0.180) 0.001 (0.745) 0.001 (0.900) 
RMRF 0.662 (0.000)*** 0.829 (0.000)*** 0.882 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.044 (0.385) 0.017 (0.616) -0.007 (0.845) 
HML -0.001 (0.981) 0.000 (0.993) 0.004 (0.909) 
R2 0.180  0.286  0.325  
Adj. R2 0.174  0.283  0.322  
Table 8.17 displays the results of the three-factor model ordinary least squares regression using 
monthly data for acquirers of public targets partitioned around the GFC. Panel A displays the ARs 
prior December 2007. Panel B shows the AR calculations for any observation whose returns 
extend over the period of January 2008 to March 2009. Panel C shows the AR calculations after 
March 2009. Panel D shows AR calculations excluding the period January 2008 to March 2009. 
Three-factor model abnormal returns are calculated over the one, two and three-year post-
announcement periods. RMRF is the excess return on the A-REIT index, SMB is the return 
difference between a portfolio of small and large A-REITs, HML is return difference between the 
portfolios of high and low book-to-market A-REITs. The INTERCEPT measures the mean 
monthly abnormal return. The number of observations represents monthly bidder excess returns 
over the event windows. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively.  
 

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Table 8.18: Three-Factor Model Abnormal Returns – A-REITs Private 
Targets 
 Panel A:  One Year (156 obs) Two Year (192 obs) Three Year (72 obs) 
Pre-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT 0.010 (0.095)* 0.008 (0.065)* 0.000 (0.995) 
RMRF 0.534 (0.012)** 0.599 (0.000)*** 0.627 (0.064)* 
SMB 0.086 (0.475) 0.094 (0.324) 0.456 (0.012)** 
HML -0.208 (0.127) -0.108 (0.325) -0.271 (0.136) 
R2 0.063  0.079  0.107  
Adj. R2 0.045  0.065  0.068  
Panel B:  One Year (108 obs) Two Year (192 obs) Three Year (324 obs) 
During-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT -0.006 (0.509) -0.015 (0.415) -0.009 (0.422) 
RMRF 0.987 (0.006)*** 1.625 (0.000)*** 1.521 (0.000)*** 
SMB -0.036 (0.847) -0.725 (0.008)*** -0.742 (0.001)*** 
HML -0.016 (0.923) 0.913 (0.000)*** 0.812 (0.000)*** 
R2 0.405  0.393  0.394  
Adj. R2 0.388  0.383  0.388  
Panel C:  One Year (48 obs) Two Year (72 obs) Three Year (36 obs) 
Post-GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT 0.000 (0.999) 0.005 (0.976) -0.009 (0.408) 
RMRF 0.705 (0.150) 1.891 (0.000)*** 1.955 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.079 (0.867) 1.602 (0.403) 0.364 (0.291) 
HML -0.099 (0.718) -0.541 (0.891) 0.136 (0.554) 
R2 0.057  0.024  0.431  
Adj. R2 0.043  0.019  0.378  
Panel D:  One Year (204 obs) Two Year (264 obs) Three Year (108 obs) 
Excl. GFC Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) Coef. (p-val) 
INTERCEPT 0.007 (0.169) 0.002 (0.904) -0.010 (0.111) 
RMRF 0.558 (0.003)*** 0.707 (0.121) 1.351 (0.000)*** 
SMB 0.076 (0.522) 0.257 (0.384) 0.377 (0.036)** 
HML -0.179 (0.130) -0.137 (0.641) -0.079 (0.612) 
R2 0.064  0.055  0.186  
Adj. R2 0.050  0.041  0.163  
Table 8.18 displays the results of the three-factor model ordinary least squares regression using 
monthly data for acquirers of private targets partitioned around the GFC. Panel A displays the 
ARs prior December 2007. Panel B shows the AR calculations for any observation whose returns 
extend over the period of January 2008 to March 2009. Panel C shows the AR calculations after 
March 2009. Panel D shows AR calculations excluding the period January 2008 to March 2009. 
Three-factor model abnormal returns are calculated over the one, two and three-year post-
announcement periods. RMRF is the excess return on the A-REIT index, SMB is the return 
difference between a portfolio of small and large A-REITs, HML is return difference between the 
portfolios of high and low book-to-market A-REITs. The INTERCEPT measures the mean 
monthly abnormal return. The number of observations represents monthly bidder excess returns 
over the event windows. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively.  

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The three-factor model results for acquirers of private targets, partitioned by 
the financial crisis, are provided in Table 8.18. Panel A shows A-REIT bidders 
earn significantly positive monthly ARs of +1.0% and +0.8% respectively in the 
pre-GFC sub-sample. The BHAR model identified positive, but insignificant 
excess returns over the same period.  
Panel B presents the excess returns results that extend across the GFC. The 
three-factor model fails to identify any statistical significance across the three 
event periods. This outcome suggests that bidders of private targets were not as 
severely impacted when compared to acquirers of public targets. The result is also 
distinctly different to the BHAR model and what was observed in Figure 8.6. It is 
hypothesised that the difference in outcomes is due to the different measurements 
of abnormal performance employed by the two methodologies.  
Overall, the results for target type show that acquires of private targets, on 
average, outperform those that acquire public targets. Supporting the arguments 
of Fuller et al. (2002) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) that private firms have 
liquidity constraints and thus less attractive targets, weakening the bargaining 
power of the target resulting in a significant discount of their assets.  
Consistent with the full sample and method of payment, a structural break in 
the data period was observed. Post-announcement performance of acquirers, 
regardless of target type, was significantly impacted by the financial crisis. Prior 
to the onset of the GFC, A-REIT bidders were able to achieve synergistic benefits 
from both private and public targets.  
8.5Conclusion
This chapter discussed the findings of the post-M&A performance by 
acquiring firms within the Australian real estate sector and more specifically,     
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A-REITs. To test the robustness of post-announcement performance, the study 
employed two methodologies: buy-and-hold abnormal returns and the three-factor 
model abnormal returns.  
Results show, across the full study period, that bidders significantly 
underperform in the long-term. The outcomes are consistent with prior studies on 
conventional firms that bidders earn negative and significant abnormal returns 
(Ang et al. 2008; Antoniou et al. 2007; Bessembinder and Zhang 2013; Petmezas 
2009). The results suggest that the market is not operating efficiently and supports 
the claim by Jensen and Ruback (1983) that future gains from M&As are 
overestimated by the market at the time of the announcement. 
Further examination of the data set identified a structural break in the sample 
due to the GFC, resulting in three different periods. It is acknowledged that the 
number of observations during and post the financial crisis are in some cases low. 
Nevertheless, there is sufficient overall evidence to suggest that the GFC has 
significantly impacted on the market for corporate control in the A-REIT sector.  
Post-M&A results in the pre-crisis period show A-REIT bidders earn positive 
and significant excess returns. The result is robust across both methodologies and 
suggests that the motive for A-REIT M&As was driven by synergy. Abnormal 
returns for acquirers whose post-announcement returns extended over the GFC 
period were negative and highly significant. The outcome is observed in both the 
buy-and-hold method and the three-factor model. The result is consistent with 
merger wave research that shows acquisitions made late in the wave suffer greater 
underperformance in the long run (Duong and Izan 2012). Furthermore, the 
structural break is consistent across payment method and type of counterparty.    
 
 
265
It is hypothesised that the negative excess returns during the crisis sub-period 
are due to the high volatility and uncertainty in the sector making it difficult for 
acquirers to integrate the target’s assets. In addition, bidders may have over-paid 
for property assets prior to the GFC and the subsequent revaluations compounded 
their under-performance. These outcomes suggest the possible existence of 
hubris.  
Results for payment method show that the signalling implications hold for    
A-REITs in the pre-December 2007 period. Cash financed M&As provide 
improved excess returns to existing shareholders, compared to scrip/combination. 
Results during the GFC period show a distinct reversal of the long-term ARs, 
acquirers suffer negative and highly significant excess returns across both 
methodologies. This outcome may be due to A-REITs utilising cash to finance an 
acquisition just prior to the financial crisis, resulting in reducing their cash levels, 
and liquidity. The need for liquidity by A-REITs during this period led to the 
raising of funds via the capital markets resulting in greater underperformance than 
the bidders using scrip/combination to finance the M&A. 
Target type results provide support for the liquidity discount argument of 
Fuller et al. (2002) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992). Private targets are less liquid 
and hence less attractive. This weakens the bargaining power of private targets 
resulting in a discount of their assets. This outcome is consistent with the findings 
around the announcement period. Acquirers of private targets earn positive and 
significant cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of +2.47% over the [-1,+1] event 
window, compared to  significant CARs of +0.63% for pubic targets.  
This chapter has identified a significant change in the A-REIT M&A landscape 
as a result of the financial crisis. After accounting for the impacts of the crisis, 
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results show that the A-REIT market is informationally efficient. However, this 
study acknowledges that the low number of observations in the crisis and 
recovery period makes robust conclusions difficult. It is felt that this is an area for 
future research as more observations become available and which will shed more 
light on the recovery of the sector along with the underlying motivation(s) for    
A-REIT M&As.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion  
9.1Introduction
This thesis has investigated mergers and acquisitions (M&As) within the 
Australian listed property sector. It is unique in that it extends beyond the usual 
approach. Instead of focusing on just the event window around the announcement 
or the pre-acquisition or post-acquisition periods individually, this research has 
examined all three together with the same dataset. Merger and acquisition 
announcements from 1995 to 2013 within the Australian real estate sector, and 
more specifically Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs) were 
studied. This chapter proceeds as follows: first, the motivations for the research 
are re-examined; second, discussion of the major findings is presented; and, 
finally, the implications of the results and the areas for future research are 
discussed.  
9.2MotivationoftheResearch
The aim of this dissertation was to identify the motivation(s) for M&As within 
the sector. Identification of the motive(s) required the answer to three questions. 
First, what was the impact on shareholder wealth when a M&A was announced? 
Second, what were the characteristics of firms that influenced M&A likelihood? 
Finally, what were the long-term impacts on shareholder wealth, post the 
announcement?   
Chapter 2 analysed the listed real estate environment in which M&As took 
place in Australia from the mid-1990’s. The chapter discussed the institutional 
features of A-REITs, the development and drivers of growth in the industry. It 
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included analysis of the performance, risk factors, management structure and 
diversification benefits of A-REITs. It concluded, that with the high level of 
securitisation, a major avenue for A-REITs to grow and possibly improve 
shareholder returns was via mergers and acquisitions.   
Chapter 3 examined the theoretical explanations of the rationale for M&As and 
reviewed the empirical studies relating to both conventional firms and the listed 
real estate sector. The literature was reviewed across the three phases of the M&A 
process that this study examined.  
Announcement period literature indicates that target REITs earn significantly 
positive excess returns. However, the levels of CARs are lower than the studies 
conducted on conventional firms. This result could be explained by the 
homogeneity of their assets (Eichholtz and Kok 2008). Evidence relating to the 
excess returns for REIT bidders is mixed, ranging from significantly positive 
(Allen and Sirmans 1987) to significantly negative (Sahin 2005; Womack 2012). 
This has resulted in varying conclusions surrounding the motives for REIT 
M&As being put forward in the literature.  
Pre-announcement literature suggests that REIT targets are in a weak financial 
position, supporting the inefficient management hypothesis (Eichholtz and Kok 
2008; Ratcliffe and Dimovski 2013). However, no strong evidence on the 
relationship between performance and REIT bidder probability is observed in the 
extant literature. Post-announcement literature on conventional firms showed, on 
average, that bidders shareholder wealth was diminished in the long-term (Ang et 
al. 2008; Conn et al. 2005), suggesting that the market is informationally 
inefficient and the existence of agency and/or hubris motive for M&As. 
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Investigation into the post-announcement performance of REITs has been 
inconclusive.  
Chapter 4 discussed the data gathering and filtering processes for the inclusion 
of observations in each of the three analytical examinations. Chapter 5 of this 
thesis presented the methodologies employed by the study to test the underlying 
motive(s) for M&As in the sector. Finally, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 presented the 
results and discussion of the three studies.   
9.3MajorFindings
9.3.1AnnouncementPeriodResults
Results from the short-term announcement period investigation support the 
synergy motive, with both A-REIT targets and bidders enjoying positive and 
significant excess returns. Bidding A-REIT CARs over the three-day event 
window sat around the +1% level. This result is in contrast to the findings of US 
REIT research by Sahin (2005) and Womack (2012) who both found significant 
negative CARs of around -1%. A-REIT targets earned CARs of approximately 
+8% over the same period. This outcome is consistent with prior REIT research, 
for example, Campbell et al. (1998); Eichholtz and Kok (2008); Keisers (2009). 
Payment method results show A-REIT targets earn higher CARs across all 
event windows when cash is used to finance the acquisition. This outcome 
supports the tax implications hypothesis proposed by Bugeja and da Silva Rosa 
(2008). Excess returns for acquiring A-REITs are in contrast to general corporate 
finance studies, (for example, Wansley et al. 1983a; Andrade et al. 2001) and 
rejects the signalling hypothesis. Acquisitions financed with scrip and/or 
combination of scrip and cash earn significant CARs of +1.75% over the [-1,+1] 
 
 
270
event window. Compared to CARs of +0.48% for cash financed M&As. This 
outcome is consistent with prior US REIT research by Campbell et al. (2011) and 
Pierzak (2001). It was argued that the regulatory requirement of A-REITs to 
payout 100% of their earnings in the form of dividends to avoid paying company 
tax limits the opportunity to finance M&As with internally generated funds. 
Therefore, lessening the signalling implications for payment method. 
The study also conducted a regression analysis to determine the driver(s) of the 
observed CARs from the announcement. Results for the targets modelling showed 
that size has a positive impact on the excess returns, suggesting that larger targets 
have greater bargaining power and improved capacity for economies of scale. 
Internally managed A-REITs enjoy higher excess returns, supporting Greer and 
Parker’s (2005) claim that internally managed A-REITs have lower agency 
problems and greater financial flexibility. Target results also show that property 
type focused A-REITs earn higher abnormal returns, suggesting that 
diversification as a reason for M&As is value destroying. Finally, regression 
results supported the tax implication hypothesis for payment method. Target 
CARs were positive and significantly related to cash financed acquisitions.  
Modelling for acquirers showed that relative size has a positive impact on 
abnormal returns. This outcome supports the claim by Kooli et al. (2003) that 
relative size provides the capacity to capture economies of scale in a M&A. This 
outcome suggests that the synergistic benefit for bidding A-REITs is a result of 
operational synergies, through economies of scale and market power. Finally, 
regression results showed that board independence and shareholder concentration 
were effective monitoring tools for acquiring A-REIT management.  
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9.3.2PreǦAnnouncementPeriodResults
The second analytical investigation involved the employment of a logistic 
regression model to identify the impact different firm characteristics had on M&A 
probability. Results showed that underperforming A-REITs and firms with high 
levels of liquidity increased the likelihood of being a target. This suggested that 
the inefficient management hypothesis was the driver for A-REIT M&As. 
However, the study also found that firm size increased target probability. This 
outcome supported the growth maximisation hypothesis proposed by Marris 
(1963). Conversely, the result also validated the claims by MIS (2006) and 
Ratcliffe et al. (2009) that asset growth and size are important areas for A-REITs 
to improve returns and attract capital.  
Examination of bidder characteristics showed that A-REIT share price return 
had a positive impact on bidder probability. This result is consistent with prior 
research on the banking sector (Mehrez et al. 2012; Pasiouras and Gaganis 2007). 
This outcome has not been previously documented in REIT research. Corporate 
governance variables display a negative relationship with bidder likelihood. This 
result indicated that bidding A-REITs, with improved monitoring, were more 
prudent in accessing M&As. Overall the results suggested that bidding A-REITs 
were in a healthy financial position and the synergy benefits were being driven by 
enhanced management or asset performance.  
9.3.3PostǦAnnouncementPeriodResults
The final analytical examination involved the calculation of bidding A-REITs 
long-term abnormal returns. Results show that bidders earn significantly negative 
excess returns, post-announcement. Further investigation observed a structural 
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break in the data set, due to the financial crisis. Pre-crisis excess returns were 
positive and significant, supporting the synergy motive. Estimation of abnormal 
returns that extended across the GFC period were negative and highly significant. 
It was suggested that this result was due to a number of contributing factors. First, 
there was a high uncertainty and volatility within the sector. Second, high 
leverage levels and risk exposures of A-REITs were brought forward as a result 
of the structural change. Third, there were property value write-downs by a large 
number of A-REITs. These factors, along with the integration of the targets 
assets, compounded the bidders underperformance.  
Method of payment results showed that A-REIT bidders earned positive and 
significant excess returns in the pre-GFC period for cash financed acquisitions. 
While, abnormal returns results during the GFC were again negative and 
significant. On the other hand, results for scrip and or combination of scrip and 
cash financed M&As were insignificant across both periods.  
It was hypothesised cash financed acquisitions shortly before the onset of the 
crisis resulted in the bidders having low levels of cash holdings. These A-REITs 
were forced to raise funds via the capital markets to finance their capital structure, 
consequently resulting in greater underperformance than bidders employing 
scrip/combination.    
9.3.4OverallResults
Results observed from the three phases of the M&A process examined by this 
thesis suggest that the motive for A-REITs is to achieve synergistic benefits. 
Evidence indicates that the synergies are achieved through economies of scale or 
replacement of inefficient management. In addition, excluding the global 
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financial crisis, A-REIT bidders were able to achieve long-term post-
announcement benefits.  
9.4ImplicationsoftheResults
This thesis contributes to the research landscape on the market for corporate 
control by examining the impacts of M&As within a regulated financial sector, 
the Australian REIT market. The findings of this research contribute to improving 
A-REIT managers’ understanding of the factors that influence shareholders 
wealth, both in the short and long-term. The results over the three phases suggest 
that A-REIT bidders need to be prudent in their assessment of acquisitions.  
The findings in this study may well be extended to other REIT markets 
globally; especially since REIT structures have recently been introduced in a 
number of countries (for example, South Africa and Ireland). Along with 
legislation in place for the listing of REIT regimes (for example, India, Pakistan 
and Philippines) (EPRA 2013). Furthermore, REITs have become well accepted 
by investors in Asia and Europe (Bairagi 2012).  
9.5AreasforFutureResearch
This study has indicated that financial crisis such as that experienced in 2007-
2009 had significant impacts on the A-REIT sector. However, it is acknowledged 
that throughout this study it has been difficult to draw strong conclusions on the 
impact the GFC has had on the market for corporate control, due to the low 
number of observations.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the A-REIT sector has undergone a number of 
changes since the financial crisis. Namely, decreased offshore exposures, 
decrease leverage and a stronger focus on their core activity of rental returns. It is 
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felt that as more observations become available in this current environment it will 
provide additional research opportunities and therefore provide an even greater 
understanding of the motive(s) for A-REIT M&As.  
Overall, this study has observed that improved performance in the three-years 
prior to an announcement has an important impact on bidder probability. 
Conversely, under-performance increases target likelihood. Excess returns to 
shareholders around the announcement are positive and significant to both parties. 
The improved returns for bidders continue into the long-term post-announcement 
period in the pre-December 2007 sample. There is evidence that the A-REIT 
merger market is informationally efficient, after allowing for the financial crisis 
period.  
The financial crisis triggered a change in the sector with a refocusing by        
A-REITs on their core business. Will this change impact on A-REIT managers’ 
attempts to achieve growth and synergistic benefits via acquisition? Given the 
high level of investment grade property already securitised, the importance of the 
superannuation investment landscape and the need to be competitive on the global 
REIT stage, acquisitions are an important investment strategy for Australian 
REITs.  
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Appendices 
AppendixA
Table A.1: Real Estate Sector Acquirers 3-day AARs 
   Market Model Two-Factor Model 
Bidder CODE Ann Date AAR (P-value) AAR (P-value) 
General Property Trust GPT 2/04/96 -0.45% (0.263) -0.47% (0.238) 
Colonial Industrial PT CIP 20/11/98 -0.14% (0.840) 0.04% (0.959) 
Goodman Hardie Ind PT GHP 28/04/99 -0.89% (0.196) -0.96% (0.164) 
Stockland  SGP 8/06/99 0.34% (0.558) 0.29% (0.587) 
Principal Office Fund POF 1/09/99 0.72% (0.372) 0.72% (0.378) 
Prime Industrial PT PIP 8/09/99 2.19% (0.021)** 2.10% (0.026)** 
Prime Credit PT PRP 8/09/99 -0.05% (0.948) 0.09% (0.893) 
Australand ALZ 25/10/99 -0.70% (0.462) -0.83% (0.388) 
Meridian Inv Trust  MRD 23/02/00 0.51% (0.535) 0.56% (0.492) 
Mirvac Group MGR 8/03/00 1.35% (0.024)** 1.22% (0.047)** 
Thakral Holdings Ltd THG 10/03/00 0.55% (0.637) 0.58% (0.617) 
Villa World Ltd VWD 27/03/00 3.13% (0.002)*** 3.20% (0.002)*** 
Stockland  SGP 11/05/00 0.38% (0.530) 0.35% (0.566) 
Westfield Trust WFT 31/05/00 -0.43% (0.466) -0.44% (0.457) 
BT Office Trust BTO 6/07/00 1.15% (0.129) 1.21% (0.107) 
Commercial Inv Trust CIT 13/07/00 0.76% (0.218) 0.70% (0.255) 
Industrial Inv Trust IIT 13/07/00 -0.16% (0.852) -0.11% (0.899) 
Goodman Hardie Ind PT GHP 15/08/00 0.03% (0.963) -0.09% (0.886) 
Warner Sea World Units VRL 9/04/01 -0.89% (0.586) -0.75% (0.636) 
Mirvac Group MGR 13/04/01 0.16% (0.738) 0.20% (0.675) 
Lend Lease Group LLC 27/04/01 0.32% (0.832) 0.13% (0.932) 
Prime Retail Group PRX 10/05/01 0.92% (0.365) 0.88% (0.389) 
Tyndall Meridian Trust TMT 10/05/01 -0.09% (0.909) -0.16% (0.838) 
Centro Properties Group CEP 10/05/01 -0.40% (0.470) -0.28% (0.612) 
Hudson Investment Group  HGL 28/05/01 4.91% (0.003)*** 4.77% (0.003)*** 
Stockland  SGP 18/06/01 0.21% (0.602) 0.23% (0.536) 
General Property Trust GPT 19/09/01 1.09% (0.019)** 1.11% (0.013)** 
Macquarie Office Trust MOF 8/11/01 -0.36% (0.525) -0.38% (0.493) 
Cmwealth Prop Off Fund CPA 30/07/02 0.31% (0.681) 0.19% (0.802) 
CFS Retail Property Trust CFX 30/07/02 1.98% (0.001)*** 1.76% (0.003)*** 
Macq Goodman Ind Trust MGI 2/04/03 -0.73% (0.149) -0.74% (0.142) 
Macq Goodman Mgmt MGM 2/04/03 0.49% (0.708) 0.42% (0.750) 
Westfield Trust WFT 20/05/03 0.89% (0.038)** 0.84% (0.046)** 
Investa Property Group IPG 22/05/03 0.53% (0.369) 0.58% (0.309) 
Stockland  SGP 28/05/03 0.28% (0.545) 0.26% (0.552) 
Centro Properties Group CEP 7/07/03 0.36% (0.457) 0.38% (0.425) 
Australand  ALZ 20/08/03 1.20% (0.093)* 1.20% (0.090)* 
Prime Retail Group PRX 27/08/03 0.64% (0.227) 0.63% (0.233) 
FKP Property Group FKP 7/11/03 -1.41% (0.529) -1.88% (0.403) 
Aspen Group APZ 1/04/04 0.55% (0.765) 0.83% (0.651) 
Lend Lease Group LLC 25/05/04 -0.85% (0.231) -0.68% (0.342) 
Valad Property Group VPG 27/05/04 0.75% (0.202) 0.65% (0.263) 
General Property Trust GPT 7/07/04 -0.31% (0.550) -0.36% (0.480) 
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Table A.1: Continued  
   Market Model Two-Factor Model 
Bidder CODE Ann Date AAR (P-value) AAR (P-value) 
City Pacific Ltd CIY 14/07/04 -1.19% (0.255) -1.12% (0.286) 
Macquarie Office Trust MOF 19/07/04 0.41% (0.492) 0.29% (0.587) 
Centro Properties Group CEP 27/07/04 2.22% (0.000)*** 2.31% (0.000)*** 
Multiplex Group MXG 27/09/04 0.80% (0.214) 0.74% (0.236) 
Australand  ALZ 29/09/04 -1.75% (0.003)*** -1.76% (0.003)*** 
Mirvac Group MGR 12/10/04 0.66% (0.207) 0.58% (0.239) 
Stockland  SGP 8/11/04 -0.35% (0.494) -0.44% (0.389) 
CNPR Group CNP 20/12/04 -0.85% (0.195) -1.22% (0.063)* 
JF Meridian Trust JFM 31/12/04 0.23% (0.699) 0.28% (0.635) 
ING Comm Living Grp  ILF 19/07/05 4.52% (0.001)*** 4.47% (0.002)*** 
Australand  ALZ 2/08/05 0.96% (0.239) 0.90% (0.272) 
Valad Property Group VPG 14/10/05 1.50% (0.028)** 1.35% (0.047)** 
Abacus Property Group ABP 6/12/05 0.25% (0.619) 0.23% (0.640) 
Macq Goodman Ind Trust MGI 9/12/05 2.66% (0.000)*** 2.81% (0.000)*** 
MFS Livng & Lsure Grp MPY 13/02/06 15.90% (0.000)*** 16.19% (0.000)*** 
MFS Diversified Group MFT 17/02/06 -0.74% (0.562) -0.46% (0.718) 
Trinity Consolidated Grp TCQ 10/05/06 0.24% (0.792) 0.14% (0.883) 
Goodman Group  GMG 25/05/06 1.35% (0.047)** 1.72% (0.012)** 
Centro Retail Group CER 10/07/06 1.14% (0.078)* 1.14% (0.078)* 
Ardent Leisure Group AAD 28/08/06 -0.35% (0.697) -0.33% (0.707) 
ING Industrial Fund IIF 31/08/06 0.34% (0.563) 0.35% (0.554) 
MFS Ltd MFS 4/09/06 -4.16% (0.004)*** -4.04% (0.005)*** 
Sunnycove Mgmt Ltd SCV 7/09/06 2.04% (0.452) 2.14% (0.431) 
Cromwell Corp Limited CMW 23/10/06 0.11% (0.946) 0.69% (0.656) 
Macq Goodman Inst Trust GMG 14/12/06 0.33% (0.693) 0.34% (0.685) 
General Property Trust GPT 14/12/06 0.03% (0.969) 0.15% (0.822) 
ING Real Estate Ent Fund IEF 22/12/06 0.24% (0.707) 0.26% (0.680) 
Stockland  SGP 7/02/07 1.33% (0.025)** 1.23% (0.039)** 
Aspen Group APZ 8/02/07 3.40% (0.000)*** 3.42% (0.000)*** 
Centro Properties Group  CNP 28/02/07 0.01% (0.993) 0.13% (0.872) 
Pelorus Property Group*  PPI 28/02/07 -0.26% (0.786) -0.27% (0.772) 
Tishman Office Fund TSO 20/03/07 -0.11% (0.861) -0.22% (0.720) 
MFS Diversified Group MFT 28/03/07 -0.72% (0.516) -0.49% (0.653) 
Goodman Group  GMG 12/04/07 -0.14% (0.872) -0.23% (0.781) 
MFS Livng & Lsure Grp MPY 30/04/07 0.29% (0.831) 0.38% (0.785) 
Valad Property Group VPG 25/06/07 -0.75% (0.401) -0.70% (0.421) 
Becton Property Group  BEC 16/07/07 0.38% (0.715) 0.35% (0.737) 
Ardent Leisure Group AAD 31/07/07 1.55% (0.108) 1.43% (0.140) 
Mirvac R Estate Inv Trst MRZ 7/08/07 0.40% (0.466) 0.38% (0.491) 
Centro Retail Group CER 24/08/07 -1.57% (0.092)* -1.61% (0.068)* 
General Property Trust GPT 7/12/07 -2.23% (0.016)** -2.56% (0.006)*** 
RCL Group RLG 20/12/07 1.15% (0.393) 1.12% (0.407) 
Prime Retirement PT PTN 4/09/08 3.57% (0.116) 0.86% (0.706) 
Mirvac Group MGR 12/05/09 -2.45% (0.349) -2.79% (0.261) 
Lend Lease Group LLC 28/09/09 -1.12% (0.427) -1.23% (0.333) 
Real Estate Cap US PT RCU 29/01/10 -0.76% (0.733) -0.23% (0.918) 
Charter Hall Group CHC 29/01/10 8.09% (0.000)*** 7.32% (0.000)*** 
Mirvac Group MGR 7/07/10 -0.83% (0.585) -1.16% (0.446) 
Stockland  SGP 2/08/10 0.38% (0.668) 0.15% (0.844) 
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Table A.1: Continued  
   Market Model Two-Factor Model 
Bidder CODE Ann Date AAR (P-value) AAR (P-value) 
Goodman Group GMG 28/10/10 -1.36% (0.235) -1.36% (0.170) 
Growthpoint Prop Aust GOZ 13/04/11 0.68% (0.203) 0.57% (0.285) 
Abacus Property Group ABP 8/12/11 -0.68% (0.468) -0.64% (0.427) 
Ardent Leisure Group AAD 13/09/12 -1.97% (0.011)** -2.07% (0.008)*** 
General Property Trust GPT 10/12/12 1.01% (0.116) 0.75% (0.222) 
Peet Ltd  PPC 10/04/13 0.72% (0.576) 0.80% (0.536) 
Dexus Property Group DXS 25/07/13 0.87% (0.347) 0.82% (0.351) 
This table presents the three-day average abnormal return (AAR) for the bidders included in the 
announcement period study. The AAR is calculated using the market model and two-factor model 
described in Chapter 5. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
Table A.2: Real Estate Sector Targets 3-day AARs 
   Market Model Two-Factor Model 
Target CODE Ann Date AAR (P-value) AAR (P-value) 
GEM retail GET 2/04/96 3.84% (0.000)*** -0.58% (0.000)*** 
GEM commercial  GCP 2/04/96 2.34% (0.000)*** -0.45% (0.000)*** 
LG Ind Property Trust LGI 20/11/98 -0.79% (0.316) -1.27% (0.334) 
Mirvac Ltd MRV 12/04/99 6.55% (0.000)*** 0.70% (0.000)*** 
Mirvac Property Trust MPT 12/04/99 4.78% (0.000)*** -0.16% (0.000)*** 
Capital Property Trust CPL 12/04/99 5.84% (0.000)*** -0.59% (0.000)*** 
Capcount Property Trust CPY 28/04/99 0.00% (0.991) 1.05% (0.896) 
Australian Com PT ACY 8/06/99 0.07% (0.939) -0.76% (0.916) 
BT Hotel Group BHT 26/08/99 3.09% (0.013)** -0.09% (0.016)** 
BT Sydney Dev Trust BTS 1/09/99 0.74% (0.273) -0.55% (0.276) 
Armstrong Jones Ind Fnd AJS 8/09/99 0.61% (0.571) 0.34% (0.564) 
Armstrong Jones Off Fnd AJO 8/09/99 0.67% (0.526) 0.32% (0.538) 
Walker Corp Ltd WKC 25/10/99 4.07% (0.000)*** 1.87% (0.000)*** 
Colonial Frst State Ret PT CMF 9/11/99 2.14% (0.008)*** 1.33% (0.006)*** 
Colonial Frst State Com PT COC 9/11/99 2.64% (0.002)*** 1.05% (0.001)*** 
Colonial Frst State Ind PT CIP 9/11/99 1.79% (0.023)** 0.50% (0.034)** 
Tyndall Property Trust TPT 23/02/00 6.00% (0.000)*** -1.47% (0.000)*** 
Advance Property Fund APF 8/03/00 4.16% (0.000)*** 3.26% (0.000)*** 
Citie Centre Ltd CIE 27/03/00 0.73% (0.695) 2.70% (0.739) 
AV Jennings  AVJ 1/05/00 1.17% (0.525) 4.68% (0.867) 
Flinders Ind Prop Trust FIT 11/05/00 1.99% (0.049)** 0.24% (0.097)* 
Challenger Prop Inc Trust  CGP 18/05/00 5.95% (0.000)*** -0.33% (0.000)*** 
St Lukes Group Ltd  SLG 31/05/00 0.10% (0.899) 0.11% (0.781) 
BT Property Trust BTP 6/07/00 2.94% (0.001)*** -0.96% (0.001)*** 
Paladin Commercial Trust PDC 13/07/00 1.35% (0.174) -0.88% (0.186) 
Paladin Industrial Trust PID 13/07/00 0.02% (0.984) 0.02% (0.993) 
Macquarie Industrial Trust MIP 15/08/00 -0.29% (0.713) 0.77% (0.769) 
Armstrong Jones Ret Fund AJR 20/11/00 0.98% (0.246) -0.43% (0.268) 
Sea World Property Trust SWD 9/04/01 6.70% (0.000)*** 6.41% (0.000)*** 
Delfin Group DEL 27/04/01 4.50% (0.000)*** -0.11% (0.000)*** 
MTM Media Ent Trust MME 7/05/01 8.48% (0.002)*** -1.92% (0.001)*** 
CT Retail Investment Trust  CTT 10/05/01 1.01% (0.374) -0.06% (0.376) 
Hudson Pacific Group  HPG 28/05/01 0.15% (0.865) 0.17% (0.896) 
Australian Comm Prop Trst ACY 18/06/01 2.96% (0.003)*** 1.02% (0.004)*** 
Tourism Asset Holding Ltd TLA 21/06/01 3.42% (0.009)*** 2.27% (0.009)*** 
Ipoh Ltd IPH 14/09/01 0.02% (0.985) 0.33% (0.999) 
Homemaker Retail Group HRP 19/09/01 0.27% (0.662) 1.18% (0.765) 
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Table A.2: Continued  
   Market Model Two-Factor Model 
Target CODE Ann Date AAR (P-value) AAR (P-value) 
PA Property Trust PAT 9/10/01 -0.81% (0.273) -0.22% (0.240) 
2 Park Street Trust TPS 8/11/01 -0.12% (0.910) 0.94% (0.650) 
Prop Trust of Australasia  PYT 21/11/01 -0.11% (0.914) -0.23% (0.831) 
Colonial Frst State PT Grp CFT 30/07/02 1.41% (0.000)*** 0.98% (0.004)*** 
Ipoh Ltd  IPH 14/03/03 6.52% (0.000)*** -2.43% (0.000)*** 
Balmoral Corp Ltd BMR 28/04/03 0.15% (0.926) -0.24% (0.918) 
AMP Shopping Centre Trst ART 20/05/03 0.46% (0.695) 0.05% (0.666) 
Principal Office Fund POF 22/05/03 0.69% (0.311) 5.46% (0.289) 
AMP Div Property Trust ADP 28/05/03 0.10% (0.881) -0.10% (0.811) 
Prudential Investment Co  PIA 28/05/03 0.06% (0.986) 0.60% (0.937) 
AMP Industrial Trust  AIP 11/07/03 2.91% (0.000)*** -1.46% (0.000)*** 
Australian Growth Prop Ltd AGH 22/08/03 -0.08% (0.944) -0.07% (0.828) 
Forest Place Group Ltd FPG 7/11/03 12.65% (0.000)*** 0.86% (0.000)*** 
Westfield Trust WFT 23/04/04 4.67% (0.000)*** -0.24% (0.000)*** 
Westfield America Trust WFA 2/04/96 4.09% (0.000)*** -0.15% (0.000)*** 
Westfield Holdings Ltd WSF 23/04/04 1.11% (0.046)** 0.04% (0.045)** 
General Property Trust GPT 25/05/04 -0.09% (0.857) -0.03% (0.643) 
S8 Ltd  SEL 14/07/04 7.00% (0.000)*** 1.99% (0.000)*** 
Principal Am Office Trust PAO 19/07/04 1.49% (0.079)* 0.06% (0.099)* 
Prime Retail Group PRX 27/07/04 3.10% (0.000)*** -0.11% (0.000)*** 
Deutsche Dive Trust DDF 4/08/04 -2.94% (0.000)*** 0.36% (0.000)*** 
Deutsche Office Trust DOT 4/08/04 -2.39% (0.000)*** -0.10% (0.000)*** 
Deutsche Industrial Trust DIT 4/08/04 -0.67% (0.174) 0.06% (0.115) 
Ronin Property Group RPH 27/09/04 1.68% (0.005)*** -0.38% (0.002)*** 
GPT Split Trust  GSTIN 1/10/04 -1.39% (0.105) 0.36% (0.111) 
James Fielding Group JFG 12/10/04 2.72% (0.000)*** 0.77% (0.000)*** 
Macq Goodman Ind Trust MGI 19/10/04 0.86% (0.128) 2.65% (0.149) 
Macq Goodman Mgmt MGM 19/10/04 -4.37% (0.000)*** 0.79% (0.000)*** 
Grand Hotel Group GHG 18/10/05 1.17% (0.266) -0.32% (0.297) 
Villa World Ltd VWD 21/04/06 0.30% (0.621) 0.05% (0.771) 
S8 Ltd SEL 4/09/06 5.01% (0.000)*** 1.31% (0.000)*** 
Village Life Ltd VLL 7/09/06 13.31% (0.166) -0.32% (0.149) 
Grand Hotel Group GHG 2/11/06 0.91% (0.388) -0.17% (0.479) 
Tourism & Leisure Trust TLT 21/11/06 0.79% (0.457) -0.04% (0.469) 
Bakehouse Quarter Fund  BQF 28/02/07 -0.46% (0.249) 0.37% (0.358) 
S8 Property Trust SPR 28/03/07 1.75% (0.109) -0.14% (0.211) 
Macquarie ProLogis Trust MPR 17/04/07 3.12% (0.000)*** -0.32% (0.000)*** 
Investa Property Group IPG 31/05/07 4.67% (0.000)*** 0.33% (0.000)*** 
Multiplex Group MXG 12/06/07 1.22% (0.322) 0.95% (0.432) 
Australian Hotel Fund AHO 9/07/07 5.32% (0.005)*** 0.56% (0.004)*** 
Centro Shop America Trst CSF 24/08/07 -2.45% (0.006)*** 1.26% (0.004)*** 
European Inv Global PT EIG 18/07/08 2.45% (0.208) -2.29% (0.185) 
Babcock&Brown Comm Grp BBC 4/09/08 5.22% (0.040)** 3.00% (0.431) 
Mirvac REIT MRZ 12/05/09 -2.61% (0.412) 0.27% (0.370) 
Macarthur Cook Ltd MCK 15/05/09 4.81% (0.287) 5.01% (0.296) 
Tishman Speyer Off Fund TSO 13/07/09 2.47% (0.668) -3.68% (0.380) 
LendLease Prme Life Grp  LLP 28/09/09 7.04% (0.040)** 0.92% (0.023)** 
Challenger Japan Trust CKT 9/12/09 11.51% (0.000)*** -0.94% (0.001)*** 
Mac Cook Ind Prop Fnd MIF 3/05/10 5.75% (0.070)* -1.16% (0.082)* 
Westpac Office Trust WOT 7/07/10 1.56% (0.111) -0.22% (0.142) 
Aevum Ltd AVE 2/08/10 11.99% (0.000)*** -0.51% (0.000)*** 
ING Industrial Fund IIF 28/10/10 3.11% (0.009)*** -1.88% (0.006)*** 
EDT Retail Trust EDT 10/03/11 4.16% (0.002)*** -0.89% (0.002)*** 
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Table A.2: Continued  
   Market Model Two-Factor Model 
Target CODE Ann Date AAR (P-value) AAR (P-value) 
Oaks Hotel & Resorts OAK 21/03/11 9.62% (0.006)*** 2.45% (0.007)*** 
Rabinov Property Trust RBV 13/04/11 7.92% (0.000)*** -0.03% (0.000)*** 
Valad Property Group  VPG 29/04/11 14.59% (0.000)*** -0.30% (0.000)*** 
Living&Leisure Aust Grp LLA 19/12/11 10.23% (0.000)*** 8.93% (0.000)*** 
Tishman Speyer Off Fnd TSO 10/02/12 19.54% (0.000)*** 1.27% (0.000)*** 
Thakral Holdings Ltd THG 19/04/12 10.83% (0.000)*** -0.61% (0.000)*** 
Real Estate Cap US PT RCU 17/05/12 6.51% (0.003)*** 1.07% (0.004)*** 
Australand ALZ 10/12/12 3.33% (0.000)*** 0.30% (0.000)*** 
CIC Australia Ltd CNB 10/04/13 -1.32% (0.134) 0.16% (0.056)* 
Commonwlth Prop Off Fnd CPA 25/07/13 2.47% (0.002)*** 2.35% (0.003)*** 
This table presents the three-day average abnormal return (AAR) for the targets included in the 
announcement period study. The AAR is calculated using the market model and two-factor model 
described in Chapter 5. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
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AppendixB
Table B.1: A-REIT Target Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
SIZE RET VAR LEV DIVYIELD MVBV FFO FCF HHPROP SHR TOP3 PREGFC MGMT 
SIZE 1.000 
RET 0.259 1.000 
VAR -0.184 0.004 1.000 
LEV -0.211 -0.023 0.304 1.000 
DIVYIELD -0.133 -0.146 0.148 -0.038 1.000 
MVBV 0.268 0.235 -0.138 0.087 -0.042 1.000 
FFO 0.086 0.068 -0.071 0.097 0.034 -0.053 1.000 
FCF 0.020 0.049 0.101 -0.110 0.432 0.114 -0.030 1.000 
HHPROP -0.087 -0.080 -0.021 0.014 0.013 0.090 -0.149 0.055 1.000 
SHR -0.289 0.046 0.097 0.092 0.154 0.031 -0.068 0.200 0.037 1.000 
TOP3 -0.143 -0.015 0.006 -0.015 0.013 0.000 0.006 0.008 -0.108 0.028 1.000 
PREGFC 0.004 0.268 -0.478 -0.313 -0.014 0.180 -0.171 -0.041 0.133 0.016 0.020 1.000 
MGMT 0.076 0.139 -0.029 0.173 -0.098 0.253 0.067 0.069 -0.087 0.173 -0.032 -0.007 1.000 
The correlation coefficient matrix of the explanatory variables for A-REIT target announcements from 1999-2013.  
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Table B.2: A-REIT Bidder Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
SIZE RET VAR LEV DIVYIELD MVBV FFO FCF HHPROP SHR TOP3 PREGFC MGMT 
SIZE 1.000 
RET 0.079 1.000 
VAR -0.039 -0.465 1.000 
LEV -0.055 -0.426 0.304 1.000 
DIVYIELD -0.175 -0.519 0.496 0.503 1.000 
MVBV 0.176 0.338 -0.041 0.181 -0.359 1.000 
FFO -0.057 -0.271 0.175 0.405 0.149 -0.090 1.000 
FCF 0.231 -0.133 0.148 0.122 -0.023 0.169 0.105 1.000 
HHPROP -0.062 0.055 -0.217 0.047 -0.139 0.089 -0.140 -0.014 1.000 
SHR -0.280 0.172 -0.133 -0.101 -0.222 0.130 0.095 -0.078 0.210 1.000 
TOP3 -0.216 0.100 -0.013 -0.035 -0.225 0.099 0.222 0.182 0.156 0.731 1.000 
PREGFC -0.292 0.491 -0.503 -0.353 -0.379 0.143 -0.297 -0.312 0.288 0.250 0.092 1.000 
MGMT 0.260 0.043 0.244 0.154 -0.079 0.278 0.092 0.231 -0.228 -0.176 -0.037 -0.329 1.000 
The correlation coefficient matrix of the explanatory variables for A-REIT bidder announcements from 1999-2013.  
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Table B.3: All Targets Odds Ratio Results 
No. Obs. = 216  
Variable Coef (P-value) 
INTERCEPT 0.000 (0.003)*** 
SIZE 1.381 (0.006)*** 
RET 0.774 (0.004)*** 
VAR 1.067 (0.230) 
LEV 0.978 (0.917) 
DIVYIELD 0.150 (0.257) 
MVBV 0.824 (0.281) 
FFO 0.996 (0.914) 
FCF 1.028 (0.125) 
HHPROP 2.300 (0.209) 
SHR 0.225 (0.106) 
TOP3 3.586 (0.314) 
PREGFC 2.328 (0.095)* 
   
Log likelihood -123.325  
Pseudo R2 0.103  
LR Ȥ2 28.32  
Prob. > Ȥ 2 0.005***  
Hosmer-Lemeshow Ȥ 2 8.147  
Prob. > Ȥ 2 0.419  
This table presents the odds ratio results for all real estate targets from 1999 to 2013. The odds ratio 
depicts what impact a one unit of change in an explanatory variable will have on the probability of 
the A-REIT being a target, whilst holding all other variables constant. The explanatory variables are 
defined in Chapter 4, Section 4.3. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively. 
 
Table B.4: REIT Bidders Logit Estimation Results – pre-GFC 
No. Obs. = 81 Panel A  Panel B 
Variable Coef (P-value)  Coef (P-value) 
INTERCEPT -6.976 (0.216)  -6.928 (0.232) 
SIZE 0.398 (0.141)  0.439 (0.101) 
RET 0.810 (0.049)**  0.736 (0.079)* 
VAR 0.095 (0.923)  -0.176 (0.859) 
LEV -1.074 (0.546)  -1.075 (0.531) 
DIVYIELD -0.041 (0.793)  -0.010 (0.955) 
MVBV -0.487 (0.262)  -0.433 (0.278) 
FFO -0.379 (0.635)  -0.033 (0.967) 
FCF 0.021 (0.617)  0.044 (0.313) 
SHR -0.058 (0.018)**    
TOP3    -0.078 (0.015)** 
MGMT 1.356 (0.106)  1.585 (0.054)* 
    
Log likelihood -39.341  -39.011 
Pseudo R2 0.237  0.243 
LR Ȥ2 24.43  25.09 
Prob. > Ȥ 2 0.006***  0.005*** 
This table displays the results of the logit regression model for the probability of A-REITs being a 
bidder before the GFC (1999-2007). The PREGFC value is removed as all observations occurred in 
this period. These models were ran to test if the VAR value was being driven by the impact of the 
GFC. The explanatory variables are defined in Chapter 4, Section 4.3. ***, **, * show statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table B.5: All Bidders Odds Ratio Results 
No. Obs. = 144 Panel A  Panel B 
Variable Odds Ratio (P-value)  Odds Ratio (P-value) 
INTERCEPT 0.050 (0.355)  0.043 (0.341) 
SIZE 1.129 (0.399)  1.177 (0.254) 
RET 1.228 (0.081)*  1.191 (0.125) 
LEV 0.748 (0.574)  0.709 (0.511) 
DIVYIELD 1.074 (0.292)  1.060 (0.382) 
MVBV 1.154 (0.452)  1.118 (0.555) 
FFO 0.958 (0.710)  0.954 (0.688) 
FCF 1.012 (0.628)  1.020 (0.441) 
HHPROP 0.944 (0.936)  0.825 (0.791) 
SHR 0.966 (0.007)***    
TOP3    0.969 (0.030)** 
PREGFC 1.005 (0.993)  0.939 (0.914) 
    
Log likelihood -82.989  -84.546 
Pseudo R2 0.095  0.077 
LR Ȥ2 17.33  14.22 
Prob. > Ȥ 2 0.067*  0.163 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Ȥ 2 7.190  11.704 
Prob. > Ȥ 2 0.516  0.164 
This table presents the odds ratio results for all real estate bidders A-REITs from 1999 to 2013. The 
odds ratio depicts what impact a one unit of change in an explanatory variable will have on the 
probability of the real estate firm being a bidder, whilst holding all other variables constant. The 
explanatory variables are defined in Chapter 4, Section 4.3. ***, **, * show statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
  
 
 
284
Bibliography 


ACFS (2013), "Australian commercial property investment market: styles, 
performance and funding", Australian Centre for Financial Studies, 
Melbourne. 
AFR. (2014), "Smart Investor - Dividends Declared", available at: 
http://www.afrsmartinvestor.com.au/share-
tables/;jsessionid=47D857D46FF7789624E0882C7768E784 (accessed 
12th Feb 2014). 
Agrawal, A. and Jaffe, J. (2000), "The Post-Merger Perfromance Puzzle", in 
Cooper, C. and Gregory, A. (Eds.), Advances in Mergers and 
Acquisitions. Emerald Group Publishing, Bradford. 
Agrawal, A. and Jaffe, J. (2003), "Do takeover targets underperform? Evidence 
from operating and stock returns", Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp. 721-46. 
Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J. and Mandelker, G. (1992), "The post-merger performance 
of acquiring firms: a re-examination of an anomaly", Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 47 No. 4, pp. 1605-21. 
Alexandridis, G., Antoniou, A. and Zhao, H. (2006), "Valuation effects of short 
sale constraints: the case of corporate takeovers", European Financial 
Management, Vol. 12 No. 5, pp. 747-62. 
Alexandridis, G., Mavrovitis, C. F. and Travlos, N. G. (2012), "How have M&As 
changed? Evidence from the sixth merger wave", European Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 18 No. 8, pp. 663-88. 
Allen, M., Madura, J. and Springer, T. (2000), "REIT characteristics and the 
sensitivity of REIT returns", Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp. 141-52. 
 
 
285
Allen, P. R. and Sirmans, C. F. (1987), "An analysis of gains to acquiring firm's 
shareholders: The special case of REITs", Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 175-84. 
Altman, E. I. (1968), "Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of 
corporate bankruptcy", The Journal of Finance, Vol. 23 No. 4, pp. 589-
609. 
Alzueta, J. P. and Lucey, B. M. (2010), 'Dynamics of the predictive power and 
investment performance of a generalized takeover prediction model', 
paper presented at the EFMA Conference, Aarhus, Denmark, 23-26 June 
2010. 
Ambrose, B. W. (1990), "Corporate real estate's impact on the takeover market", 
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 307-22. 
Ambrose, B. W. and Linneman, P. (2001), "REIT organizational structure and 
operating characteristics", Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol. 21 No. 3, 
pp. 141. 
Ambrose, B. W. and Megginson, W. (1992), "The role of asset structure, 
ownership structure, and takeover defenses in determining aquisition 
likelihood", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 27 No. 
4, pp. 575-89. 
Anderson, D., Haynes, A. and Heaney, R. (1994), "Company takeovers and 
equity returns: the target size effect", Australian Journal of Management, 
Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 1. 
Anderson, R. I., Medla, H., Rottke, N. B. and Schiereck, D. (2012), "Real estate 
merger motives: an analytical review of the literature", Journal of Real 
Estate Literature, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 37-47. 
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M. and Stafford, E. (2001), "New evidence and 
perspectives on mergers", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15 No. 
2, pp. 103-20. 
 
 
286
André, P., Kooli, M. and L'Her, J.-F. (2004), "The long-run performance of 
mergers and acquisitions: evidence from the Canadian stock market", 
Financial Management, Vol. 33 No. 4, pp. 27-43. 
Ang, J. and Cheng, Y. (2006), "Direct evidence on the market-driven acquisition 
theory", Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 199-216. 
Ang, J. and Kohers, N. (2001), "The take-over market for privately held 
companies: The US experience", Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 
25 No. 6, pp. 723-48. 
Ang, J., Yingmei, C. and Nagel, G. (2008), "An analysis of acquirers as 
dealmakers: differentiating acquirers' timing, bargain hunting and 
negotiating skills", Journal of Mergers and Acquisitions, Vol. 5 No. 4, pp. 
7-33. 
Anglin, P., Edelstein, R., Gao, Y. and Tsang, D. (2013), "What is the relationship 
between REIT governance and earnings management?", The Journal of 
Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 47 No. 3, pp. 538-63. 
Antoniou, A., Jie, G. and Petmezas, D. (2008), "Merger momentum and market 
valuations: the UK evidence", Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 18 No. 
17, pp. 1411-23. 
Antoniou, A., Petmezas, D. and Zhao, H. (2007), "Bidder gains and losses of 
firms involved in many acquisitions", Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, Vol. 34 No. 7/8, pp. 1221-44. 
APRA. (2014), "Annual superannuation bulletin 2014", available at: 
http://www.apra.gov.au/Super/Publications/Documents/Revised 2013 
Annual Superannuation Bulletin 05-02-14.pdf (accessed 23rd July 2014). 
Arnull-Almond, B. (2008), "The predicition of Austrailian takeover targets: a 
binomial and multinomial logit analysis", Masters, University of Sydney, 
Sydney. 
 
 
287
Asquith, P., Bruner, R. F. and Mullins, D. W. (1983), "The Gains to Bidding 
Firms from Mergers", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 
121-39. 
ASX. (2013), "A-REITs", available at: 
http://www.asx.com.au/products/managed-funds/areits.htm (accessed 15th 
August 2013). 
ASX. (2014), "Monthly Funds Report - December 2013", available at: 
http://www.asx.com.au/products/managed-funds/market-update.htm 
(accessed 10th Feb 2014). 
Atiase, R. K. (1985), "Predisclosure information, firm capitalization, and security 
price behavior around earnings announcements", Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 21-36. 
Atkinson, G. (2011), "The global financial crisis, the G-20 and S&P/ASX 200 
index", available at: 
http://www.shareswatch.com.au/blog/stockmarket/the-global-financial-
crisis-the-g20-spasx-200-index/ (accessed 20 October 2014). 
Bairagi, R. K. (2012), "Costs of raising equity capital for U.S. REITs", PhD, 
Deakin University, Melbourne. 
Ball, R. and Brown, P. (1968), "An empirical evaluation of accounting income 
numbers", Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 159-78. 
Banz, R. W. (1981), "The relationship between return and market value of 
common stocks", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 3-18. 
Barber, B. M. and Lyon, J. D. (1997), "Detecting long-run abnormal stock 
returns: The empirical power and specification of test statistics", Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 43 No. 3, pp. 341-72. 
Barnes, P. (1999), "Predicting UK takeover targets: some methodological issues 
and an empirical study", Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 
Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 283-302. 
 
 
288
BDO (2008), "A-REIT Survey 2008", BDO Kendalls, Melbourne. 
BDO (2009), "A-REIT Half Year Survey 2009", BDO Kendalls, Melbourne. 
BDO (2010), "A-REIT Half Year Survey 2010", BDO Kendalls, Melbourne. 
BDO (2012), "A-REIT survey 2012", BDO, Sydney. 
Bellamy, D. E. and Lewin, W. M. (1992), "Corporate takeovers, method of 
payment and bidding firm's shareholder returns: Australian evidence", 
Asia-Pacific Journal of Management, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 137-50. 
Berkovitch, E. and Narayanan, M. P. (1993), "Motives for takeovers: an empirical 
investigation", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 28 
No. 3, pp. 347-62. 
Bessembinder, H. and Zhang, F. (2013), "Firm characteristics and long-run stock 
returns after corporate events", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 109 
No. 1, pp. 83-102. 
Betton, S., Eckbo, E. and Thorburn, K. (2007), "Corporate Takeovers", in Eckbo, 
E. (Ed.), Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance. 
Elsevier/North Holland, Amsterdam. 
Bhagat, S., Malhotra, S. and Zhu, P. (2011), "Emerging country cross-border 
acquisitions: characteristics, acquirer returns and cross-sectional 
determinants", Emerging Markets Review, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 250-71. 
Bishop, S., Dodd, P. and Officer, R. (1987), Australian Takeovers: The Evidence, 
The Centre for Independent Studies, St. Leonards, N.S.W. 
Black, E. L., Carnes, T. A., Jandik, T. and Henderson, B. C. (2007), "The 
relevance of target accounting quality to the long-term success of cross-
border mergers", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 34 
No. 1/2, pp. 139-68. 
 
 
289
Bouwman, C. H. S., Fuller, K. and Nain, A. S. (2009), "Market valuation and 
acquisition quality: empirical evidence", Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 
22 No. 2, pp. 633-79. 
Bradley, M., Desai, A. and Kim, E. H. (1983), "The rationale behind interfirm 
tender offers: information or synergy?", Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 11 No. 1–4, pp. 183-206. 
Bradley, M., Desai, A. and Kim, E. H. (1988), "Synergistic gains from corporate 
acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and 
acquiring firms", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 3-
40. 
Bradley, M. and Jarrell, G. (1988), "Comment", in Coffee, J., Jnr,, Lowenstein, L. 
and Rose-Ackerman, S. (Eds.), Knight Raiders and Targets: The Impact of 
the Hostile Takeover. Oxford University Press, New York. 
Brailsford, T., Gaunt, C. and O'Brien, M. (2012), "Size and book-to-market 
factors in Australia", Australian Journal of Management, Vol. 37 No. 2, 
pp. 261-81. 
Brar, G., Giamouridis, D. and Liodakis, M. (2009), "Predicting European 
takeover targets", European Financial Management, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 
430-50. 
Brenchley, H. (2001), "Listed property trust review: ten years on", Property 
Invetsment Research Melbourne. 
Brown, P. and da Silva Rosa, R. (1998), "Research method and the long-run 
performance of acquiring firms", Australian Journal of Management Vol. 
23 No. 1, pp. 23-38. 
Brown, S. J. and Warner, J. B. (1985), "Using daily stock returns: the case of 
event studies", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 3-31. 
Bugeja, M. (2005), "Effect of independent expert reports in Australian takeovers", 
Accounting & Finance, Vol. 45 No. 4, pp. 519-36. 
 
 
290
Bugeja, M. and da Silva Rosa, R. (2008), "Taxation of shareholder capital gains 
and the choice of payment method in takeovers", Accounting and Business 
Research, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp. 331-50. 
Bugeja, M. and da Silva Rosa, R. (2010), "Capital gains taxation and shareholder 
wealth in takeovers", Accounting & Finance, Vol. 50 No. 2, pp. 241-62. 
Bugeja, M. and Walter, T. S. (1995), "An empirical analysis of some 
determinants of the target shareholder premium in takeovers", Accounting 
and Finance, Vol. 35 No. 2, pp. 33-60. 
Cai, J., Song, M. H. and Walkling, R. A. (2011), "Anticipation, acquisitions, and 
bidder returns: industry shocks and the transfer of information across 
rivals", Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 24 No. 7, pp. 2242-85. 
Campbell, R. D. (2002), "Shareholder wealth effects in Equity REIT restructuring 
transactions: sell-offs, mergers and joint ventures", Journal of Real Estate 
Literature, Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 205-22. 
Campbell, R. D., Ghosh, C., Petrova, M. and Sirmans, C. F. (2011), "Corporate 
governance and performance in the market for corporate control: the case 
of REITs", Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics, Vol. 42 No. 4, 
pp. 451-80. 
Campbell, R. D., Ghosh, C. and Sirmans, C. F. (1998), "The great REIT 
consolidation: fact or fancy?", Real Estate Finance, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 45-
54. 
Campbell, R. D., Ghosh, C. and Sirmans, C. F. (2001), "The information content 
of method of payment in mergers: evidence from Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs)", Real Estate Economics, Vol. 29 No. 3, pp. 361-87. 
Campbell, R. D., Ghosh, C. and Sirmans, C. F. (2005), "Value creation and 
governance structure in REIT mergers", Journal of Real Estate Finance & 
Economics, Vol. 31 No. 2, pp. 225-39. 
 
 
291
Campbell, R. D., Giambona, E. and Sirmans, C. F. (2009), "The long-horizon 
performance of REIT mergers", Journal of Real Estate Finance & 
Economics, Vol. 38 No. 2, pp. 105-14. 
Campbell, R. D. and Sirmans, C. F. (2002), "Policy implications of structural 
options in the development of real estate investment trusts in Europe – 
lessons from the American experience", Journal of Property Investment 
and Finance, Vol. 20 No. 4, pp. 388-405. 
Capozza, D. and Seguin, P. J. (1999), "Focus, transparency and value: the REIT 
evidence", Real Estate Economics, Vol. 27 No. 4, pp. 587-619. 
Capozza, D. and Seguin, P. J. (2000), "Debt, agency, and management contracts 
in REITs: the external advisor puzzle", Journal of Real Estate Finance 
and Economics, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 91-116. 
Casey, R., Dodd, P. and Dolan, P. (1987), "Takeovers and corporate raiders: 
empirical evidence from extended event studies", Australian Journal of 
Management Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 201. 
Caves, R. (1989), "Mergers, takeovers, and economic efficiency: foresight vs. 
hindsight", International Journal of Industrial Organisation, Vol. 7 No. 1, 
pp. 151-74. 
Chan, K. C., Hendershott, P. H. and Sanders, A. R. (1990), "Risk and return on 
real estate: evidence from Equity REITs", Journal of the American Real 
Estate & Urban Economics Association, Vol. 18 No. 4, pp. 431-52. 
Chang, S. (1998), "Takeovers of privately held targets, methods of payment, and 
bidder returns", Journal of Finance, Vol. 53 No. 2, pp. 773-84. 
Chang, S. and Tsai, M. (2013), "Long-run performance of mergers and 
acquisition of privately held targets: evidence in the USA", Applied 
Economics Letters, Vol. 20 No. 6, pp. 520-24. 
 
 
292
Chaudhry, M. K., Maheshwari, S. and Webb, J. R. (2004), "REITs and 
idiosyncratic risk", Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 
207-22. 
Chen, S., Chou, R. K. and Lee, Y. (2011), "Bidders’ strategic timing of 
acquisition announcements and the effects of payment method on target 
returns and competing bids", Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 35 
No. 9, pp. 2231-44. 
Cheng-Wei, W., Reuer, J. and Ragozzino, R. (2013), "Insighyts of signalling 
theory for acquisitions research", in Finkelstein, S. and Cooper, C. (Eds.), 
Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions. Emerald Insight, Bradford. 
Cheong, C. S., Wilson, P. J. and Zurbruegg, R. (2009), "An analysis of the long-
run impact of fixed income and equity market performance on Australian 
and UK securitised property markets", Journal of Property Investment and 
Finance, Vol. 27 No. 3, pp. 259-76. 
Chi, J., Sun, Q. and Young, M. (2011), "Performance and characteristics of 
acquiring firms in the Chinese stock markets", Emerging Markets Review, 
Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 152-70. 
Conn, R. L., Cosh, A., Guest, P. M. and Hughes, A. (2005), "The impact on UK 
acquirers of domestic, cross-border, public and private acquisitions", 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 32 No. 5/6, pp. 815-70. 
Corrado, C. J. (2011), "Event studies: a methodology review", Accounting and 
Finance, Vol. 51 No. 1, pp. 207-34. 
Corrado, C. J. and Truong, C. (2008), "Conducting event studies with Asia-
Pacific security market data", Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 16 No. 
5, pp. 493-521. 
Cosh, A. and Guest, P. M. (2001), "The long run performance of hostile 
takeovers: UK evidence", in. ESRC Centre for Business Research 
Working Papers. 
 
 
293
Croci, E., Petmezas, D. and Vagenas-Nanos, E. (2010), "Managerial 
overconfidence in high and low valuation markets and gains to 
acquisitions", International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 19 No. 5, 
pp. 368-78. 
Cronqvist, H., Hogfeldt, P. and Nilsson, M. (2001), "Why agency costs explain 
diversification discounts", Real Estate Economics, Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 85. 
da Silva Rosa, R., Izan, H. Y., Steinbeck, A. and Walter, T. (2000), "The method 
of payment decision in Australian takeovers: an investigation of causes 
and effects", Australian Journal of Management, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 67. 
da Silva Rosa, R., Limmack, R., Supriada and Woodliff, D. (2004), "The equity 
wealth effects of method of payment in takeover bids for privately held 
firms", Australian Journal of Management Vol. 29, pp. 93-110. 
Danbolt, J. (2004), "Target company cross-border effects in acquisitions into the 
UK", European Financial Management, Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 83-108. 
Datta, S., Kodwani, D. and Viney, H. (2013), "Shareholder wealth creation 
following M&A: evidence from European utility sectors", Applied 
Financial Economics, Vol. 23 No. 10, pp. 891-900. 
Davidson, W. N. and Cheng, L. T. W. (1997), "Target firm returns: Does the form 
of payment affect abnormal returns?", Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 465-79. 
Delcoure, N. and Dickens, R. (2004), "REIT and REOC systematic risk 
sensitivity", Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 237-54. 
Diepold, B., Feinberg, R. M., Round, D. K. and Tustin, J. (2008), "Merger 
impacts on investor ixpectations: an event study for Australia", 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 45-
62. 
 
 
294
Dietrich, J. K. and Sorensen, E. (1984), "An application of logit analysis to 
prediction of merger targets", Journal of Business Research, Vol. 12 No. 
3, pp. 393-402. 
Dimovski, B. (2009), "The global financial crisis and the Centro Properties Group 
earnings revision and refinancing announcements: an event study", Pacific 
Rim Property Research Journal, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 417-29. 
Dimovski, B. (2010), "The underpricing of A-REIT IPOs in Australia during 
2002 to 2008", Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 
39-51. 
Dimovski, B. and O'Neill, L. (2012), "Characteristics of A-REIT private 
placements during the global financial crisis", Pacific Rim Property 
Research Journal, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 180-90. 
Dimson, E. (1979), "Risk measurement when shares are subject to infrequent 
trading", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 197-226. 
Doble, M. (2009), "Debt behind AREIT woes", available at: 
http://www.financialplanningmagazine.com.au/opinion/debt-behind-areit-
woes (accessed 12th Dec 2011). 
Dodd, P. (1976), "Company takeovers and the Australian equity market", 
Australian Journal of Management, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 15. 
Dodd, P. (1980), "Merger proposals, manageement discretion and stockholder 
wealth", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 105-38. 
Dodd, P. and Ruback, R. S. (1977), "Tender offers and stockholder returns : an 
empirical analysis", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 
351-73. 
Dolvin, S. and Pyles, M. (2009), "REIT IPOs and the cost of going public", 
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 39 No. 1, pp. 92-106. 
 
 
295
Doukas, J., Holmen, M. and Travlos, N. G. (2001), "Corporate diversification and 
firm performance: evidence from Swedish acquisitions", SSRN Working 
Papers. 
Draper, P. and Paudyal, K. (2006), "Acquisitions: private versus public", 
European Financial Management, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 57-80. 
Dube, S. and Glascock, J. L. (2006), "Effects of the method of payment and the 
mode of acquisition on performance and risk metrics", International 
Journal of Managerial Finance, Vol. 2 No. 3, pp. 176-95. 
Dullard, S. and Hawtrey, K. (2008), "Do acquirer company returns improve after 
a takeover? empirical evidence for Australia", Applied Financial 
Economics Letters, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 65-69. 
Duong, L. and Izan, I. H. Y. (2012), "Consequences of riding takeover waves: 
Australian evidence", International Review of Finance, Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 
399-434. 
Dutta, S. and Jog, V. (2009), "The long-term performance of acquiring firms: a 
re-examination of an anomaly", Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 33 
No. 8, pp. 1400-12. 
Eichholtz, P. M. A. and Kok, N. (2008), "How does the market for corporate 
control function for property companies?", Journal of Real Estate Finance 
and Economics, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp. 141-63. 
Elayan, F. A. and Young, P. J. (1994), "The value of control: evidence from full 
and partial acquisitions in the real estate industry", Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 167-82. 
Ellert, J. C. (1976), "Mergers, antitrust law enforcement and stockholder returns", 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 31 No. 2, pp. 715-32. 
Ellis, C., Wilson, P. J. and Zurbruegg, R. (2007), "Real estate ‘value’ stocks and 
international diversification", Journal of Property Research, Vol. 24 No. 
3, pp. 265-87. 
 
 
296
EPRA (2012), "EPRA global REIT survey 2012", European Public Real Estate 
Association, Belguim. 
EPRA (2013), "EPRA Global REIT survey 2013", European Public Real Estate 
Association, Belguim. 
Espahbodi, H. and Espahbodi, P. (2003), "Binary choice models and corporate 
takeover", Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 27 No. 4, pp. 549-74. 
Fama, E. F. (1998), "Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral 
finance", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 49 No. 3, pp. 283-306. 
Fama, E. F., Fisher, L., Jensen, M. C. and Roll, R. (1969), "The adjustment of 
stock prices to new information", International Economic Review, Vol. 10 
No. 1, pp. 1-21. 
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1992), "The cross-section of expected stock 
returns", Journal of Finance, Vol. 47 No. 2, pp. 427-65. 
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1993), "Common risk factors in the returns on 
stocks and bonds", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 33 No. 1, pp. 3-
56. 
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1995), "Size and book-to-market factors in 
earnings and returns", Journal of Finance, Vol. 50 No. 1, pp. 131-55. 
Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. (1983), "Seperation of ownership and control", 
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 301-25. 
Feng, Z., Ghosh, C. and Sirmans, C. F. (2007), "CEO involvement in director 
selection: implications for REIT dividend policy", The Journal of Real 
Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 35 No. 4, pp. 385-410. 
Forsyth, M. and Raj, M. (2003), "Hubris amongst U.K. bidders and losses to 
shareholders", International Journal of Business, Vol. 8, pp. 1-16. 
 
 
297
Frank, L. A. C., Campbell, R. D. and Feng, Z. (2011), "Corporate exit strategies: 
evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts", Financial Decisions Vol. 
23 No. 1, pp. 1-21. 
Franks, J. R., Broyles, J. E. and Hecht, M. J. (1977), "An industry study of the 
profitability of mergers in the United Kingdom", Journal of Finance, Vol. 
32 No. 5, pp. 1513-25. 
Franks, J. R. and Harris, R. S. (1989), "Shareholder wealth effects of corporate 
takeovers. The U.K. experience 1955-1985", Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 225-49. 
Friday, H. S. and Sirmans, G. S. (1998), "Board of director monitoring and firm 
value in REITs", Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 411. 
Fuller, K., Netter, J. and Stegemoller, M. (2002), "What do returns to acquiring 
firms tell us? Evidence from firms that make many acquisitions", Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 57 No. 4, pp. 1763-93. 
Gaspar, J.-M., Massa, M. and Matos, P. (2005), "Shareholder investment horizons 
and the market for corporate control", Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 76 No. 1, pp. 135-65. 
Ghosh, C., Petrova, M. and Xiao, Y. (2012), "Do REITs use cash reserves 
efficiently? Evidence from corporate acquisitions", Journal of 
International Money and Finance, Vol. 31 No. 7, pp. 1953-70. 
Ghosh, C. and Sirmans, C. F. (2005), "On REIT CEO compensation: does board 
structure matter?", Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 
30 No. 4, pp. 397-428. 
Glascock, J. L., Lu, C. and So, R. W. (2000), "Further evidence on the 
intergration of REIT, bond and stock returns", Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 177-94. 
 
 
298
Gonzalez, P., Vasconcellos, G. M., Kish, R. J. and Kramer, J. K. (1997), "Cross-
border mergers and acquisitions: maximizing the value of the firm", 
Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 295-305. 
Graham, J., Lemmon, M. and Wolf, J. (2002), "Does corporate diversification 
destroy value?", Journal of Finance, Vol. 57 No. 2, pp. 695-720. 
Greer, I. and Parker, C. (2005), "Australian stapled property trusts: meeting 
investors’ appetite for growth", Australian Property Journal, Vol. 38 No. 
5, pp. 394-96. 
Gregory, A. (1997), "An examination of the long run performance of UK 
acquiring firms", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 24 
No. 7/8, pp. 971-1002. 
Gregory, A. and McCorriston, S. (2005), "Foreign acquisitions by UK limited 
companies: short- and long-run performance", Journal of Empirical 
Finance, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 99-125. 
Gyourko, J. and Keim, D. B. (1992), "What does the stock market tell us about 
real estate returns?", Journal of the American Real Estate & Urban 
Economics Association, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 457-85. 
Halpern, P. J. (1973), "Empirical estimates of the amount and distribution of 
gains to companies in mergers", The Journal of Business, Vol. 46 No. 4, 
pp. 554-75. 
Hardin, W. G. and Wu, Z. (2009), "Bank mergers, REIT loan pricing and 
takeover likelihood", Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 
38 No. 3, pp. 275-301. 
Harris, R. S., Stewart, J. F., Guilkey, D. K. and Carleton, W. T. (1982), 
"Characteristics of acquired firms: fixed and random coefficients probit 
analyses", Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 49 No. 1, pp. 164-84. 
 
 
299
Hartzell, J. C., Sun, L. and Titman, S. (2006), "The effect of corporate 
governance on investment: evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts", 
Real Estate Economics, Vol. 34 No. 3, pp. 343-76. 
Hedander, J. (2005), "Focus, liquidity and firm value: an empirical study of 
Listed Property Trusts in Australia", Pacific Rim Property Research 
Journal, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 84-111. 
Heggen, C. and Gannon, G. (2008), "Information leakage and informed trading 
around unscheduled earnings announcements", Corporate Ownership and 
Control, Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 143-63. 
Henry, D. (2005), "Directors’ recommendations in takeovers: an agency and 
governance analysis", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 
32 No. 1/2, pp. 129-59. 
Higgins, D. and Ng, B. (2009), "Australian securitised property funds: an 
examination of their risk-adjusted performance", Journal of Property 
Investment and Finance, Vol. 27 No. 4, pp. 404-12. 
Higson, C. and Elliott, J. (1998), "Post-takeover returns: the UK evidence", 
Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 27-46. 
Hirscham, A. O. (1964), "The paternity of an index", American Economic Review, 
Vol. 54 No. 5, pp. 761-2. 
Idzorek, T., Barad, M. and Meier, S. (2006), "Commercial real estate: the role of 
global listed real estate equities in a strategic asset allocation", Ibbotson, 
Chicago. 
IPF (2008), "Implications for the strategic development of UK REITs from the 
experience of the LPTs in Australia", Investment Property Forum 
Research Programme, London. 
Jarrell, G. A., Brickley, J. A. and Netter, J. M. (1988), "The market for corporate 
control: the empirical evidence since 1980", The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 49-68. 
 
 
300
Jensen, M. C. (1986), "Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and 
takeovers", American Economic Review, Vol. 76 No. 2, pp. 323-29. 
Jensen, M. C. (1988), "Takeovers: their causes and consequences", The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 21-48. 
Jensen, M. C. and Ruback, R. S. (1983), "The market for corporate control", 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 5-50. 
JLL (2012a), "Real assets and the Asia Pacific", Jones Lang LaSalle, Sydney. 
JLL (2012b), "Real Estate Transparency Index", Jones Lang LaSalle. 
Kang, J., Shivdasani, A. and Yamada, T. (2000), "The effect of bank relations on 
investment decisions: an investigation of Japanese takeover bids", Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 55 No. 5, pp. 2197-218. 
Karagiannidis, S. (2010), "Mergers and acquisitions in Australia: easons and 
timing", PhD, Victoria University, Melbourne. 
Keavney, R. (2010), "The unlisted property fund crisis", available at: 
http://www.moneymanagement.com.au/opinion/columns/the-
messenger/the-structure-of-unlisted-property-funds (accessed 23rd April 
2013). 
Keisers, M. (2009), "Shareholder wealth effects of REIT M&A: an international 
analysis", European University Studies, pp. 101-31. 
Kirchhoff, M., Schiereck, D. and Mentz, M. (2006), "Market valuation of real 
estate finance mergers: a note", Journal of Property Investment and 
Finance, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 79-86. 
Kiymaz, H. and Baker, H. K. (2008), "Short-term performance, industry effects, 
and motives: evidence from large m&as", Quarterly Journal of Finance 
and Accounting Vol. 47 No. 2, pp. 17-44. 
Kohler, U. and Kreuter, F. (2012), Data analysis using Stata, Stata Press, College 
Station, Texas. 
 
 
301
Kooli, M., Kortas, M. and L'Her, J. (2003), "A new examination of the private 
company discount", Journal of Private Equity, Vol. 6 No. 3, pp. 48-55. 
Kothari, S. P. and Warner, J. B. (1997), "Measuring long-horizon security price 
performance", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 43 No. 3, pp. 301-39. 
La Porta, R., Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997), "Good news for 
value stocks: further evidence on market efficiency", Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 52 No. 2, pp. 859-74. 
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1994), "Contrarian investment, 
extrapolation, and risk", Journal of Finance, Vol. 49 No. 5, pp. 1541-78. 
Lang, L. H. P., Stulz, R. M. and Walkling, R. A. (1989), "Managerial 
performance, Tobin's Q, and the gains from successful tender offers", 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 137-54. 
Langetieg, T. (1978), "An application of a three-factor performance index to 
measure stockholders gains from merger", Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 6 No. 4, pp. 365-84. 
Latorre, M. A., Herrero, B. and Farinós, J. E. (2014), "Do acquirers’ stock prices 
fully react to the acquisition announcement of listed versus unlisted target 
firms? Out-of-sample evidence from Spain", Applied Economics Letters, 
Vol. 21 No. 15, pp. 1075-78. 
Le, H. T. and Shultz, E. (2007), "Toeholds and the bidder shareholder wealth 
effects of takeover announcements", Australian Journal of Management, 
Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 315-44. 
Lee, C. L., Robinson, J. and Reed, R. (2008), "Listed property trusts and 
downside systematic risk sensitivity", Journal of Property Investment and 
Finance, Vol. 26 No. 4, pp. 304-28. 
Leland, H. E. (2007), "Financial synergies and the optimal scope of the firm: 
implications for mergers, spinoffs, and structured finance", Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 62 No. 2, pp. 765-807. 
 
 
302
Lewellen, W. (1971), "A pure financial rationale for the conglomerate merger", 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 521-37. 
Lewellen, W., Loderer, C. and Rosenfeld, A. (1985), "Merger decisions and 
executive stock ownership in acquiring firms", Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 7 No. 1-3, pp. 209-31. 
Li, J., Elayan, F. A. and Meyer, T. O. (2001), "Acquisitions by Real Estate 
Investment Trusts as a strategy for minimization of investor tax liability", 
Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 115. 
Limmack, R. J. (1997), "Discussion of an examination of the long run 
performance of UK acquiring firms", Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, Vol. 24 No. 7/8, pp. 1003-07. 
Ling, D. and Petrova, M. (2011), "Why do REITs go private? Differences in 
target characteristics, acquirer motivations, and wealth effects in public 
and private acquisitions", The Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, Vol. 43 No. 1, pp. 99-129. 
Ling, D. and Ryngaert, M. (1997), "Valuation uncertainty, institutional 
involvement, and the underpricing of IPOs: the case of REITs", Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 43 No. 3, pp. 433-56. 
Loderer, C. and Martin, K. (1990), "Corporate acquisitions by listed firms: the 
experience of a comprehensive sample", Financial Management, Vol. 19 
No. 4, pp. 17-33. 
Loughran, T. and Ritter, J. R. (2000), "Uniformly least powerful tests of market 
efficiency", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 55 No. 3, pp. 361-89. 
Louis, H. (2013), "Are stock-for-stock acquirers of unlisted targets really less 
overvalued?", Financial Management, Vol. 42 No. 4, pp. 901-29. 
Lynch, J. and Lind, B. (2002), "Escaping merger and acquisition madness", in 
Randall, R. (Ed.), Meregers and Acquisitions: New Strategies for 
Improving the Odds of Success. Emerald Group Publishing, Bradford. 
 
 
303
Lyon, J. D., Barber, B. M. and Tsai, C.-L. (1999), "Improved methods for tests of 
long-run abnormal stock returns", Journal of Finance, Vol. 54 No. 1, pp. 
165-201. 
Magenheim, E. B. and Muller, D. C. (1988), "Are acquiring firm shareholders 
better off after an acquisition.", in Coffee, J., Jnr, , Lowenstein, L. and 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (Eds.), Knight Raiders and Targets: The Impact of the 
Hostile Takeover. Oxford University Press, New York. 
Maheswaran, K. and Pinder, S. (2005), "Australian evidence on the determinants 
and impact of takeover resistance", Accounting and Finance, Vol. 45 No. 
4, pp. 613-33. 
Malatesta, P. H. (1983), "The wealth effect of merger activity and the objective 
functions of merging firms", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11 No. 
1-4, pp. 155-81. 
Malmendier, U. and Tate, G. (2008), "Who makes acquisitions? CEO 
overconfidence and the market's reaction", Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 89 No. 1, pp. 20-43. 
Maloney, M. T., McCormick, R. E. and Mitchell, M. L. (1993), "Managerial 
decision-making and capital structure", Journal of Business, Vol. 66 No. 
2, pp. 189-217. 
Mandelker, G. (1974), "Risk and return: The case of merging firms", Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 1 No. 4, pp. 303-35. 
Manne, H. G. (1965), "Mergers and the market for corporate control", Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 73 No. 2, pp. 110-20. 
Marris, R. (1963), "A model of the 'managerial' enterprise", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 77 No. 2, pp. 185-85. 
Martijn-Cremers, K. J., Nair, V. B. and John, K. (2009), "Takeovers and the 
cross-section of returns", The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22 No. 4, 
pp. 1409-45. 
 
 
304
Martynova, M. and Renneboog, L. (2008), "A century of corporate takeovers: 
What have we learned and where do we stand?", Journal of Banking and 
Finance, Vol. 32 No. 10, pp. 2148-77. 
Martynova, M. and Renneboog, L. (2011), "The performance of the European 
market for corporate control: vidence from the fifth takeover wave", 
European Financial Management, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 208-59. 
McDougall, F. M. and Round, D. K. (1986), "The determinants and effects of 
corporate takeovers in Australia: 1970-1981", in McDougall, F. M., 
Round, D. K., Crouch, A. G. and Wirth, A. (Eds.), The Effects of Mergers 
and Takeovers in Australia. Australian Institute of Management - 
Victoria, Melbourne. 
McIntosh, W., Officer, D., T, and Born, J., A. (1989), "The wealth effects of 
merger activities: further evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts", 
Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol. 4 No. 3, pp. 141-55. 
McWilliams, A. and Siegel, D. (1997), "Event studies in manangement research: 
theoretical and empirical issues", Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 
40 No. 3, pp. 626-57. 
Mehrez, B. S., Saidane, D. and Fedhila, H. (2012), "How to identify targets in the 
M&A banking operations? Case of cross-border strategies in Europe by 
line of activity", Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 38 
No. 2, pp. 209-40. 
MIS (2006), "Australian LPT industry outlook 2006", March 2006, Moody's 
Investors Service, Sydney. 
Mitchell, M. L. and Stafford, E. (2000), "Managerial decisions and long-term 
stock price performance", Journal of Business, Vol. 73 No. 3, pp. 287. 
Moeller, S. B. and Schlingemann, F. P. (2005), "Global diversification and bidder 
gains: a comparison between cross-border and domestic acquisitions", 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29 No. 3, pp. 533-64. 
 
 
305
Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F. P. and Stulz, R. M. (2004), "Firm size and gains 
from acquisitions", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 73 No. 2, pp. 
201-28. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1990), "Do managerial objectives drive 
bad acquisitions", Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, pp. 31-48. 
Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. J. (1984), "Corporate financing and investment 
decisions when firms have information that investors do not have", 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 187-221. 
Nankervis, M. and Singh, H. (2012), "The diversification discount and takeovers: 
some Australian evidence", International Journal of Managerial Finance, 
Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 36-57. 
NAREIT. (2014), "The basics of REITs", available at: 
http://www.reit.com/REIT101/REITFAQs/BasicsOfREITs.aspx (accessed 
20th Feb 2014). 
Newell, G. (2005), "Factors influencing the performance of Listed Property 
Trusts", Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 211-
27. 
Newell, G. (2008), "The significance of property in superannuation funds", 
Australian and New Zealand Property Journal, Vol. 1 No. 8, pp. 670-77. 
Newell, G. and Peng, H. W. (2009), "The impact of the global financial crisis on 
A-REITs", Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 
453-70. 
Newell, G. and Steglick, M. (2006), "Assessing the importance of property 
development risk factors", Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, Vol. 
12 No. 1, pp. 22-37. 
Newell, G. and Tan, Y. K. (2003), "The significance of property sector and 
geographical diversification in Australian institutional property 
 
 
306
portfolios", Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, Vol. 9 No. 3, pp. 248-
64. 
Norris, S. (2004), "Exploring the LPT landscape", Property Australia Vol. 18 No. 
9, pp. 54-56. 
North, D. S. (2001), "The role of managerial incentives in corporate acquisitions: 
the 1990s evidence", Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 
125-49. 
O'Sullivan, N. and Wong, P. (1999), "Board composition, ownership structure 
and hostile takeovers: some UK evidence", Accounting and Business 
Research, Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 139-55. 
Ohlson, J. A. (1980), "Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of 
bankruptcy", Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 109-31. 
Ooi, J. T. L., Ong, S. E. and Neo, P. H. (2011), "The wealth effects of property 
acquisitions: evidence from Japanese and Singaporean REITs", Real 
Estate Economics, Vol. 39 No. 3, pp. 487-500. 
Packer, F. and Riddiough, T. (2012), "Securitisation and the commercial property 
cycle", in Heath, A. (Ed.), Property Markets and Financial Stability. 
RBA, Sydney, pp. 143-90. 
Palepu, K. G. (1986), "Prediciting takeover targets", Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 3-35. 
Parker, D. (2011), Global real estate investment trusts: people, process and 
management, Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell. 
Pasiouras, F. and Gaganis, C. (2007), "Financial characteristics of banks involved 
in acquisitions: evidence from Asia", Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 
17 No. 4, pp. 329-41. 
PCA. (2010), "A-REITs on the road to recovery", available at: 
http://www.propertyoz.com.au/Article/NewsDetail.aspx?p=56&mid=1675 
(accessed 7th October 2014). 
 
 
307
Penrose, E. T. (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Blackwell, Oxford. 
Peterson, P. P. (1989), "Event studies: a review of issues and methodology", 
Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, Vol. 28 No. 3, pp. 36. 
Petmezas, D. (2009), "What drives acquisitions?: Market valuations and bidder 
performance", Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Vol. 19 
No. 1, pp. 54-74. 
PFA (2012), "PFA Investment Report", Property Funds Association, Melbourne. 
Pierzak, E. F. (2001), "Payment choice in REIT property acquisitions", Journal of 
Real Estate Research, Vol. 21 No. 1/2, pp. 105. 
Pike, R. and Neale, B. (2006), Corporate Finance and Investment, Pearson 
Education, Harlow. 
PIR (2013), "Australian Property Funds Industry Survey", Property Investment 
Research, Sydeny. 
Powell, R. G. (1997), "Modelling takeover likelihood", Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, Vol. 24 No. 7 & 8, pp. 1000 - 30. 
Powell, R. G. (2001), "Takeover prediction and portfolio performance: a note", 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 28 No. 7/8, pp. 993-
1011. 
Powell, R. G. (2004), "Takeover prediction models and portfolio strategies: a 
multinomial approach", Multinational Finance Journal, Vol. 8 No. 1/2, 
pp. 35-72. 
Ratcliffe, C. and Dimovski, B. (2007), "The responsiveness of LPT returns and 
their attributes", Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, Vol. 13 No. 3, 
pp. 280-97. 
Ratcliffe, C. and Dimovski, B. (2012a), "A-REIT bidder returns: an evaluation of 
public and private targets and method of payment", Pacific Rim Property 
Research Journal, Vol. 18 No. 4, pp. 355-69. 
 
 
308
Ratcliffe, C. and Dimovski, B. (2012b), "REIT mergers and acquisitions: a meta-
analysis", Journal of Property Investment and Finance, Vol. 30 No. 3, pp. 
241-53. 
Ratcliffe, C. and Dimovski, B. (2013), "An investigation into the drivers of 
Australian REIT merger and acquisition announcements", Journal of 
Property Investment and Finance, Vol. 31 No. 5, pp. 441-61. 
Ratcliffe, C. and Dimovski, B. (2014), "Market discounts and shareholder 
benefits: Evidence from Australian REIT private placements", Journal of 
Property Investment and Finance, Vol. 32 No. 6, pp. 570-88. 
Ratcliffe, C., Dimovski, B. and Keneley, M. (2009), "Consolidation within the 
Australian Real Estate Investment Trust sector: an evaluation of the 
impact on unitholder returns", Journal of Property Research, Vol. 26 No. 
4, pp. 283-307. 
RBA. (2014), "Australian Share Markets", available at: 
http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/ - share_mkts (accessed 12th Feb 
2014). 
Reddy, W. (2013), "Superannuation funds and property allocation strategies: what 
is the mix? - direct property, listed property of both?", Pacific Rim 
Property Research Journal, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 57-79. 
Rege, U. P. (1984), "Accounting ratios to locate take-over targets", Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 11 No. 3, pp. 301-11. 
Ritter, J. R. (1991), "The long-run performance of initial public offerings", 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 46 No. 1, pp. 3-27. 
Roll, R. (1986), "The hubris hypothesis of corporate control", Journal of 
Business, Vol. 59, pp. 197-216. 
Rose, B. (2011), "AREITs: Death of an asset class?", available at: 
http://www.morningstar.com.au/funds/article/areits-death/3219?q=printme 
(accessed 27th Aug 2014). 
 
 
309
Sah, V. and Seagraves, P. (2012), "IPO market timing: evidence from the 
operating performance of REITs", Journal of Property Investment and 
Finance, Vol. 30 No. 1, pp. 58-68. 
Sahin, O. F. (2005), "The performance of acquisitions in the Real Estate 
Investment Trust industry", Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol. 27 No. 
3, pp. 321-42. 
Savor, P. G. and Lu, Q. I. (2009), "Do stock mergers create value for acquirers?", 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 64 No. 3, pp. 1061-97. 
Scholes, M. and Williams, J. (1977), "Estimating betas from nonsynchronous 
data", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 309-27. 
Schwert, G. W. (1996), "Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions", Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 41 No. 2, pp. 153-62. 
Seth, A. (1990), "Sources of value creation in acquisitions: an empirical 
investigation", Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 11 No. 6, pp. 431-46. 
Shams, S. M., Gunasekarage, A. and Colombage, S. R. (2013), "Does the 
organisational form of the target influence market reaction to acquisition 
announcements? Australian evidence", Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 
Vol. 24 No. 0, pp. 89-108. 
Sharpe, W. F. (1964), "Capital asset prices: a theory of market equilibrium under 
conditions of risk", Journal of Finance, Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 425-42. 
Shekhar, C. and Torbey, V. (2005), "Takeovers, ownership, and shareholder 
wealth - the Australian evidence", Review of Accounting and Finance, 
Vol. 4 No. 3, pp. 101-20. 
Shivdasani, A. (1993), "Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile 
takeovers", Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 16 No. 1–3, pp. 
167-98. 
 
 
310
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1989), "Managerial entrenchment: the case of 
manager-specific investments", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 25 
No. 1, pp. 123-39. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1992), "Liquidation values and debt capacity: a 
market equilibrium approach", Journal of Finance, Vol. 47 No. 4, pp. 
1343-66. 
Shukla, A. and Gekara, M. G. (2010), "Effects of multinational mergers and 
acquisitions on shareholders' wealth and corporate performance", Journal 
of Accounting Research and Audit Practices, Vol. 9 No. 1/2, pp. 44-62. 
Simkowitz, M. and Monroe, R. (1971), "A discriminant function for 
conglomerate targets", Southern Journal of Business, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp. 1-
16. 
Singh, H. and Montgomery, C. A. (1987), "Corporate acquisitions strategies and 
economic performance", Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 
377-87. 
Smith Jr, C. W. and Watts, R. L. (1992), "The investment opportunity set and 
corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies", Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 32 No. 3, pp. 263-92. 
Smith, R. and Kim, J. (1994), "The combined effects of free cash flow and 
financial slack on bidder and target stock returns", Journal of Business, 
Vol. 67 No. 2, pp. 281-310. 
Song, M. H. and Walkling, R. A. (1993), "The impact of managerial ownership 
on acquisition attempts and target thareholder wealth", Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 439-57. 
Stevens, D. L. (1973), "Financial characteristics of merged firms: a multivariate 
analysis", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 8 No. 2, 
pp. 149-58. 
 
 
311
Stone, B. K. (1974), "Systematic interest-rate risk in a two-index model of 
returns", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 9 No. 5, pp. 
709-21. 
Sudarsanam, S., Holl, P. and Salami, A. (1996), "Shareholder wealth gains in 
mergers: Effects of synergy and ownership structure", Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, Vol. 23 No. 5/6, pp. 673-98. 
Sudarsanam, S. and Mahate, A. A. (2003), "Glamour acquirers, method of 
payment and post-acquisition performance: the UK evidence", Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 30 No. 1/2, pp. 299-341. 
Sugiarto, A. (2000), "The effect of mergers and acquisitions on shareholder 
returns", Doctor of Business Administration, Victoria University of 
Technology, Melbourne. 
Tan, Y. K. (2004), 'The effects of management structure on the performance of 
Listed Property Trusts', paper presented at the ERES Conference, Milan, 
Italy, 2 -5 June 2004. 
Taylor, L. W. and Paolone, A. (1997), "The effects of REIT mergers on REIT 
stock prices", Real Estate Review, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 34-43. 
Thangaraj, R. K. and Chan, T. K. (2012), "The effects of the global financial 
crisis on the Australian building construction supply chain", Australasian 
Journal of Construction Economics and Building, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 16-
30. 
Travlos, N. G. (1987), "Corporate takeover bids, method of payment, and bidding 
firms' stock returns", Journal of Finance, Vol. 42 No. 4, pp. 943-63. 
Trimbath, S., Frydman, H. and Frydman, R. (2001), "Cost inefficiency, size of 
firms and takeovers", Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 
Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 398. 
Tsagkanos, A., Georgopoulos, A. and Siriopoulos, C. (2006), "Predicting 
takeover targets: new evidence from a small open economy", 
 
 
312
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 
172-83. 
Walter, R. M. (1994), "The usefulness of current cost information for identifying 
takeover targets and earning above-average stock returns", Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 349-77. 
Walter, T. S. (1984), "Australian takeovers: capital market efficiency and 
shareholder risk and return", Australian Journal of Management, Vol. 9 
No. 1, pp. 63-95. 
Wansley, J., Lane, W. and Yang, H. (1983a), "Abnormal returns to acquired firms 
by type of acquisition and mehtod of payment", Financial Management, 
Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 16-22. 
Wansley, J., Roenfeldt, R. L. and Cooley, P. L. (1983b), "Abnormal returns from 
merger profiles", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 18 
No. 2, pp. 149-62. 
Weir, C. and Laing, D. (2003), "Ownership structure, board composition and the 
market for corporate control in the UK: an empirical analysis", Applied 
Economics, Vol. 35 No. 16, pp. 1747-59. 
Wheelock, D. C. and Wilson, P. W. (2004), "Consolidation in US banking: which 
banks engage in mergers?", Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 13 No. 
1–2, pp. 7-39. 
Williamson, O. E. (1964), The Econiomics of Discretionary Behaviour: 
Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm, Prentice-Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs. 
Wist, M. (2011), "Why the discount to net tangible asset in A-REITs should 
disappear", available at: http://www.propertyobserver.com.au/reits/why-
the-discount-to-net-tangible-asset-in-a-reits-should-disappear (accessed). 
 
 
313
Womack, K. (2012), "Real estate mergers: corporate control & shareholder 
wealth", The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 44 No. 
4, pp. 446-71. 
Young, P. J. and Elayan, F. A. (2002), "An investigation into the shareholder 
wealth effects of REIT acquisitions", Real Estate Finance, Vol. 19 No. 4, 
pp. 27-32. 
Zarebski, P. and Dimovski, B. (2012), "Determinants of capital structure of A-
REITs and the global financial crisis", Pacific Rim Property Research 
Journal, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 3-19. 
Zochling, H. and Phipson, M. (2011), 'REIT takeovers: an evaluation of barriers 
to activity', paper presented at the Pacific Rim Real Estate Society, Gold 
Coast, Queensland, January 16-19. 

